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1. Introduction 
1.1. What is the problem? 
1.1.1. Research questions 
In 2000, the international community agreed on a set of eight development goals, including foremost 
the halving of extreme poverty and commonly known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
to be achieved by 2015. In their efforts “to make the right to development a reality for everyone”, 
world leaders resolved “to create an environment – at the national and global levels alike – which is 
conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty” (United Nations 2000: 4). Fifteen years 
later, the target of reducing the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half has been global-
ly met, but inequalities within and among countries persist. In 2015, the international community thus 
re-affirmed their commitment by setting out a broadened set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals to 
be achieved over the next 15 years through a global partnership for “ending poverty in all its forms 
everywhere” (United Nations 2015: 14).  
Independent of their impact on poor people's lives, one of the most manifest outcomes of these con-
certed efforts over the last 15 years has been the rise of the international aid effectiveness agenda. 
While the Millennium Development Goals provided the official mandate for the global consensus on 
poverty reduction, developed and developing countries alike acknowledged that increasing the volume 
of international development aid1 is not enough. In a series of high-level meetings headed by the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), they, therefore, agreed on a new aid 
agenda aimed at making aid more effective and conducive to the final elimination of poverty in the 
21st century (OECD 1996). Signaling a clean break with the one-way decision-making model that 
characterized earlier development efforts, the contours of the international aid effectiveness agenda 
have been shaped by an understanding of aid as a partnership between national and international ac-
tors.  
Key to this new global partnership has been the promotion of mutual accountability between develop-
ing countries and their development partners. Developing countries are expected to account for their 
efforts to monitor national development strategies, and to strengthen linkage between national devel-
opment strategies and domestic budget processes, while development partners have to account for 
their efforts to harmonize their monitoring and reporting requirements, and to rely to the extent possi-
ble on developing countries’ own systems and processes to deliver aid (OECD 2005b).  
                                                     
1 Throughout the whole book the focus lies on foreign aid given for developmental reason leaving aside other 
non-developmental objectives. 
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Beyond making developing countries and development partners more accountable to each other, the 
new aid agenda also strives to make them more accountable to citizens in developing countries. An 
important milestone in this regard has been the World Bank’s Voices of the Poor study (2000), which 
pointed to widespread distrust expressed by poor people as to state institutions that are “either not 
accountable to anyone or accountable only to the rich and powerful” and suggested to make “the well-
being of those who are worse off the touchstone for policy and practice" (Narayan et al. 2000: 203, 
264). The challenge thereby consists of finding ways to empower poor people and enable them to take 
more control of their lives. Enhancing accountability towards citizens is understood not only as in-
strumental, that is, as leading to better service delivery for the people, but also as an essential dimen-
sion of poverty reduction in itself.  
In 1999, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced a new approach to 
their relations with low-income countries. The approach made the broad-based participation of the 
general public (and the poor in particular) in the preparation of a national Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) a requirement for access to debt relief and financial support from both institutions. Rep-
resenting the centerpiece of the new aid agenda towards which the international community has turned 
lately, the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) approach provided the operational framework — both for 
developing countries and for their development partners — for accelerating progress towards the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (World Bank and IMF 2005: 2). 
Drawing on previous research on the international aid effectiveness agenda (in particular, Eberlei 2005 
and Fraser and Whitfield 2009), this study postulates that the interesting thing about the promotion of 
mutual accountability in the contemporary aid architecture is that it adds an inherently political logic 
to the International Financial Institutions’ (IFIs) predominantly economic reform agenda. While their 
way of doing business traditionally followed a corporate logic, the new political logic propagates a 
three-fold shift from a narrow focus on borrowing governments and state elites to broad-based partici-
pation by the general public and the poor in particular (new partners), from donor-driven policy blue-
prints to policy dialogue around country-owned strategies (new principles), and from identifiable pro-
ject aid and sector activities to program-based aid in support of the general budget (new practices).  
On a more general level, this thesis contributes to the broader aid and democratization literature in 
arguing that not only the targets but also the modalities of development aid matter, and that the scope 
for domestic accountability these modalities allow bears significant consequences for the political 
institutions and practices in recipient countries.  
Since its introduction in 1999, more than 60 low-income countries have taken part in this global ac-
countability initiative by the IMF and World Bank. However, despite its broad dissemination across 
the developing world, broad comparative analyses of the PRS approach’s impact on democracy are 
still missing in the respective literature. By applying a clear accountability lens, this thesis thus asks  
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if and how the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach has changed the relations between donors and 
recipients of foreign aid as compared to earlier development efforts. Assuming that it has changed aid 
relationships, it raises the follow-up question, whether and under which conditions this new type of 
aid, as opposed to other types of IMF and World Bank support, has made any meaningful difference in 
terms of strengthening democracy in recipient countries. 
 
1.1.2. Research contributions 
This study focuses on accountability relations between national and international actors collaborating 
on common development issues. The general innovation of this thesis lies in its use of a clear account-
ability lens for analyzing the way international development aid is delivered at the recipient country 
level. Thus, development and democracy perspective are brought together, which had often been kept 
separate in scholarly debate and development practice.  
More specifically, by drawing on the long and distinguished history of the concept in democratic theo-
ry (for an excellent review, see Borowiak 2011) and the work of global governance scholars (in partic-
ular, Grant and Keohane 2005 and Rubenstein 2007), this research proposes to conceptualize aid mo-
dalities in developing countries as institutionalized accountability forums in order to better understand 
the causal mechanisms by which development aid affects democratic change in recipient countries. 
Within these forums, donors act as surrogates of weak citizens in holding their governments accounta-
ble.  
The main finding of the present study is that, beyond the new rhetoric of aid, the PRS approach has 
changed the relations between donors and recipients of multilateral aid since the IFIs have increased 
the scope for domestic accountability within their new aid modalities as compared to earlier develop-
ment efforts. Evidence from expert interviews shows that multilateral aid practices have changed in 
terms of strategy, mechanisms, and goals to build on and strengthen domestic accountability systems 
at the recipient country level. Moreover, empirical findings also show that beyond the PRS approach, 
the impact of development aid on democratic change varies with the way aid is delivered. In a statisti-
cal analysis of all types of IMF and World Bank support, general budget support under the PRS ap-
proach has the most substantial impact on democratization in recipient countries. While evidence from 
disaggregated data supports this general conclusion, it also finds that the impact of multilateral aid 
differs according to the strategic rationale of aid, the nature of the recipient regime, and the extent of 
donor coordination at the recipient country level.  
In sum, this research makes three contributions to the debate on the effectiveness of aid in general and 
the success of transparency and accountability initiatives in particular. 
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A first, theoretical-conceptual contribution of this research is that it provides a more comprehensive 
and democratic understanding of accountability than the simplistic and rather technocratic notion of 
mutual accountability that has shaped development thinking and practice. Against the normative prin-
ciple of accountability, that has been promoted in the international aid architecture; chapter 2 proposes 
to look at accountability as institutionalized forums or spaces of the actual confrontation between na-
tional and international actors interacting on common issues in the new global governance of aid. An 
understanding of accountability as a social concept makes it possible to explore how mutual accounta-
bility relations at the donor-recipient level interact with domestic accountability relations at the state-
society level in aid-receiving countries. At the same time, through defining donors as surrogates of 
citizens in their institutional accountability relations with recipient governments, this research recog-
nizes the primacy of domestic over mutual accountability demands and thus sees citizen participation 
in the current aid architecture from a more democratic perspective.  
A second, empirical-descriptive contribution of this research is the highlighting of an observed trend 
towards a more political and rights-based development approach both at the national and global level 
of aid policy. In particular, chapter 3 describes how (normative) mutual accountability standards at the 
donor-recipient level and (institutionalized) domestic accountability arrangements at the state-society 
level have both increasingly been linked to an international framework of human rights, democracy, 
and good governance. Through a desk review of relevant policy documents by bilateral and multilat-
eral donors, the present study finds substantial evidence for the hypothesis that over the past two dec-
ades a more “political spirit” has been introduced into the global aid regime.  
A final, empirical-analytical contribution of this research consists in demonstrating that not only the 
democratic targets of aid matter, but that also the modalities of aid delivery have a significant impact 
on democratization in recipient countries. While chapter 4 traces the shift in aid relations between 
donors and recipients of foreign aid as perceived by World Bank staff who have been engaged in these 
new aid modalities under the PRS approach, chapter 5 assesses the impact of general budget support 
under the PRS approach on democratization in recipient countries and compares it to more established 
modalities of IMF and World Bank support. Together, these two empirical analyses contribute to a 
more robust and general picture of the PRS approach than is found in literature so far.  
Before reviewing the existing literature, it is necessary to put the PRS approach into context. In the 
following, it will be shortly explained why this approach has been the IFIs’ most promising initiative 
in recent times.  
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1.1.3. Research context 
The IMF and World Bank presented their PRS approach as a series of process innovations based on 
the lessons learned from past experiences. In particular, the World Bank moved from a conception of 
development based on the primacy of economic growth towards poverty reduction as the focal point of 
all its development efforts. This shift in goals constitutes the legacy of World Bank President James 
Wolfensohn and his Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz, who together have been leading the internal 
“revolution” for a new comprehensive development framework (Wolfensohn 1998, 1999; Stiglitz 
1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2002). Under the presidency of Wolfensohn (1995-2005), the poorest segments 
of society became the object of the World Bank’s mission to free the world from poverty (Pender 
2001: 406).  
However, as I argue here, the novelty of the PRS approach lies – despite its name – not in targeting 
poverty reduction (a development objective that already has a long history), but in linking the global 
governance of aid systematically to citizen participation at the national level. In practice, the PRS ap-
proach probably has been the most innovative approach of recent times, since it simultaneously aims 
at transforming aid relationships at the global level (‘governance promise’) and accountability rela-
tionships at the national level (‘participation promise’).  
In the following, I will describe these two “promises” as they have been set on the international aid 
effectiveness agenda by President Wolfensohn.  
A first promise originates from the introduction of good governance into the global governance of aid. 
Addressing the deficits of past aid practices, World Bank President James Wolfensohn outlined the 
essentials of good governance at the donor-recipient level. First and foremost, as he pictured it, recipi-
ent countries “must be in the driving seat” defining the content of their own development strategy. 
That is, the IFIs (and the donor community at large) should always be mindful “that it is up to the gov-
ernment and its people to decide what their priorities should be”, since development cannot and should 
not be imposed “by fiat from above – or from abroad” (Wolfensohn 1998: 8). At the same time, do-
nors “must learn to co-operate with each other”, and become “better team players capable of letting 
go” (Wolfensohn 1998: 10). So far, as Wolfensohn self-critically notes, there has been “much too little 
coordination of effort, much too much suspicion between participants and in many cases a simple ab-
sence of a framework to coordinate and bring together under government guidance an agreed set of 
objectives and effective and accountable programs” (Wolfensohn 1999: 21). Only if donors and recip-
ients of foreign aid adopt such good practice, they will succeed in building a partnership that would 
allow addressing the “global challenge of equitable, sustainable development and poverty alleviation” 
(Wolfensohn 1999: 31).  
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In sum, through defining principles of good operational practice, the PRS approach has introduced the 
idea that governance reforms in recipient countries must be matched by similar reforms of the way aid 
is delivered (Faust and Messner 2007: 1; Santiso 2001b: 18). Central to the new governance of aid is 
that it would move “beyond projects” and think instead of a global partnership required for sustainable 
development in its broadest sense (Wolfenstein 1998: 7). From a development perspective, the PRS 
approach thus promises to transform the relationship between donors and recipients of foreign aid.  
A second promise stems from the introduction of citizen participation in policy-based lending by in-
ternational financial institutions. When World Bank President James Wolfensohn outlined the basic 
parameters of the Bank’s new approach to development, he proposed that it must be a holistic one. 
Crucially, such a holistic approach to development should “be a participatory process, as transparent 
and as accountable as possible within the political climate prevailing in each country” (Wolfensohn 
1999: 30). National policy agendas should be “set by a process of public debate and consensus build-
ing led by the government with all sections of society” (Wolfensohn 1999: 10). While particular atten-
tion should be given to strengthening the voices of the poor and other marginalized groups in the pro-
cess, Wolfensohn draws attention to the fact that the new approach should not become a blueprint, but 
provide enough flexibility to be tailored to specific country contexts (Wolfensohn 1999: 8). Even in 
places where civil society has not much voice, there is a growing recognition among donors that 
“[e]ffective development must address these social concerns”, because “it is crucial to the long-term 
peace and stability of any country” (Wolfensohn 1999: 12, 26). Therefore, citizen participation should 
rank high on the agenda, particularly of those donors working with governments on social programs 
and providing support to national budgets (Wolfensohn 1999: 12).  
In sum, by involving civil society in public policy-making, the PRS approach goes beyond donors’ 
traditional development approach, which has been obsessed with “the local” as opposed to wider 
structures of power in the national political arena (Hickey and Mohan 2005: 241). Central to the new 
type of citizen participation is the idea that it would introduce a process through which citizens are 
empowered to take charge of their own destinies (Wolfensohn 1998: 2). From a democracy perspec-
tive, the PRS approach thus holds great promise in transforming relationships between political actors 
in aid-receiving countries.  
 
 
  
17 
1.2. What has previous research shown? 
In line with these two promises, previous research on the PRS approach may be split into a governance 
strand that examines whether the development potential of the PRS approach has transformed aid rela-
tionships at the donor-recipient level, and a participation strand that investigates whether the demo-
cratic potential inherent to the PRS approach has mitigated the democratic deficits at the state-society 
level in recipient countries. At the risk of some simplification, both strands may be further split be-
tween those reviews that take an optimistic or a critical position when assessing the PRS approach’s 
potential in terms of its actual changes from a development or a democracy perspective. Combining 
empirical assessment with theoretical outlook, four positions within the PRS literature can be identi-
fied.  
 
1.3.1. Governance optimists 
Along with official statements, the optimistic position within the development debate holds that the 
PRS approach operates as a “catalyst for change” (Stiglitz 1998b: 3). The new approach is seen as a 
major departure from previous donor-driven approaches to development. At the same time, the inher-
ent difficulties of transforming the global governance of aid are often acknowledged.  
Internal evaluations by the IMF (IEO 2004) and the World Bank (OED 2004) display an optimistic 
view of their “new way of doing business in low-income countries” that “has generally helped make 
progress in the right direction” (IEO 2004: 5; OED 2004: 4). According to their evaluation offices, the 
PRS approach “has the potential to encourage the development of a country-owned and credible long-
term strategy for growth and poverty reduction” (IEO 2004: 3). At the same time, the PRS approach 
remains work in progress, as it has not yet realized its full potential in terms of transforming aid rela-
tionships and achieving pro-poor development results (IEO 2004: 6; OED 2004: 45). Whether the new 
approach will achieve these goals, is considered to depend on its successful implementation (OED 
2004: 6). In this regard, the IFIs note that the initial conditions from which the PRS process started in 
most low-income countries have not been conducive to generating quick results. Moreover, they also 
acknowledge shortcomings in the initial design of the PRS initiative, related to their own role and 
management procedures (IEO 2004: 3; OED 2004: 47).  
These findings by the evaluation offices of the Bank and the Fund have generally been shared by a 
wide range of sympathetic insiders, who portray the PRS approach as “unfinished business” and ad-
dress the opportunities and challenges for closing the “implementation gap” and “putting the new par-
adigm to work” (see, e.g., Booth and Lucas 2002; Driscoll et al. 2005; GTZ 2005; Holvoet and Renard 
2005; Marcus and Wilkinson 2002). According to these insiders, weak institutional and human capaci-
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ties in recipient countries often are the main reason for development efforts falling short of their poten-
tial. As mainly seen in Africa, the immense capacity constraints of recipient countries to plan and im-
plement national development strategies in a sustained way are further exacerbated by a slow change 
in donor attitudes and practices (Cheru 2006: 370, 373; GTZ 2005: 62; Ikhide and Obadan 2011: 1).  
To promote PRS sustainability, a first recommendation for donors has been to encourage recipient 
countries’ own prioritizing of capacity needs and then jointly support these country-specific priorities 
(GTZ 2005: 20; Ikhide and Obadan 2011: 23). As a result, country ownership of the PRS approach 
should significantly increase. To reduce PRS complexity, another pivotal recommendation for donors 
has been to increase their efforts at “[s]treamlining conditionality and making donor funding more 
predictable” (Cheru 2006: 371). Better donor coordination is said to be essential for building global 
partnerships in support of nationally defined policy agendas.  
In general, insiders of the aid business still see a long way to go by the international community for 
transforming aid relationships in a sustainable way (Marcus and Wilkinson 2002). Still, they are con-
fident and forward-looking in searching for new tools and good practices to achieve better results in 
future iterations of the PRS process (see Booth and Lucas 2002; Driscoll et al. 2005; Ikhide and Oba-
dan 2011).  
 
1.3.2. Governance critics 
The critical position within the development debate contends that the PRS approach represents a radi-
cal break with past aid practices. Instead, it should be seen as a hegemonic approach driven in no small 
way by the international financial institutions to cement “the external legacy” (World Bank and IMF 
2005: 43) in the global governance of aid.  
The IMF and World Bank claim that the PRS approach has introduced a fundamental change in the 
nature of the relationship between developing countries and donors (World Bank and IMF 2005: 1). 
However, critics from outside the inner circles of policy-making dispute this demise, arguing that the 
PRS approach does not represent a “qualitative” departure from previous adjustment programs, but 
may be better seen as “the latest installment in the ever-changing fashionable semantics of the devel-
opment community” (Imboela 2005: 435). The new “fashion” shows itself in that recipient govern-
ments are telling donors what they want to hear, instead of donors telling them what to do (Sumner 
2006: 1407). From a critical outsider’s perspective thus, “today’s generation of development blue-
prints under the rubric of poverty reduction” are perceived as “a re-branding of old-style practices and 
policies” – wrapped up in principles of local ownership and global partnership (Abrahamsen 2004a: 
1456; Fine 2001: 15; Cornwall and Brock 2005: 1052, 1055).  
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From a development perspective, the crucial question is whether these principles have found their 
“way into the real business” or whether they are “mere rhetoric” (Eberlei 2007: 8). Critics within the 
development debate may be grouped around the two principles of ownership and partnership as the 
central axes of the disputes of the period. While the former deny that power has been transferred to 
poor individuals and countries (‘no change’), the latter argue that aid practices have been transformed 
by the use of softer and less visible forms of power (‘subtle change’).  
Critics of the ownership principle claim that the PRS approach has neither empowered poor people nor 
has it disempowered the IFIs (e.g., Dijkstra 2005; Fraser and Whitfield 2009; Imboela 2005; Stewart 
and Wang 2003; Whitfield 2009; Whitfield and Fraser 2009; Seshamani 2005; Zack-Williams and 
Mohan 2005). Understanding ownership as the degree of control recipient governments can secure 
over “the contents of the strategies” and the “implemented policy outcomes” (Dijkstra 2005: 451; 
Whitfield and Fraser 2009: 4), they assert that policy conditionality is “still alive” and “kicking” at the 
negotiation stage of loan conditions regarding multi-donor budget support operations (Fraser and 
Whitfield 2009: 85). These critics note that especially the IFIs’ practice “business as usual” (Dijkstra 
2005: 459). The stark similarity in the PRS content worldwide suggests that the macroeconomic 
framework remains non-negotiable (Imboela 2005: 437, Fine 2001: 6; Stewart and Wang 2003: 19), 
limiting the debate to government spending on social sectors (Dijkstra 2005: 452). Moreover, the IMF 
and the World Bank have created many opportunities in the wake of the PRS process to push for their 
preferred policy options. Critics of the new ownership philosophy blame the PRS approach to elicit 
“illusions” of improved aid effectiveness (Dijkstra 2005), whereas in reality, as they contend, only 
cosmetic changes have been made to the contemporary aid architecture (Seshamani 2005: 9; Dijkstra 
2005: 452; Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 87).2  
In sum, ownership critics find no evidence that the PRS approach has transformed aid relationships 
and reduced the inequalities between donors and recipients of foreign aid (Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 
89, Stewart and Wang 2003: 1). According to them, the IFIs continue to dictate policy directions in 
developing countries despite the PRS approach’s focus on greater local ownership (Bendaña 2001, 
cited by Fraser 2005: 318; see also Zack-Williams and Mohan 2005).  
The second group of critics within the governance strand argues that the IFIs continue to govern but 
by less “coercive” and more “subtle” means (e.g., Abrahamsen 2004a, 2004b; Cornwall and Brock 
2005; Craig and Porter 2003, 2006; Harrison 2001; Mercer 2003). Understanding partnership as “a 
form of advanced liberal rule” (Abrahamsen 2004a: 1453), these critics claim that the PRS approach 
should not be analyzed in terms of its potential to change the power imbalance between donors and 
recipients of foreign aid, but in terms of its impact on transforming the aid industry’s way of doing 
business. In particular, the IFIs are said to increasingly rely on “the explicit commitment to the self-
                                                     
2 For comprehensive critiques, see Whitfield 2009 on African experiences; and Dijkstra 2005 on Latin American 
experiences. 
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government and agency of recipient states” for “influencing a country’s development choices more 
effectively” (Abrahamsen 2004a: 1453, 1059; Mercer 2003: 743). Harrison (2001) has coined the term 
“post-conditionality regimes” to describe the intimate working relations between IFIs and government 
technocrats at the center of policy-making in many aid-dependent African states. A central feature of 
the post-conditionality regime is that IFIs do not just impose conditionalities, but employ the dis-
bursement of funds to introduce “new methodologies of policy design based on corporate plans, sur-
veys, and closer budgeting and monitoring techniques” (Harrison 2001: 671). These new methods are 
held together by a distinct vocabulary, which carries “the allure of optimism and purpose”, but also 
“circumscribes the legitimate terrains of agency” for development actors (Cornwall and Brock 2005: 
1044, 1052). Conditionality thus continues, albeit under a different name (Abrahamsen 2004a: 1453, 
2004b: 184; Mercer 2003: 743).  
In a nutshell, partnership critics agree that is it not the new policies, but a new vocabulary and new 
methodologies that are the defining features of the PRS approach. From their perspective, the PRS 
approach has indeed transformed aid relationships in terms of introducing a new global partnership, 
but it has done so without questioning the intellectual roots and the assumed consensus of the new 
comprehensive development framework (Craig and Porter 2003: 54).  
 
1.3.3. Participation optimists 
Unlike the governance strand that has considered the PRS approach’s development potential within 
the global governance of aid, the participation strand has focused on the PRS approach’s democratic 
potential related to citizen participation in national decision-making processes.  
The optimistic school of thought sees the PRS approach as a potentially transformative approach for 
“deepening democracy” (Gaventa 2006) at the recipient country level. Involving civil society in the 
preparation and monitoring of national poverty reduction strategies is perceived to have the potential 
for mitigating the existing democratic deficits in recipient countries.  
Participation optimists draw hope from two expectations linked to the introduction of the participatory 
method at the national level. First, they hope that involving the poor in the preparation and monitoring 
of poverty reduction strategies might help to define a better development strategy “more in tune with 
local conditions and needs” (Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaut 2002: 6). Second, they also strongly 
believe in participation “as a high democratic value in itself” (Rombouts 2006: 29). Participation op-
timists understand civil society participation “as an exercise in political freedom, and thus an onset, 
however timid, of democratic practices” (Molenaers and Renard 2006: 8).  
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Given these high expectations, it comes as no surprise that the PRS process yielded a vivid debate 
among participants from (international) civil society. This debate was primarily informed by case stud-
ies (or syntheses thereof) “that focus on process qua process asking whether participatory planning 
techniques are being implemented according to their true principles” (Fraser 2005: 318). In general, 
civil society organizations welcome the PRS approach as an important “step forward” over past aid 
practices but also report many drawbacks concerning the nature of the participatory process (Oxfam 
2004: 1; Whaites 2000: 27).  
On the positive side, civil society organizations generally agree that the participatory process has 
opened up new spaces for domestic policy dialogue, in which civil society played a far more active 
role than ever before. Moreover, some organizations have also been capable of taking advantage of the 
participation opportunities introduced by the PRS process and formed new networks, umbrella organi-
zations, and strategic alliances to advance their agendas. Last but not least, in a handful of conflict-
affected and fragile countries like Mozambique, Rwanda or Sierra Leone, the PRS process is said to 
have contributed to broader processes of social cohesion and national reconciliation (e.g., Curran 
2005; Thornton and Cox 2005; Oxfam 2004; UNDP 2003; World Bank 2005c).  
On the negative side, non-governmental development organizations, in particular, expressed their con-
cerns about a “participation deficit” among key sections of civil society and the government in the 
PRS process, whereas those who participated lacked democratic legitimation to determine binding 
government decisions. Moreover, participation in PRS processes is said to have been limited to con-
sultation rather than joint decision-making on relevant aspects of pro-poor policy-making, leading to 
frustrations among participants. Finally, the participatory process has been criticized as an on-stage 
“theater” routinely performed by recipient governments to satisfy donors’ new aid policy, while at the 
same time the crucial decisions are made backstage between “unaccountable technocrats on both 
sides” (e.g., CIDSE-Caritas 2004; Eberlei 2001; Oxfam 2004; McGee et al. 2002; Richmond and Ladd 
2001; Rocha Menocal and Rogerson 2006).  
Academic observers of the PRS process have generally confirmed this balance sheet by societal partic-
ipants (e.g., Biekart 2009; Booth 2003a, 2003b; Lister and Nyamugasira 2003; Molenaers and Renard 
2003, 2006). The new type of “participation conditionality”, i.e., the donor requirement that recipient 
governments involve civil society in public policy formulation and monitoring, is regarded by many as 
the most “revolutionary” element of the PRS approach (Molenaers and Renard 2003: 133, 2006: 28; 
Morrison and Singer 2007: 722).3 However, they emphasize that reality is more complicated than por-
trayed in official documentation by the IMF and World Bank. Echoing the findings of internal reviews 
(World Bank and IMF 2002, 2005), academic observers of the PRS process acknowledge its trans-
                                                     
3 This new donor requirement has also been called “process conditionality” (Booth 2003b: 136) or “social condi-
tionality” (Whaites 2000: 5).  
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formative potential, but criticize its uniform application across the developing world (Molenaers and 
Renard 2006: 15; Doe 2012: 47; Piron and Evans 2004: 19; Rombouts 2006: 4).  
While showing general sympathy for the participatory approach, participation optimists ask the IFIs to 
consider that state-society relations are barely institutionalized in so-called neo-patrimonial regimes.4 
In particular, they contend that civil society’s new role as “watchdog of government” under the PRS 
approach barely meets the realities in most African countries, where “domestic politics tend to be pat-
ronage-based, with fragmented party systems and weak civil societies” (Booth 2003b: 137; see also 
Lister and Nyamugasira 2003: 103; Molenaers and Renard 2006: 22). State elites in neo-patrimonial 
regimes that combine elements of patrimonial and legal-rationale rule deploy a broad range of “tac-
tics” to control and manipulate the participatory process, thereby effectively blocking off any govern-
mental or non-governmental watchdog, whose participation they perceive as threatening to their own, 
narrowly defined interests. By taking the neo-patrimonial context into account, constructive critics 
from academia thus claim that civil society participation serves governments as a “legitimizing gim-
mick” (Molenaers and Renard 2006: 22) rather than providing means for strengthening the democratic 
process in recipient countries.  
As a result, recommendations for donors are either to get serious about it by “setting out minimum 
criteria [that] could partially avoid negative effects of participation processes” (Rombouts 2006: 39) or 
to drop the participation conditionality in its present form by replacing it with “country-specific and 
realistic targets, based on solid political and social analysis” (Molenaers and Renard 2003: 135; 2006: 
23).  
In general, academic observers point to an overtly voluntaristic tendency among governmental and 
non-governmental donors rallying behind the PRS approach “in considering any form of participation 
as an improvement over past practices” (Molenaers and Renard 2006: 8, citing Hickey and Mohan 
2005: 238). Since aid practitioners have invested a lot of resources and prestige, their reviews seem all 
“to be based on the tacit assumption that the ‘PRSP approach’ must be saved” (Dijkstra 2005: 462).  
 
1.3.4. Participation critics 
The critical position within the democracy debate does not believe that the PRS approach has the po-
tential for political transformation and the strengthening of democracy. Instead, they see the PRS ap-
proach as a depoliticized mode of decision-making that has “undermined democracy” (Brown 2004) in 
recipient states either from the outside or from the inside.  
                                                     
4 For an introduction to the concept of neo-patrimonialism, see Médard (2014). Jordan and van Tuijl (2006: 5-8) 
have reviewed the most commonly used government tactics to compromise, disturb or stop civil society activi-
ties in neo-patrimonial regimes, while Molenaers and Renards (2006: 22) give specific examples from the PRS 
process. 
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Participation skeptics distinguish themselves from the optimists by trying to move beyond “bench-
marking” the political institutions of recipients. Rather, they try to explain the underlying political 
dynamics in which state-society interactions are embedded. In their view, it is not the “quality of insti-
tutions per se that is important but rather the types of conflict that are institutionalized within various 
modes of participation” (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007: 781).  
From a democracy perspective, the debate on the PRS approach circles around the question of who is 
to participate, on what terms and for what purpose (Jayasuriya 2003: 7; Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007: 
781). The fault line that runs through this literature strand is whether the mode of participation implied 
by the PRS approach has strengthened or undermined democracy in recipient countries (Brown 2004). 
Participation skeptics challenge the assumption that PRS processes reinforce democracy and offer 
opportunities for broadening the public debate over economic and social policies. According to them, 
they rather undermine domestic systems of political accountability and limit the ability of the delibera-
tive process for adding legitimacy to its conclusion (Morrison and Singer 2007: 725, 727; Piron and 
Evans 2004: 19; Siebold 2005: 6).  
Two groups of participation critics can be distinguished: A first group believes that the externally in-
duced depoliticized management of public governance in recipient states operates to discipline demo-
cratic regimes from the outside. By contrast, the second group of participation critics points out that 
state-sponsored participation by civil society works to stabilize authoritarian rule from the inside. Im-
portantly, the focus of both groups does not lie on democratic institutions and procedural norms, but 
on democratic politics and substantive rights that embed state-society relations in broader societal 
(‘internal’) and global (‘external’) contexts.5  
Focusing on the external embeddedness of democracy, the first group challenges the original idea of 
the PRS approach that only the participation by all “players in the development field” will make the 
world a “better and fairer” place to be (Wolfensohn 1999: 21-22, 31). They do not perceive the PRS 
approach as “representing the convergence of all interests” (Gould and Ojanen 2003: 7), but as repre-
senting the “convergence of neo-liberal and populist tendencies” (Gould 2005: 147). They claim that 
the PRS approach is not a happy affair of social learning and stakeholder dialogue (Fraser 2005: 322), 
but rather should be seen as “hallmark” of an emerging trend of “populist neo-liberalism” (Gould 
2005: 7; Jayasuriya 2003: 15).  
According to them, the populist elements can be seen in donors’ definition of poverty reduction as the 
over-riding normative framework for all development efforts by the international community; and in 
their parallel efforts to include organizations of civil society broadly representing the interests of so-
ciety as a whole or of the poor in particular in “reform coalitions” supporting this policy consensus 
                                                     
5 For a general conceptualization of political regime embeddedness, see Merkel (2004), whereas Luckham et al. 
(2001) provide a conceptual analysis of democracy and its relevance to the problems of broadening societal 
participation in the international development context. 
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(Fraser 2005: 317; Gould 2005: 7). In practice, this has meant that the PRS process has been dominat-
ed or captured by a small, homogenous “iron triangle” consisting of poverty specialists “in key gov-
ernment ministries and donor agencies” as well as selected non-governmental organizations in the 
capital area, all of whom collaborate so that they can realize their priorities through the PRS process 
(Fraser 2005: 319; Gould 2005: 7; Gould and Ojanen 2003: 7). The crucial point thereby is that the 
emphasis on transnational coalitions for fighting poverty and on depoliticized modes of participation 
by the poor “goes hand in hand […] with a program of market-oriented policy reform” (Jayasuriya 
2003: 19). Opposed to official statements, civil society participation in the PRS process is thus not 
seen as empowering poor people, but as “a means of empowering ‘reform coalitions’ to defend ad-
justment against the reassertion of popular demands” (Fraser 2005: 333).  
In sum, this first group of participation critics perceives the PRS approach as a strategy of outside 
control. From their point of view, the PRS initiative is a “political project” of “a narrow corps of de-
velopment professionals” for developing a global “surveillance architecture capable of disciplining 
democracy” (Fraser 2005: 336; Gould and Ojanen 2003: 9).  
Focusing on the internal embeddedness of democracy, a second group of participation critics challeng-
es the assertion of participation optimists who claim that, despite many drawbacks, the PRS approach 
plays a positive, incremental role – particularly in the case of neo-patrimonial regimes, where civil 
society participation in the PRS process could, in time, contribute to the democratization of decision-
making (Molenaers and Renard 2006: 8, Cling et al. 2002: 9). By contrast, these critics contend that 
civil society participation in policy design and implementation should not be seen as an onset of dem-
ocratic practices, but as an experiment with controlled forms of political participation and deliberation 
by governing state elites. Moreover, the combination of more participation with less contestation is 
said not to be unique to the PRS process, but common to many “developing contexts” (see He and 
Warren 2011 as well as Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007 for theoretical underpinnings of this view).  
Two general characteristics may be identified that operate in tandem to facilitate – as these participa-
tion critics call it – the logic of “extra-parliamentary politics” (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007: 778), or 
respectively, “authoritarian deliberation” (He and Warren 2011: 269). On the one hand, new forms of 
governance-level participation are introduced, which “foster a technocratic conception of politics”, 
aimed at effective policy-making and framed as joint problem-solving (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007: 
784). Accordingly, PRS processes have been criticized from the beginning as “a highly manipulated 
form” of state-sponsored participation aimed at smooth policy implementation at the local level. Such 
“participation by invitation” is said to be “almost by definition political cooption”, since broadened 
participation within these spaces is not perceived as a political right of citizens, but as a means for 
solving the problems of the poor (Brown 2004: 241; Hatcher 2009: 137; Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007: 
783). On the other hand, established forms of regime-level participation are filtered out of politics, 
leaving no room for addressing unequal power relations within society as well as undermining inde-
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pendent oversight and the separation of powers within states (He and Warren 2011: 275; Jayasuriya 
and Rodan 2007: 784). Correspondingly, PRS processes have been repeatedly criticized for systemati-
cally bypassing representative bodies of broader societal concerns and the endogenous political pro-
cess. With their focus on public consensus and technocratic “management of dissent”, PRS processes 
have evolved in the realm of “policies” and not in the domain of “politics” where the “real battle” over 
state control and its revenue allocation is fought (amongst others, see Hatcher 2009: 139; Lazarus 
2008: 1209; Morrison and Singer 2007: 735; Stewart and Wang 2004: 469-470). In new democracies, 
the situation is perceived to be even worse, where the fragile consensus on political institutions is said 
– as a reversion of the argument by participation optimist – to translate into short-time horizons for 
policy-makers who might resort to neo-patrimonial means (Faust 2010: 517).  
In sum, this second group of participation critics looks at the PRS approach in terms of a strategy of 
inside control. From their point of view, the PRS experiment is a “strategy” of authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian regimes for channeling popular “obstruction and protest” into “functionally-specified, 
controlled arenas of governance-level participation”, “while seeking to avoid regime-level democrati-
zation” (He and Warren 2011: 275).  
 
 
1.3. Where are the blind spots? 
1.3.1. Three dividing lines 
After more than a decade of practical experience with the PRS approach, it would seem reasonable to 
expect some general conclusions about its success. Instead, this review recognized three fundamental 
dividing lines within the existing literature, related to the new partners, the new principles, and the 
new practices under the PRS approach.  
First, concerning the new partners, I could identify an economic-political divide that exists between 
those studies that focus either on development partners and those studies that zoom in on democratic 
stakeholders as the relevant actors under the new approach. This dividing line does not only relate to 
the particular goals that these new partners in aid may follow, like poverty reduction as opposed to 
democracy promotion, but can also be said to cut across the literature in general. Accordingly, the 
review of the PRS literature above has made a difference between those studies that focus on its trans-
formative potential either from a developmental (‘the governance strand’) or a democratic point of 
view (‘the participation strand’).  
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Second, within these two streams of scholarship, I recognized a global-local divide that distinguishes 
previous research with regard to general principles that figure both as main references of academic 
research and as central axes of scholarly dispute. With slight variation, both literature strands display 
this divide. In particular, the governance strand analyzes donor-recipient relations in terms of the new 
principles guiding international development cooperation (‘local ownership’ versus ‘global partner-
ship’), while the participation strand analyzes state-society relations according to their embeddedness 
into broader societal and global contexts (‘internal embeddedness’ versus ‘external embeddedness’).  
The final disjuncture I could discern consists of an insider-outsider divide separating aid practitioners 
and sympathetic insiders (being partially or wholly funded by the aid industry and/or actively involved 
in PRS processes) from critical outsiders and academic observers (being more autonomous in their 
funding source and/or fulfilling the passive role of an observer). This dividing line roughly coincides 
with their positive or negative appraisal of the PRS approach. Although the boundaries between insid-
ers and outsiders are not clear-cut, insiders generally tend to be more optimistic as opposed to outsid-
ers who are more pessimistic with regard to the transformative potential of the PRS approach, both in 
terms of transforming aid relationships (‘external catalyst’ versus ‘external legacy’) as of political 
relationships in recipient countries (‘deepening democracy’ versus ‘undermining democracy’).  
In sum, the review of the PRS literature has shown that there is no single consensus about the devel-
opmental and democratic contributions of the new approach. Instead, there is widespread disagreement 
on what the goals of these new partnerships are, how aid relationships should operate in principle, and 
whether the new aid modalities have put the new goals and principles into practice.  
The lack of common grounds in previous research may be explained in terms of three research gaps 
that have been found within the existing literature.  
 
1.3.2. Theoretical gap 
Even though the need for political analyses has been mentioned quite often (Eberlei 2007: 19), it is 
generally agreed that “[m]ore work needs to be done to understand and develop the links between 
democracy building and the wider aid effectiveness agenda” (Horner and Power 2009: 19). Previous 
research on the PRS approach has been preoccupied with either identifying whether or not the new 
global governance of aid has actually changed the inherent power imbalance between donors and re-
cipients of foreign aid (see review of governance strand) or with explaining the political dynamics 
behind the new form of stakeholder participation under the PRS approach (see review of participation 
strand). So far, little efforts have been made to bring these two analytical perspectives together, for 
example, by specifying the causal mechanisms linking development aid with democratic change in 
recipient countries.  
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Two likely reasons for the overall lack of strategic interaction between the development and democra-
cy perspectives are an abundance of positive-sounding buzzwords for describing the operational basis 
of the aid relationships and the absence of a more nuanced theory for explaining the causal mecha-
nisms between aid and democracy. For example, critics noted that donor strategies build on simplistic 
notions of ownership (Whitfield and Fraser 2009) and partnership (Abrahamsen 2004a) within the 
governance strand, while the participation strand may be criticized for limiting itself to theoretical 
benchmarking of political regimes (He and Warren 2011) and political participation (Jayasuriya 2003). 
As a result, previous research has been framed in terms of vaguely defined development principles or 
has dwelled into extensive typologies of democratic practices, but no efforts have been made to inte-
grate development and democracy perspectives.  
 
1.3.3. Empirical gap 
An additional research gap concerns the goal dimensions of the PRS approach and their empirical 
assessment. Most empirical analyses are guided by a focus on the development goals of the interna-
tional aid effectiveness agenda. By contrast, the democratic goals of the new aid agenda are rarely 
examined. Given that the democratic potential is indeed acknowledged in the PRS literature (see, e.g., 
Faust, Leiderer and Schmitt 2012; Molenaers and Renard 2006), it comes as a surprise that academic 
work has not yet tried to assess the democratic outcomes of the PRS approach empirically.   
At first sight, the lack of research in this area may just be explained by the all-encompassing consen-
sus on poverty reduction as the declared main goal of the international aid effectiveness agenda – and 
indeed many scholars justify their focus on welfare-orientated outcomes with this new normative 
framework of international development efforts. However, a closer look reveals that both the govern-
ance strand and the participation strand miss the opportunity to shed light on democracy-related out-
comes – but for different reasons. While the former strand generally perceives the global governance 
of aid “as technical in nature and beyond the arena of political debate” (Horner and Power 2009: 28), 
the latter predominantly understands citizen participation in an instrumental sense as means to increas-
ing the pro-poor impact of foreign aid (in line with the official development agenda). Both strands thus 
mostly ignore the question whether this new type of macro-level participation has also provided an 
opportunity for enhancing democratic outcomes (what I would call the hidden democratic agenda), 
which is the topic of this research. 
 
1.3.4. Methodological gap 
Closely related to the missing assessment of the political goal dimension in the PRS literature, a third 
research gap concerns the country coverage and methods used by previous assessments of the new 
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approach to aid. The burgeoning literature on the PRS approach has tended to use qualitative methods 
based on individual case studies (or syntheses thereof), whereas the use of cross-national data and 
quantitative methods have been scarce. As a result, it remains difficult to draw any general conclu-
sions.  
The literature itself gives two principal reasons, which may explain this noticeable research gap: First, 
within the participation strand, the claim that it is too early for an assessment of the material changes 
brought by the PRS approach appears time and again (Booth 2003b: 157; Cling et al. 2002: 3; Piron 
and Evans 2004: 19). Accordingly, most studies of the PRS process focus on its embeddedness in par-
ticular political contexts but do not evaluate its impact on longer-term political development (Piron 
and Evans 2004: 1). Within the governance strand, a second, more fundamental objection to cross-
country analyses stems from the context-sensitivity of the PRS approach (Driscoll and Evans 2005: 
16; GTZ 2005: 15). As argued by the IFIs themselves, the new ownership philosophy implies that the 
PRS approach is tailored to individual country’s circumstances and does not follow a blueprint that 
could be assessed by using uniform benchmarks (World Bank and IMF 2005: 3-4). While this may 
true for the recipient side of national poverty reduction strategies (triggering an abundance of country 
case studies on the subject), this research claims that the same cannot be said when looking at the do-
nor side of general budget support, whose political impact may well be comparable across space and 
over time. Moreover, first econometric analyses of the broader impact on poverty reduction have al-
ready appeared after 5, 10 and 15 years’ experience with the PRS approach (see Eggen and Bezemer 
2008; Marshall and Walters 2011; and Elkins et al. 2018).6 There is thus no plausible reason why a 
similar assessment of its broader impact on democratization may not be feasible.  
 
 
1.4. Personal approach and structure of the thesis 
From the review of the PRS literature above, three research gaps on the PRS approach have been de-
tected. First, theoretical lenses to analyze the interaction of development actors across global and local 
levels have been missing. Second, empirical evidence on development outcomes has been accumulat-
ed at the expense of a more thorough evaluation of the democratic outcomes. Finally, comparative 
methods for analyzing the actual changes have been rare both from the inside and the outside of the 
aid business. The present study addresses all of these gaps.   
                                                     
6 As PRSPs formulate their policy implementations in years and not decades, these empirical studies also claim 
that they are evaluating the PRS approach on its own terms, “quite regardless of the reader's (or researcher's) 
own judgment of the time scale needed for policies to bear fruit, and to achieve and observe development pro-
gress” (Eggen and Bezemer 2008: 3). 
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1.4.1. Theoretical approach 
Since no ready-made theoretical framework to rely on exists to analyze the interaction of development 
actors under the PRS approach, a first general aim of this research is to contribute to theory-building 
concerning the causal mechanisms that link development aid with democratic change in recipient 
countries.  
The lack of strategic interaction between the development and democracy perspectives shows itself in 
the governance and participation strands’ different actor perspective. While the governance strand with 
its focus on “external partners” has rarely taken other actors than the government inside the nation-
state into account, the participation strand, in turn, has suffered from its preoccupation with “domestic 
stakeholder” and for its failure to think about influences outside the boundaries of the nation-state. 
Given that development actors at both levels, donor-recipient level, and state-citizen level, interact 
with each other under the PRS approach, it is surprising to see that, apart from a few studies on the 
role exercised by external actors in domestic systems (e.g., Gould 2005; Hickey and Mohan 2008), the 
causal mechanisms between donor support and recipient regime have received little attention so far.  
To overcome the limitations of the participation and governance strand within the PRS literature, 
which has shortcomings seen most clearly when reviewed in combination, this research endeavors to 
synthesize these two streams of scholarship employing an accountability framework that conceptual-
izes aid modalities as public – read political – forums where national and international actors interact. 
From a theoretical perspective, the central proposition made in this thesis is that the concept of ac-
countability enables to bring development and democracy perspective together, which have often been 
kept separate in the academic debate on the international aid effectiveness agenda.  
To the best of my knowledge, there are only three studies that examined relationships between devel-
opment actors under the PRS approach through an explicit accountability lens (Hickey and Mohan 
2008; Komives 2011; Winters 2010). There is no doubt that these studies represent a significant con-
ceptual advance within the PRS literature. Understanding accountability as a responsibility of devel-
opment actors to account for pro-poor performance, these studies provide a wealth of insights on ac-
countability relations between development actors under the new approach. From a political perspec-
tive, however, a common drawback is that none of these studies has also looked at the question of 
whether the accountability relations under the PRS approach have also strengthened democracy in 
recipient countries. 
This research adopts a different approach by placing the concept into the political framework from 
which it has arisen.7 Accordingly, it draws on the rich literature on public accountability – a concept 
that has a long and distinguished intellectual history in democratic theory – to analyze contemporary 
                                                     
7 I owe this image to Jordan and van Tuijl (2006: 4) who use it to motivate their research on the accountability of 
non-governmental organizations. 
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accountability relationships in international development aid. In most general terms, accountability in 
the present study is defined as a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an 
obligation to inform and explain his or her conduct in light of certain standards, the forum has the 
right  to pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face  consequences by the forum or 
some third party. This definition differs from mainstream understandings of accountability in the de-
velopment literature in that it does not merely define accountability as an actor’s responsibility for 
performance, but in line with much of the democracy literature also as an actor’s obligation to submit 
to external judgment by a forum that is not part of the actor being held accountable. Accountability in 
this research is thus essentially defined as a social concept, that is, as a relationship between an actor 
and a forum that has to proceed through three phases to become effective. First, accountability in the 
political arena is not a private, but a public affair. Its public character lies in the notion of a “forum” 
implying a public space, in which the actor must inform and explain his or her conduct. Second, ac-
countability between political actors is not a one-way reporting relationship, but a two-way dialogic 
relationship, as emphasized by the notion that the forum has the right to pose questions and pass 
judgment on the actor’s conduct. Third, accountability in political practice usually comes down to 
sanctions – or more neutrally – the consequence an actor may face who has violated his or her duties. 
However, since the forum does not always have the capacity to enforce accountability vis-à-vis more 
powerful actors, the definition of accountability used throughout this thesis also includes the possibil-
ity that some third party may impose sanctions on the actor by acting as a surrogate of the forum, that 
is, substituting for the forum’s lack of sanctioning capacity. Building on more recent work by account-
ability scholars (in particular, Bovens 2007 and Philp 2009), this research claims that the institutional 
arrangement must be kept separate from the set of standards that determine what conduct is expected 
by the accountable actor (‘obligations’) and the criteria by which the forum might validly judge it 
(‘rights’). Accountability as a concept should not be confused with any normative principle that lends 
legitimacy to the operative standards (e.g., the authority of the parties to the relationship) or any nor-
mative result a specific accountability relationship is thought of to bring about (e.g., poverty reduction 
or democracy promotion). Having said that, this research deliberately uses the term “democratic ac-
countability” if it explicitly refers to an institutional accountability arrangement that is guided by the 
normative principle “that the governed should have opportunities to sanction and demand answers 
from the powers that govern them” (Borowiak 2011: 9). 
In general, however, this research follows a descriptive approach in defining accountability, because it 
allows for a better understanding of the causal mechanisms through which development aid affects 
democratic change in recipient countries. Moreover, my definition does not limit accountability in 
international development cooperation to a dyadic relationship between state elites (i.e., actor) and 
donors (i.e., forum). Instead, I join a small group of scholars who conceptualized the interaction 
among a broad spectrum of aid partners in terms of “political spaces” created by the new aid modali-
ties under the PRS approach (Gould 2005: 5; Lazarus 2008: 1212). Poverty reduction strategies are 
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formulated and implemented in what anthropologists have long termed an arena or “a place of con-
crete confrontation between social actors interacting on common issues” (Bierschenk and Olivier de 
Sardan 1998, cited by Bastiaensen, de Herdt and d’Exelle 2005: 981). Adopting Rubenstein’s (2007) 
surrogate accountability concept to the international development context, this study’s theoretical in-
novation is defining these places or loci, where external partners interact with domestic stakeholders 
around national development strategies, as surrogate accountability forums. For this research, surro-
gate accountability forums are defined as institutional accountability arrangements at the recipient 
country level where donors act as surrogates of weak citizens who lack the systemic capacity to hold 
their powerful governments accountable.  
Understanding aid modalities as surrogate accountability forums, this research analyzes contemporary 
aid relationships in terms of three theoretical dimensions of public accountability: First, I differentiate 
between two archetypes of aid modalities and between two generations of PRS-based lending under 
the new development approach, which enables me to compare within and across these two forums how 
surrogate accountability demands interact with domestic accountability arrangements and to evaluate 
whether the IFIs’ strategy has actually changed as compared to earlier development efforts. Second, I 
examine the accountability mechanisms that the IFIs use to hold borrowing governments accountable 
within these surrogate accountability forums and that – ultimately – lend legitimacy to their operation-
al practice. Third, I compare the value ascribed to these surrogate accountability forums and the poten-
tial impact they may have had as perceived by IFI staff to identify the underlying goals in hierarchy 
and over time. Through using the concept of the surrogate accountability forum as my analytical lens, 
this research provides a more comprehensive and democratic understanding of accountability than the 
one that has shaped current development thinking and practice.  
 
1.4.2. Empirical approach 
Since the democratic outcomes of the PRS approach have not been evaluated in a large-scale study so 
far, a second primary purpose of the present study is to empirically assess the impact of the new aid 
modalities in terms of their democracy-enhancing outcomes.  
This purpose highlights an vital paradox that is part of the IFIs’ development assistance. While the 
official mandate of the Bank and the Fund does not allow them any political interference with recipi-
ent countries, it is quite obvious that their lending programs do have political consequences in recipi-
ent countries. For example, the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement state that the Bank will ensure 
that its finances “are used only for the purposes for which the financing was provided, with due atten-
tion to considerations of economy, efficiency, and competitive international trade and without regard 
to political or other non-economic influences or considerations.” Moreover, “its officers shall not in-
terfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the 
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political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be rele-
vant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the 
purposes stated in this Agreement” (IDA 1960, Article 5, Section 1(g) and Section 6).8 Given that their 
official mandates impose “clear limitations on their ability to engage with ‘political’ topics”, it is un-
derstandable that “the PRS approach has tended to be articulated largely in technocratic terms” (Dris-
coll and Evans 2005a: 16; Piron and Evans 2004: 5).  
However, this study argues that the new aid partners, the new aid principles and the new aid modali-
ties of the PRS approach all have significant political implications making their assessment in practice 
valuable.  
In particular, I claim that the new aid partners introduce a more political understanding of aid delivery 
in recipient countries. The new focus on participation and collaboration of all aid partners marks an 
apparent shift from a narrow relationship between borrowing governments and the IFIs for implement-
ing Washington-driven policy blueprints to a broader partnership around country-owned development 
strategies, which draw on the contributions of three sets of actors at the recipient country level, that is, 
recipient state, organized society, and the donor community. I thus agree with the argument that this 
new partner or stakeholder perspective embeds the global governance of aid in a broader democratic 
sense since citizens in recipient countries are not merely treated as target groups for aid interventions, 
but rather “as empowered partners with democratic rights” (Eberlei 2005: 93).  
Moreover, I concur with the claim that the new aid principles of the PRS approach do have political 
implications, since today, the way how aid relationships should work is more firmly rooted in demo-
cratic principles of accountability and participation than it was previously the case (Horner and Power 
2009: 17). The “spirit” of mutual accountability (OECD 2005a, para.13) has been said to lie at the 
heart of to the new aid agenda born out the joint recognition of aid intermediaries that – in the end – 
they must render an account to “citizens and taxpayers of all countries” whether their collective devel-
opment efforts had any “positive impacts on people’s lives” (OECD 2008a, para. 10). The PRS pro-
cess, in turn, may be seen as a translation of this spirit into practice with aid intermediaries inviting 
civil society to participate alongside them in the formulation, but also the monitoring of national de-
velopment strategies. With democratic principles foremost in the process, the operational framework 
of the aid effectiveness agenda thus reveals a hidden democratic agenda no matter what the declared 
development objectives are that are pursued with it (for similar lines of reasoning, Driscoll and Evans 
2005: 16; Hickey and Mohan 2008: 236, 250; Jordan and van Tuijl 2000: 2053; Meyer and Schulz 
2008: 31; Molenaers and Renard 2006: 9; Piron and Evans 2004: 4; Steer et al. 2009: 17).  
                                                     
8 The IBRD's Articles of Agreement is identical in wording (see IBRD 1944, Section 5(b) and Section 10), while 
the IMF's Articles of Agreement use somewhat different wording but with analogs meaning (IMF 2016, Article 
IV, Section 1, Section 3, Schedule C).  
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Last but not least, I argue that the new aid modalities of the PRS approach provide opportunities for 
donors to assume a more “political” role in domestic accountability systems. A central claim of the 
present study is that the way how aid is delivered bears important consequences for democratic institu-
tions and practices at the recipient country level. New aid modalities such as general budget support 
and sector‐wide approaches have been increasingly used to channel aid directly to and through recipi-
ent governments via contributions to overall or sector-specific budgets (Domingo et al. 2009: 14). As a 
result, donors become increasingly engaged – “even, one might say, complicit” – in the political af-
fairs of recipient countries “as de facto financial underwriters of the political regime of the day” 
(Booth and Fritz 2008: 24). Even though this new role is often framed in technical terms, I argue that 
outside support to domestic budgets is a highly political issue since donors act as surrogates of domes-
tic accountability holders in their capacity of providing both resources and accountability thereof with 
these new aid modalities. While this may be true, to varying degrees, for all budget support donors, it 
certainly is concerning the IMF and World Bank, whose pro-poor lending instruments provide the 
largest share of multi-donor general budget support.  
Historically, poverty reduction lending by the IMF and World Bank is not the first (and will not be the 
last one) among a multitude of financial lending instruments, commonly framed as programmatic 
lending, meaning that this type of aid is not intended for specific projects, but comes as financial sup-
port to borrower governments for a medium-term program (3-4 years) of policy or institutional reform. 
More than 20 years ago, critics of structural adjustment lending already emphasized the inherently 
political nature of policy-based lending by the international financial institutions. In particular, they 
claimed that donor-driven policy reforms aimed at economic growth affect the welfare of most people, 
that policy-based lending provides outside agencies with a means to influence the domestic decision-
making process, and that the corresponding policy conditions are seen by recipient countries as an 
invasion of their sovereignty. The joint conclusion they reach is that the political neutrality of the IMF 
and World Bank may be regarded as a myth, since – as one critic note – “[i]t is hard to think of any-
thing more political than deciding how money is spent” (Gillies 1993: 4; see also Haggard and Webb 
1993: 156; Killick 1995: 170; Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 3).  
I concur with these scholars that policy-based lending by the IFIs is always political – notwithstanding 
their apolitical mandate. While pro-poor lending under the PRS approach has been the prime example 
of the IMF and World Bank’s increasingly political role, I suggest that this holds, to varying degrees, 
for all types of programmatic lending. Given that the external promotion of economic or governance 
reforms entails strong political consequences for recipient nations, one may reasonably assume that 
IMF and World Bank programs are highly political in effect, despite statutory prohibitions against 
political interference. 
However, this does not mean that the IFIs programmatic lending always results in either positive or 
negative democratic returns. Instead, I argue that depending on the strategic focus of aid and the par-
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ticular channel how aid is delivered to recipient countries, the political impact of IMF and World Bank 
lending may either be positive or negative in democratic terms. To compare the PRS approach with 
other types of financial support, I focus on the surrogate accountability forums supported by different 
types of IFI lending (‘aid modalities’) and the scope for domestic accountability they allow (‘strategic 
focus’). Those types of lending programs that strategically target and respect domestic accountability 
in their modus operandi should positively affect democratization. In contrast, those types of financial 
support that neither target nor respect domestic accountability in the delivery of aid, are expected to 
affect democratization negatively.  
To examine these differences, this research draws on the vast literature on aid and democratization, 
whose research frontiers it extends in three different ways: First, I differ between four broad types of 
IFI lending, which makes it possible to assess whether general budget support under the PRS approach 
has led to more “political” effects as compared to other aid modalities by the IMF and World Bank. 
Second, I compare the impact of IFI lending on procedural democracy as opposed to substantive de-
mocracy to identify differing targets of aid subsumed under the PRS approach. Third, I examine the 
conditions on donor and recipient sides under which general budget support by the IFIs may become 
more effective in promoting democracy. By separating between the normative accountability standards 
at the donor-recipient level and the institutionalized accountability forums at the state-society level in 
recipient countries, this research finds substantive evidence for the argument that under the PRS ap-
proach a more “political spirit” has been introduced into the IFIs’ lending programs.  
 
1.4.3. Methodological approach 
To counterbalance the methodological prevalence of case study designs in the PRS literature, a third 
main goal of this research is to use comparative methods in analyzing the aid-democracy nexus.  
Democratic deficits and aid delivery in recipient countries have been intensively discussed within the 
context of the PRS approach. However, despite the controversies around possible mitigation of the 
former by the latter, very little scientific research exists that seeks to systematize evidence. Evaluation 
reports are said to come in too large numbers and, far too often, oversimplified assessments of what is 
at first sight observable – in particular country contexts (Dewachter and Molenaers 2011: 115). This 
research endeavors to scientifically generalize some of these assessments by following a comparative 
research design with three steps.  
In a first step, I will compare the insider knowledge of different World Bank staff from the African 
region within and across different surrogate accountability forums under the PRS approach in order to 
determine whether the behavior of development actors has changed as compared to earlier develop-
ment efforts. A first methodological problem lies in the novelty of the PRS approach. The existing 
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literature has focused overwhelmingly on the formulation phase of poverty reduction strategies, while 
the implementation phase has received considerably less attention. Accordingly, plenty of qualitative 
research exists on recipient countries that have opened the public space, but there exists almost no 
qualitative research on donor involvement in the subsequent phases of the PRS process.9 Unlike partic-
ipation by domestic stakeholders that have been under the public eye, participation by external part-
ners often occurred behind closed doors under the PRS approach. To shed more light on these hidden 
surrogate accountability forums under the PRS approach, this study thus builds – among other sources 
– on the insider knowledge of aid practitioners. As noted by an academic observer, direct budgetary 
aid by the IMF and World Bank may well be seen as “the life-blood” of the new approach, since there 
can be no effective implementation without adequate finance (Seshamani 2005: 10). Opening the 
black box on General Budget Support (GBS) would thus be an intriguing subject.  
In advance, I decided to focus only on experts from the World Bank and not the IMF, because World 
Bank staff has insider experience of different aid modalities within the PRS approach. That is, they are 
involved in GBS operations (like IMF staff), but they also participate in PRS processes at the recipient 
country level (unlike IMF staff). Unlike the Fund that defines its role – within a broader partnership 
framework – rather narrowly as external financier of national poverty reduction and growth strategies 
(IEO 2004: 12), the Bank sees its role – beyond financing poverty reduction strategies – in facilitating 
the participatory process at the recipient country level (World Bank 2002: 254). By contrast, the Fund 
decided to rather stay away from the participatory process in aid-receiving countries, due to its narrow 
interpretation of domestic ownership (IEO 2004: 63). 
Another reason to focus solely on experts from the Bank’s African Region Department was that the 
African region has been the first region to be exposed to the new thinking and practices under the PRS 
approach. When the PRS approach became an integral part of the process by which countries would 
qualify for the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative and receive debt relief, African count-
ries figured prominently among the early adopters, as their debt burdens were (and still are) high. 
Among all countries worldwide that have embarked on the PRS approach to date, more than half were 
Sub-Saharan African countries. As a corollary, experts from the African region possess a long work 
experience, and their insights thus offer the unique chance for tracing the shift in aid relations between 
donors and recipients of foreign aid.  
In a second step, I will compare the statistical impact of different types of financial support by IMF 
and World Bank on the different conceptualization of the ‘democratic purpose’ in order to assess the 
actual impact of foreign aid on democratization in aid-receiving countries. The basic methodological 
problem of assessing the democratic impact of the PRS approach is its context-specificity. The fact 
that the PRS approach allows context to be a factor in the identification of country-specific needs is, 
                                                     
9 A possible exception are the IFIs’ own independent evaluations of their pro-poor financial instruments, see IEG 
2010 and IEO 2007. 
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surely, an advance beyond the previous one-size-fits-all approach, but at the same time, it makes the 
“identification of an aggregate effect due to PRSP-adoption difficult to sustain” (Marshall and Walters 
2011: 5). To address this methodological challenge, this study opts to follow the money instead. As an 
outsider, the most apparent data to draw from are those on standardized funding for poverty reduction 
strategies. However, disaggregated data on IFIs’ various types of financial support have only recently 
become available with the publication of the World Bank’s Project Database and the IMF’s Monitor-
ing of Fund Arrangements (MONA) database.10 
Today, the available data on IMF and World Bank lending covers about a decade’s experience with 
the PRS approach, notably, the approach supposed to mark the most important structural change in 
comparison to other lending types. Being able to include the PRS-based programs into the quantitative 
analysis offers a unique opportunity to examine potential differences in the impact of different types of 
financial support to developing countries across countries and over time. In fact, this is the first large-
scale study comparing the impact of different IMF and World Bank programs on democratization in 
recipient countries. It is based on a panel of 100 developing countries over 30 years.  
In assessing the impact of foreign aid on democratization in recipient countries, this study focuses 
specifically on aid from the IMF and World Bank for two reasons. First, their leverage capacity is 
high, because the vast resources at their disposal in combination with their financial gate-keeping role 
during crisis times, gives the international financial institutions extraordinary power within the broader 
donor community. Second, their influence probably extends beyond their “hard” leverage capacity due 
to linkage mechanisms rooted in their roles as “knowledge provider” and “active coordinator” of joint 
development efforts. In these “softer” roles the IFIs can have a wide multiplier effect by fostering so-
cial learning and collaboration among other donors. Thus, the combination of proxying PRS interven-
tions with GBS operations and exploiting data on different types of IFI lending provides an excellent 
opportunity for assessing the impact of the PRS approach in comparison with more established aid 
modalities across a broader sample than any study has done before.  
In the last step, I will compare the qualitative insights on how aid relationships have changed over 
time as perceived by selected experts of the PRS approach with the quantitative evidence from time-
series estimations regarding the impact of poverty reduction lending on democratization as compared 
to other types of financial support by the IMF and World Bank. As noted by the literature on democra-
cy promotion, evaluating the impact of foreign aid and targeted democracy support poses enormous 
methodological problems, such as the difficulty of demonstrating causality, and of finding operational 
indicators of aid due to limited data availability (Green and Kohl 2007; Schmitter and Brouwer 1999). 
To avoid at least some of the methodological pitfalls of quantitative evaluations of democracy and 
                                                     
10 The World Bank’s (2013a) Project Database provides information on all Bank operations from 1947 to the 
present, while the IMF’s (2013a) MONA database covers operations since 2001. 
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governance assistance, the statistical results have been cross-checked with findings from a qualitative 
analysis of aid practitioners’ experiences.  
Methodologically, I thus join recent attempts of what has been called an “anthropology of the state” 
(Migdal 1994: 15). That is, this research combines traditional macro-oriented analysis of political sci-
ences with an emphasis on micro-level data collected “in the field” as derived from social anthropolo-
gy (Eriksen 2001: 304). Thus, while the conceptual apparatus and macro focus of the political science 
tradition has been retained in the quantitative assessments of the democratic impact, the qualitative 
exploration of the new aid modalities by means of an online survey and several expert interviews 
served to get “inside the whale” in order to grasp the everyday practice of the PRS approach (as cap-
tured by the personal experiences with and the discursive construction of the PRS approach in the 
organizational culture beyond the IFIs’ official policy narratives) (for an anthropological perspective, 
see Gupta 1995: 375). Together, these three comparisons serve to sketch a more robust and general 
picture of the PRS approach than is found in the literature so far.  
The present thesis is organized as follows. Combining important contributions of the democracy and 
development literature, Chapter 2 introduces this research’s conceptual framework, its theoretical ap-
proach, and a typology of surrogate accountability for analyzing the PRS approach in the subsequent 
chapters. Chapter 3 discusses the shift in development thinking within the broader aid architecture. In 
particular, it describes the normative standards that guide accountability relations at the donor-
recipient level and the institutionalized arrangements for monitoring recipient compliance with these 
standards at the state-society level. The policy analysis thereby sets the stage for the following two 
empirical analyses of the actual changes in development practice. Chapter 4 explores the shift in aid 
practices under the PRS approach by applying an accountability lens to the World Bank’s operational 
practices and the subjective perceptions by its staff, while Chapter 5 assesses its democratic impact in 
practice as compared to other types of financial support by the IMF and World Bank. Finally, Chapter 
6 draws some broader conclusions for policy and research on aid and accountability.  
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2. Theory 
The previous chapter reviewed the existing literature on the PRS approach. It showed that previous 
research had been divided between two streams of scholarship that focused either on the developmen-
tal or democratic potential of the new approach, but generally did not take the empirical findings of the 
other strand into account. This chapter aims at bringing these two strands of literature into a dialogue 
with each other. The central question that guides this intellectual exchange of ideas is how democratic 
theory helps us to understand the new development approach. In answering this question, this chapter 
shows how democratic standards, models and types of public accountability have been used by devel-
opment actors to legitimize their goals, mechanisms, and strategies for promoting transparency and 
public accountability in recipient countries. By making the theoretical roots of the new practices ex-
plicit, it contributes to a better understanding of the causal mechanisms through which development 
aid affects democratic change in recipient countries. In doing so, it also sets the stage for the empirical 
analyses in chapter 4 and 5 by clarifying, through an examination of public accountability in the de-
mocracy and development literature, the analytical framework used. The chapter is divided into three 
sections that develop the conceptual framework, the theoretical approach and the typologies of surro-
gate accountability used throughout this study.  
 
2.1. Concept 
Accountability as a concept has a long and distinguished intellectual history. In political practice, 
however, the concept has only become popular since the late twentieth century, when the concept 
found its way out of the specialized domains of traditional bookkeeping and financial accounting to-
wards broader forms of global governance and public accountability. Notwithstanding the increased 
public attention it gets, in conceptual terms accountability is used in a very general sense, detached 
from any specific theoretical meaning. There is no widely accepted definition, and its meaning “is 
about as muddled as concepts get in the social sciences” (Mainwaring 2003: 6).  
In no small part, this lack of common grounds may be explained by the specific double connotation of 
accounts (Schedler 1999a: 15; Borowiak 2011: 6). The word “accountability” is derived from the Old 
French acont (meaning comptes à render), which in turn goes back to the Latin word accomptare that 
is composed of the verb computare (‘to count’ as the counting component) and ac (‘to’ or ‘toward’ as 
the telling component). Taken literally, accountability thus means both “giving an account to some-
one” (counting component) and “being answerable for something” (telling component). This double 
connotation shows up in most dictionary definitions, which use the term “being liable” to refer to the 
counting component, while the term “being answerable” usually refers to the telling component of the 
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concept. For example, accountability has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “the liabil-
ity to account for and answer for one's conduct” (Oxford English Dictionary 2019).  
In the academic debate, these two basic connotations have been captured by the conceptual distinction 
of two dimensions of accountability. Andreas Schedler (1999a) was the first to discriminate between 
answerability, that is, “the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they are 
doing” (telling component) and enforcement (or enforceability), that is, “the capacity of accounting 
agencies to impose sanctions on powerholders who have violated their public duties” (counting com-
ponent) (Schedler 1999a: 14). The distinction between these two accountability dimensions has been 
widely disseminated in the democracy and development literature (Hickey and Mohan 2008: 236; 
Steer et al. 2009: 15; O’Neil, Foresti, and Hudson 2007: 3). At the same time, there has also been a 
general tendency within the academic debate to focus solely on one of these two dimensions of ac-
countability. Depending on the academic disciplines, the concept of accountability has thus received 
slightly different shadings.  
In the following, I will develop the conceptual framework of accountability used in this research based 
on a review of the concept as it has been used in democratic theory as compared to the development 
literature. In line with more recent conceptual research on accountability, the argument is made that to 
distinguish more clearly between the different meanings of accountability used in the literature dis-
perses at least some of the conceptual confusion and may provide the basis for further empirical analy-
sis (Bovens 2010: 946). In particular, I argue that the democracy literature has been more attentive to 
the enforcement dimension, while the development literature has tended to emphasize the answerabil-
ity dimension.  
 
2.1.1. Democracy literature: accountability as a sanctioning mechanism 
2.1.1.1. Social concept 
In democracy literature, scholars focus firmly on the enforcement dimension. Accountability in poli-
tics is perceived as a mechanism that links actions of public officials to sanctions by citizens (Manin et 
al. 1999a: 10). Accordingly, José Antonio Cheibub and Adam Przeworski call a government “account-
able”  
“if citizens can discern whether governments are acting in their best interest and sanction 
them appropriately, so that those incumbents who satisfy citizens remain in office and 
those who do not lose it.” (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999: 225)  
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Similarly, Enrique Peruzzotti defines political accountability as  
“the ability to ensure that public officials are answerable for their behavior, in the sense 
of being forced to inform and justify their decisions and of being eventually sanctioned 
for those decisions.” (Peruzzotti 2006: 45)  
Sanctions or, at least, the possibility of sanctions, thereby appear as the sine qua non of accountability 
relationships in politics.  
Two common aspects of these definitions of accountability in politics are remarkable. First, accounta-
bility is external. As shown in the definitions above, accountability in politics involves the possibility 
that public officials are sanctioned for their decisions. As argued by Richard Mulgan, accountability 
entails in its core meaning external scrutiny, justification, sanctions and control by some other person 
or body that is not part of the person or body being held accountable (Mulgan 2000: 555). In short, it 
implies the need “to submit to an outside or external judgment” (Caiden 1985: 20, 25).  
Second and closely related, accountability is not only external, but also inherently relational. Ac-
countability in the definitions above is about a mechanism that links public officials to citizens and 
representative bodies. In this regard, many accountability scholars within the democracy literature are 
eager to differentiate their concept of accountability against other terms like “responsibility” or “re-
sponsiveness” that do not display this relational structure. For example, John Uhr has noted that ac-
countability “defines the boundaries within which official responsibilities are acted out” (Uhr 1993: 4). 
John Ferejohn expresses comparable boundedness through defining accountability as “a property of 
institutional structures”, whereas responsiveness is perceived to be “a consequence of interaction with-
in such structures” (Ferejohn 1999: 131).  
Together, these demarcations of the concept show that accountability is used to describe how institu-
tional arrangements operate. Given that actors are held ex post facto accountable for their conduct, this 
usage of the concept has also been called “passive accountability” (Bovens 2010: 946). Adopting the 
distinction given by Mark Bovens (2010: 946) of accountability as a “virtue” as opposed to a “mecha-
nism”, we may thus say that accountability in the democracy literature is generally conceptualized in a 
narrow, passive sense as a “social mechanism”, that is, “an institutional relation or arrangement in 
which an actor can be held to account by a forum” (Bovens 2010: 946).  
As a social mechanism, accountability always involves at least two parties who interact within an in-
stitutionalized relationship. To understand this relationship, the simple dyadic model of accountability 
in Figure 2-1 is a useful starting point.  
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Figure 2-1: The accountability relationship: a dyadic model 
 
 
 
 
Note: figure from O’Neil et al. (2007: 3) 
 
First, this figure shows accountability as a dyadic relationship, in which one party (A) can be held 
accountable by another (B) and where the two parties involved can either be an individual or a collec-
tive. Moreover, this figure highlights that accountability is not about a simple one-way reporting rela-
tionship, but involves a “two-way social exchange” (Peruzzotti 2006: 45), in that those calling for an 
account seek answers and rectification, while those being held accountable respond and accept sanc-
tions (Mulgan 2000: 555). Finally, scholars and practitioners alike have used a broad vocabulary, be-
yond the A-B model, for specifying the roles of the two parties involved as Table 2-1 shows.  
Table 2-1: Language used to describe the roles within an accountability relationship 
Discourse Party who is being held accountable Party who holds accountable 
Neutral A 
Accountability-holdee 
B 
Accountability-holder 
Development Accountee 
Supply-side 
Decision-maker 
Accounter 
Demand-side 
Stake-holder 
Democracy Power wielder 
Duty-bearer 
Actor 
Accountability holder 
Claim-holder 
Forum 
Note: adapted from O’Neil et al. (2007: 4) 
 
To stay within neutral terrain, the two central roles within an institutionalized accountability relation-
ship have been called the “accountability-holdee” (A), that is, the party who is being held accountable, 
and the “accountability-holder” (B), that is, the party who holds accountable (for scholars who used 
this neutral vocabulary, see Behn 2001: 2 and Borowiak 2011: 79). However, much of the vocabulary 
used for describing these two roles carries – as any discourse through which meaning is given to reali-
ty – its “own intellectual baggage” (O’Neil et al. 2007: 4).  
Within the development discourse, a direct route to accountability focuses on the financial dimension 
of foreign aid and speaks quite literally of “accountee” and “accounter” as the two roles of people 
which either are held to account or do the holding (Moore and Teskey 2006: 3). Especially with regard 
to new donor practices such as direct budget support this terminology is firmly grounded in the etymo-
logical and historical roots of the concept. A second way of describing accountability relationships is 
A B 
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borrowed from the language of economics. Accountability in this perspective is a question of finding 
the right balance between the “supply-side” and the “demand-side”. This is the predominant vocabu-
lary among leading donor agencies (O’Neil et al. 2007: 4). By contrast, a third perspective focuses 
more on “those affected” by public decision-making. Accountability in this vocabulary is about “deci-
sion-makers” who give an account to those being affected by these decisions, most commonly called 
“stake-holders” (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005: 3; Mfunwa 2006: 3; Hickey and Mohan 2008: 
236).  
Likewise, researchers within the democracy discourse also use a specific vocabulary for specifying the 
roles in an accountability relationship. For instance, global governance scholars often speak of “power 
wielders” that are authorized to wield power and “accountability holders” that are properly entitled to 
call power wielders to account. While accountability in this vocabulary is about mechanisms for con-
trolling the use of power in world politics, power wielders can have more or less power than accounta-
bility holders depending on context (Grant and Keohane 2005: 30; Rubenstein 2007: 616). An alterna-
tive approach that has its roots in the international human rights framework talks about “duty-bearer” 
and “claim-holder”. In this perspective, citizens hold legitimate rights that need to be respected by the 
bearers of public office (Cornwall, Lucas and Pasteur 2000: 3; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2011: 454). A 
third approach of specifying the two roles puts the emphasis more on the public nature of the account-
ability relationship and prefers to speak of an “actor” being held accountable by an accountability “fo-
rum” (Bovens 2007: 450; Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 52).  
Accountability in the development and democratic discourse is thus framed differently. While devel-
opment scholars ask whether the decision-maker has acted in an accountable (i.e., responsible or re-
sponsive) way towards financial, corporate or public stakeholders, democracy scholars ask whether the 
this actor that makes the decisions can be held accountable by an institutional (i.e., regular, estab-
lished, accepted) accountability forum (Bovens et al. 2008: 227; Moore and Teskey 2006: 3, 7).  
Adopting the vocabulary of the last approach as a standard for this research, I will speak of the 
“actor” as the account-giving party and of the “forum” as the party calling for an account. Both par-
ties to an accountability relationship may refer either to an individual or a collective. For example, an 
actor can be a single politician or public servant, or it can be a public organization, like an aid agency 
or government ministry. In reverse, an accountability forum can be “a superior, a minister, or a jour-
nalist, or it can be an institution, such as parliament, a court, or the audit office” (Bovens 2010: 951).  
 
2.1.1.2. Standard accountability process 
Democracy scholars generally agree that the actual practice of account-giving, usually consists of at 
least three phases in order to become operative (Bovens et al. 2008: 234; Bovens 2010: 952; Schedler 
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1999a: 14-15). Together, these phases are constitutive of the standard accountability process by which 
an actor is being held accountable by an accountability forum.  
Information: First of all, every accountability process begins with the obligation of the actor to inform 
the forum about his or her conduct. An accountability forum must have the necessary information at 
its disposal to assess the actor’s conduct. This information is either directly disclosed by the actor or 
indirectly extracted by the forum through external monitoring (Borowiak 2011: 7). Without infor-
mation, accountability may be blind (Borowiak 2011: 7). Accountability discourses are filled with 
terms such as “imperfect and asymmetrical information”, “back-room deals”, “cabal”, “whistle-
blowing”, “unobservable actions” and “opaque decision-making” in order to describe these blind 
spots. What they all show, respectively criticize, is that accountability relationships do not work in 
seclusion. Andreas Schedler has nicely elaborated this point. According to him, accountability de-
mands precisely arise because of the “classical arcanae imperii, the dark playgrounds of power shut 
off from public scrutiny for no other reason than the self-contained arrogance of power” (Schedler 
1999a: 20-21). Accordingly, the ultimate goal of accountability as a social mechanism will be “to shed 
light into the black box of politics” (Schedler 1999a: 20).11 To make this point clear, Schedler com-
pares the “supervisor” with the “accountability holder”. Whereas the supervisor may remain in the 
dark, the accountability holder must come into the spotlight:  
“In this sense, institutions of accountability are vampires in reverse. They can live only 
as long as they act in the daylight of the public sphere, and they crumble and die as soon 
as they enter the shadows of privacy and secrecy.” (Schedler 1999a: 21)  
While secrecy has been regarded as the great enemy of accountability (Garry Wills 1999, cited by 
Behn 2001: 206), publicity is perceived as its friend, since it makes public officials accountable to the 
citizens. For example, in his analysis of the evolution of the concept, Gerald C. Caiden observes that 
accountability came to mean that the actions of public officials “had to be justified, their reasons ex-
plained and their deeds and misdeeds accounted before the court of public opinion” (Caiden 1985, 
cited by Behn 2001: 220). The principle of publicity supports accountability in its function as a means 
of control, as deeds and misdeeds have to be accounted for in a public court (counting component). At 
the same time, the principle of publicity also supports accountability in its function as a means of dia-
logue, since public officials need to justify their actions and explain their reasons in public (telling 
                                                     
11 Nonetheless, there exist legitimate realms of deliberation and decision-making behind closed doors, such as 
central banks and regulatory agencies within the global financial system, or truth commissions and courts within 
national justice systems (Schedler 1999a: 21, Kahler 2005: 11). In such secret realms, relationships between the 
invisible decision-makers and their public could be described as some type of ‘confidential accountability’. 
However, such a term does not cope well with accountability's public nature. It is perceived rather as a ‘farce’, as 
a ‘caricature’ of itself (Schedler 1999a: 21). While these secret realms of decision-making may thus be legitimate 
in the sense that they are under the supervision of an actor that, in turn, is accountable to a public forum, they are 
not accountable themselves in the original sense of the concept. 
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component). I will turn now to the second phase of a standard accountability process that brings these 
more reciprocal aspects to the front.  
Debate: After having received the information by the actor, the forum must have the right to question 
the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct in light of certain normative stan-
dards. Accountability is more than merely collecting information. It also includes going into the debate 
with each other. In particular, there needs to be the “possibility of debate, of questions by the forum 
and answers by the actor, and eventually of judgement of the actor by the forum” (Bovens 2010: 951). 
Many scholars within the democracy literature conceptualize accountability as a means of control in 
that they assert that answerable actors must explain and justify their conduct vis-à-vis a public ac-
countability forum (Schedler 1999a: 15; Bovens 2007: 452). Central to this notion of answerability is 
that “[e]xplanations and justifications are not made in a void, but vis-à-vis a significant other” (Bovens 
2010: 951). In reverse, those significant others have the right to receive information and explanation 
from answerable actors (Kearns 1998: 144; Peruzzotti 2006: 45). Bringing these two perspectives to-
gether establishes accountability as a “dialectical activity, requiring officials to answer, explain and 
justify, while those holding them to account engage in questioning, assessing and criticizing” (Mulgan 
2000: 569). Thus, while power in the information phase may still be monologic, it is forced into dia-
logue in the debate phase. As a social mechanism, accountability makes both parties speak and “is 
therefore opposed not only to mute power but also to unilateral speechless controls of power” 
(Schedler 1999a: 15). In the alternative conception as a means of dialogue, accountability “becomes 
equated with the principles of deliberative democracy” (Mulgan 2000: 555). According to Amy Gut-
mann and Dennis Thompson, for example, deliberative democracy is based on a type of accountability 
they call “deliberative accountability”. They never define deliberative accountability themselves, but 
other researchers have inferred from their writing that deliberative accountability entails 
“public officials to account for their decisions, to provide reasons, ‘to justify their actions 
in moral terms’” (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 129, cited by Behn 2001: 221);  
or that deliberative accountability broadly means 
“having to ‘give an account’ of something in the sense of publicly articulating, explai-
ning, and justifying public policy.” (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 52, cited by Borowiak 
2011: 103)  
Accordingly, deliberative accountability implies that public officials need to justify something – be it 
“public policy” or “their actions in moral terms”. However, “justification” and “answerability” are not 
the same. Craig Borowiak, for instance, criticizes Gutmann and Thompson for not taking particular 
care in separating the two terms clearly from each other (Borowiak 2011: 103). While justification is 
forward-looking in trying to validate or legitimize a position or policy, answerability, in turn, is back-
ward-looking. It refers to prior conduct, to actions taken, to decisions already made. In deliberative 
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settings thus, a comprehensive understanding of accountability, respectively answerability is used, 
including both past actions and future policies (Borowiak 2011: 104). Since mutual “understanding” 
and “reasoning” take center stage in deliberative accounts, the question of unilateral reporting and 
sanctions has not been central to this strand of research, which brings me to the final phase of a stand-
ard accountability process.  
Judgment: In the final phase, there needs to be a possibility for the forum to pass judgment on the 
actor’s conduct and the actor may face consequences of some kind or another. Until now, accountabi-
lity has been defined as a relationship between an actor and an accountability forum, in which the ac-
tor is obliged to inform and explain his or her conduct and the forum has the right to ask questions and 
demand reasons in order to reach mutual understanding of the actor’s conduct. However, accountabi-
lity dialogues are not always that friendly. Accountability is more than a benign inquiry or discursive 
activity. According to Robert Behn, political actors usually have a clear sense of what being held ac-
countable means to them personally: namely some punishment. While “[i]t's great to be an accounta-
bility holder. It’s not so much fun to be an accountability holdee” (Behn 2001: 2, 5). Being held ac-
countable has consequences. In theory, these consequences can be both positive and negative. Ac-
countability holdees can be rewarded and punished, praised and blamed for their conduct. However, in 
practice, accountability more often means that they might be or are eventually punished. Public offi-
cials may lose their job, receive a fine, go into jail and so forth (Behn 2001: 3). Within the democracy 
literature, the question of whether accountability holders must have sanctioning power has spurred a 
fierce scholarly debate.  
On the one hand, there are those scholars for whom the capacity to sanction is essential to the concept 
of accountability. As argued by Schedler, exercises of accountability without the sanctioning possibil-
ity might be seen by many as “weak, toothless, ‘diminished’ forms of accountability. They will be 
regarded as acts of window dressing rather than real restraints on power” (Schedler 1999a: 16). Like-
wise, Charles Kenney affirms that while it is possible to analytically distinguish between these two 
dimensions (as Schedler does), “accountability itself requires penalties beyond publicity. […] Without 
political or legal sanctions, publicity can remain at the level of mere allegations that the powerful often 
find ways to manage” (Kenney 2003: 64). Moreover, answerability should not be seen as a separate 
matter of information and explanation, but rather as directly tied to enforcement. Enforcement is in-
herently dependent on answerability. Thus, without the threat of sanctions, there is no need for ans-
wers (Kenney 2003: 63, 65). Saying the same, but more formally, accountability has been defined by 
James Fearon as a dyadic relationship in which enforcement takes center stage:  
  
47 
“We say that one person, A, is accountable to another, B, if two conditions are met. First, 
there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on behalf of B. Second, B is 
empowered by some formal institutional or perhaps informal rules to sanction or reward 
A for her activities or performance in this capacity.” (Fearon 1999: 55)  
On the other hand, there are those accountability scholars who conceptualize sanctioning in a more 
indirect or contingent way. Scott Mainwaring, for example, contends that “indirect sanctioning power” 
is sufficient to characterize accountability relationships as such. Independent oversight bodies with 
indirect sanctioning power, such as an ombudsman or an audit office, hold power in that they “are 
expected to refer possible wrongdoings to actors that can impose sanctions” (Mainwaring 2003: 13). A 
slightly different approach has been taken by Mark Philp, who claims that enforcement is not a ques-
tion of whether or not applying sanctions, but of conceptualizing sanctions in relation to accountabi-
lity. Analytically, he distinguishes between sanctioning for content and sanctioning for the failure of 
giving an account, and only the latter should be regarded as an integral part of accountability (Philp 
2009: 30). In contrast to Fearon’s (1999) formal definition given above, he defines accountability in 
formal terms as a triadic relationship:  
A is accountable with respect to M when some individual, body or institution, Y, can re-
quire A to inform and explain/justify his or her conduct with respect to M.” (Philp 2009: 
32)  
In this definition, some individual, body or institution (Y) can require an actor (A) to inform and give 
reasons for his or her conduct with respect to a forum (M). While the emphasis lies on the answerabi-
lity dimension of accountability, the enforcement dimension appears in the “can require” clause and 
concerns the account-giving, but not the specific content of that account. Philp agrees with Mainwa-
ring that sanctions are not essential to the concept of accountability. Beyond that, there comes another 
commonality: Both of them implicitly (Mainwaring) or explicitly (Philp) refer to a third party being 
involved in institutionalized accountability relationships. While this third party can sanction the power 
wielder, it does not necessarily need to do so.  
 
2.1.1.3. Meaning of accountability in this research 
This review of the democracy literature has shown that there exist two general approaches for defining 
accountability that ground their definitions in either a “narrow” or “broad” understanding of the con-
cept. A first approach for defining accountability has been to find its “essential core” by striving for a 
narrow definition. Mark Philp (2009: 32), for example, maintains that contingent circumstances or 
additional requirements need to be distinguished from the core elements of accountability. The nature 
of accountability should not be confused with what is necessary for accountability to produce a parti-
cular outcome, which might be driven by a range of other values (Philp 2009: 46). Moreover, he ar-
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gues that definitions of accountability should not reduce accountability to a dyadic relationship bet-
ween an agent or institution who is to give an account and the agent or institution to whom or to which 
they give an account, but should include the possibility that a third party is included (Philp 2009: 48).  
An alternative approach for defining accountability has been to build all phases into a broader and 
more generous definition while acknowledging that not every single one needs to be present. Andreas 
Schedler (1999a) is a typical representative of this second approach. He defines accountability in for-
mal terms as a dyadic relationship in which  
“A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions 
and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual miscon-
duct.” (Schedler 1999a: 17)  
Accountability in his view is as a “radial” concept in the sense that the main phase of accountability as 
he sees it – information, justification, punishment – are not thought of as binary and thus “defining 
characteristics” which must always be present to describe a particular arrangement as an exercise of 
accountability. While the “classical” accountability concept of Philps displays a hard core of invaria-
ble basic characteristics, the “radial” accountability concept of Schedler displays subtypes and secon-
dary expressions that lack “one or more elements that characterize the prototypical ‘primary’ catego-
ry” of the former (Schedler 1999a: 18).  
This research aspires to bring these two approaches for defining accountability together by combining 
Schedler’s radial approach with Philp’s triadic structure of accountability. Due to its contested nature 
in democratic thinking and practice, the extraction of a single “core” would strip almost every mean-
ing from the concept. Therefore, this research adopts the radial approach by Schedler (1999a) that 
seems more suitable for defining the concept. At the same time, this research adopts Philp’s triadic 
structure of accountability as opposed to Schedler’s dyadic relationship assuming that the accountabi-
lity forum may or may not be identical with the individual, body or institution who has the capacity to 
require the actor to give an account (Philp 2009: 33).  
The following definition of accountability is used throughout this research: Accountability is a rela-
tionship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to inform and explain his 
or her conduct in light of certain standards, the forum has the right to pose questions and pass judg-
ment, and the actor may face consequences by the forum or some third party. This definition is based 
on a combination of writings and definitions given by some of the scholars cited above.12 Following 
Schedler (1999a) this definition of accountability should not be regarded as a “classical” one in the 
sense that it defines an essential “core” of accountability. Rather, it encompasses a broad meaning in 
                                                     
12 In particular, I started with adopting the definition given by Bovens (2007: 450), which was then subsequently 
broadened to include the elements of standard-setting (see Grant and Keohane 2005: 29) as well as third-party 
involvement (see Philp 2009: 32). 
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order to include as many different types and expressions of accountability as possible. In this “radial” 
sense not every single element of accountability always has to be present to describe an accountability 
process. Figure 2-2 visualizes its key features.  
Figure 2-2: Dimensions, actors, and phases in a fully-fledged domestic accountability process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: adapted from Bovens (2007: 454) 
 
As shown by Figure 2-2, accountability in this research refers to two dimensions (social concept), 
three parties (triadic concept) and four phases (radial concept).  
First, I conceptualize accountability as a social mechanism for holding power to account. This social 
concept has two dimensions – answerability and enforcement – as implied by the double connotation 
of financial and narrative accounts (Bovens 2007; Schedler 1999a). Answerability refers to the discur-
sive processes of information, debate, and judgment, whereby an actor is made answerable to a forum. 
enforcement 
enforcement 
Answerability 
Enforcement 
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Enforcement, in turn, refers to the formal and informal consequences that may follow from the judg-
ment by the forum and that are imposed on the actor by the forum or a third party acting in its capaci-
ty. As Figure 2-2 shows, the process of account-giving needs to be separated analytically from the 
content of accountability. While in practice, the setting of normative standards occurs throughout the 
whole process, I keep it separate from the telling component (answerability) and counting component 
(enforcement) of my social concept. These two social dimensions, by contrast, are inherently linked 
through the judgment phase, from which consequences may follow. Although accountability usually 
means punishment in political practice, I use the term “consequences” deliberately in order to allow 
for the possibility that some reward may follow from the forum's judgment.  
Second, I conceptualize accountability in formal terms as a relationship involving three parties, name-
ly the actor, the forum, and a third party. While, in practice, an actor is often directly being held ac-
countable by a forum, this is not a constant. My definition of accountability features a formal triadic 
structure. I assume that the accountability forum itself or a third party acting in its capacity can impose 
formal or informal consequences on the actor (Bovens et al. 2008: 324; Philp 2009: 30). In other 
words, the accountability holder and the sanctioning actor must not necessarily be identical. A power 
wielder can also be held accountable by a third party (also being called “a surrogate”) that sanctions 
the power wielder (or actor) on behalf of the accountability holder (or forum) when the latter cannot 
sanction (or play its role in helping to sanction) the former (Rubenstein 2007: 624).  
Third, I conceptualize accountability in radial terms as a dynamic process that runs through four se-
quential phases.  
Standard-setting: The first phase is determining the set of standards which specify the conduct and the 
roles of the involved parties to the accountability relationship.13 I differ from earlier radial definitions 
of accountability (e.g., Bovens 2007; Schedler 1999a) in making the formal and informal norms ex-
plicit that guide any accountability relationship. Accountability presupposes a relationship between an 
actor and a forum where there is a general recognition of the norms and rules that lend legitimacy to 
this relationship (Grant and Keohane 2005: 29). My definition refers to these by mentioning the “obli-
gations” and “rights” of the parties involved derived from “certain standards”. By their nature, these 
standards are always contested, because they are inherently normative. Moreover, they may be either 
exogenous or endogenous to the process of accountability. The fact that I set them first does thus not 
mean that they may not change in due course of the accountability process.  
Information: The second phase is about collecting information on the conduct of the actor in light of 
these standards. This information may stem from two sources. Information can be given directly by 
                                                     
13 Scholars who perceive accountability as a social mechanism often leave this first stage aside, because they 
want to focus on the description of the institutionalized arrangement in question (e.g., Bovens et al. 2008; Philps 
2009). By contrast, I deliberately refer to the normative standards (without defining their content) in my descrip-
tive definition, because their inclusion makes the normative claims guiding the accountability process explicit, as 
shown by the terms “judgment” and “obligations” in other definitions. 
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the actor who is obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct. Alternatively, information may 
also be collected indirectly by the forum or a third party who explores whether or not the conduct of 
the actor meets the agreed standards (Moore and Teskey 2006: 3). Collecting information on the con-
duct of the actor may serve several purposes. For example, the combination of visibility and punish-
ment may be a potent recipe for discipline and the democratic control of political power. However, 
preventing the abuse of political power may not be the only purpose. The combination of publicity and 
dialogue may be equally important in providing incentives for public officials and state agencies to 
commit to better performance or to deepen democracy (Borowiak 2011: 7; Mainwaring 2003: 7; 
Bovens et al. 2008: 232). Whatever the purpose, the information phase is a necessary step for the fol-
lowing phases of the accountability process.  
Debate: The third phase brings the involved parties into a debate with each other. The notion of the 
debate is present both explicitly and implicitly in the definition given above. I explicitly refer to the 
discursive activities by mentioning the obligation of an actor “to explain” his or her conduct towards a 
forum, which in turn has the right “to pose questions”. However, I also refer implicitly to the debate 
phase by using the term “forum” for specifying the role of those calling for an account. Since “forum” 
means both being a place of public discussion as well as a tribunal, it refers by itself to the answerabi-
lity and enforcement dimensions of the concept (see Oxford English Dictionary 2019).  
Judgment: The last phase delivers a judgment by the accountability forum that may yield possible 
consequences for the actor. However, not all judgments discharge consequences and not all conse-
quences are formal, as my definition implies. Nevertheless, I concur with Mark Bovens (2010) that at 
least the possibility of consequences of some kind forms a constitutive element of accountability as a 
social mechanism and include it therefore in my definition (Bovens 2010: 952). At the same time, I 
concur with Philp (2009) that, from an analytical point of view, the consequences that follow from 
conduct are a contingent, and not a necessary condition for accountability, while those that follow 
from the due process are necessary ones. Describing the actual accountability process is a separate task 
from evaluating the outcome of the conduct in light of the standards set in the first stage, and should 
thus be performed separately (as shown in Figure 2-2 where the normative standards are separated 
from the institutional arrangement).  
In sum, accountability in the present study is understood to refer to a social, triadic and radial concept. 
It is social since it defines accountability in terms of a social mechanism for holding power to account. 
It is triadic since it recognizes that those who are calling for an account need not be the same as those 
who are effectively sanctioning the ones being held accountable. And it is radial since it does not at-
tempt extracting an essential core of the concept, but acknowledges that even though sanctions may be 
fully or partially absent, the accountability arrangement as a whole can still be legitimate – depending 
on the standards applied in any real case.   
52 
2.1.2. Development literature: accountability as an organizational virtue 
2.1.2.1. Normative concept 
In the development literature, scholars mainly focus on the answerability dimension. Accountability 
concerning aid is perceived as a virtue that characterizes an individual or organization engaged in in-
ternational development. For example, as part of the ongoing efforts to strengthen the effectiveness 
and impact of aid, accountability is said to be about 
“holding those with responsibilities to account with the purpose of securing more respon-
sive, efficient and effective behaviour. It means ensuring that actions are answered for, 
that performance is evaluated, and that consequent steps are taken.” (Droop et al. 2008: 
4)  
Likewise, current transparency and accountability initiatives use the concept as follows:  
“Broadly speaking, accountability refers to the process of holding actors responsible for 
their actions. More specifically, it is the concept that individuals, agencies, and organisa-
tions (public, private and civil society) are held responsible for executing their powers 
according to a certain standard (whether set mutually or not).” (Tisné 2010, cited by 
McGee and Gaventa 2013: 13)  
Accountability thus means that development actors from the public, private and social sector are re-
sponsible for their actions and that their behavior is evaluated in the light of specific standards.  
“Responsibility” is the central term in these definitions of accountability concerning aid, and it brings 
its own meaning with it. Two points are noteworthy. First, responsibility accentuates the internal obli-
gation or duty for “being answerable” or “being responsible” for some action. The literature on non-
governmental development organizations has been very attentive to this internal source of motivation, 
probably due to this sector’s stronger focus on social values, organizational missions, and internal 
motivations of foreign aid agencies. Many scholars within this literature strand have argued that ac-
countability has both an external and an internal dimension (Charnovitz 2006: 34; Cornwall et al. 
2000: 3; Ebrahim 2003a: 814, 2003b: 199, 208; Edwards and Hulme 1995: 9; Kovach 2006: 201).14 
For example, Alnoor Ebrahim has argued that non-profit organizations in development assistance do 
not merely follow a corporate logic where subordinates report to superiors, but are also highly moti-
vated by their own missions and values. These organizational norms and mission statements “add an 
ethical or value-based dimension to accountability” (Ebrahim 2003b: 199). On the one hand, they pro-
vide a basis for external judgment of organizational performance and progress in light of these stand-
ards (Ebrahim 2003b: 199). On the other hand, they emphasize an organization’s “internal responsibi-
                                                     
14 For an excellent collection of essays on this topic, see Jordan and van Tuijl’s NGO Accountability (2006). 
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lity for continuously shaping and scrutinizing […] mission, goals, and performance” (Ebrahim 2003b: 
194) – which is fundamental for organizations working in the non-profit sector.  
Second, this internal aspect of accountability has come to be paired with strong normative expecta-
tions of “performance” in the international development context. Again, the literature on non-
governmental development organizations is intriguing concerning this aspect. For example, Michael 
Edwards and David Hulme note that “[p]erforming effectively and accounting transparently are essen-
tial components of responsible practice, on which the legitimacy of development intervention ulti-
mately depends” (Edwards and Hulme 1995: 6). However, holding non-profit organizations accounta-
ble for their performance is a “difficult and messy business” (Edwards and Hulme 1995: 6). For actors 
in the social sector, there are no agreed performance standards available nor is there any obvious “bot-
tom line” against which progress can be measured. Unlike businesses (which must make a profit) and 
governments (which must face elections), the bottom line for non-governmental development organi-
zations changes with the situation at hand. Thus, accountability in the non-profit sector, as they con-
clude, is inevitably a matter of judgment and interpretation (Edwards and Hulme 1995: 11).  
What the literature on non-governmental development organizations shows is that accountability is 
understood as a normative concept to evaluate the performance of an individual or organization 
against a given set of standards. Unlike its usage in the democracy literature, where accountability is 
seen as an institutional arrangement for holding power wielders to account, accountability in the de-
velopment literature is instead seen as a positive feature of individuals and organizations entrusted 
with public responsibilities. In terms of the distinction between accountability as a “virtue” as opposed 
to a “mechanism” provided by Mark Bovens (2010) , we may thus say that “[a]ccountability, used in 
this more active sense of virtue, refers to substantive norms for the behaviour of actors” (Bovens 2010: 
949).  
 
2.1.2.2. Mutual accountability process 
In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the promotion of mutual accountability as 
demonstrated by the large number of international and national agreements, where aid recipients and 
their development partners “have volunteered to pursue their common interest in aid effectiveness and 
development results in a mutual accountable way” (Steer et al. 2009: 16). “The international agree-
ment with the most explicit recognition of mutual accountability is the Paris Declaration” (Steer et al. 
2009: 16) According to this declaration, enhancing mutual accountability and transparency in the use 
of development resources is considered to be a significant priority for aid recipients and their deve-
lopment partners. Beyond its narrow focus on enhancing financial responsibilities, mutual accountabi-
lity is also said to contribute to broader issues of democratic governance and development perfor-
mance (OECD 2005a, para. 1, 47).  
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From a theoretical perspective, the point I want to make here is that the meaning of mutual accounta-
bility in the current aid architecture follows the conceptual lines of accountability that have been 
sketched above. While the literature on mutual accountability is still in its infancy, development scho-
lars generally agree on its central features (Domingo et al. 2009: 15; Droop et al. 2008; Steer et al. 
2009).  
First, mutual accountability emphasizes the internal motivations of actors being held accountable. In 
most general terms, it has been defined as “the process by which two (or multiple) parties hold one 
another accountable for the commitments they have voluntarily made to one another” (Droop et al. 
2008: 4). What this definition accentuates is that mutual accountability is not a one-way relationship, 
but a two-way social exchange, in which both parties have a moral obligation to comply with the 
commitments they have voluntarily made to one another. Given the voluntary character of mutual 
commitments, they are “largely maintained through positive incentives and a desire to maintain one's 
reputation. Hard sanctions generally do not exist” (Steer et al. 2009: 16). The focus of mutual accoun-
tability thus generally lies on the answerability dimension of the concept.  
Second, mutual accountability has been introduced into the current aid architecture with the overall 
aim of better performance. As stated in the Paris Declaration, commitments to mutual accountability 
include joint assessment of mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness 
(OECD 2005a, para. 50). Since these commitments include “a set of monitorable targets for changes in 
donor, recipient, and joint behavior”, this declaration deserves credit for having brought “current aid 
practices under a transparent and legitimate overall umbrella of universal standards and country-based 
monitoring” (Rogerson 2005: 539). Even though the term is not precisely defined in the current aid 
architecture, mutual accountability is understood as a normative concept used to assess the individual 
and joint performance of development partners according to the standards embodied in the Paris De-
claration and similar international treaties.  
If the performance standards are given, the question then is how donors and recipients of foreign aid 
can hold each other accountable for mutual commitments they have made? The answer given by the 
literature on mutual accountability is that there is a variety of mechanisms emerging by which donors 
and recipients of foreign aid are beginning to hold each other to account (Domingo et al. 2009: 17). 
While it is too early to speak of a “fully-fledged mutual accountability process”, recent research on 
mutual accountability has identified several critical elements of country-based monitoring of donor 
and recipient performances (Steer et al. 2009: 19; Domingo et al. 2009: 17).15 In particular, mutual 
accountability is said to proceed through three phases, as depicted by Figure 2-3.  
  
                                                     
15 Mutual accountability mechanisms at the global level are not considered here (see also synthesis below). 
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Figure 2-3: Dimension, actors, and phases in a simplified mutual accountability process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: adapted from Steer et al. (2009: 20) 
 
As shown by this figure, mutual accountability is said to run through three phases, including the set-
ting of standards (‘agreeing on a shared agenda’), the information phase (‘monitoring progress’) and 
the debate phase (‘dialogue & negotiation’). What stands out from this sequencing of the process is 
that the judgment phase is missing, when we compare it to the standard accountability process de-
scribed in the democracy literature above. To understand why this is the case, it is helpful to look at 
the three other phases of mutual accountability in more detail.  
Standard-setting: In the first phase of setting the standards of mutual accountability, donors and reci-
pients of foreign aid agree on a shared agenda that sets out clear goals and commitments for both 
sides. Following recent research on mutual accountability (e.g., Domingo et al. 2009 and Steer et al. 
2009), shared agendas mostly fall into two categories: agreements around development strategies and 
development results, i.e., “what needs to be done to address development problems”; and agreements 
around operational principles and aid effectiveness practice, i.e., “how development aid can be deli-
vered” (Steer et al. 2009: 7). Examples of the first category involve national, sector and program spe-
cific development strategies, while aid policies, harmonization and alignment action plans, and joint 
assistance strategies constitute examples of the second category. These agreements differ in terms of 
the degree they are being shared by all development actors, that is donors, governments, and citizens at 
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the recipient country level. Usually, agreements of the first category are more government-driven, 
whereas donors are inclined to take the lead in agreements of the second category. While donors and 
governments usually lead the process, the degree of citizen involvement, however, strongly varies by 
country and national development strategy (Domingo et al. 2009: 19).  
Information: Next, monitoring actions and reviewing progress in implementing shared agenda charac-
terizes the information phase in mutual accountability. In line with the two categories of shared agen-
das above, monitoring mechanisms at the country (or sector) level either may monitor progress in im-
plementing agreements around development strategies and, above all, development results, or they 
may track both donor and recipient progress towards implementing agreements on aid effectiveness. 
For example, Annual Progress Reports (APRs) on national development strategies are standard for 
countries under the PRS approach. APRs are typically carried out under government leadership and 
then discussed at workshops, sector working group meetings and/or other government-donor forums 
(see debate phase) (Domingo et al. 2009: 19). By contrast, Performance Assessment Frameworks 
(PAFs) constitute an example of a joint monitoring mechanism under donor leadership. PAFs provide 
a set of monitorable indicators, often drawn from existing PRSPs, which donors use for determining 
their future financial contributions to national budgets (Domingo et al. 2009: 19). Finally, aid data-
bases are another source of information for monitoring government and donor progress towards agreed 
commitments on aid effectiveness (Domingo et al. 2009: 19). While not being a standard everywhere, 
citizens have increasingly become involved in monitoring aid effectiveness and development results – 
both inside and outside donor-government forums. For example, civil society actors were more often 
invited to participate in joint donor-government forums for monitoring progress in implementing na-
tional development strategies. However, civil society, parliament and the media have also become 
more active in some countries through conducting their own reviews and organizing their parallel fo-
rums in reviewing progress, thereby taking on the role of a societal watchdog (Steer et al. 2009: 35).  
Debate: Finally, the debate phase in mutual accountability comprises the various spaces and mecha-
nisms that provide forums where donors and governments can discuss evidence-based issues of con-
cern (Domingo et al. 2009: 4). Importantly, these spaces for dialogue and negotiation “serve not only 
to define the agenda and review progress, but also to establish trust and provide incentives to carry out 
commitments” (Steer et al. 2009: 8). They exist at both the technical and political level. For example, 
many technical working groups are organized sector-wise and are composed of technical staff from the 
related ministries and donors active in the area (such as the health, education or agricultural sector) 
(Steer et al. 2009: 8). At their meetings, they discuss the information collected on the progress (or the 
reasons for lack of progress) towards agreed commitments in the particular area. A central feature of 
technical working groups meetings is that they are held regularly throughout the year. Their regularity 
makes them important forums for building trust and a common strategy (Domingo et al. 2009: 20). By 
contrast, the main forums for political dialogue in most countries are the Consultative Groups mee-
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tings, where APRs and findings from independent monitoring mechanisms are often presented. They 
are held only once or twice in a year. Historically, these meetings functioned as ceremonial events and 
pledging sessions chaired by the World Bank. However, they have recently been reformed to provide 
an open forum for discussing past performance and future strategies not only between governments 
and external development partners, but among all domestic stakeholders at the recipient country level 
(Domingo et al. 2009: 20; Steer et al. 2009: 8).  
 
2.1.2.3. Accountability in the global aid architecture 
This review of the development literature has shown that mainstream conceptions of accountability, 
and in particular mutual accountability in the global aid architecture, refer to specific performance 
standards (normative concept) used for qualifying the internal commitment (classical concept) of do-
nors and recipients of foreign aid (dyadic concept). This concept stays opposed to the one used in this 
research.  
First, mutual accountability is conceptualized in normative terms as a virtue or quality of individuals 
and organizations entrusted with public responsibilities. This normative concept refers to specific per-
formance standards that aid practitioners are thought to adhere to voluntarily. There is widespread 
consensus among aid practitioners what these performance standards are. For example, the final doc-
ument of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, reports that effec-
tive development cooperation works through a standard set of principles, which are shared by all de-
velopment actors and underpin all forms of development cooperation: “While differences between aid 
providers as well as aid modalities are acknowledged, all development partners are assumed to gather 
behind one global development agenda” (OECD 2011a, para. 2). Moreover: “We will hold each other 
accountable for implementing our respective actions in developing countries and at the international 
level. As we focus on implementing our commitments at the country level, we will form a new, inclu-
sive Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation to support implementation at the 
political level” (para. 13). Put simply, the performance of development partners is measured in terms 
of increasing the effectiveness of aid. Moreover, it is assumed that aid effectiveness principles are 
shared among all development partners. By contrast, this research does not take this effectiveness cri-
terion for granted, but argues that aid standards – concerning delivery and results – are always contest-
ed. To make the normative standards explicit that underlie any accountability relationship, this re-
search strives to separate the description of mutual accountability arrangements from the evaluation of 
their impact according to different normative standards.  
Second, mutual accountability is conceptualized in formal terms as a relationship between two parties, 
namely the aid-donating and the aid-receiving party. While in practice, both sides of the new aid com-
pact are composed of several actors (assumingly) united in their commitment to one global develop-
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ment agenda, the concept itself features a formal dyadic structure as shown by the dualistic structure of 
the main agreements of the international aid effectiveness agenda. In the Paris Declaration, for exam-
ple, “donors” and “partner countries” affirm that they will periodically assess mutual progress at the 
country level in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness (OECD 2005a, para. 10). In 
the Accra Agenda for Action, “donors” and “developing countries” reaffirm that they will hold each 
other accountable for mutually agreed development results, but recognize that they are also accounta-
ble to their respective public (OECD 2008a, para. 24). In the more recent Global Partnership of Busan, 
however, the dualistic structure is almost lost, since development partners are said to be not solely 
accountable to each other, but also jointly accountable to the intended beneficiaries of their co-
operation, as well as to their respective citizens at the domestic country level (OECD 2011a, para. 11). 
In accordance with this ever-expanding circle of actors in accountability arrangements around aid, this 
research’s concept of accountability exhibits a formal triadic structure that allows integrating citizens 
at the domestic country level in traditional donor-recipient aid relationships. Through conceptualizing 
aid modalities as accountability forums, this research conceives accountability for aid not solely as a 
relationship between those who donate and those who receive money, but as an institutionalized ar-
rangmenent in which recipient state, organized society, and the international community interact.  
Third, mutual accountability is conceptualized in classical terms as being answerable for one’s actions 
or behavior. Within the current aid architecture, development actors are answerable for the commit-
ments they have voluntarily made to one another. Accordingly, international agreements on aid effec-
tiveness generally refer to substantive norms for the behavior of actors, such as the “sharing of feed-
back for learning over time (Paris Declaration, para. 28) and the “creation of incentives for collabora-
tive behavior” (Accra Agenda for Action, para. 36) based on “openness, trust and mutual respect” 
(Global Partnership of Busan, para. 11). Development actors are said to maintain their commitments, 
respectively to change their behavior, not because they fear sanctions by their aid partners, but because 
“they value their relationship and reputation with each other and the larger development community” 
(Steer et al. 2009: 38-39). By contrast, this research does not reduce accountability for aid to a mutual-
ly beneficial relationship between aid recipients and their development partners. Instead, this research 
sees the possibility of sanctions as a constitutive element of accountability, since we may assume that 
under conditions of extreme inequality (characteristic of most aid-dependent political regimes) only 
sanctions by a powerful third party enforce compliance of the actor with standards given by a less 
powerful forum.  
In sum, as this comparison of mutual accountability with the concept of accountability used in this 
research has shown, accountability in the development literature refers primarily to a normative, dyad-
ic and classical concept. First of all, mutual accountability is a normative concept, since it is used to 
evaluate the conduct of development actors according to a set of normative standards. Staying close to 
the financial roots of the concept, mutual accountability possesses a formal dyadic structure, since it 
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focuses on the relationship between money-donating and money-receiving actors engaged in interna-
tional development cooperation. And finally, mutual accountability is defined in rather classical terms, 
since it is the internal responsibility of development actors for voluntary commitments that lies at the 
heart of the mutual accountability concept.  
 
2.1.3. Synthesis: conceptual framework 
Based on my review of the meaning of accountability in the democracy and development literature, 
this section proposes a conceptual framework to analyze the different goals and mechanisms of global 
accountability initiatives. Central to my conceptual framework is the clear separation between ac-
countability forums and accountability standards. Accountability forums concern the institutional ac-
countability relationships between development actors, while accountability standards refer to the 
norms and values that development actors use to lend legitimacy to these relationships.  
 
2.1.3.1. Fields: Interaction of two fields of accountability processes 
To analyze the accountability forums, I draw on scholars within the democracy literature who define 
and break down the concept of accountability by asking four simple questions (see Schedler 1999a; 
Behn 2001; Bovens 2007; Philp 2009):  
Who has to render an account? To identify the actor in the accountability relationship.  
To whom has the actor to render an account? To identify the forum in the accountability relationship.  
For what is the actor being held to account by the forum? To establish the conduct that stands central 
to the accountability relationship.  
Why should the actor render an account to the forum? To establish the consequences that may follow 
from the accountability relationship.16  
Together, we may thus ask who is accountable, to whom, for what, and why? Each of these questions 
highlights one key component of the definition of accountability given above, that is, the actor and the 
forum, their conduct and the possible consequences thereof. To these four questions, I add a fifth ques-
tion that has been raised about mutual accountability by scholars within the development literature 
(see Domingo et al. 2009: 9; Hudson 2009: 6):  
                                                     
16 The last question is sometimes also framed as a “how” question, through asking how the forum is holding the 
actor to account. Many development scholars framed it this way in order to identify the rules or the process by 
which accountability is achieved (e.g., Bendell and Cox 2006: 115). However, whether framed as a “why” or a 
“how” question, the answers given in the literature are seemingly similar; thus they are probably contained in 
each other (Philp 2009: 28, footnote 2).  
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Where is the forum holding the actor to account? To establish the level where the accountability rela-
tionship unfolds.  
Mapping out these five dimensions provides a starting point to deepen our understanding of mutual 
accountability and domestic accountability and how they might interact within institutionalized ac-
countability forums in recipient countries.  
Starting with the last question, the development literature mentions two levels of accountability (where 
the forum is holding the actor to account): One is the country level, and the other is the global level. 
Public accountability at the country level concerns the established mechanisms of accountability that 
citizens in donor countries and recipient countries can use to hold both donors and recipients of for-
eign aid accountable. By contrast, public accountability at the global level concerns the comparatively 
newer mechanisms of accountability that donors and recipients of aid have created to hold each other 
accountable.  
If we add the actors (who have to render an account) to these two possible levels of public accountabil-
ity, we arrive at a two-by-two matrix showing the two domains of accountability with regard to for-
eign aid (see Figure 2-4).  
Domestic accountability refers to the relationship between the “aid intermediaries” (i.e., donors and 
recipients) and their constituencies (i.e., citizens in either donor or recipient countries). In multilateral 
development assistance, international financial institutions (representing donor governments) and re-
cipient governments themselves act as intermediaries of domestic constituencies on whose behalf aid 
is managed and used. The relevant accountability holders in domestic accountability thus are the citi-
zens at the respective country level; today commonly subsumed under the notion "domestic stakehold-
ers” (to whom aid intermediaries owe an account). Key accountability institutions on which they rely 
for calling aid intermediaries to account are political parties, parliaments, the media, legal and quasi-
legal forums, interest groups, charity and other stakeholders (Bovens 2007: 455-457). Given the full 
range of domestic accountability institutions, the type of conduct (about which aid intermediaries have 
to render an account) is said to vary enormously (Bovens 2007: 460). Independent of the forum, how-
ever, the process of account-giving has generally been classified in financial, procedural or product 
terms within the democracy literature (Behn 2001: 224; Bovens 2007: 454; Philps 2009: 48).  
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Figure 2-4: Interplay of domestic and mutual accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: adapted from Domingo et al. (2009: 30) 
 
By contrast, mutual accountability refers to the two-way relationship between the “aid intermediaries” 
themselves. In multilateral development assistance, mutual accountability refers to the relationship 
between international financial institutions (i.e., aid donors) and borrowing governments (i.e., aid re-
cipients). Looked from the perspective of aid recipients, the relevant accountability holders in mutual 
accountability thus are the aid donors, nowadays dubbed “development partners” (to whom aid recipi-
ents owe an account and vice versa from the perspective of aid donors). The particular forum where 
aid intermediaries hold each other accountable for the delivery and use of aid is primarily determined 
by the aid modality in question, with some types of aid allowing for more and others for less space in 
terms of domestic accountability. In general, it may be said that aid that is programmable at the coun-
try levels, such as donor support to national development strategies and budgets allows for greater 
space, whereas non-programmable aid, such as humanitarian aid or non-governmental project funding 
does not give much or even no space at all for domestic accountability (Domingo et al. 2009: 14). 
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Probably due to its origin in the international aid effectiveness agenda, the type of the conduct (about 
which donors and recipients of foreign aid have to render an account to each other) has strong norma-
tive elements attached to it. Accordingly, mutual accountability has generally been understood as a 
standard for increased aid effectiveness and poverty reduction within the development literature (Do-
mingo et al. 2009: 15; Steer et al. 2009: 7).  
Finally, the question arises why aid intermediaries should render an account to their relevant constitu-
encies or among themselves. While domestic accountability is said to be driven mainly by domestic 
politics (Hudson 2009: 4), mutual accountability is said to be part of ongoing efforts to strengthen the 
effectiveness and pro-poor impact of aid (Droop et al. 2008: 4). However, this research argues that part 
of the answer also lies in the interplay of domestic accountability and mutual accountability at the 
recipient (and donor) country level. Specific mechanisms of mutual accountability (between donors 
and recipient of foreign aid) interfere with more established systems of domestic accountability (be-
tween governments and their citizens). Importantly, this research conceptualizes these two domains of 
accountability as fields of accountability (Eyben 2008: 23). In such a field perspective, accountability 
would not refer to a single process or a dyadic relationship but is “understood as a temporally sus-
tained collection of processes, nested within or overlapping with other fields” (Eyben 2008: 23). Thus, 
mutual accountability for aid can be imagined as being embedded within and interacting with domestic 
accountability systems at the recipient (and donor) country level.  
In the past, few scholarly analyses existed on the interplay of these two different fields or domains of 
accountability. Among them, the workstream on aid and accountability by the Governance Network 
(GOVNET) of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has been one of the most 
thoroughly consistent, systematic, comprehensive efforts to date. This workstream has involved a wide 
range of leading donors, recipient countries and experts on accountability to understand how “ac-
countability for aid” works (Domingo et al. 2009: 6). As part of this joint research effort, all domains 
of accountability involved in aid relationships have been studied. On the one hand, domestic account-
ability for aid between governments and citizens has been researched both for recipient governments 
(Hudson 2009) and donor governments (Vielajus, Hudson, Johnsson, and Neu 2009). On the other 
hand, mutual accountability between donors and recipients of aid, has also been explored both at the 
country level of recipient countries (Domingo, Wild, Hudson, and Wathne 2009; Steer, Wathne, and 
Driscoll 2009) and at the global level between donors and recipients of foreign aid (Droop, Isenman, 
and Mlalazi 2008). Jointly, these studies provide valuable groundwork on which to build my concep-
tual framework.  
Figure 2-4 portrays the interplay of these two accountability domains from the perspective of an aid 
recipient. Concerning the level and actors, I focus on the domestic (recipient) country level where aid 
recipients are being held accountable by aid donors and their respective constituencies. Conversely, I 
do not focus on the global level where donors and recipients of foreign aid hold each other accounta-
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ble. Regarding the forum and conduct, I focus on the conduct of aid recipients vis-à-vis domestic ac-
countability forums (upper left cell) for which they have to render an account to aid donors in mutual 
accountability forums at the recipient country level (upper right cell). Regarding possible consequenc-
es that may result from the interaction of these accountability domains, I focus solely on consequences 
for aid recipients at the recipient country level (upper right cell). This implies that I do not consider 
consequences for aid donors at the global level that may stem from the interaction of these two do-
mains at the donor country level (lower right cell). They have been the topic of an ever-growing 
stream of literature, particularly about the international financial institutions’ own accountability to-
wards their relevant public (see, e.g., Fox and Brown 1998; Woods 2001, Woods and Narliker 2001; 
Kapur 2002; Buira 2006; Scholte 2011).  
My conceptual framework thus shares with the GOVNET's workstream on aid and accountability its 
focus on the interaction between mutual accountability and domestic accountability at the recipient 
country level (upper right cell). However, it differs from their approach in that it does not take the 
normative standards for granted in accountability concerning aid, but leaves them to the empirical 
analysis to be determined. The question thus arises what these standards are that may underlie ac-
countability relationships in international development cooperation. In the following subsection, I will, 
therefore, look at the accountability standards that lend legitimacy to these relationships in order to 
understand the dynamics behind the shape of the ellipses in Figure 2-4.  
 
2.1.3.2. Standards: Performance measured according to three accountability standards 
To analyze the accountability standards, I draw on scholars within the development literature who 
outline the desired outcomes of “transparency and accountability initiatives”17 of late. As shown 
above, the primary rationale of most donors for creating and sustaining accountability arrangements in 
international development cooperation stems from their common mandate around poverty reduction 
and sustainable development (O’Neil et al. 2007: 14). However, more specific research on transparen-
cy and accountability initiatives – much of it based on World Bank research – has identified three 
broad kinds of impact associated with these initiatives (see Malena et al. 2004: 5; McGee and Gaventa 
2013: 16; O’Neil et al. 2007: 14).  
Effectiveness: First, strengthening transparency and accountability around aid contributes to increased 
aid effectiveness. Given that the three key groups of actors in aid delivery – donor community, recipi-
ent state and organized society – “have different (sometimes conflicting) goals and incentives, com-
pounded by information asymmetries and lack of communication” (Malena et al. 2004: 5), transparen-
                                                     
17 “The collective term “transparency and accountability initiatives” denotes a broad array of citizen-led and 
multi-stakeholder initiatives. While they often vary enormously, they share “common assumptions about the 
relationship of transparency and accountability, as well as the contributions that can be made by non-state actors 
to strengthening state regulatory and accountability capacities” (McGee and Gaventa 2013: 5). 
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cy and accountability initiatives that give voice to the poor and promote dialogue and mutual learning 
between the three groups of actors, can go a long way toward increasing the effectiveness of aid and 
making public decision-making more transparent, participatory and pro-poor (Malena et al. 2004: 5). 
Since poor people have the most to gain from enhanced accountability in the governance of aid, this 
perspective is most closely associated with the goal of reducing poverty.  
Governance: Second, strengthening transparency and accountability around aid also contributes to 
improved governance of the recipient state. Since many recipient states face what the World Bank has 
termed a “crisis in governance” (Narayan et al. 2000: 197) – citing a lack of responsiveness, abuse of 
discretion, corruption, favoritism and weak accountability on the part of the executive branch of go-
vernment – , transparency and accountability initiatives that support domestic constituencies to moni-
tor compliance of the executive with existing rules and possibly sanction executive misbehavior can 
thus provide a means for improving the quality of governance and strengthening the democratic insti-
tutions and processes in recipient states. By increasing the rule of law and government respect for the 
electoral process, accountability in this perspective is thus linked to normative standards of procedural 
democracy.  
Empowerment: Third, beyond improving the quality of governance in recipient states, strengthening 
transparency and accountability around aid can also target at empowering organized civil society. In 
many countries worldwide, major parts of the population are effectively excluded from the public 
sphere due to “gender, societal inequalities, lack of organization, cultures of intolerance or intimida-
tion and violence” (Luckham et al. 2001: 22). In response to these democratic deficits, contemporary 
initiatives for strengthening transparency and accountability often “go beyond traditional understand-
ings of representative democracy through creating and supporting more participatory mechanisms of 
citizen engagement, which in turn are built upon, and support, more robust views of the rights and 
responsibilities of democratic citizenship” (Gaventa 2006: 264). Thereby, they can create significant 
incentives for recipient governments to commit to the needs of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups 
and to fulfill their human rights obligations, consistent with substantive democracy targets.  
While this last perspective is seen by some scholars merely as a manifestation of the former perspec-
tive, I rather see this perspective as a distinct effort for strengthening substantive democracy through 
addressing the gap between democratic institutions of the state and the deep politics of society – as 
opposed to efforts for strengthening democratic institutions and procedure.18 The idea that the PRS 
process provides an onset of democratic practices in recipient countries (Molenaers and Renard 2006: 
8) refers directly to the substantive democracy case.  
                                                     
18 See Luckham et al. (2001: 22) for an excellent analysis of these two different concepts of democracy and their 
relevance in the international development context.  
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The three broad impacts identified by specific research on transparency and accountability initiatives 
in the development literature broadly concur with the three general “promises” (Dubnick 2002) of 
public accountability in the democracy literature that recur, albeit implicitly, time and again (for a 
good review of these promises, see Bovens 2010). Accordingly, accountability is essential, because it 
enhances the effectiveness and learning capacity of public administration; because it prevents the con-
centration and abuse of power by public authorities; and because it expands democratic participation 
beyond the electoral arena. Following this conceptual sketch of the institutional arrangements and the 
normative standards that underlie external efforts for promoting government accountability to citizens 
in developing countries, the next section will distinguish between different theoretical models of pub-
lic accountability.  
 
 
2.2. Model 
Accountability within democratic theory has received slightly different shadings depending on aca-
demic tradition and the target level of accountability. At the center of my work are the accountability 
forums in which development actors interact. Development actors use different mechanisms to hold 
each other accountable within these forums. To approach these mechanisms in theoretical terms, I 
follow global governance scholars who have theorized accountability mechanisms beyond the national 
level, since accountability forums may be situated both at the national and at the global level. In par-
ticular, I adopt the pluralist-institutionalist model of accountability by Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane 
(2005), who discriminate between two basic mechanisms for holding public power to account – dele-
gation and participation – that lend legitimacy to accountability arrangements at the country and the 
global level.  
I choose to adopt their pluralist-institutionalist model, because they are not taking the normative con-
tent of accountability for granted, but identify different “standards of legitimacy” (Grant and Keohane 
2005: 35) that need to be distinguished from the operation of accountability mechanisms for holding 
power wielders to account (social concept); because they conceive of accountability not as a dyadic 
relationship between two parties, but as a “configuration of power” (Grant and Keohane 2005: 40) 
where a plurality of public, private, and civil society actors interact (triadic concept); and because they 
emphasize that there is no single legitimate mechanism for accountability, but many mechanisms 
should be explored with the full recognition that their “appropriateness and efficacy […] will depend 
on the particular context” (radial concept) (Grant and Keohane 2005: 40).  
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My approach may be juxtaposed with the stakeholder democracy model as the main alternative ap-
proach towards public accountability in the global governance literature.19 This model also focuses on 
accountability arrangements beyond state borders, but it differs from the pluralist-institutionalist mod-
el in that it defines specific normative values of democracy, justice and socio-economic equality that 
are widely shared within the international community as global standards for evaluating the behavior 
of answerable actors (normative concept); it stipulates symmetry and congruence between decision-
makers and decision-takers in global accountability arrangements (dyadic concept); and it assumes 
that accountability mechanisms based on participatory and deliberative democracy are the much 
sought-after “magic bullet” for global accountability (classical concept).  
In the following, I will compare my theoretical approach based on the pluralist-institutionalist model 
with other models of public accountability that are found in democratic theory. This outline of the 
different approaches to public accountability in the democracy literature enables me to situate the 
newer proposals for reforming aid in the development literature according to their specific mecha-
nisms for holding public power to account. Despite their differences, all accountability mechanisms 
have one thing in common, and that is that they lend legitimacy to the governance arrangement at 
hand. By revealing the century-old democratic thinking behind today’s development practices, I ex-
pect to contribute to a better understanding of the more political and rights-based development ap-
proach that has been introduced into the current aid architecture.  
 
2.2.1. Democracy literature: accountability in democratic theory 
Democratic theory gives a rich and complex picture of the way how public power is held to account. 
Following Grant and Keohane (2005), theoretical models of public accountability fall into two aca-
demic traditions of infusing governance arrangements with legitimacy. Legitimacy may rest on claims 
derived from the delegation of authority or the participation in governance (Grant and Keohane 2005: 
41). This distinction draws on a long-standing scholarly debate whether those who govern should be 
held accountable by those who entrusted them with powers or by those affected by their actions (Grant 
and Keohane 2005: 31). Within these two traditions, I distinguish six theoretical models of public ac-
countability.20 While I have adopted the first four models from Craig Borowiak’s (2011) excellent 
review of public accountability in democratic theory, I have derived the last two models out of my 
own engagement with the global governance literature.21 Table 2-2 summarizes the six models that can 
                                                     
19 See Held and Koenig-Archibugi Global Governance and Public Accountability (2005) for an excellent intro-
duction to the scholarly debate and a collection of some basic essays. 
20 Notwithstanding that these models of accountability have their intellectual roots in democratic theory, I will 
speak of “public accountability” instead of “democratic accountability” in order to keep the institutional ar-
rangement clean from any normative connotations, including democracy.  
21 Borowiak also discusses what accountability in global governance means. While I sometimes refer to his dis-
cussion of “liberal cosmopolitanism” and “skeptical pluralism” (that approximate my “stakeholder democracy” 
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be found in the democracy and global governance literature. To highlight similarities and differences, I 
will present them two at a time in the way they have evolved in space and over time.  
Table 2-2: Models of public accountability in democratic theory 
Level Participation Delegation 
State Participatory democracy model: 
Visibility 
Participation 
Generating community 
Republican-federalist model: 
Institutions 
Delegation 
Regulating gaps 
National Deliberative democracy model: 
Mutuality 
Dialogue 
Collective problem-solving 
Principal-agent model: 
Hierarchy 
Discipline 
Collective action problems 
Global Stakeholder democracy model: 
Civic publics 
Direct involvement 
Universal values 
Pluralist-institutionalist model: 
Regulatory agencies 
Indirect control 
Plural mechanisms 
 
2.2.1.1. State level 
The first two models of public accountability may be viewed as ancient blueprints for contemporary 
accountability debates. The participatory democracy model of accountability has its origins in ancient 
Athens, while the republican-federalist model has been presented during the eighteen-century ratifica-
tion debate over the U.S. Constitution. Accountability forums in both models are situated at the state 
level, that is, at the level of ancient Greek city-states or U.S. states respectively. In both cases of “pre-
modern republics”, citizens were directly engaged in small polities governing themselves (Plattner 
1999: 64-65). Besides the target level of the accountability forum, these two ancient perspectives on 
public accountability also shared a focus on the principle of sovereignty and were mindful of the po-
tential abuses of power in politics. Central to ancient Athens was the question of how the rule by the 
people could be guaranteed. To this end, the Athenians developed an ingenious set of accountability 
mechanisms and practices to check the “dangers of concentrated power and of the corruptibility of 
their fellow citizens” (Borowiak 2011: 82). This went so far that citizens even could be punished for 
“sheer bad luck” as they were also being held accountable for being demonstrably incompetent or 
dishonest (Elster 1999: 276). The ratification debate over the U.S. Constitution, in turn, centered on 
the question whether the principle of popular sovereignty could be maintained in the light of an ex-
tending political sphere. While Federalists and Anti-Federalists disagreed on the perils of concentrated 
power, the republican principle of self-governance was fiercely defended from both sides (Borowiak 
2011: 27). The participatory democracy and republican-federalist model differ, however, concerning 
their emphasis on different accountability mechanisms. While ancient Athens emphasizes the partici-
patory logic through creating a political system where citizens had to answer before their peers public-
                                                                                                                                                                      
and “pluralist-institutionalist” model), I consider the work by other scholars who focus more on what accounta-
bility means in international development cooperation as a useful complement to his more general review of the 
concept in democratic theory.  
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ly, the U.S. ratification debate accentuates the delegation logic given the introduction of more distance 
between citizens and their representatives in the federal constitution.  
 
Participatory democracy model 
The visibility of political power was an essential feature of ancient Athens’ participatory democracy. 
The formerly “privileged secret spheres of the governing elite – the monarchs, warrior-aristocrats, and 
priests – were gradually recast into a public sphere of open scrutiny and debate”, the so-called polis 
(Borowiak 2011: 85). Public accountability in the polis manifested itself in an open and public pro-
cess, where citizens had to answer before their peers. Visibility was important as a means for punish-
ing individuals because it allowed exposing wrongdoing and clarifying the targets of sanctioning pow-
er (Borowiak 2011: 8). At the same time, visibility was also understood by the Athenians as a means 
of “constituting the polis” meaning that citizens came to mutually recognize each other as equals 
(Borowiak 2011: 89). Mechanisms of public accountability in Athens democracy were thus more than 
merely mechanisms for checking abuses of power. They were vital elements of a “broader culture of 
participation and mutuality” (Borowiak 2011: 79).  
Civic participation was the central mechanism through with accountability in Athens direct democracy 
was ensured. In theoretical terms, citizens participated on both sides of the accountability relationship. 
On the forum side, there was a broad range of accountability mechanisms and practices based on direct 
civic involvement, such as generally open proceedings of the General Assembly and the courts, re-
wards for attendance and punishment for non-attendance of Assembly sessions for all citizens, courts 
composed of citizens selected by democratic election or by lot, courts welcoming any criticism during 
proceedings, and so forth (Borowiak 2011: 87). On the actor side, the participatory logic put every 
(male) citizen into public service at one point or another. Due to this temporal modulation, almost 
every (male) citizen was directly being held accountable by a public forum at least once in a lifetime 
(Borowiak 2011: 87-88). This unique fabric of public accountability in ancient Athens allowed not 
only to prevent the concentration of power, but also “helped to uphold political equality” (Borowiak 
2011: 88).  
In the end, participatory accountability mechanisms contributed in large part to the generation of a 
“community of free and equal citizens collectively governing themselves” (Borowiak 2011: 87). The 
Athenians did not understand political community in some abstract sense, but as real citizenship prac-
tice being activated and sustained by public accountability dynamics. Key to this “culture of accounta-
bility” in ancient Athens was its mutuality, meaning that citizens were both subjects and objects of 
power (Borowiak 2011: 88). Citizens were both accountability holder and accountability holdee. This 
specific quality of both-ness cultivated “a sense of belonging to a larger community of political 
equals” (Borowiak 2011: 79-80).   
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Republican-federalist model 
The particular institutional design played an essential role in the debate on the ratification of the U.S. 
Constitution in 1787 (Borowiak 2011: 27). Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists perceived accounta-
bility arrangements as a principal way to institutionalize popular control. They did not want a system 
of direct rule by the people as understood by the Athenians, but envisioned a system of indirect con-
trol by the people. Not the visibility of political power, but the institutionalization of citizen control 
was seen as a principal way to ensure popular sovereignty and to protect against the abuses of power 
(Borowiak 2011: 30). However, Federalists and Anti-Federalists differed in their envisioned institu-
tional designs. The Federalists supported the ratification of the new U.S. Constitution in order to con-
centrate political power and thus introduce more distance between government and citizens. They 
argued that good government needs “high-quality leaders” and some autonomy from the people to be 
effective (Borowiak 2011: 36). The Anti-Federalists, by contrast, declined to adopt a new constitution. 
They feared that too much concentration of power and too much distance between government and 
citizens would make the constitution “devoid of all responsibility or accountability to the great body of 
the people” (Centinel, cited by Borowiak 2011: 42).  
The delegation of authority to the centers of governmental power figures as the central mechanism 
through which accountability in the new U.S. Constitution would be ensured. Federalists were eager to 
distinguish their republic from earlier forms of participatory democracy, which they characterized as 
“a state of perpetual vibration, between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy” (Hamilton, cited by 
Borowiak 2011: 32). In particular, Federalists were concerned that majority groups within the demos 
were able to exert a tyranny over the minority – “without having to account for their actions” (Borowi-
ak 2011: 33). They thus suggested limiting citizens’ participation in governance through mechanisms 
based on the delegation of authority. According to the Federalists, the delegation logic should make 
every magistrate “personally responsible for his behavior in office”, while being checked, at the same 
time, by his “dependence on the people" (Borowiak 2011: 34). In this way, they argued, “sovereignty 
is retained by the people but exercised at a safe distance” (Borowiak 2011: 34).  
Anti-Federalists, by contrast, were more attentive to the potential gaps22 created through the new con-
stitution between citizens and their representatives. They feared that citizens would get disempowered 
and the republican “spirit” lost if the government is installed at too great a distance (Borowiak 2011: 
43). They also feared that electoral institutions themselves could be manipulated by upper-class politi-
cal elites against the lower and middle classes and agrarian communities (Borowiak 2011: 43). Since 
these gaps between citizens and their representatives could take many forms, they thus suggested a 
whole series of institutional reforms, such as shorter electoral cycles; the maintenance of the recall 
option by the states; the abolition of the bicameral system; and the enlargement of the number of re-
presentatives (Borowiak 2011: 35-50).  
                                                     
22 For an overview and definition of these gaps of representation, see Borowiak (2011: 31). 
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Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed that the institutionalization of citizen control is essential for 
managing governance. Both sides did not want the gaps between citizens and their representatives to 
collapse completely (as with the participatory democracy model of ancient Athens), but they wanted to 
regulate them (Borowiak 2011: 30). In the end, however, history has been kinder to the type of institu-
tional design the Federalists had in mind. They had the winning arguments in the eighteenth-century 
ratification debate. However, the republican model of the Anti-Federalists has made an impressive 
comeback in the contemporary debates over global governance and the future of representative democ-
racy (Borowiak 2011: 51).  
 
2.2.1.2. National level 
The two models of public accountability that have been situated at the national level in Table 2-2 may 
be viewed as the dominant perspectives within the academic debate on public accountability, probably 
because they are associated most clearly with either the delegation logic (principal-agent model) and 
the participatory logic (deliberative democracy model) for holding power to account. Given their joint 
focus on modern forms of representative government, accountability forums in both models have been 
situated at the national level. Besides their joint engagement with national institutions and practices, 
these two modern perspectives on public accountability both focus on the role of elections and how 
voters may hold public officials accountable at election time – and in between. According to the prin-
cipal-agent model, the electoral connection is understood as a hierarchical relationship between self-
interested agents (i.e., public officials) and their principals (i.e., citizens), whose preferences and inter-
ests they are supposed to serve. While agents are motivated to shirk, principals can sanction shirking 
behavior through the mechanism of elections (Borowiak 2011: 53; Maravall 1999: 155; Stimson 1999: 
198). According to the deliberative model, by contrast, public accountability does not only take place 
on election dates, but also between elections. In representative democracies, there is much accounta-
bility taking place outside the privacy of the voting booth. Deliberative democracy scholars view elec-
tions, and in particular electoral campaigns, as only one of many public forums, where citizens and 
public officials challenge and respond to each other (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 142). The delib-
erative democracy model thus differs from the principal-agent model in its directionality. While the 
former perceives accountability as a two-way social exchange between citizens and representatives, 
the latter perceives accountability as a one-way reporting from elected officials to the electorate.  
 
Principal-agent model 
Like the republican-federalist model, the principal-agent model focuses on control, delegation, and 
representation. Unlike the republican-federalist model, the principal-agent model is based on narrower 
methodological assumptions adapted from economic theory. First and foremost, it conceptualizes ac-
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countability relationships as “agency relationships in which one party is understood to be an ‘agent’ 
who makes some choices on behalf of a ‘principal’ who has powers to sanction or reward the agent” 
(Fearon 1999: 55). Second, it is based on methodological individualism explaining people's behavior 
in terms of rational choice, i.e., assuming that individuals are “egoistic, rational, and interest-
maximizing” (Borowiak 2011: 55). And third, in order to predict the behavior of the involved people, 
it uses formal theory often accompanied by mathematical formulas to model relationships between 
agents and principals, who have been stripped of all their social and cultural class markers they had in 
the republican-federalist model (Borowiak 2011: 54).  
The concept of hierarchy figures prominently in agency theory and as a result, in the principal-agent 
model of public accountability. Erika Moreno and colleagues (2003) have been most explicit on this 
point. According to them, decision-making in large entities implies a delegation of authority. The 
principal assigns the right to make a decision to the agent, but this assignment is always conditional. 
That it may be withdrawn, as they point out, is the “very essence of accountability” (Moreno, Crisp, 
and Shugart 2003: 83). In modern governments, the concept of representation has been at the core of 
efforts to balance the democratic principle of rule by the people with the practical need for the delega-
tion of responsibility in governmental hierarchies (Borowiak 2011: 59). This trade-off has been con-
ceptualized in principal-agent terms as involving two closely related processes that run in opposite 
directions: authorization that runs from principals to agents and accountability that runs from agents to 
principals (Moreno et al. 2003: 83). While authorization “establishes the conditional authority and sets 
the standards”, accountability and in particular, electoral mechanisms offer citizen-principals a means 
to keep control over their agent-representatives (Borowiak 2011: 60). These processes are always 
framed in vertical terms in the principal-agent model because subordinate agents are supposed to act 
on behalf of superior principals (Moreno et al. 2003: 85).  
Moreover, relationships between principals and agents are characterized by discipline. In politics, this 
usually means that citizen-principals dismiss representative-agents by denying them reelection. 
Whether this disciplinary function is exerted directly (via the election of government) or indirectly (via 
the election of an intermediate body that elects or appoints the government), all politicians in the prin-
cipal-agent model of public accountability are ultimately accountable to the same principal, the citi-
zenry (Moreno et al. 2003: 84).23 However, there exist a multitude of mechanisms in representative 
governments – besides elections – for disciplining public officials. Jon Elster (1999), for example, 
notes that in politics sanctions may take the form of “dismissal with additional punishment” (e.g., im-
mediate dismissal followed by the opening of judicial proceedings) or “punishment without dismissal” 
(e.g., denial of promotion or downgrading his or her authority). Nevertheless, the most important sanc-
tioning mechanism in politics remains “dismissal without any further punishment” (Elster 1999: 255-
256).  
                                                     
23 Principal-agent scholars often speak of “the citizenry” or “the public” as the ultimate sovereign or principal in 
a democracy (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999: 222; Dunn 1999: 298; and Moreno et al. 2003: 84). 
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A final characteristic of the principal-agent model of public accountability is that it pays much atten-
tion to collective action problems. In general, collective action problems are said to fall into two cate-
gories: “adverse selection” and “moral hazard”.24 Adverse selection refers to the challenge of selecting 
reliable agents “and deselecting them if they prove unreliable” (Borowiak 2011: 57). Moral hazard, by 
contrast, concerns the challenge of deterring agents from shirking after they have received authoriza-
tion (Borowiak 2011: 57). In the principal-agent model, the value of elections as a control mechanism 
(or of any other accountability mechanism) does not only stem from “its actual use” (corrective ef-
fect), but also from “the belief that it might be used” (deterrent effect) (Elster 1999: 257; Behn 2001: 
14). Elections thus correct for adverse selection by “removing poor-performing officials from office” 
(Borowiak 2011: 61). However, elections also control for moral hazard by disciplining elected offi-
cials with the credible threat that they may lose their offices in the next election round (Boix 2003: 
208; Borowiak 2011: 61).  
 
Deliberative democracy model 
Deliberative democracy shares with participatory democracy an emphasis on publicity, participation, 
and community. However, deliberative democracy differs from participatory democracy insofar that it 
shifts the focus from the public sphere to the quality of public deliberation, and that it widens the basis 
for inclusion beyond membership in existing political communities (Borowiak 2011: 101; Gutmann 
and Thompson 1996: 52).  
The concept of mutuality figures prominently in the deliberative version of representative accountabi-
lity. For example, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996), assert that the basic idea of delibera-
tive democracy is that both citizens and public officials seek mutually justifiable reasons that can be 
accepted by those who are bound by them (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 52). While in a deliberative 
forum, each is accountable to all; this is difficult to realize in political practice (Gutmann and Thomp-
son 1996: 128).  
According to Gutmann and Thompson, modern representative government poses two challenges to 
universal accountability. The first challenge, what they call the “challenge of specialization”, refers to 
the specialized actors who are being held accountable in deliberative forums. Representation creates 
gaps between citizens and representatives. Almost by definition, some “specialists” (representatives) 
deliberate for all (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 128). Representation thus comes at a cost: politicians 
may become active “specialists” in political deliberation, while ordinary citizens remain with the role 
of passive “spectators” (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 132). Two dangers derive from this division of 
labor: One is elitism or the danger that political equality among citizens decreases, i.e., that the spe-
                                                     
24 These two general problems of economic theory have been mainstreamed into the principal-agent model of 
accountability (see, e.g., Borowiak 2011: 57, 61; Maravall 1999: 158-169; Stimson 1999: 198). 
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cialists come to dominate the spectators utilizing a deliberative process. The other is populism or the 
danger that the quality of the public deliberation decreases, i.e., that public opinion prevails over the 
specialists’ political and moral expertise (Gutmann and Thompson 1999: 132, 137).  
The second, so-called “challenge of constituency” concerns the identity of the public forums that hold 
these specialized actors accountable. In representative democracies, public officials are primarily ac-
countable to those who brought them into office, namely their voters and political parties (Gutmann 
and Thompson 1996: 128-129). In addition to these electoral constituents, however, as Gutmann and 
Thompson explicate, democratically elected representatives should also be obliged to justify their de-
cisions towards “moral constituents” across space (e.g., citizens of other countries), identity (e.g., 
marginalized groups of citizens), and time (e.g., citizens still to be born), which are themselves not 
part of the electoral process (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 145). These different identities of constit-
uents, in turn, imply that representatives may be understood either in a narrow sense as “delegates” of 
electoral constituents or more broadly as “trustees” of moral constituents they represent. This has also 
been called the “classical dilemma of representation”, because both of these two constituents may 
reasonably demand that their interests are being represented at the same time (Gutmann and Thomp-
son 1996: 145).  
In the end, as Gutmann and Thompson conclude, these challenges are here to remain. While more 
participation is generally wanted from the perspective of participatory democracy, in deliberative de-
mocracy representation is both necessary and desirable. It is necessary due to the scale and complexi-
ties of modern government; and it is desirable, because of the practical limits to the number of people 
who can reasonably deliberate at the same time (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 131).  
Despite these challenges, the deliberative democracy model of accountability broadens the meaning of 
accountability in three different ways as compared to the principal-agent model. First, deliberative 
democrats think of public accountability in terms of mutual reason-giving between citizens and their 
representatives rather than in terms of hierarchical delegation and unilateral control of representatives 
by citizens. Second, while ongoing deliberation in public forums is no substitute for periodical voting 
en masse, the notion of deliberative accountability shifts the emphasis: in place of discipline and con-
trol of representative-agents by citizen-principals, dialogue and mutual understanding among citizens 
and their representatives comes in the first place (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 142). Finally, the 
deliberative democracy model perceives public accountability “as a way to foster collective problem 
solving and expanded worldview” (Borowiak 2011: 101), which may be contrasted with the principal-
agent model that has primarily focused on collective action problems derived from a narrow set of 
methodological assumptions.  
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2.2.1.3. Global level 
The last two models of public accountability in Table 2-2 may be seen as the contemporary counter-
parts of the long-standing debate between the participation and delegation strand within democratic 
theory – but concerning public accountability at the global level. They ask to what extent these ideas 
and practices of representative government can be transferred to global governance. Global govern-
ance scholars agree that the “unbundling” of the relationship between territoriality, popular sovereign-
ty and political power has resulted in a widespread sense of “losing control” (pluralist-institutionalist 
model) over governance decision that significantly affects one’s “life and life chances” (stakeholder 
democracy model) (Borowiak 2011: 152-153; Young 2000: 23). However, they disagree about the 
proposed solution statements. Those who adhere to a stakeholder democracy model want to strengthen 
the political responsibility of global governance institutions through increasing civic participation in 
global governance (e.g., Held 2005; Nanz and Steffek 2005; Zürn 2005). The pluralist-institutionalist 
model, by contrast, aims at strengthening popular control of global governance institutions through 
institutionalizing a plurality of accountability mechanisms at the global level based on democratic and 
nondemocratic sources of power (e.g., Kahler 2005; Keohane 2005; Moravcsik 2005).  
 
Stakeholder democracy model 
In the stakeholder democracy model, “global civic publics” 25 take center stage, that is, the people who 
collectively form the constituency of a given global governance institution (Scholte 2011: 22).26 The 
concept of “stakeholder” thereby serves to group together all people who have “a stake” in what a 
given institution does and to whom it should, therefore, be “giving an account” (Mfunwa 2006: 3). 
The stakeholder concept is considered to be particularly useful at the global level, because it groups 
people not by their nationality, but based on their affectedness, thereby redefining accountability as a 
multi-stakeholder concept (Bendell and Cox 2006: 114; Brown and Fox 1998: 474). Broadly defined, 
stakeholders, refer to “any group or individuals who can affect or is affected by […] an organization” 
(Freeman 1984, cited by Kovach 2006: 201).27 This all-affected-principle may be seen as a revival of 
the “forgotten equivalence principle” that stipulates symmetry and congruence between political deci-
sion-makers and decision-takers (Kaul et al. 2003, cited by Held 2005: 247). However, the basic di-
lemma in today’s world is that those who decide are not the ones being affected by these decisions. At 
                                                     
25 Importantly, “the public sphere” in the stakeholder democracy model does not consist of one single political 
space, but is “conceived as a pluralistic social realm of a variety of sometimes overlapping or contending (often 
sectoral) publics engaged in transnational dialogue” (Nanz and Steffek 2005: 197). 
26 Following Scholte (2011), “global governance” may be defined as “a complex of rules and regulatory institu-
tions that apply to transplanetary jurisdictions and constituencies” (Scholte 2011: 8). This newer term is distin-
guished from the older label “international organizations”, because of its reference to planetary (and not inter-
governmental) realms that include both state and non-state actors (Scholte 2011: 10).  
27 For a practical application of this accountability model, see the Global Accountability Project by the UK-
based One World Trust, which uses a multi-stakeholder approach in assessing the accountability of the world’s 
most powerful organizations (see OWT 2005).  
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the national level, the tension between the sphere of decision-makers and the sphere of decision-takers 
has been resolved by the idea of territorially bounded political community, which creates accountabil-
ity mechanisms and practices to match these two circles (Held 2005: 248). But at the global level, 
there is no political community and no congruence between these two spheres. The question thus aris-
es how far we should extend the boundaries at the global level? The literature on deliberative democ-
racy has given two answers: one that restricts the circle to those being governed and one that extends 
its boundaries to those being affected. While Gutmann and Thompson (1996) have used the “all-
affected-principle” to draw moral constituents into public accountability arrangements, they distin-
guish between those “whose well-being is significantly affected” (moral constituents) and “those who 
are bound by the laws and policies” (electoral constituents). Where conflicts between these two con-
stituents exist, they argue, decision-makers will always give special consideration to the latter (Gut-
mann and Thompson 1996: 128-129, 145). By contrast, the literature on stakeholder democracy con-
tends that not only the people who are governed but also those who are significantly affected by the 
decisions of those who govern should be included in public accountability arrangements. Iris Marion 
Young (2000), for instance, argues that the criterion of inclusion provides legitimacy to global ac-
countability mechanisms. However, this does not mean that “everyone affected by decisions in any 
trivial way ought to be party to them”, but that at least those persons whose options for action are sig-
nificantly conditioned by the decisions and policies of global governance agencies should be included 
(Young 2000: 23). As opposed to many others in this academic tradition, the primary reference for her 
is not “democracy per se”, but “justice”. According to her, obligations of justice are global; and where 
there is justice, there is also a need for accountability mechanisms to address potential instances of 
injustice (Borowiak 2011: 116). Accordingly, those who are significantly affected by the decisions and 
policies of a global governance agency have a legitimate claim to demand justice through holding this 
institution accountable. It follows that a decision of a global governance agency is legitimate to the 
extent that all those being significantly affected by it have been included in the process of discussion 
and decision making (Young 2000: 23).  
From the above discussion, it follows that direct involvement of stakeholders in public decision-
making processes is deemed to be crucial in the stakeholder democracy model. However, given the 
perceived democratic deficits of global governance, traditional expert deliberation within global gov-
ernance agencies is perceived to be not enough. Instead, as argued by Patrizia Nanz and Jens Steffek 
(2005), the internal discussion and decision-making of global governance agencies need to be opened 
towards their publics, because a “parliamentarization of politics” above the national level is not in 
sight (Nanz and Steffek 2005: 196). Such an opening would imply that “certain participatory condi-
tions for rule-making” are institutionalized at the global level, like “transparency of the decision-
making process”, “inclusion of stakeholder concerns”, and “empowerment of marginalized groups of 
stakeholders”, and so forth (Nanz and Steffek 2005: 202).  
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To enhance the legitimacy of global governance, scholars in this tradition propose to strengthen the 
direct participation of national stakeholders in global governance – or transnational civil society more 
generally (Zürn 2005: 138). Moreover, they claim that civic participation in the stakeholder democracy 
model – like in the participatory democracy model – is not only about creating transparency of the 
decision-making process, but also has a dynamic and ongoing character. Various scholars thus sug-
gested that global governance agencies should open themselves towards their publics both in terms of 
prospective justification of actions (i.e., formulation of policies) and retrospective answerability for 
their actions (i.e., evaluation of policies) (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005: 3); that global governance 
agencies should involve “all stakeholders at all stages of an organization’s decision-making from for-
mulation to evaluation” (Kovach 2006: 196-197); and that global governance agency should be 
“transparent to those affected, consult those affected, report to those affected and provide redress to 
those who are adversely affected” (Scholte 2011: 17).  
To ensure that public accountability in global governance has a democratizing effect, the stakeholder 
democracy model draws on universal values generally associated with democracy, including political 
equality, freedom, and control (Lauth 2004: 10, 31). Jem Bendell and Phyllida Cox (2006) call this 
inclusion of stakeholder concerns in global governance arrangements “stakeholder democracy”, which 
they define as “an ideal system of governance of a society where all stakeholders in an organization or 
activity have the same opportunity to govern that organization or activity” (Bendell and Cox 2006: 
114). Key to this understanding of democracy is the role played by (transnational) civil society. While 
“civil society” features multiple and conflicting meanings28, it is regarded as a “discursive interface”, 
or “transmission belt” between global governance institutions and an emerging transnational public 
sphere in the stakeholder democracy model (Nanz and Steffek 2005: 191, 199; Fox and Brown 1998: 
21). On the one hand, civil society actors can give voice to stakeholder concerns and channel them into 
deliberative processes within global governance agencies. On the other hand, they can make internal 
decision-making processes transparent and formulate them in ways more accessible to a broader public 
(Nanz and Steffek 2005: 199). As a result, scholars within this tradition hope that the participation of 
transnational civil society – understood as the global demos – will lend democratic legitimacy to glob-
al governance arrangements (Nanz and Steffek 2005: 192; Brown and Fox 1998: 474).  
 
Pluralist-institutionalist model 
In the pluralist-institutionalist model, the focus of global governance scholars lies on “specialized reg-
ulatory agencies” who advance the interests of their “shareholders”, that is, “the national governments 
that ‘own’ them by authority of treaty” (Kahler 2005: 12). Global governance agencies are said to be 
accountable to the governed, but not necessarily in a democratic way. In the tradition of the principal-
                                                     
28 See Scholte for four main contemporary usages of a deeply contested concept (Scholte 2011: 33-34). 
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agent model, the pluralist-institutionalist model of public accountability perceives global governance 
agencies as “unelected, technical, specialized instruments of national governments” similar to non-
majoritarian institutions at the national level, such as central banks and other regulatory agencies. 
These specialized regulatory agencies (i.e., the agents) are meant to be accountable to their national 
governments (i.e., the principals) who entrusted them with powers (Grant and Keohane 2005: 31; 
Kahler 2005: 11, 16; Borowiak 2011: 158). The principal lines of accountability run to powerful states 
– whether they are democratic or not. There is thus generally adequate oversight of global governance 
agencies by national governments; and if there are democratic deficits, then these are the result of 
choices by their “masters” and not symptoms of a dysfunctional global polity (Kahler 2005: 16-17; 
Grant and Keohane 2005: 37). It follows that decisions of global governance agencies are legitimate to 
the extent that they are based on existing norms and mechanisms to hold global power wielder to ac-
count –independent of whether they are derived from democratic sources of power or not.  
In the pluralist-institutionalist model, citizens exercise only indirect control over global governance 
agencies. For instance, Jan-Aart Scholte (2011) recognizes that global actors are usually being held 
accountable “as parts of larger regulatory arrangements” (Scholte 2011: 20). In particular, he claims 
that transnational policy networks are characterized by a wide variety of regulatory actors that join 
national delegates in global governance, such as transgovernmental, interregional, translocal, private 
and public-private bodies. These are, in turn, accompanied by non-regulatory actors, such as corporate, 
media, and civil society actors. Together, they form “polycentric networks” that may be characterized 
as “post-statist” and “post-sovereign”. They are post-statist in that they involve multiple kinds of ac-
tors in addition to state actors; and they are post-sovereign in that they lack “a single locus of supreme, 
absolute and comprehensive authority” (Scholte 2011: 18-19).  
Since no final arbiter exists that can effectively and legitimately hold global governance agencies ac-
countable, the question then arises how can global governance agencies be held accountable? Thomas 
Risse (2005), for instance, has answered this question by distinguishing between compliance-based 
and integrity-based global accountability mechanisms as two different, non-hierarchical forms of 
steering at the global level. Compliance-based global accountability mechanisms “use incentives and 
sanctions to manipulate the cost-benefit calculations of actors so as to convince them that rule compli-
ance is in their best interest” (Risse 2005: 168-169). By contrast, integrity-based global accountability 
systems focus on increasing the moral legitimacy of the rules and norms in question in order to make 
actors comply voluntarily with them (Risse 2005: 169). Drawing on the literature on republican mod-
els of public accountability, we may say that global representatives are seen as “trustees” of wider 
publics for which they should feel responsible, while being checked, at the same time, by their peers in 
integrity-based accountability systems (as argued by the Federalist). By contrast, global representa-
tives are seen as “delegates” of those who entrusted them with power and who may withdraw this 
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conditionally delegated authority in case of non-compliance with rules and interests in compliance-
based accountability systems (as argued by the Anti-Federalists).29  
To reduce contemporary “accountability gaps” between citizens and their representatives in global 
governance, scholars within this tradition explore a plurality of accountability mechanisms to institu-
tionalize citizen control within transnational policy networks. Most prominently, Ruth Grant and Rob-
ert Keohane (2005) offer a distinction, “evident in theories of accountability at the nation-state level 
between “participation” and “delegation” models of accountability” (Grant and Keohane 2005: 29). 
They argue that the absence of civic participation does not mean that global governance agencies are 
not accountable to their constituencies. Rather, they follow a different logic of generating accountabil-
ity based on delegation of authority. While these two logics coincide through the mechanisms of elec-
tions at the national level, where the electorate is both the source of power as the body affected by it 
(see, for example, the arguments in the ratification debate over the U.S. Constitution), this is not the 
case for accountability mechanisms at the global level. Accountability mechanisms in today’s world 
may be grouped whether they rely more on a delegation logic, such as hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal 
and legal accountability, or whether they are based more on a participation logic, such as market, peer, 
and public relational accountability (Grant and Keohane 2005: 36).  
To make public accountability in global governance more effective (and widely viewed as legitimate), 
they suggest “to create and support various kinds of accountability systems in world politics based on 
an appreciation of the competing and complementary possibilities within democratic theory” (Grant 
and Keohane 2005: 42). However, a “mechanical application of the ideals of democracy” (Grant and 
Keohane 2005: 42) should be resisted. Global “standards of legitimacy” need not necessarily be law-
based or demos-defined (Grant and Keohane 2005: 35). Moreover, they argue that effective global 
governance needs both global standards and “a configuration of power that enables sanctions to be 
imposed relatively consistently on all violators of standards” (Grant and Keohane 2005: 40). Particu-
larly with regard to powerful states which cannot be held accountable at the global level in more for-
mal ways, global power configurations thus often operate through reputation and peer pressure (Grant 
and Keohane 2005: 35). These informal ways of holding power to account may provide greater re-
straints on the abuse of power in world politics than “fragmentary global publics” in the stakeholder 
democracy model can (Grant and Keohane 2005: 37). In the end, as Scholte notes, by some sort of 
synthesis of the two strands of the global governance literature, establishing global accountability has 
nothing inherently democratizing. Instead, it depends on the extent of involvement and the type of 
stakeholders being addressed by and benefiting from, a particular accountability arrangement (Scholte 
2011: 22-23).   
                                                     
29 A similar distinction can be found in the literature on international relations between the “management school” 
and the “enforcement school” regarding the compliance with international agreements and treaties (see Chayes 
and Handler Chayes 1993; Chayes, Handler Chayes and Mitchell 1998). The distinction between enforced and 
managed compliance with the rules of an international regulatory regime largely corresponds to the one present-
ed here. 
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2.2.2. Development literature: accountability along the aid chain 
With strong roots in democratic theory, these models of public accountability are also very much alive 
in today‘s global governance of aid where they appear as templates for framing accountability rela-
tionships in foreign aid. In particular, the development literature has identified three distinct logics that 
frame accountability around aid (see Brown 2007; Droop et al. 2008; Eyben 2008; Najam 1996). Tra-
ditionally, the aid industry followed a corporate logic, where aid recipients are accountable upwards to 
aid donors. More recently, a representative logic has found its way into the aid business via non-
governmental development organizations arguing that both aid recipients and aid donors are also ac-
countable downwards to aid beneficiaries. Finally, a collaborative logic has been pushed in many offi-
cial treaties of the global aid regime, where aid recipients and aid donors are accountable inwards to 
themselves. As I will show in the next three subsections, each of these three aid frames draws on one 
distinct model of public accountability found in democratic theory. While aid has traditionally been 
framed along the lines of a principal-agent model (‘aid as contract’), newer aid frames, which are re-
lated to proposals for reforming accountability mechanisms along the aid chain, refer to models of 
stakeholder democracy (‘aid as entitlement’) or to pluralist-institutionalist governance models (‘aid as 
partnership’).  
 
2.2.2.1. Corporate logic 
For a long time, foreign aid has been interpreted as a long and complex chain of interacting dyadic 
relationships between principals and agents who are bound through their contractual obligations. This 
frame of “aid as contract” between donors and recipients of foreign aid has been so dominant in inter-
national development cooperation that people working in the aid business even forgot that “it is just 
one way of looking at things” (Eyben 2008: 17). One of the core characteristics of the so-called “aid 
chain” is that there is only a distant and indirect relationship between the wealthy individuals who 
provide the money to fund bilateral and multilateral development assistance, and the needy individuals 
who are intended to benefit from this aid. Nevertheless, we find a significant number of intermediate 
institutions between the taxpayers in donor countries and the beneficiaries in recipient countries 
(Radelet 2006: 12; Wenar 2006: 9). In principal-agent terms, we may say that the rich people in donor 
countries are the principals, the intermediate institutions their agents, and the poor people in recipient 
countries the targeted beneficiaries.30  
Figure 2-5 shows development actors and multilateral aid flow along a simplified aid chain.  
  
                                                     
30 These three roles in principal-agent terms are also mirrored in the three broad functions – fundraising, admin-
istration, and distribution – of large intermediate institutions themselves (Friberg 2015: 247).  
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Figure 2-5: The aid chain in multilateral development assistance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: adapted from Biekart (1999: 79) 
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relationship between the citizen-principals and their aid-agents, while the second is looking more nar-
rowly at accountability relationships among the various aid-agents involved along the aid chain.  
 
The bucket chain 
From a bird’s eye view, foreign aid has been pictured as “a chain of people passing buckets of water to 
put out a fire” (Friberg 2015: 246). As shown by Figure 2-5, this chain of helping hands crosses bor-
ders and thus involves two sovereigns: people who donate and people who receive. At one end of the 
aid chain are the citizens in donor countries whose taxes are used to fund the activities of the interme-
diate organizations, while at the other end of the chain are the citizens in recipient countries who are 
meant to benefit from these activities.  
Looked at through the lens of a principal-agent model of accountability, citizens in recipient countries 
play a dual role: besides being the beneficiaries of aid, they are also principals in their own right 
(Faust and Messner 2007: 2). There are thus two ultimate citizen-principals at two different levels to 
whom aid-agents are accountable for delivering aid effectively. Discipline plays a central role in prin-
cipal-agent models of accountability. However, as many scholars have noted, the fundamental princi-
pal-agent problem in foreign aid is that the normal feedback loop for aid-agents is incomplete (Radelet 
2006: 12). Citizens at the “receiving” end of the aid chain lack the power to hold the aid intermediaries 
accountable. In the most general term, this is because they are poor and lack the power of sanctioning 
anyone (Wenar 2006: 10). The citizens at the “donating” end of the aid chain, by contrast, lack the 
information to hold the aid intermediaries accountable, because of the complexities of foreign aid 
(Faust and Messner 2007: 5). As a result of the poor’s lack of power and the rich’s lack of infor-
mation, there is “currently little significant accountability to either rich or poor individuals” (Wenar 
2006: 23). The broken feedback loop-problem may thus be interpreted, first and foremost, “as an out-
come of the relatively weak position of the two “principals” at both ends of the aid chain (Faust and 
Messner 2007: 15).  
 
The business chain 
However, if we direct our eye towards the internal working of the aid chain, we do find some account-
ability at the level of the aid-agents that link the rich with the poor. A second metaphor that has been 
used to describe these more specific accountability relationships is the one of “a business supply 
chain”, suggesting that the aid industry meets similar logistical challenges as other large-scale business 
providers (Larson 2012: 2-3). Accordingly, the supply chain of the international relief system is 
framed as a long and complex chain of interacting dyadic relationships among aid intermediaries.  
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A central feature of these intermediaries is that they play a dual role in their relationships with other 
actors (Ebrahim 2003b: 191). Since hierarchy plays a central role in principal-agent models, the role of 
aid intermediaries is framed either in terms of superiors (donors) or subordinates (recipients) depend-
ing on their position along the aid chain. Among the aid intermediaries, four institutions are para-
mount: donor governments, recipient governments, international financial institutions, and implement-
ing aid agencies (both state and non-state) (Wenar 2006: 9).31 As shown by Figure 2-5, in the case of 
multilateral development assistance this means that implementing agencies are held accountable by 
recipient governments for financing and technical support. Recipient governments, in turn, are held 
accountable by the IMF and World Bank for the loans and conditions attached to them. Finally, the 
international financial institutions are held accountable by donor governments for their management of 
membership contributions, which finance the whole business.  
Following a corporate logic, accountability relationships along the aid chain have been described (and 
criticized) in four different ways.32  
First, corporate accountability flows upwards, that is, accountability among aid-agents always flows 
upwards to those constituencies that provide money and services to them – collectively known as “pa-
trons”. Adil Najam (1996) has been most explicit on this point. According to him, “[a] relationship 
becomes one of patronage when failure to fulfill the stated or implied responsibility can lead to a 
withdrawal of whatever support, in kind or in service, is being provided to the client NGO” (Najam 
1996: 344). The problem with upward accountability – and that is the reason for Najam to call it “pat-
ronage” – is the danger that aid donors (patrons) may abuse their sanctioning power through the co-
ercion or co-optation of the aid recipient (clients) (Najam 1996: 344).  
Second, corporate accountability primarily serves functional purposes, that is, aid-agents are held ac-
countable for resource use and contractual obligations in exchange for money and services received. 
The type of conduct, for which aid-agents are being held accountable, is closely related to the relevant 
forum, which is holding them accountable. Twenty years ago, Michael Edwards and David Hulme 
already recognized that aid donors’ heavy use of logical framework approaches with their focus on 
short-term targets, quantitative indicators, individual project impacts and hierarchical project man-
agement implies “a tendency to ‘accountancy’ rather than ‘accountability’; audit rather than learning” 
(Edwards and Hulme 1995: 13). On a sober note, they add that this focus on functional accountability 
                                                     
31 In principal-agent terms, recipient governments and donor governments should be the most accountable 
among these four categories, because – at least in theory – they can get sanctioned democratically through elec-
tions by their respective citizenry. At the global level, in turn, international financial institutions are said to be 
more accountable overall than non-governmental development organizations – although this must not necessarily 
be in a democratic way (Wenar 2006: 11, 13).  
32 A rich literature on the accountability of non-governmental development organizations has explored their mul-
tiple and often competing accountabilities (among many, see, e.g., Ebrahim 2003a, 2003b; Edwards and Hulme 
1995, 1996; Jordan and van Tuijl 2006; and Najam 1996). Although these scholars have explicitly focused on 
non-governmental development organizations, their findings may be generalized for all intermediate institutions 
in foreign aid. Building on the insights available in this literature, I follow Alnoor Ebrahim (2003a) who pro-
posed a set of binary characteristics to examine accountability along the aid chain.  
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may eventually be inevitable, because of the aid industries pressure on aid recipients for short-term 
visible results (‘perform or perish’) (Edwards and Hulme 1995: 13).  
Third, corporate accountability refers to a unilateral relationship, that is, accountability among aid-
agents traditionally took the form of hierarchical reporting from aid recipients towards aid donors. 
While aid donors usually have strong mechanisms to hold aid recipients accountable, aid recipients 
only have weakly developed mechanisms to hold aid donors accountable. As noted by Mzwanele 
Mfunwa (2006), in a frame of aid as contract aid donors are not held accountable for their performance 
– neither by the aid recipient (i.e., the co-contracting party) nor by the public in recipient countries. As 
a result, no causal link between donor input and development outcomes exists in traditional frames of 
aid (Mfunwa 2006: 7). Liesbet Steer and colleagues (2009) put it as follows: “This form of accounta-
bility, reflecting a power imbalance in the aid relationship, involved a fairly unilateral approach to 
monitoring recipients’ […] ‘contractual obligations’ as a precondition for the delivery of aid” (Steer et 
al. 2009: 6).  
Finally, corporate accountability is above all externally driven, that is, aid-agents render an account 
since they are held accountable by others and not because they are taking responsibility for them-
selves. Aid as a contract is about “spending money for designated purposes” as argued by Najam 
(1996: 342). Accountability for money and accountability for policy are intrinsically related, and it 
may be difficult to separate the two, because “funds are provided to serve policy goals and, all too 
often, are provided only where it can be demonstrated (or at least argued) that particular policy goals 
(i.e., those shared by the donor) will, in fact, be pursued” (Najam 1996: 342). To enforce compliance 
with policy goals, donors thus often attach policy conditions to aid. And while these are most often 
associated with the IMF and World Bank, as Steve Radelet (2006) reminds us, “all donors use condi-
tions to some extent” (Radelet 2006: 13).  
Given these characteristics (or weaknesses – depending on perspective) of the corporate logic in the 
global governance of aid, a broad array of new mechanisms for strengthening and improving account-
ability have been suggested in the development literature. These new accountability mechanisms may 
be summarized under two proposals for reform. One is that aid donors and aid recipients should 
strengthen their accountability downwards to aid beneficiaries and the other is that aid intermediaries 
should strengthen their accountability inwards to themselves.  
 
2.2.2.2. Representative logic 
As a response to the accountability deficits of the contractual approach to development, a first reform 
proposal suggests strengthening accountability downwards to the intended beneficiaries of aid. In re-
cent years, there have been widespread calls from theory and practice that public and intergovernmen-
tal aid agencies should engage in downward accountability processes with their beneficiaries in order 
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to make aid more effective (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2011: 454). These calls are generally based on a 
frame that perceives aid as an entitlement, to which citizens in developing countries are said to have a 
claim within an international human rights framework (Eyben 2008: 18). Such a rights-based approach 
to development draws on the stakeholder democracy model in that it seeks to identify domestic stake-
holders at the recipient country level and to empower them vis-à-vis their governments so that they 
can claim their rights as laid down in international law and agreements. Through the identification of 
claim-holders (and their entitlements) and corresponding duty-bearers (and their obligations), this 
reform proposal aims at strengthening accountability between citizens and their representatives en-
gaged in cross-border activities. Following a representative logic, a frame of aid as entitlement ad-
dresses two of the four accountability deficits of the contractual approach, namely the upward and 
functional nature of traditional accountability relationships.  
 
Strengthening downward accountability 
First, representative accountability flows downwards, that is, public and inter-governmental aid agen-
cies are supposed to be democratically accountable to domestic stakeholders both in recipient and 
donor countries. Reform proposals for strengthening downward accountability usually recognize a vast 
variety of “stakeholders” – often with conflicting demands – to whom aid intermediaries should render 
an account. Among these, the most important stakeholders of aid intermediaries are their beneficiaries, 
i.e., those individuals and groups to whom they provide services, and/or advocate on behalf of. From 
both service delivery and/or advocacy perspective, those who benefit are often the disadvantaged and 
vulnerable groups in society, the weak and the poor, the ones with no voice (Najam 1996: 345). Con-
cerning these people “who tend otherwise to be marginalized and silenced” (Scholte 2011: 15), in-
creasing downward accountability is more understood as a means to compel aid intermediaries to be 
responsive to them.  
Some scholars also emphasize that the concept of stakeholders needs to be broadened to include not 
only the direct “beneficiaries” of aid, but also those people who are indirectly affected by the activities 
of aid intermediaries. The community at large or the general public in recipient (and donor) countries 
should also be considered as stakeholders (Najam 1996: 345). The notion of “democracy” in combina-
tion with “stakeholder” is important in this context. Most reform proposals for strengthening down-
ward accountability are commonly (although not exclusively) situated at the national level aimed at 
improving accountability of recipient governments towards citizens, parliaments and other bodies in 
representative democracies. However, following Young’s (2000) argumentation, the notion of down-
ward accountability may easily be extended to the global level, if stakeholder claims would refer to 
global obligations of justice and not democracy per se. Within such a rights-based approach, poor 
people worldwide could legitimately claim to have a right to development, that is, to see their needs 
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and aspirations fulfilled within an international human rights framework (Eyben 2008: 18; O’Dwyer 
and Unerman 2011: 452).  
 
Seeking strategic accountability 
Second, beyond strengthening downward accountability, this model of representative accountability 
also serves strategic purposes, that is, public and inter-governmental aid agencies are not held ac-
countable for financial performance and immediate impacts on needy target groups in developing 
countries (or at least, not in the first place), but for the longer-term impacts they have on the actions of 
other aid agencies and the broader social and political environment at the recipient (and donor) country 
level. To strengthen accountability of aid intermediaries for long-term changes rather than the short-
term activities, reform proposals for strengthening strategic accountability suggest that aid intermedi-
aries will have to change their organizational procedures. For example, over the last decades, there has 
been much enthusiasm for a set of approaches commonly known as “participatory development”.33 
Underpinned by participation theory (for an excellent review and critique of the various versions of 
this theory, see Eduard Brett (2003), the benefits of participatory approaches to development are seen 
in that they draw on aid recipients’ knowledge about local circumstances in designing projects that 
respond better to their needs and can lead to lasting improvement in their conditions (in terms of re-
sults), while also creating a feedback mechanism that makes the implementing agencies more account-
able and the project more responsive and useful to them (Wenar 2006: 16; Winters 2010: 228). In line 
with a stakeholder democracy model of accountability, participation scholars agree that participatory 
development is about involving stakeholders in the decision-making process that affects them (Brett 
2003: 5). Yet, scholars disagree about how far stakeholder participation can influence the outcomes of 
the decision-making process. Depending on the degree of control that stakeholders effectively can 
exert over the decisions that affect them, stakeholder participation may range from mere information 
and consultation (weak version) to partnership and joint control over decisions among participants 
(strong versions) (Brett 2003: 5).34 Previous research suggests that stakeholder involvement (in its 
strong versions) has increased downward accountability of aid intermediaries at the project level. 
However, the same could not be said for the management of complex development programs at the 
recipient country level, where the participatory approach could only be realized in its weak versions. 
In public and private bureaucracies, as argued by Brett, strong participatory approaches can never 
displace the need for the delegation of authority and representative democracy (Brett 2003: 11). There-
                                                     
33 Participation is not a new phenomenon in international development cooperation. As Brett (2003: 2) reminds 
us, theories of development have been in flux over the last 50 years. In development practice, the search for 
participatory solutions began with non-governmental development organizations (Burkie 1993; Chambers 1983; 
Korten 1987) but has been taken up now by leading bilateral and multilateral donors. 
34 In the literature, a broad range of participation typologies or so-called “participation ladders” (Arnstein 1969) 
have been proposed to describe these different degrees. 
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fore, participatory approaches must be located into a broader approach of strategic accountability and 
social empowerment (Brett 2003: 19).  
A rights-based approach to development represents such a logical extension on the participatory ap-
proach (see, e.g., Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi 2004; Nelson and Dorsey 2003; Filmer-Wilson 
2005; Jordan and van Tuijl, 2006, O’Dwyer and Unerman 2011). It shares with the participatory de-
velopment approaches a focus on stakeholder involvement in the design, implementation, and evalua-
tion of development strategies, with particular attention to empowering the poor and other marginal-
ized groups. However, it differs in framing development not as a “need” of beneficiaries, but as a 
“right” of citizens. A rights-based approach focuses, first, on explicitly defining people’s rights as laid 
down in international conventions in relation to various state and non-state aid intermediaries; and, 
second, on empowering people to assert these rights (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2011: 452). A rights-
based approach offers potential “added value” through strengthening domestic accountability as com-
pared to participatory development approaches (Filmer-Wilson 2005, cited by O’Dwyer and Unerman 
2011: 454).  
In sum, following a representative logic that stipulates symmetry and congruence between decision-
makers and decision-takers, public and inter-governmental aid agencies are said to be accountable to 
those being (significantly) affected by their conduct; and these stakeholders, in turn, based on their 
affectedness, have the (ultimate) right to claim accountability from them. Mirroring the ever-
expanding circles of stakeholders in global public policy, reform proposals for strengthening down-
ward accountability have also been broadened in recent years to include not only the local stakeholders 
of a development project but the citizenry at large (see Brett 2003; Hickey and Mohan 2008). In a 
frame of aid as an entitlement, upward accountability from beneficiaries over agents to principals in 
the traditional aid chain is thus getting replaced with downward accountability of decision-makers 
(i.e., the duty-bearers) to affected stakeholders (i.e., the claim-holders) at different political levels.  
 
2.2.2.3. Collaborative logic 
A second proposal for reform suggests strengthening the accountability of the whole aid system. In 
recent years, the notion of accountability has been widely spread in international development cooper-
ation. In particular, the international aid effectiveness agenda, and the efforts for strengthening the 
principle of mutual accountability within it, stem from “a normative preference for cooperation rather 
than competition” (Droop et al. 2008: 5; Eyben 2008: 39). This understanding of accountability in the 
current aid architecture is based on a frame of aid as a partnership35  between multiple actors – collec-
tively termed “the peers” – that cooperate in pursuit of societal objectives (Droop et al. 2008: 17). A 
                                                     
35 Alternatively, Eyben (2008: 22, 36-37) has used the notion of “aid as gift” (embodying an expression of soli-
darity and mutual responsibility as theorized by the French anthropologist Mauss) to emphasize the diffuse na-
ture of power as a process. 
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partnership approach to development draws on the pluralist-institutionalist model in that it seeks to 
create and support various kinds of accountability mechanisms among development partners, which 
should allow them to hold themselves accountable for the commitments they have mutually agreed on. 
Rather than substituting upward with downward accountability, this reform proposal focuses on im-
proving collaboration among aid intermediaries themselves, thereby strengthening the accountability 
of the whole aid system. Following a collaborative logic, a frame of aid as partnership addresses two 
more accountability deficits of the contractual approach, namely the unilateral and the external nature 
of traditional accountability relationships.  
 
Promoting mutual accountability 
First, collaborative accountability concerns a mutual relationship, that is, accountability among aid 
intermediaries in international development cooperation takes the form of a horizontal exchange be-
tween “partners”.36 Reform proposals for strengthening mutual accountability usually come in two 
forms. The dominant understanding in the development literature perceives mutual accountability as a 
means to create a “more level playing field”, or put differently, a “partnership on equal footing” 
(Eyben 2008: 37; Steer et al. 2009: 16). In this perspective, strengthening mutual accountability is 
about redistributing power among development partners in terms of making donors more accountable 
to recipients. Being partners in the global “project” of development, this understanding of mutual ac-
countability also assumes “the prior existence of a shared vision of a common good” (Eyben 2008: 39, 
40).  
The dominant understanding may be contrasted with an alternative reading of mutual accountability 
available in the literature, which conceptualizes power not as a resource of individual development 
actors, but as “productive energy that simultaneously shapes and is shaped by social interactions” 
(Eyben 2008: 20). Strengthening mutual accountability in this perspective is about tapping into the 
energy of a network of peers – on which development partners can draw in order “to help each other 
participate effectively in shaping and expanding the social limits of what is possible” (Droop et al. 
2008: 17; Eyben 2008: 40). Following a collaborative logic, this alternative view draws on a pluralist-
institutionalist model of public accountability in that it does not presuppose equality between devel-
opment partners for accountability to become effective. Instead, it perceives global partnerships as 
“effective mechanisms to bind in more powerful players to common rules, values and behavior” 
(Droop et al. 2008: 17). Nor does this view presuppose the prior existence of a shared agenda among 
participants, since participants, standards and accountability mechanisms of peer networks are seen to 
be open-ended and evolving” (Droop et al. 2008: 17; Steer et al. 2009: 15).   
                                                     
36 “Partners” differ from “patrons” in that they actively participate in the governance of aid, whereas “patrons” 
do not directly participate in the activities they are paying for (Najam 1996: 348).  
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Reinforcing internal accountability 
Second, closely related with an understanding of mutual accountability among “partners”, collabora-
tive accountability is above all internally driven, that is, aid intermediaries voluntarily render an ac-
count to their fellow peers since they are taking responsibility for themselves and not because they 
need to submit to an external judgment. As in other fields of international cooperation where no final 
arbiter exists, such as international arms control and disarmament or international environmental is-
sues, development partners voluntarily comply with shared agendas and reciprocal commitments. In 
the absence of a single overarching authority in international development cooperation commitments 
are “largely maintained through trust, reciprocity and peer pressure – not by sanctions or other ‘hard’ 
mechanisms for enforcement” (Domingo et al. 2009: 16). Peer networks in international development 
cooperation work via “the emergence of ‘social norms’ which introduce collective standards of behav-
iour and serve to reinforce the incentives for the cooperation that is in everybody’s collective interest” 
(Droop et al. 2008: 17). As a result of a shared vision on professional and ethical standards, accounta-
bility between development partners should improve, which could then “evolve into collaborations of 
collective responsibility for outcomes” (Ebrahim 2003b: 199).  
“[S]ince the end of the 1990s at the latest”, as it has been argued in the development literature, there 
has been “a gradual process of change toward a new development cooperation regime” (Faust and 
Messner 2007: 12) that generates new forms of financial support between donors and recipients of 
foreign aid (Domingo et al. 2009: 14; Vielajus et al. 2009: 9). Underpinned by some kind of “program 
theory” (Booth and Fritz 2008: 10), these new program-based approaches are said to give more weight 
to “cooperative development” than traditional forms of financial support (Mfunwa 2006: 3). Program-
based approaches have been defined in the current aid architecture as “a way of engaging in develop-
ment cooperation based on the principles of co-ordinated support for a locally owned programme of 
development” (OECD 2005a, Appendix A). Examples range from sector-wide programs (i.e., where 
there is a shared bank account within which various donors pool their funds) and sector budget support 
(i.e., where funds are not earmarked, but the policy dialogue is focused on a particular sector) to na-
tional development plans and general budget support (i.e., where funds are not earmarked but depend 
on the existence of an overall national development strategy) (Booth and Fritz 2008: 8). As argued by 
scholars studying general budget support, foreign aid that assists poor people directly may superficial-
ly appear attractive. However, the flip side of the coin is that aid that bypasses official country systems 
does institutional damage (Booth and Fritz 2008: 4-5). Practical experience teaches that, except for the 
most immediate emergency relief situations, the channeling of aid through official budgetary and ac-
counting systems is always to be preferred in the medium and long run (Booth and Fritz 2008: 4). The 
use of program-based approaches, and in particular those that rely on the use of national systems and 
processes, thus allows addressing both donor coordination and recipient ownership concerns (de Ren-
zio 2006: 629).  
89 
In sum, following a collaborative logic that stipulates collective responsibility for outcomes, develop-
ment partners are said to be accountable to their fellow peers with whom they cooperate in pursuit of 
shared developmental objectives. Through this process, they create both common standards for behav-
ior and a field or configuration of power that can reinforce the incentives for collaborative behavior 
that is in everybody's interest. Accordingly, proposals for strengthening inward accountability of the 
global aid regime have focused on program-based approaches that are supposed to strengthen account-
ability not only within the global governance of aid but also within national governance systems. 
 
2.2.3. Synthesis: theoretical approach 
Based on my review of the democracy and development literature, this section proposes to analyze the 
different mechanisms that development actors use to hold each other accountable across space and 
time, according to two alternative conceptions of the legitimacy of political authority as outlined by 
global governance scholars adhering to a pluralist-institutionalist model of public accountability. Be-
yond clarifying the theoretical approach of this research, the combined review of accountability mod-
els and aid frames in the literature has served two additional purposes. A first purpose has been to 
show how different models of public accountability in democratic theory appear in development prac-
tice as templates for framing accountability relationships in foreign aid. A second purpose has been to 
show how the mechanisms for infusing global governance of aid with legitimacy have changed in 
development thinking.  
 
2.2.3.1. Models: Accountability models framing aid relationships 
Reviewing the democracy literature, I was able to distill six models of public accountability that give a 
rich and complex picture of the way public power is held to account. They ask fundamental questions 
about the nature of the actor (republican-federalist model), the forum (participatory democracy mod-
el), the conduct (deliberative democracy model), and the consequences of accountability (principal-
agent model). And they have asked how far ideas and practices of representative government can be 
transferred to global governance institutions and processes (stakeholder democracy and pluralist-
institutionalist models).  
Scholars within the global governance literature agree that global governance suffers from a crisis in 
democratic legitimacy nurtured by diffuse feelings of losing control and having no choice. The global 
governance of aid is no exception in this regard (Hsieh 2009: 141). Relationships between donors and 
recipients of foreign aid are said to lack popular legitimacy. Traditional accountability relationships in 
foreign aid have been criticized because there has been no accounting for longer-term strategic impact 
(strategic accountability); no coordination among aid donors (mutual accountability); no ownership by 
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aid recipients (internal accountability); and as a result, no accountability from either donors or recipi-
ents towards citizens at both ends of the aid chain (downwards accountability).  
To overcome the deficits of the traditional frame of aid, reformers suggested changing the perspective. 
Instead of framing aid as a contract between donors and recipients of foreign aid, they propose to 
frame aid either as an entitlement to which citizens have legitimate rights, respectively as a partnership 
between peers in pursuit of shared developmental objectives. However, as argued by Rosalind Eyben, 
(2008), “aid practitioners mix and match these different perspectives on aid” (Eyben 2008: 30). A first 
purpose of the foregone discussion thus was to show that these three frames of aid are underpinned in 
effect by three different and identifiable theoretical models of public accountability as provided by 
democratic theory.  
The corporate logic that has framed aid as contract has strong roots in a principal-agent model of ac-
countability. Given that foreign aid is about the delivery of money and services across national bor-
ders, the aid industry’s reminiscences of agency theory do not come as a surprise. Like this influential 
approach in democratic theory, the development variant gives much weight to collective action prob-
lems that may arise when agents follow other interests than those of the principals. Aid decisions 
based on a principal-agent model of accountability are considered legitimate to the extent that aid-
agents render an account to those who delegated power to them.  
The representative logic underlying a frame of aid as an entitlement has been nurtured by a model of 
stakeholder democracy that has gained prominence within the research on global governance of late. 
Developed in reaction to the accountability deficits of the contractual approach, the perspective of aid 
as entitlement primarily focuses on domestic accountability deficits – and possible solutions to over-
come these – between citizens and their representatives at the recipient country level. Stakeholder 
participation takes center stage in proposals for enhancing downward and strategic accountability. Aid 
decisions based on a stakeholder democracy model of accountability are considered legitimate to the 
extent that all those being significantly affected have been included in the process of discussion and 
decision-making.  
The collaborative logic of the new global partnership, finally, may be seen as a manifestation of a plu-
ralist-institutionalist model of accountability as developed by global governance scholars in parallel, 
but also in contrast to the former stakeholder democracy model. Whereas the former model of stake-
holder democracy refers mainly to domestic accountability relationships at the recipient country level, 
the perspective of aid as partnership directs its attention to accountability relationships between aid 
recipients and their development partners, both at the global and recipient country level. Engaging in 
partnerships for effective development cooperation lies at the center of proposals for strengthening 
mutual and internal accountability. Aid decisions based on a pluralist-institutionalist model of ac-
countability are considered legitimate to the extent that they are based on existing norms and mecha-
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nisms to hold development partners to account – independent of whether they are derived from demo-
cratic sources of power or not.  
 
2.2.3.2. Mechanisms: Shift in aid frames and accountability mechanisms 
While the two later perspectives of aid may be seen as individual reactions to the accountability defi-
cits of the traditional frame of aid, they can also be thought of as two variations of the same trend of 
infusing the global governance of aid with legitimacy. The second purpose of this review of the de-
mocracy and development literature has been to show how the mechanisms for infusing global gov-
ernance of aid with legitimacy have changed in mainstream development thinking.  
Following Grant and Keohane (2005), democratic theory offers two alternative conceptions of the 
legitimacy of political authority (Grant and Keohane 2005: 30). Legitimacy may rest either on claims 
derived from the delegation of authority or on claims derived from the participation in governance 
(Grant and Keohane 2005: 41). These different conceptions of legitimacy have an impact on how ac-
countability is understood. To identify the relevant accountability holder (i.e., forum) in world politics, 
the basic question to ask is: to whom are global governance agencies accountable? Two answers are 
possible: global governance agencies may either be held accountable by those who entrusted them 
with powers (what they call the “delegation model”) or by those affected by their actions (the so-called 
“participation model”) (Grant and Keohane 2005: 31).  
Within these two basic models of accountability, Grant and Keohane further suggest asking how much 
discretion do power wielders (i.e., actors) have. Again, two answers are possible: global governance 
agencies may be held accountable either in compliance-based or integrity-based global accountability 
systems. Compliance-based systems of global accountability use both ex-ante and ex-post accountabil-
ity mechanisms and perceive global governance agencies (i.e., actors) as “instrumental agents” that 
follow clear instructions given by their relevant public (Grant and Keohane 2005: 31). By contrast, 
global governance agencies (i.e., actors) in integrity-based systems have some discretion. Those call-
ing for an account (i.e., forums) use only ex-post accountability mechanisms and do not try to direct 
the behavior of “discretionary authorities” in advance – although accountability mechanisms can have 
effects ex ante, “since the anticipation of sanctions may deter the powerful from abusing their posi-
tions in the first place” (Grant and Keohane 2005: 30). Accountability relationships thus “presuppose 
norms of legitimacy that establish, not only the standards by which the use of power can be judged, 
but also who is authorized to wield power and who is properly entitled to call power wielders to ac-
count” (Grant and Keohane 2005: 30).  
In line with the theoretical distinction given by Grant and Keohane (2005), I argue that there has been 
a shift from a delegation model to a participation model of public accountability that frames current 
aid relationships. Figure 2-6 depicts the proposed shift.  
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Figure 2-6: The shift in models of accountability along the aid chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the figure shows how accountability flows along the aid chain, namely (1) upwards, (2) downwards, and 
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Whereas the delegation model has been related to upward accountability in the traditional frame of aid 
(aid as a contract), the participation model underpins the more recent reform proposals for more 
downward (aid as entitlement) and more inward (aid as a partnership) accountability along the aid 
chain. Participatory mechanisms of accountability characterize both proposals for reform in that the 
delegation logic that has governed the previous aid frame has been replaced by a participatory logic in 
two alternative aid frames. Yet, participation in these aid frames stems from different rationales.  
Following a representative logic, participatory and rights-based approaches in the first aid frame aim at 
involving all relevant democratic stakeholders in public policy-making; whereas participation in pro-
gram-based approaches in the second frame that follows a collaborative logic serves to tap into the 
collective energy of all development partners for better policy outcomes. As shown by Figure 2-6, new 
“stakeholders”, respectively, “partners”, have been added to the traditional frame of aid as a contract, 
including other donors, supervising agencies, civil society and the private sector. These new stake-
holders and/or partners do not all participate in one single forum, but in multiple accountability forums 
with varying actor constellations at different levels. Accordingly, we also find a multiplicity of ac-
countability mechanisms that participants in particular forums use to hold each other accountable. 
Adopting a pluralist-institutionalist approach, this research thus argues that the participation of the 
development actors needs to be analyzed separately depending on the forum, respectively aid modality 
at hand. The next section looks at these different types of domestic forums and the external strategies 
for strengthening public accountability at the recipient country level.  
 
 
2.3. Typology 
There is an abundance of typologies of accountability in the democracy and development literature. In 
the democracy literature, public accountability arrangements have been distinguished according to the 
direction in which accountability may run in democratic states (state versus non-state actors). In the 
development literature, foreign transparency and accountability initiatives have been classified accord-
ing to their democratic targets, that is, whether they aim at promoting formal or partisan accountability 
(procedural versus substantive democracy). These typologies generally refer to “democratic accounta-
bility” in the sense of being guided by the normative principle that rulers should be held accountable 
by the people they govern. In line with my conceptual framework, these typologies may thus be dis-
tinguished whether they are used for describing the domestic axes of the democratic accountability 
field in recipient countries or whether they aim at evaluating foreign transparency and accountability 
initiatives according to certain democratic accountability standards. 
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In the following, I will develop a typology of surrogate accountability based on my review of demo-
cratic accountability in the democracy and development literature. First, I will combine two distinc-
tions available in the democracy and development literature to describe the different surrogate ac-
countability forums in which national and international actors interact at the recipient country level. 
Second, I will draw on the theoretical contribution by Jennifer Rubenstein (2007) to evaluate surrogate 
accountability forums in terms of their democratic targets. In line with the pluralist-institutionalist 
model of accountability, the argument is made that distinguishing more clearly between the institu-
tional arrangements and the normative standards of surrogate accountability can provide a more solid 
basis for generating hypotheses on the impact of development aid on democratic change in developing 
countries. By describing the institutionalized surrogate accountability forums and evaluating their 
democratic impact at the recipient country level, I expect to contribute to a more robust and general-
izable picture of the PRS approach than is found in the literature so far.  
 
2.3.1. Democracy literature: domestic accountability axes 
2.3.1.1. Seminal distinction 
In the political science literature, democratic accountability takes on many forms. Democracy scholars 
usually begin by giving their interpretation of democratic accountability as being different from other 
types of accountability or oversight found in the literature. Given the existence of multiple, and some-
times competing typologies, we may easily lose track unless we position a conceptual anchor. 
Guillermo O’Donnell (1994, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2003) provides such an anchor. According to him 
accountability in a democratic state runs  
“not only vertically, making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also hori-
zontally, across a network of relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other institutions) that 
can call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of discharging the responsi-
bilities of a given official.” (O’Donnell 1994: 61)  
Taken literally, vertical accountability refers to a relationship between “unequals” in the sense that it 
concerns a relationship between state and non-state actors. By contrast, horizontal accountability re-
fers to a relationship between “equals” in the sense that the term is reserved to relationships between 
“incumbents of positions in the state and the regime” (O’Donnell 1999b: 68). While vertical accounta-
bility as a method of democratic control over state institutions has been largely uncontested for the last 
two centuries, O’Donnell was the first in conceptualizing horizontal accountability (and in particular 
the lack thereof in his concept of “delegative democracy”) as a central dimension of democratic ac-
countability. His contribution has spurred a vibrant debate on the subject but has also generated much 
criticism.  
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Three critical points have been raised against the horizontal-vertical divide in general and O’Donnell’s 
definition of horizontal accountability in particular: First, the types of conduct state actors are being 
held accountable for; second, the notion of a power hierarchy between state and non-state actors; and 
third, the type of sanctions imposed by non-state actors. These three criticisms will structure the fol-
lowing discussion of the four types of domestic accountability forums distinguished in this research.  
Following O’Donnell, I speak of horizontal accountability and vertical accountability as the central 
axes of domestic accountability. However, I do not perceive them in terms of a power balance between 
actors with equal or unequal power, but in terms of two power configurations of which one involves 
only state actors (horizontal accountability) and the other also includes non-state actors (vertical ac-
countability). Within these two configurations, I further distinguish between those accountability fo-
rums that formally exhibit a dyadic structure as opposed to those with a triadic structure. Accountabil-
ity forums that possess direct sanctioning power usually display a dyadic structure, while those ac-
countability forums that lack this sanctioning capacity and therefore appeal to third parties exhibit a 
triadic structure. Based on this classification, I focus on four types of accountability forums along two 
axes of domestic accountability. These are political accountability and administrative accountability 
(on the horizontal axis) as well as electoral accountability and social accountability (on the vertical 
axis). In the following four subsections, I will briefly describe these four types of domestic accounta-
bility based on a review of their use in democratic theory.  
 
2.3.1.2. Horizontal types 
Horizontal accountability refers to the accountability relationships within the state. O’Donnell defines 
horizontal accountability as follows:  
“[T]he existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually 
willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or 
impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state 
that may be qualified as unlawful.” (O’Donnell 1999a: 38)  
As shown by this definition, the triggering mechanism of intrastate accountability is the presumed 
“unlawfulness” of another state actor’s conduct (O’Donnell 2003: 51). According to O’Donnell, there 
are two primary expressions of unlawful conduct within the state: encroachment and corruption. En-
croachment generally refers to the unlawful trespassing of one state actor into the proper authority of 
another one. Corruption is loosely defined as the illegal use of public office for personal use or for the 
benefit of associates (O'Donnell 1998: 121; 2003: 34). Whether on the grounds of encroachment or of 
corruption, the consequences of unlawful conduct may range from routine oversight to criminal sanc-
tions or impeachment proceedings (O’Donnell 1999a: 38).  
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O’Donnell’s concept of horizontal accountability has been fiercely criticized in the literature.37 In par-
ticular, critics note that his concept of horizontal accountability does not consider political actions or 
omissions by other state actors due to its focus on the unlawfulness of the conduct. Accordingly, hori-
zontal accountability is said to exclude political accountability in a narrow sense, that is, the accounta-
bility of the executive to other branches of the government (Mainwaring 2003: 19; Schmitter 1999: 
60). Besides, they also criticize that the term horizontal accountability does not specify the state actor 
who is being held accountable. While in most instances, the executive is taken as the usual suspect to 
be kept in check, it could be any other state actor, such as the legislature, the judiciary, or a particular 
part of the bureaucracy that must render an account to another agency of the state (Manin et al. 1999a: 
19; Schmitter 1999: 60).  
In response to his critics, O’Donnell contends that there is not anything particularly legalistic in his 
definition of horizontal accountability since all positions in the regime and the state are legally defined 
and regulated (O’Donnell 1999b: 68). I agree with O’Donnell that horizontal accountability is general-
ly law-based and thus regulated by formal relationships of accountability, but I do not agree that this 
also refers to the type of conduct for which state actors are being held accountable. In line with his 
critics, I also consider more “political” forms of account-giving as constitutive elements of horizontal 
accountability. To classify the particular accountability forum within the state, I draw on a second 
distinction that O’Donnell made, but which has only recently received more attention from accounta-
bility theorists. According to him, a given state agency may either “directly or by means of mobilizing 
another state agency” hold other agents or agencies of the state accountable for their actions and omis-
sions (O’Donnell 2003: 35). Hence, we may distinguish two different types of state agencies, or “ac-
countability forums” to stay within my terminology, summarized under the same heading of “horizon-
tal” accountability.  
On the one hand, there are those “political” forums within the state and the regime that possess suffi-
cient power to hold other state actors accountable directly. On the other hand, there are the more “ad-
ministrative” forums that do not have sufficient power to hold other state actors accountable and thus 
seek redress by a third party, which does have this sanctioning capacity. While in the former case, the 
traditional dyadic relationship of accountability adequately describes the nature of the relationship 
between the two state actors, in the latter case, a formal triadic structure better describes the accounta-
bility relationship at play. Here, one powerful state agent (e.g., minister) is being held accountable by 
another less powerful state agent (e.g., corruption control agency) who addresses, in turn, a third state 
agent with sanctioning capacity (e.g., administrative court). Accordingly, I distinguish between two 
broad types of horizontal accountability that differ in their formal structure: political accountability 
(dyadic relationship) and administrative accountability (triadic relationship).   
                                                     
37 See debate between O'Donnell and his critics in The Self-Restraining State by Schedler et al. 1999. 
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Political accountability 
Political accountability refers to a dyadic relationship between two state actors, who have sufficient 
political autonomy to control each other mutually. Across the democracy literature, scholars highlight 
three key elements of political accountability. 
First, political accountability refers to the tripartite division of political power among the legislative, 
executive and judiciary (Schedler et al. 1999: 3). According to Montesquieu’s principle of the separa-
tion of powers, the three traditional functions of government should be entrusted to different organs 
(Manin et al. 1999a: 20). The legislative branch makes the laws, the executive branch implements the 
laws, and the judiciary branch interprets the laws and decides legal controversies. To become opera-
tive, every accountability relationship needs a minimal gap, a separation between those being held 
accountable and those who are calling for an account; otherwise, there is no control of public power. 
Separation alone, however, does not constitute an instance of accountability by itself. Instead, the clas-
sical separation between the three branches of government must be seen as a necessary condition for 
political accountability (Kenney 2003: 60).  
Second, political accountability also originates in the view that these separate political powers should 
roughly be kept in balance in order to check each other (O’Donnell 2003: 44). Since most contempo-
rary democratic constitutions seek to keep the legislative, executive and judiciary branch of govern-
ment roughly in balance, O’Donnell uses the term “balance institutions” to describe state institutions 
among which the flow of power and authority in the government and the state is divided (O’Donnell 
2003: 45). These “countervailing powers” should have equivalent capacities in order to monitor and 
react to each other’s conduct. In order to do so, they need to be “permanently constituted” and “mutu-
ally recognized” (Schmitter 1999: 61). There are two basic ways in which constitutions have orga-
nized the traditional government functions in real-world democracies. In presidential systems, state 
actors are held accountable through the principle of “checks and balances”. This principle, “prescribes 
that each branch partially participates in the function primarily exercised by another (e.g., through a 
presidential veto, judicial review), so that they can hold each other in check” (Manin et al. 1999a: 20). 
In parliamentary systems, the parliament is the central arena of political accountability, as it provides 
the crucial link between state and non-state actors. Given that its members have been elected, parlia-
ments are directly accountable to the electorate, which empowers them vis-à-vis other state actors they 
are holding to account. Independent of the political system, it is the existence of power-sharing ar-
rangements between different government branches, which are being forced to share authority over 
legislation and appointment to offices with other state agencies, that allows them to hold each other 
accountable.  
Third, political accountability implies that political powers not only listen to each other, but that they 
are also “sanctioning actors” (Mainwaring 2003: 20). Due to their autonomy as outlined in the consti-
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tution, they can effectively impose sanctions on other state agencies accused of wrongdoing (in a legal 
sense) or disregard of the public will (in a political sense). Courts are usually seen as the central sanc-
tioning actor within the state. However, their authority overlaps with parliaments in both parliamen-
tary and presidential systems. Given the parliamentary sovereignty in parliamentary systems, the 
courts' main responsibility lies in ensuring that the government bureaucracy duly implements the laws. 
In presidential systems, by contrast, courts have a double role to play: on the one hand, like in parlia-
mentary systems, they ensure that the executive branch correctly implements the laws of the legislative 
branch; and on the other hand, they have the authority to veto legislative acts (constitutional review) as 
an equal “balancing” actor (Moreno et al. 2003: 90). Accordingly, they sanction both legal and politi-
cal conduct.  
 
Administrative accountability 
Political accountability is not the only type of horizontal accountability. Democracy scholars noted 
that Montesquieu's three-fold conception of government had left no room for the bureaucracy. Moreo-
ver, it may also be outdated, because modern government has become so complex over time that “we 
are simply lacking a systematic picture of the functions performed by present-day governments” 
(Manin et al. 1999a: 20). Both the steady growth and the increasing complexity of bureaucracy pose 
severe challenges to public accountability. Unelected, technical and specialized state agencies increa-
singly decide on issues that “can decisively impact policy, potentially in ways that disregard public 
preference” (Dunn 1999: 297). Political scientists and practitioners alike have thus more and more 
turned their attention to “administrative accountability”.38  
Administrative accountability describes an accountability relationship among (at least) two state actors 
where those specialized agencies calling for an account usually appeal to a third party since they lack 
the sanctioning capacity for holding political power to account. It features the following three ele-
ments.  
First, administrative accountability is performed by “autonomous agents of accountability” (Schedler 
et al. 1999: 3). These agents may form part of any of the three branches of government and, at the 
same time, they are endowed with sufficient autonomy to hold any state agent accountable within their 
area of specialization. Their primary task is superintendence, that is, they have superior authority to 
oversee other state agencies (Moreno et al. 2003: 91). The list of oversight agencies is as long as di-
verse, including election commissions, electoral and constitutional tribunals, audit offices, anti-
corruption bodies, human rights commissions and ombudsmen, administrative and constitutional 
                                                     
38 The term “administrative accountability” as it is used here must not be confused with the internal bureaucratic 
process. Administrative accountability as a specific sub-type of horizontal accountability refers to accountability 
relationships between different state agencies, not to employer-employee relationships within them (Kenney 
2003: 62). 
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courts, central banks, public prosecutors, and controllers-general (Schedler et al. 1999: 3; Moreno et 
al. 2003: 81). Typically, these state agencies are insulated from other state institutions and the people 
as well. The idea behind this is that no president or simple parliamentary majority should be able to 
intervene or dissolute these oversight agencies (Moreno et al. 2003: 81). However, while their base of 
authority is separate from other powers, as administrative agencies they cooperate with other state 
agencies. They need to do so, because of their mandate.  
Second, administrative accountability involves independent bodies of oversight with specific mandates 
(O’Donnell 2003: 45). Unlike “balance institutions”, which aim primarily at an overall balance of 
political power, “mandated agencies” have rather specific, legally defined mandates, such as control of 
corruption, protection of human rights, financial audits and the holding of free and fair elections to 
name a few. What they all have in common is that they strive to separate administration from policy, 
respectively, the legal procedure from the power play. According to O’Donnell, mandated agencies 
have several qualities that make them ideally suited for legal proceedings. First, their professional 
ethos rather than partisan character; second, their effectiveness in addressing unlawful actions by the 
agencies they oversee; third, their proactive and continuous nature of oversight; and finally their capa-
bilities that allow them to examine complex policy matters (O’Donnell 2003: 45). Still, O’Donnell 
hastens to add that mandated agencies should not be considered as substitutes for balance institutions. 
Instead, their qualities make them a useful complement and reinforcement of the latter (O’Donnell 
2003: 45-46).  
Third, administrative accountability refers to “oversight actors” that have the legally ascribed respon-
sibility for monitoring the behavior of other state actors (Mainwaring 2003: 20). These independent 
bodies of oversight generally have no sanctioning power, but they may provide crucial information to 
others, such as the courts or parliamentary committees, for sanctioning those who have abused their 
powers. For example, an ombudsman (i.e., forum) may provide information regarding human rights 
abuses committed by the police or armed forces (i.e., agents) to the executive or the legislative (i.e., 
third party). Consequences then may result from the president firing the subordinate employee who 
perpetrated the abuses, or they may come from members of the parliament, who may use their political 
power to reduce or revoke funding for the office in question (Moreno et al. 2003: 81). The greatest 
problem of these superintendence bodies, however, is their weak public accountability. As part of the 
bureaucracy, citizens can control them only indirectly, because they have no direct mechanism availa-
ble to hold appointed bureaucrats legally accountable (Manin et al. 1999a: 20). Moreover, it is far from 
clear whether these administrative agencies will be more accountable to the executive (which employs 
them) or the legislative (which funds them). In sum, while they are supposed to serve the public, ad-
ministrative accountability forums are accountable at most to politicians (Manin et al. 1999a: 21).  
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2.3.1.3. Vertical types 
Vertical accountability refers to the accountability relationships between the state and non-state actors. 
Vertical accountability presupposes a prior distinction between the people who rule and the people 
being ruled. It lies at the center of the concept of representation that has been defined as “acting in the 
best interest of the public” (Pitkin 1967, cited by Manin et al. 1999a: 2). The question then arises why 
rulers should act in the best interest of those being ruled? As we have seen above, depending on the 
intellectual background, the answers to this question may differ. However, most democracy scholars 
would agree that they do so because they are made accountable through general, free and fair elec-
tions. Elections bridge the representative gap that exists between the rulers and the people being ruled. 
They are seen as the primary mechanism of vertical accountability through which compliance of rulers 
with the will of the people, the so-called demos, or ultimate sovereign in a democracy is enforced 
(Cheibub and Przeworski 1999: 222).  
Like horizontal accountability, vertical accountability has been the subject of much debate. In particu-
lar, scholars have noted that power as a property of relationships is hard to measure and that accounta-
bility understood as “answerability” does not include the necessity of hierarchical relations (Mainwar-
ing 2003: 18-19). And if it does, as implied in the notion of “vertical accountability”, it is indetermi-
nate regarding directionality. That is, accountability in vertical relations may either flow “top-down” 
(e.g., when used as a strategy of control from above) or “bottom-up” (e.g., when citizens control do-
mestic authorities). In other words, the terminology alone cannot determine whether a particular ac-
countability exercise is a normal or inverted version of normal power relations (Schedler 1999a: 23-
24). Bringing these observations together, we may thus say that the horizontal-vertical divide has been 
criticized because it brings two issues together that should be kept separate: on the one hand, a spatial 
metaphor of power that conveys images of independence (horizontality) and hierarchy (verticality) and 
on the other hand, the direction in which accountability may run (state versus non-state actors) (Main-
waring 2003: 19).  
To solve this tension, previous research suggested focusing on one or the other aspect and changing 
terminology respectively. For example, Mainwaring (2003: 20) proposes to differentiate accountability 
relationships strictly according to the agent of accountability, and to drop the horizontal-vertical no-
menclature. Other scholars keep the term “vertical accountability”, but replace “horizontal accounta-
bility” with “horizontal exchange” in order to convey more clearly, according to them, that accounta-
bility relationships are inherently vertical (Moreno et al. 2003: 80). In this thesis, however, I follow a 
different approach. I stick to the established horizontal-vertical divide along which accountability may 
run (state versus non-state actors), but I further distinguish between accountability relationships that 
involve a third party and those which do not (dyadic versus triadic actor constellation).  
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Electoral accountability 
Electoral accountability thus can be said to exist between elected public officials and citizens, where 
the former can be removed from power by the latter, usually through the withdrawal of delegated au-
thority. This first type of vertical accountability has a periodic nature and is dependent on election 
dates. Moreover, it concerns a dyadic relationship in the sense that the electoral accountability forums 
possess sufficient sanctioning capacity for directly holding state actors accountable. And finally, it 
entails hard sanctions as elected holders of public office are held accountable by those electoral con-
stituencies who delegated power to them. In sum, the three key elements of electoral accountability in 
procedural terms are its periodic, dyadic and formal nature.  
While there is broad consensus over the procedure of representative institutions, the substance of elec-
tions in inducing representation has caused quite some controversy (Manin et al. 1999a: 3).39 Elections 
have been conceptualized as fulfilling two roles at the same time: “selecting good types” and “sanc-
tioning poor performance” (to borrow the terminology by Fearon 1999). In the former role, elections 
are perceived as a prospective devise used for selecting politicians for public offices. Conversely, in 
the latter role, elections are conceived as a retrospective devise by which public officials are sanc-
tioned for performing badly. While at first sight, electoral accountability seems to resonate more with 
the sanctioning role (as conveyed by the popular phrase “to throw the rascals out” that often reemerges 
at election times), it must be noted that these two roles interact: selection implies sanctioning and vice 
versa (Fearon 1999: 71). Public officials who know that they are being held accountable on the next 
election date for their political performance may thus decide to stay closer to their electoral mandates.  
While this is true, elections have been heavily criticized – notably by scholars adopting a principal-
agent model of accountability – for being a weak mechanism for public accountability, both in terms 
of “selecting good people” and “sanctioning poor performance”. On the one hand, elections have been 
criticized as a weak mechanism for selecting good people, because political programs of major parties 
are not binding for those being subsequently elected. For example, Bernard Manin and colleagues 
(1999) argue that holding politicians accountable on the basis of their electoral mandate appears un-
realistic since no democracy embodies institutional mechanisms to force elected public officials to be 
faithful to their electoral platforms. This lack of binding instructions can be explained historically by 
intentional efforts to allow for space regarding deliberation among elected public officials, judgment 
among voters, and changing conditions more generally (Manin et al. 1999b: 39).  
On the other hand, elections have been criticized as a weak mechanism for sanctioning poor perfor-
mance, since citizens face tremendous difficulties when trying to monitor the behavior of incumbents. 
For example, James Fearon (1999: 69) argues that the collective action problem that voters face sug-
                                                     
39 A good overview of the debate on electoral accountability is given in the volume on Democracy, Accountabil-
ity, and Representation, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin (1999). 
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gests that elections should be considered rather as a selection than as a sanctioning devise. Selecting 
good people for public office appears entirely reasonable as a strategy. In addition, empirical observa-
tions, such as the general dislike of office-seekers, the considerable support for term limits, the high 
value put on adherence to principles of electoral candidates, and the lack of last-period efforts, also 
jointly suggest that the voters think of elections more as opportunities to select good types than as 
subjecting officials to popular control (Fearon 1999: 60-63).  
These arguments have found empirical, though contradictory support. On the one hand, José Antonio 
Cheibub and Adam Przeworski cannot find any empirical evidence that elections serve as a sanction-
ing devise (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999: 222). In a sample of 135 countries (including all democra-
cies) between 1950 and 1990, they find no significant correlation between the economic performance 
of political leaders and their survival in office, even in election years. Except for the growth of the 
labor force in parliamentary democracies, none of the indicators of economic performance matter for 
the survival of presidents in presidential democracies (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999: 228-229).  
On the other hand, Susan Stokes (1999) shows that electoral mandates have been widely and severely 
violated in Latin America between 1982 and 1995, which may suggest that elections do not provide an 
effective selection devise. In twelve of the forty-four presidential election campaigns at that time, 
elected officeholders switched their policies immediately upon coming into office. This breakdown of 
the mandate mechanism in Latin America implies a severe lack of information on the part of the citi-
zens. Politicians chose not to inform the people about the real choices they faced, but instead, in the 
heat of the campaigns, told them what they wanted to hear (Stokes 1999: 126-127).  
A possible explanation for the lack of empirical evidence regarding the two roles of electoral account-
ability is given in a follow-up study by Susan Stokes (2005). Here, she does not focus on elections as a 
means of citizens to select and sanction public office holders, but questions the directionality of elec-
toral accountability per se. Building on the insight by James Scott (1969) that “machine politics of old 
is a lot like clientelist politics of new” (Stoke 2005: 324), she argues that the vertical mechanism of 
electoral accountability is turned on its head in many democracies around the world, even today. In the 
standard principal-agent model that has been described above, voters hold political leaders accountable 
for what they have done in office and reward or punish them conditional on these actions. In a clien-
telistic context, by contrast, political machines (or clientelistic parties) can use their social proximity to 
hold individual voters accountable for what they have done in the voting booth and reward or punish 
them according to these actions. Empirical evidence from a broad-based voter survey, conducted in 
December 2001 and January 2002 in three Argentine provinces supports her theoretical reasoning. 
When principals (i.e., citizens) become “clients” and agents (i.e., politicians) become “patrons”, this is 
what Stokes calls “perverse accountability” (Stokes 2005: 316).  
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Social accountability 
Electoral accountability is not the only type of vertical accountability. Probably due to O’Donnell’s 
legalistic focus, the concept of public accountability has often been reduced to formal mechanisms of 
oversight and/or sanction relative to public officials in the democracy literature. Newer research, how-
ever, shows that public accountability may also work through informal mechanisms, that is, when 
monitoring and sanctioning of public officials takes place outside a legal framework that formally 
gives this authority (Mainwaring 2003: 7). These informal, non-legalized mechanisms of societal 
oversight interact with the formal network of accountability institutions in representative democracies 
(Mainwaring 2003: 8). Particularly in democracies where formal mechanisms of accountability are 
weak or inadequate, citizens' actions and organizations aimed at overseeing political authorities are 
becoming a crucial aspect of political life, thereby, redefining the traditional links between the repre-
sented and their representatives (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 309). Even O’Donnell acknowledges 
that in countries where “electoral vertical accountability functions quite deficiently, the societal ver-
sion of vertical accountability becomes extremely important for the workings and eventually, even for 
the survival of a democratic regime” (O’Donnell 2003: 48). Democracy scholars thus increasingly 
focused on “social accountability” as an alternative form of vertical accountability.  
Social accountability describes an accountability relationship between elected and non-elected public 
officials and citizens, where monitoring of public officials takes place outside a legal framework, usu-
ally through civic participation in governance. This second type of vertical accountability has an ongo-
ing quality in that public officials are held accountable before, during, and after electoral campaigns. 
Moreover, it reveals a triadic actor constellation, since social accountability forums usually do not 
directly sanction state actors, but activate third parties that do have this capacity. And finally, it entails 
largely symbolic sanctions, as they do not stem from legalized mandates, but are imposed by those 
who are significantly affected by the actions and omissions of state actors.  
Social accountability thus distinguishes itself from other types of domestic accountability through its 
ongoing, triadic and informal process character. By way of contrast, I will discuss each of these three 
key elements of social accountability as compared to the other three types of domestic accountability 
discussed so far. Catalina Smulovitz and Enrique Peruzzotti (2000, 2003) have introduced this type of 
societal oversight in the democracy literature. I will broadly follow them in my conceptual demarca-
tion of social accountability.  
In contrast to electoral accountability, social accountability is not bound by the electoral calendar. 
While being a vertical mechanism of domestic accountability, it may be exercised at any time between 
election dates and is activated “on demand” (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 310). Accountability 
demands come from a broad range of societal “actors with differing degrees of organization that rec-
ognize themselves as legitimate claimants of rights” (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 310), including 
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citizen associations, social movements, and the media. A distinctive feature of social accountability is 
that it enlarges the number of people involved in the control of political authorities (Smulovitz and 
Peruzzotti 2003: 310). As a non-electoral, yet vertical mechanism of public accountability, the main 
lines of social accountability do not run to electoral constituencies, but to broader audiences within 
civil society that seek, from outside political parties, to hold public officials and state agencies ac-
countable.  
In contrast to administrative accountability, social accountability is not formally charged with moni-
toring the behavior of public officials and state agencies (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 310; Main-
waring 2003: 8). While social accountability mechanisms exhibit the same triadic structure as mandat-
ed agencies, social ones perform this watchdog function without fulfilling “special majority require-
ments or constitutional entitlements” (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 310). This allows social mecha-
nisms to give voice to citizen concerns that otherwise may not be heard and to channel them into the 
formal political system (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 310). As an informal, yet triadic type of pub-
lic accountability, social accountability forums usually do not sanction power wielders directly. Their 
power lies in the sheer number of people involved in this type of public accountability, and that they 
can activate more formal ones in manifold ways (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 310).  
Finally, social accountability also differs from political accountability in that it does not discipline 
public authorities in a way that formal representatives do. Like the checks and balances enshrined in 
formal political systems, social accountability mechanisms continuously subject political power to 
public control. However, social accountability does not entail mandatory legal consequences but in-
formal symbolic ones based mostly on public disapproval (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 310). That 
is, civil society actors are calling public attention to the existence of specific issues in ways that the 
citizenry can relate to (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 311). As an ongoing, but an issue-specific type 
of public accountability, these actions by civil society then “may produce changes in the social appre-
ciation of a particular phenomenon, transforming it into an issue of a more general and public interest” 
(Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 311).  
These three qualities of social accountability make it a useful complement and reinforcement of tradi-
tional types of domestic accountability. First, given that elections are a “fairly blunt instrument” of 
popular control (Ferejohn 1999: 137; Przeworski et al. 1999: 50), social accountability mechanisms 
enable soft forms of punishment on specific issues relevant to a particular group of citizens. However, 
this does not mean that symbolic sanctions by non-state actors do not have “material consequences” 
(Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 311). On the contrary, the “[p]ublic disclosure of wrongdoings or of 
policy flaws can destroy a fundamental resource of electoral politics: the symbolic capital or reputa-
tion of a politician or institution” (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 311). Particularly in democracies, 
where the political life of elected officials depends on getting the highest number of votes, the reputa-
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tional costs that may result from these socially engineered strategies of accountability can become a 
threat to their political survival (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 312).  
Furthermore, social accountability mechanisms may activate the operation of horizontal balance insti-
tutions. Traditional mechanisms of political and judicial oversight have been criticized for remaining 
predominantly passive. For example, incentives for spending attention, time, and energy on oversight 
duties are said to be weak for individual members of parliament, unless a specific issue draws full 
public attention (Behn 2001: 74-75). Issue-specific attention may be created, for example, when a 
social movement organizes and mobilizes around a particular issue, when the media carry out own 
investigations concerning this issue or when citizen associations activate political oversight and judi-
cial proceedings on this issue (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 312).  
Finally, social accountability mechanisms may establish parallel “societal watchdog” organizations 
that monitor the performance of specific public institutions or mandated state agencies. Their institu-
tional independence is simultaneously the greatest strength and weakness of these mandate agencies. It 
enables them to hold other state agencies accountable in their area of specialization. At the same time, 
it makes them “vulnerable to charges that they are undemocratic or that they overstep their bounda-
ries” (Schedler et al. 1999: 3). Experience in many countries around the globe shows that, after recur-
rent public criticism of mandated state agencies, parallel society-based bodies of oversight “have been 
formed with the goal to continuously oversee the behavior of certain public officials in specific policy 
arenas” (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 314-315); thereby “adding relatively persistent and newly 
organized grassroots ‘guardians of the guardians’” (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2003: 315).  
From the previous discussion, it follows that it makes sense to distinguish four types of public ac-
countability. Starting with O’Donnell’s seminal horizontal-vertical divide, I distinguished between 
four types of public accountability within the domestic arena that jointly serve to hold powerful state 
actors accountable: on the horizontal axis these are the political and administrative accountability fo-
rums, and on the vertical axis these are the electoral and social accountability forums. From a democ-
racy perspective, electoral accountability may have “logical priority”. However, as argued by 
O’Donnell (2003), it would be a mistake to equate this with “pre-eminent factual importance” 
(O'Donnell 2003: 49). Instead, the interactions to be found among various types of domestic account-
ability seem to be the key to holding public power to account within democratic regimes.  
Moreover, as observed by Kenney (2003), external actors do not easily fit into this concept of two 
axes of domestic accountability. Governments increasingly find themselves in relationships with the 
international community, which are governed by “agreements and treaties that form a body of interna-
tional law within which accountability relationships may develop” (Kenney 2003: 55). Similarly, 
Schedler (1999b: 344) points out that “national advocates of public accountability are not ‘alone’ any-
more” (Schedler 1999b: 344). They have received company from a broad range of “external” actors 
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who interfere with domestic accountability. Robert Pastor (1999: 124) therefore suggests that the rela-
tionship between nation-states and the international community could be conceptualized as a third axis 
of accountability besides vertical and horizontal accountability. If external actors would be endowed 
with greater awareness and a more deliberate strategy, as he suggests, they might have the power and 
potential to intervene on behalf of national democracy (Pastor 1999: 124). According to these democ-
racy scholars the relationship between donors and recipients of foreign aid may thus be conceptualized 
as a third axis of accountability that interacts with horizontal and vertical accountability at the recipi-
ent country level. These scholars agree that the question is not whether external actors intervene in 
domestic regimes, but how they affect democratic accountability in recipient countries.  
 
2.3.2. Development literature: foreign accountability initiatives 
2.3.2.1. Hidden distinction 
Within the field of development studies, the promotion of domestic accountability often forms part of 
governance programs aimed at strengthening the institutional framework in developing countries. 
However, accountability within these governance programs rests on contested grounds, particularly if 
the concept is seen as something to build democracy on. For instance, Craig Borowiak argues that  
“[t]oo often, the concept is used loosely or in a generalized manner that masks just what 
sort of accountability is being demanded, as if any and all forms of accountability are the 
same, when, in fact, many of those demanding accountability don’t have democratic ide-
als in mind.” (Borowiak 2011: x)  
A clear understanding of the different types of accountability that have been demanded in the devel-
opment context should thus work as “a helpful harpoon” (Moore and Teskey 2006: 2) that does not 
exactly tell what the target is in any context, but offers a way to get closer to the goal. Moreover, 
“[p]aying attention to the ways in which particular development buzzwords have come to be used, 
then, sheds interesting light on the normative project that is development” (Cornwall and Brock 2005: 
1044).  
One harpoon that has been offered is the fundamental distinction between formal (or technical) ac-
countability and partisan (or political) accountability. Following Mark Philp (2009), formal accounta-
bility concerns “the requirement that public officials act within the formal responsibilities of their of-
fice” (Philp 2009: 38). Central to the notion of formal accountability is that their conduct is assessed in 
a non-partisan way. Partisan accountability, by contrast, concerns “the answerability of those in public 
office to partisan elements within the political system” (Philp 2009: 38). Key to the notion of partisan 
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accountability is that the conduct of public officials is assessed according to political criteria.40 Parti-
san accountability does not ask whether a public official “acted within his or her legitimate and allo-
cated power”, but whether they exercised this power in ways “their political constituencies are willing 
to endorse or approve” (Philp 2009: 38-39). While Philp admits that the formal-partisan distinction is 
rather crude, it remains important to ask whether an actor transgressed the legal boundaries of his or 
her public office or whether the actor did something “that lies clearly within the parameters of his or 
her office” (Philp 2009: 40).  
Albeit of paramount importance, following Philp (2009), this distinction between form and content has 
rarely been acknowledged by the democracy literature. First, some use of language implicitly blurs 
this important distinction between formal and partisan accountability. For example, the popular phrase 
“to throw the rascals out” meant as an invitation to vote for the party not currently in power is mis-
leading in that it mixes these two different rationales for public accountability. As a term, “rascals” 
should be best reserved for those who violate formal accountability, that is, violate the law through 
corrupt and criminal acts, whereas the fact that politicians are getting “thrown out of their offices” at 
election times is nothing else than the regular exercise of partisan accountability (Philp 2009: 40).  
Second, the formal-partisan distinction has often been obscured by much of democratic theory, which 
sees accountability intimately intertwined with the concept of representation (Philp 2009: 40). In rep-
resentative democracies, accountability refers “to a particular type of relationship that results in the act 
of delegating authority to a representative body, where the represented holds a claim to superior au-
thority over those to whom it has temporarily delegated its power” (Peruzzotti 2006: 46). This view 
focuses on elections as a means for achieving partisan accountability, while more abstract goals of 
formal accountability are not part of the conceptual framework. As Philp affirms, the formal system 
must legitimately set the parameters right in advance of the elections; otherwise, electoral accountabil-
ity will be flawed (Philp 2009: 40).  
Finally, the distinction between formal and partisan accountability has often been hidden behind the 
more common horizontal-vertical divide in the democracy literature (Philp 2009: 51). Although this 
literature has noted the distinction between formal and partisan accountability (see the debate between 
O'Donnell and his critics), neither those who stick to a legalistic interpretation nor those who include 
political oversight in their accounts of horizontal accountability consider the formal-partisan distinc-
tion to be more important than the horizontal-vertical divide. Instead, the prevailing mode to deal with 
this issue has been to associate the formal accountability with horizontal accountability and partisan 
accountability with vertical accountability (Kenney 2003: 61; O’Donnell 2003: 35; Peruzzotti 2006: 
45-46).  
                                                     
40 While Philp (2009) talks about “political accountability” with regard to this sort of accountability purpose, I 
use the term “partisan” in order to not confuse it with the “political” type of horizontal accountability that has 
been discussed above. 
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The present study takes a different approach. As I argue here, accountability standards and accounta-
bility forums must be kept separate. Accordingly, public actors may be held accountable according to 
formal and partisan accountability standards by accountability forums located inside and outside the 
state. Following Philp, the horizontal-vertical divide has value in thinking about directions in which 
accountability may run in democratic states (state versus non-state actors), whereas the formal-partisan 
distinction captures a major issue in newly democratizing states, where this distinction often is severe-
ly blurred. For example, politicians regularly “seek political ends by accusing their opponents of cor-
ruption” or, conversely, condone corrupt practices “in exchange for certain political outputs” (Philp 
2009: 51). I agree with Philp that the formal-partisan distinction has grown in importance in recent 
years. However, I do not use this distinction for describing domestic electoral and political arenas, but 
use it for specifying the democratic targets of external intervention strategies.  
As we have seen above, shared agendas in a mutual accountability framework largely fall into two 
categories: aid purpose and aid delivery. While the former concerns the normative standards of ac-
countability (or the motives of donors), the latter refers to the operational process (or the modalities at 
the recipient country level). From an accountability perspective, external intervention strategies may 
thus be classified according to their targets, that is, whether they aim at promoting formal or partisan 
accountability standards; and according to their modalities, that is, whether they rely on standard or 
surrogate accountability processes for the delivery of aid. In the following subsection, I will briefly 
review external efforts for promoting domestic accountability in terms of their strategic rationale and 
their method of support, based on which I will propose my typology for describing and evaluating 
surrogate accountability arrangements in international development aid.  
 
2.3.2.2. Strategic rationale 
In the development literature, foreign transparency and accountability initiatives are usually subsumed 
under “democracy aid” that is commonly perceived as having a political purpose as opposed to “de-
velopment aid” which is given for economic purposes alone. However, as noted by Thomas Carothers 
(2009), “democracy-aid providers are moving away from an early tendency to follow a one-size-fits-
all strategy” (Carothers 2009: 5). Democracy aid is undergoing a process of strategic differentiation 
marked by the emergence of two distinct overall approaches to assisting democracy (Carothers 2009: 
5). Since these two overall approaches of assisting democracy in recipient countries target different 
standards of accountability, I will use slightly different terminology than Carothers (as shown in 
brackets) by calling them the partisan (or political) approach and the formal (or developmental) ap-
proach. While the partisan approach aims at enhancing liberal democracy (‘democracy assistance’), 
the formal approach aims at improving good governance (‘governance assistance’) in recipient coun-
tries. Following Carothers, I will compare these two different approaches according to their concept of 
democratization and their strategy for supporting democracy in recipient countries.   
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Democracy assistance 
The partisan approach (‘democracy assistance’) looks at democratization as a conflict-ridden process 
“in which democrats work to gain the upper hand in society over nondemocrats” (Carothers 2009: 5) 
Yet as noted by Schedler, “political institutions do not fall from heaven; they have to be conquered 
against the express will of those who defend the status quo (Schedler 1999b: 337).41  
Democracy promoters in this tradition thus often intervene in “conjunctural moments” of this political 
struggle between democrats (i.e., the actors perceived as such by external democracy supporters) and 
non-democrats in the hope of having “catalytic effects” (Carothers 2009: 5). Moreover, they tend – 
quasi by design – to support individuals and groups that stand in opposition to an authoritarian regime 
and its representatives. Support to those who challenge the existing regime can be done directly, for 
example, through providing training, advice, moral support or funding to the political actors them-
selves, such as political parties, politicians or members of political society. It can also be done indi-
rectly through supporting key institutions and procedures that may have logical priority from a liberal 
democracy perspective, such as free and fair elections, a strong legislature, or independent media 
(Carothers 2009: 7).  
In terms of accountability, we may thus say that democracy assistance in a narrow sense aims at pro-
moting partisan accountability in recipient countries, based on the central idea of representative de-
mocracy that rulers should act in the best interest of the public. External efforts aimed at strengthening 
the answerability of those in public office to partisan elements within the political system are seen as a 
key democratic norm that has value by itself. Given that the support of a nascent civil society may 
figure as a counterweight to the incumbent regime, the external promotion of partisan accountability 
usually comes against the will of the recipient government and the political elites. 
Governance assistance 
The formal approach (‘governance assistance’) considers democratization to be a slow, iterative pro-
cess of change with many ups and downs. There is no easy and quick fix to the widespread democratic 
deficits in recipient countries. Instead, democracy is incrementally promoted through long-term devel-
opment assistance across all political, social and economic sectors (Carothers 2009: 5).  
Democracy promoters in this tradition see themselves working with a rights-based approach that is 
more easily defensible against charges of “external interventionism”. Human rights are thought of as 
being “more clearly rooted in universal legal principles” than the institutions of liberal democracy. As 
such, their democracy-related work is often tied to or even cast in human rights term (Carothers 2009: 
                                                     
41 The literature on democratic transitions is full of examples showing the binary structure of internal conflict 
between conservatives and agents of change. See O’Donnell and Schmitter Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 
(1986) for an introduction to the basic concepts of the so-called “transitology” literature. 
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9). Human rights are seen as “a useful gateway” for integrating political with socioeconomic concerns. 
If the political is addressed directly, aid providers who subscribe to the formal approach incline to-
wards strengthening of “state capacity and good governance (usually in a technocratic, apolitical fash-
ion)” as an alternative to more “confrontational” activities for supporting liberal democracy (Carothers 
2009: 9). As a result, governance assistance is directed at more formal institutions and processes 
deemed necessary for the “good” management of socio-economic development, such as administrative 
and judicial mandate institutions as well as the participation of civil society and the private sector in 
policy design and implementation.  
In terms of accountability, we may thus say that governance assistance more broadly aims at promot-
ing formal accountability in recipient countries, based on the conviction that compliance with formal 
standards like general rule-following and respect for procedural norms also contributes to more equi-
table socioeconomic development overall. The external requirement that public officials must act with-
in the formal responsibilities of their office is seen as crucial for a governance system that is also 
“good” for national development. Given that this type of economic governance is not dependent on the 
type of political regime, the external promotion of formal accountability usually comes with the con-
sent of the “host” government.  
 
2.3.2.3. Method of support 
The development literature has distinguished two basic methods for the external promotion of domes-
tic accountability (e.g., Booth and Fritz 2008; Meyer and Schulz 2008; Horner and Power 2009; Hud-
son 2009). According to this literature, donors may either provide direct support for key domestic ac-
countability institutions (‘direct method’), or they may indirectly support domestic accountability 
through insisting in mutual accountability forums that aid is well accounted for by recipients (‘indirect 
method’). Accordingly, this indirect method rather shapes the scope for domestic accountability than 
that it helps to build the capacity of domestic accountability holders (Hudson 2009: 6-7).  
 
Direct support 
Providing aid in direct support of domestic accountability usually has meant promoting “the respon-
sive capacities of states and citizens directly” (Meyer and Schulz 2008: 26). This is especially notable 
in PRS processes which, in order to be accepted by donors, are required to involve civil society and 
other stakeholders in the formulation and monitoring of national development strategies. The idea 
behind is that the participation of domestic stakeholders in national decision-making processes 
strengthens their voice and capacity for effectively engaging in domestic politics and claiming their 
rights (i.e., achieving substantive democracy). Research on these new aid modalities suggests that 
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capacity development efforts in recipient countries should work on both sides of the “citizen-state 
contract” (Meyer and Schulz 2008: 26). Traditionally, donors’ governance programs have focused on 
capacity-building of state institutions, “with the overall aim of furthering democratic and effective 
ownership of development processes” (Lister and Carter 2006, cited by Horner and Power 2009: 16). 
More recently, however, donors realized that democratic governance and effective accountability re-
quires the active involvement of a wide range of domestic stakeholders (Hudson 2009: 10). Newer aid 
modalities thus aspire to strengthen the voice and capacity of citizens so as they can directly demand 
greater accountability and responsiveness from public officials and state agencies.  
 
Indirect support 
The more indirect way, by which foreign aid impacts on domestic accountability works via donors’ 
coordinated support for recipient-owned programs, which should increase the scope for domestic ac-
countability. The prime example for the coordination and harmonization of donor procedure is multi-
donor or general budget support. As it has been argued in the literature, channeling aid through recipi-
ent country budgets has an “inbuilt democratizing logic” (Meyer and Schulz 2008: 25). As general 
budget support is provided through the government's accountability channels, it not only reduces 
transaction costs generated by aid management but also strengthens democratic institutions and proce-
dures in recipient countries (de Renzio 2006: 629; Driscoll et al. 34) (i.e., creating and sustaining pro-
cedural democracy). Using aid modalities that do not bypass domestic accountability systems is a 
“powerful but deceptively simple idea” (Booth and Fritz 2008: 1). As an argument, it is reasonably 
straightforward and broadly shared within the international development community. However, as 
shown by more recent research, actual practice falls short of high expectations linked to general budg-
et support (see Booth and Fritz 2008; de Renzio 2006; Driscoll et al. 2005, Faust et al. 2012; Hayman 
2011). On the one hand, evidence suggests that “even the more progressive donors” were reluctant to 
switch completely towards general budget support but have used a range of other aid modalities in-
stead (Booth and Fritz 2008: v). On the other hand, the domestic drive for the budget-support vision to 
work well has also been questioned: “calling for a more nuanced view of the role of donors as ‘change 
agents’” (de Renzio 2006: 634). In this regard, a common view amongst donors has been that the new 
ownership philosophy implies that donors should not become actively engaged in national governance 
systems. However, as argued by recent research, this view is deeply mistaken, since aid is fundamen-
tally a “relationship business” which depends on the collaboration of all partners being involved 
(Booth and Fritz 2008: 50).  
Traditionally, there has been some division of labor between bilateral and multilateral donors concern-
ing motive and modalities of “democracy aid”. While bilateral donors tended to use more direct means 
of supporting political society aimed at building the prerequisite for liberal democracy (‘democracy 
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assistance’), multilateral donors rather aimed at sustaining good governance in recipient countries 
through using more indirect means of improving formal governance (‘governance assistance’). How-
ever, it would be a mistake to associate democracy assistance with direct methods of enhancing do-
mestic accountability and governance assistance with indirect methods of furthering domestic ac-
countability. Rather, we find an increasing differentiation regarding donors’ intervention strategies. 
Today, the combination of different strategies and modalities is thought to be the most effective way 
for influencing domestic accountability relationships (Levitsky and Way 2005: 22; Nelson and Eglin-
ton 1992: 4; Pastor 1999: 140).  
How the typologies of accountability available in the democracy and development literature may be 
combined in order to advance our understanding of the causal mechanisms between aid and democra-
cy is the topic of the final synthesis.  
 
2.3.3. Synthesis: typology of surrogate accountability 
Based on my review of democratic accountability in the democracy and development literature, the 
final synthesis develops a typology for describing surrogate accountability and evaluating its impact of 
democratic change in recipient countries. In line with my conceptual framework, I keep the description 
of surrogate accountability arrangements separate from their evaluation according to different ac-
countability standards. Consequently, this subsection has two main objectives. First, it shows how 
foreign transparency and accountability initiatives may be described according to different types of 
domestic accountability forums they support at the recipient country level. Second, it shows how these 
initiatives may be evaluated according to different targets, respectively normative standards of mutual 
accountability.  
 
2.4.3.1. Axes: Describing targeted domestic forums of surrogate accountability 
In the literature review above, two seminal distinctions or typologies of accountability have been iden-
tified. First, the democracy literature distinguishes between horizontal accountability and vertical ac-
countability as the two central axes of domestic accountability. Second, the development literature 
recognizes that the formal-partisan distinction captures two different rationales that underlie foreign 
efforts at promoting domestic accountability. If we combine the two rationales of foreign transparency 
and accountability initiatives with the two axes of domestic accountability, we arrive at a two-by-two 
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matrix displaying four ideal-typical strategies of external accountability promotion available to the 
donor community at large.42 The following Table 2-3 summarizes these four strategies.  
Table 2-3: Foreign strategies for promoting domestic accountability 
Domestic axis Formal accountability Partisan accountability 
Horizontal accountability Administrative accountability Political accountability 
Vertical accountability Social accountability Electoral accountability 
 
These four strategies differ in terms of the type of domestic accountability forum they support. A first 
strategy aims at supporting administrative accountability by building and strengthening the capacities 
of mandated state agencies whose primary task is to oversee other state agencies. With the rise of gen-
eral budget support as a new aid modality, donors looked more closely at those institutions that over-
see the domestic budget process as they wanted their funds to be used in an effective and accountable 
way. Among the broad panoply of administrative oversight or mandate institutions, those exerting 
some form of financial control have been most important to budget-supporting donors, including gen-
eral or supreme audit and accounting offices with a largely preemptive role as well as judicial bodies 
and corruption control agencies specialized in demanding accountability ex post facto (see O’Donnell 
1998; Heilbrunn 1999; Widner 1999).  
A second strategy aims at supporting social accountability through involving representatives of civil 
society in co-governance processes with the state. This strategy differs from traditional approaches to 
formal accountability in that it does not reduce governance “to a question of state reform” (Newell and 
Wheeler 2006: 2), but increases the number of participants within it. Participatory co-governance is 
seen as valuable in that it widens the parameters of the public debate and strengthens the domestic 
decision-making processes. As a result, the responsiveness of those who govern to the needs and aspi-
rations of those being governed should be strengthened (Ottaway and Carothers 2000). Potential activ-
ities of this sort of external intervention strategy include, for example, participatory public policy-
making, participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking, citizen monitoring and evaluation of 
public service delivery to name a few (see Malena et al. 2004; McNeill and Malena 2010).  
A third strategy aims at supporting political accountability by building and strengthening the capaci-
ties of horizontal balance institutions whose primary task is to check and balance each other. Donors 
that follow this strategy perceive democratization as a process of institutional modeling. They focus on 
institutional minima, that is, the core processes and institutions of representative democracy deemed 
necessary for it to work, such as the existence of a democratic constitution, a representative and com-
petent legislature, a politically autonomous judiciary, and government authorities at the national and 
                                                     
42 Similar two-by-two matrices have been developed in the literature that either focused on democracy or go-
vernance assistance (see, Börzel et al. 2008; Schmitter and Brouwer 1999). However, my approach differs from 
these typologies in that it focuses on the interaction of different types of accountability at the recipient country 
level. 
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local level. The list of key political institutions is not random; instead it is grounded in donors’ convic-
tion that in a representative democracy the constitutive powers need to be separated and in balance to 
each other. Potential activities aimed at strengthening political checks and balances thus encompass, 
for example, constitutional engineering aimed at keeping the military in its barracks; parliamentary 
assistance aimed at building capacities for national budget review; and decentralization efforts aimed 
at devolving power to local levels as a check on central power within the state (see Carothers 1997; 
Santiso 2001a).  
A fourth strategy aims at supporting electoral accountability by educating citizens and strengthening 
the capacities of political society vis-à-vis the incumbent regime. Donors increasingly recognized that 
the outcome of democratic state reforms would be shaped by domestic society, not just recipient go-
vernments. To offset the biases towards elitism and to go beyond the modeling of democratic institu-
tions, democracy promoters thus began to invest in the capacities of organized society. Such rights-
based capacity development usually included “transferring knowledge about democratic institutions 
and practices, socializing individuals to democratic (civic) values, and changing their behavior” 
(Schmitter and Brouwer 1999: 21). Among the broad range of politically oriented civil society groups, 
those representing large segments of the population, which could potentially figure as counterweight 
to state power, have been most important to donors that adhere to this type of capacity building strate-
gy, including political parties, labor unions, advocacy-oriented non-governmental organizations, hu-
man rights movements and independent media (see Carothers 1997; Schmitter and Brouwer 1999).43  
After having distinguished the types of forums that external strategies of public accountability promo-
tion support, we may ask what type of actor has to render an account. In line with the various aid 
frames identified above, the answer to this question in the development literature has been three-fold.  
A first answer to the above question might be that the public organization is perceived as a unitary 
actor being held accountable for its collective outcomes (‘corporate actor’). The corporate logic frames 
aid as a contract between donors and recipients of foreign aid. Within this aid frame, accountability 
relationships are analyzed in terms of a principal-agent model of accountability, where aid recipients 
(agents) are accountable upwards to aid donors (principals). Corporate accountability focuses on the 
fiduciary responsibilities of agents (e.g., public financial management) and the challenge that faces 
                                                     
43 A side note on civil society: Following Scholte (2011), civil society operations and electoral-legislative strate-
gies of political society represent “very different (albeit potentially complementary) ways of exacting accounta-
bility from governance authorities” (Scholte 2011: 38). In line with the pluralist-institutionalist model of public 
accountability, we may say that civil society follows a participatory logic of deliberation and direct democracy, 
while political society is firmly grounded in a delegation logic of plebiscites and representative democracy. 
Hence, capacity-building of “civil society” is subsumed in my analytical framework under social accountability 
support, whereas strengthening of “political society” is subsumed under electoral accountability support. These 
two types of external intervention strategies also correspond with the two ways social accountability has been 
conceptualized in the democracy literature (‘societal oversight’) and development literature (‘participatory co-
governance’) (see Ackerman 2004 for a review of these two literature strands). 
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principals (i.e., shareholders) in establishing appropriate legal and economic incentives (Droop et al. 
2008: 17; Steer et al. 2009: 15).  
A second answer may be that the political leader at the top of the public organization is being held 
accountable for all its members (‘representative actor’). The representative logic frames aid as entitle-
ment to which citizens in recipient countries have legitimate rights. It is a rights-based approach to 
development that draws on the stakeholder democracy model of accountability, where both aid recipi-
ents and aid donors being entrusted with public responsibilities (duty-bearer) are democratically ac-
countable domestic stakeholders (claim-holder) in recipient (and donor) countries. As we have seen, 
representative accountability can be thought of as running along a vertical (in case of electoral and 
social accountability) and a horizontal axis (in case of administrative and political accountability) to 
those having delegated power to them.  
A third answer finally may be that any member could be held personally accountable for the conduct 
of the public organization as a whole (‘collaborative actor’). The collaborative logic frames aid as a 
partnership between all partners engaged in international development cooperation. Relationships 
within global partnerships in pursuit of developmental objectives have been analyzed according to the 
pluralist-institutionalist model of public accountability. Collaborative accountability focuses on the 
shared agendas and reciprocal commitments that development partners have voluntarily made to their 
fellow peers – and for which they are collectively accountable to those being affected.  
A third question that has been asked is the type of conduct about which an actor has to render an ac-
count. Importantly, this question must be understood in descriptive terms and needs to be separated 
from the normative standards used to evaluate the outcomes of an accountability relationship (such as 
democratic or pro-poor impacts).  
To describe the conduct for which an account is to be rendered, I draw on the specialized accountabil-
ity literature. Accountability scholars have offered general classification schemes that appear surpris-
ingly similar across the literature. In most instances, a three-fold classification scheme like the one by 
Mark Bovens has been suggested based on whether the actor is being held accountable for “financial, 
procedural, or product accountability” (Bovens 2007: 459). Similar classification schemes based on 
whether the information an actor has to provide concerns his or her “resources, processes, or out-
comes” (Kearns 1996: 30) also speak of “fiscal, process, and program accountability” (Fessler and 
Kettl, 1991: 327) or “accountability for finances, fairness, and performance” (Behn 2001: 6). These 
classification schemes have in common that they do not evaluate the content of accountability, but 
merely describe the account-giving of the actor.  
The type of conduct is closely linked to the type of actor that is being held accountable. If we compare 
the three-fold classification schemes of the democracy literature with the three aid frames of the de-
velopment literature, we see that corporate actors are usually liable for financial management, repre-
116 
sentative actors are generally responsible for public policies, and collaborative actors hold themselves 
mutually accountable through the process. Thus, the classification of conduct often concurs with the 
one made according to the type of actor. However, in theoretical terms, that must not necessarily be 
the case. Instead, I assume that the type of conduct can be combined with any actor that has to render 
an account.  
Finally, we may ask why the actor should render an account to the domestic forums identified above. 
Global governance scholars speak of compliance-based and integrity-based steering mechanisms that 
guide accountability relationships at the global level. Following Thomas Risse, external actors can 
either manipulate the cost-benefit calculations of political leaders so as to convince them that rule 
compliance is in their best interest, or they can focus on increasing the moral legitimacy of the norms 
and rules in question in order to make political leaders comply voluntarily with them (Risse 2005: 
168-169). However, besides these two indirect mechanisms of influence, external actors may also 
directly support domestic accountability holders and their institutions enabling them to demand greater 
accountability and responsiveness from their political leaders. Accordingly, three types of instruments 
can be identified that serve to promote public accountability in recipient countries.  
First, political conditionality tries to manipulate the cost-benefit calculations of political leaders 
through creating incentives for democratic and governance reforms. Political conditionality comes in 
two forms: as a reward or as punishment. After the end of the Cold War, bilateral donors were more 
inclined to use negative incentives (or punishment) “in situations of perceived violations of human 
rights, lack of progress towards democratization or state corruption” (Crawford 1997: 70). This prac-
tice was criticized by multilateral donors for being too adversarial vis-à-vis the recipient government 
in situations where the government's cooperation might bear more potential for institutionalizing dem-
ocratic and governance reforms (Carothers 2009: 6). Multilateral donors, by contrast, preferred using 
positive incentives (or rewards), which they saw as more legitimate and potentially more effective than 
plain punishment (Youngs 2001: 192, cited by Schimmelfennig 2012: 12). In practice, however, most 
donors have increasingly combined negative sanctions with a positive dimension to reward good per-
formance (Santiso 2001a: 160).  
Second, political dialogue exerts influence by virtue of argumentative power to convince political 
leaders of the moral legitimacy of the norm and rules in question (Hewitt and Killick 1993: 44; Fuster 
1998: 266-267). Political dialogue has often been presented as an alternative instrument to donors 
when conditionality (for whatever reasons) is not available or adequate. It may occur informally or 
through formal settings like the Consultative Group meetings, which have been the bilateral donors’ 
principal forum for the discussion of sensitive issues with the host government (Fuster 1998: 324). 
Like bilateral donors, multilateral donors also rely on this “soft” form of power which works via the 
socialization of citizens and state elites. They use political dialogue as an informal means both for 
supporting broader reform coalitions within national society and for finding internal allies within the 
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state bureaucracy (Kahler 1992: 126; Stallings 1992: 52). The “transnational network of mainstream 
professional economists”, which have been trained at American or European universities and have 
been working on both sides of the donor-recipient relationship, is the main example in this respect 
(Kahler 1992: 126).  
Third, technical assistance works via donor involvement in the reform process and aims at strengthen-
ing the capacities of domestic constituencies to exercise effective accountability over their political 
leaders. Technical assistance, sometimes also dubbed positive support, to domestic institutions and 
processes differs from the other two instruments in that democratic and governance reforms are not 
solely delegated to recipient countries, but actively supported and financed by the international com-
munity (Fuster 1998: 244; Moore 1995: 89). Given their apolitical mandates, multilateral donors 
showed a strong preference for this type of assistance, since it comes on “technical” terms – notwith-
standing the political character of the recipient (Fuster 1998: 246; Knack 2004: 251). This technical 
approach of multilateral donors, however, has been criticized for being “too vague and unassertive” in 
a world where many recipient governments are said to have “learned to play a reform game with the 
international community”, that is, they absorb large amounts of aid, while avoiding genuine political 
reform (Carothers 2009: 6). Unlike multilateral donors, bilateral donors generally exhibited less prob-
lems in “teaching” domestic actors respect for human rights as well as democratic norms and practic-
es, for example, by using “high-pressure tactics such as public protest” against the domestic regime 
(Crawford 1997: 69-70; Covey 1998: 82; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011: 890).  
In sum, we may think of the set of instruments donors can use to induce recipient governments to ren-
der an account to domestic constituencies in terms of a continuum from compliance-based to integrity-
based accountability mechanisms with political conditionality and political dialogue as the two poles 
and, lying somewhere in-between, some type of technical assistance to domestic accountability. Since 
this intermediate category involves donors directly in the domestic accountability process, it has been 
said to rely on some form of “accountability in the shadow of hierarchy” (Bovens 2007: 460).  
 
2.4.3.2. Initiatives: Evaluating democratic impact of surrogate accountability 
In order to classify the different channels how development aid may impact on democratic change in 
recipient countries, I will draw on the concept of surrogate accountability as it has been introduced by 
Jennifer Rubenstein (2007) into the debate on global accountability. Following Rubenstein, I will first 
sketch the main lines of the surrogate accountability concept, followed by an outline of the democratic 
targets of surrogate accountability.  
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Standard versus surrogate accountability 
According to Rubenstein, global governance faces the general problem that holding public power to 
account is difficult to achieve in an unequal world. In other words, standard accountability does not 
work under conditions of extreme inequality. In particular, poor citizens in aid-dependent, unstable, 
and/or autocratic countries are often too weak to hold their governments accountable and to sanction 
them accordingly in case of poor performance. This weakness is due to numerous reasons ranging 
from high poverty rates, over social and political exclusion, to low education and poor health (Ru-
benstein 2007: 617).44  
In line with the development literature cited above, Rubenstein identifies two possible solutions to this 
general problem that shapes the global governance of aid and beyond. The first solution would be to 
empower weak accountability holders in order that they can achieve the capacity to exercise effective 
accountability over power wielders, that is, pursuing standard accountability via increased equality. 
Because inequality is unlikely to disappear soon, a strategy of reducing inequality may be promising in 
the long term but is not sufficient for the short and medium term (Rubenstein 2007: 617, 623). Thus, a 
“second-best” solution that Rubenstein identifies is to involve a third party or “surrogate” in her terms, 
“who substitutes for accountability holders during one or more phases of the accountability process” 
(Rubenstein 2007: 617). Despite that replacing standard accountability with surrogate accountability is 
perceived to be a normatively inferior strategy, it has the potential to be realized in the short and medi-
um term (Rubentstein 2007: 617).  
A surrogate may substitute for the accountability holder in all phases of the standard accountability 
process, but his or her role is undoubtedly most important in the sanctioning phase. Sanctions are the 
“weakest link” in contexts that are characterized by deep-seated forms of inequality, which is true for 
accountability arrangements both at the national and global level (Grant and Keohane 2005: 41; Ru-
benstein 2007: 621-622). In the main usage of the term, surrogate accountability thus occurs, “when a 
third party sanctions a power wielder on behalf of accountability holders because accountability hold-
ers cannot sanction (or play their role in helping to sanction) the power wielder” (Rubenstein 2007: 
624). In conceptual terms, three other features of the concept are noteworthy: first, the third party that 
sanctions the power wielder – that is, the surrogate accountability holder – is independent of the origi-
nal accountability holder; second, the surrogate accountability holder primarily substitutes for the orig-
inal accountability holder's capacity in the accountability process, and not for his or her authority in 
defining the content of accountability; and third, if possible, surrogate accountability holders should 
“deliberate with accountability holders and seek their authorization to act on their behalf” (Rubenstein 
2007: 624).  
                                                     
44 Similar arguments with regard to “disenfranchised publics” have been raised by Grant and Keohane (2005: 
40). 
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At the national level, “surrogate accountability” is not a new phenomenon, but a natural characteristic 
of public accountability systems. The review of the democracy literature above has shown that admin-
istrative accountability holders usually do not sanction other state institutions. Yet, they provide cru-
cial information for others to bring them to court, among other possibilities. Likewise, social account-
ability holders have no formal sanctioning power. However, they can activate the operation of formal 
accountability holders in a variety of ways, like increasing public pressure on or triggering legal ac-
tions against power wielders. Thus, despite that administrative and social accountability holders usual-
ly refer to a third party who sanctions the power wielder, the crucial point is that accountability hold-
ers play a significant role in this process. According to Rubenstein, what matters is that accountability 
holders – even if they are no sanctioning actor – participate in all phases of the accountability process, 
that is, in the standard-setting, information, debate, and judgment phase. It is their ongoing participa-
tion in the process that finally serves “to pressure the power wielder to comply with the relevant 
standards” (Rubenstein 2007: 619-620).  
At the global level, where the issue of surrogate accountability is of more recent origin, the academic 
debate has mainly focused on the question whether external interventions in favor of domestic ac-
countability may be conceptualized as accountability or (justifiable) coercion.45 Rubenstein gives us a 
useful distinction: We may speak of accountability, according to her, when the accountability holders 
have endorsed the standards, while the power wielder has recognized the “standards as standards in an 
accountability mechanism (even if the power wielder does not endorse them)” (Rubenstein 2007: 618). 
Thus, in terms of external promotion of domestic accountability, there does not need to be (prior) 
agreement between citizens and recipient governments regarding the standards of public accountabil-
ity. However, the citizens must have endorsed the accountability standards (otherwise they are not 
accountability holders); and the government must have recognized the legitimacy of these accountabil-
ity standards somewhere (for example, by signing an international agreement that shows its willing-
ness to participate in discussion with accountability holders on these standards (Rubenstein 2007: 
619).  
 
Procedural versus substantive democracy 
Adopting the pluralist-institutionalist model of public accountability to the development context, Ru-
benstein has articulated the fundamental dilemma of the global governance of aid, which is that under 
conditions of extreme inequality, typical for many developing countries around the world, processes of 
standard accountability do not work. She discriminates between two basic donor strategies in reaction 
to this dilemma: a direct strategy: where donors empower domestic accountability holders, thereby 
                                                     
45 For an interesting contribution to the debate on the development of an “international development law”, see 
Dann (2006). 
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strengthening the standard accountability process; and an indirect strategy, where donors substitute for 
domestic accountability holders in one or more phases of the standard accountability process, thereby 
seeking redress to surrogate accountability. I will use her distinction to generate hypotheses on the 
impact of development aid on democratic change in recipient countries.  
Following Rubenstein, enhancing public accountability in developing countries yields at least six 
normative benefits: On the one hand, it promotes accountability holders’ preferences; it increases rule-
following by power wielders; and it fosters valuable substantive or procedural norms. On the other 
hand, it provides useful information to accountability holders, power wielders, and third parties; it 
strengthens civic virtues and self-development on the part of both power wielders and accountability 
holders; and most importantly, it helps to constitute nondomination (Rubenstein 2007: 620-621). Of 
these six benefits, as I argue, the first three arguments roughly coincide with the core dimensions of 
procedural democracy, while the last three arguments conform more to the key aspects of a substantive 
democracy.  
Procedural democracy refers to democracy as a system of popular control over government (Dahl 
1999: 20). In procedural definitions, the starting point of defining democracy is “rule by the people”, 
or the demos, who decides as the sovereign authority in the last instance about all important political 
matters. In order to do so, the people's representatives (by necessity in any larger political entity) or 
"the government of the state” need to be controlled “either directly in popular assemblies or indirectly 
through its representatives, chosen by lot or, in modern democracies, by means of elections” (Dahl 
1999: 20). The government thereby is made accountable to the people, and democracy prevails. Proce-
dural or formal definitions of democracy thus look how popular control over government is ensured by 
the “institutions, procedures or routines of a democratic system” (Luckham et al. 2001: 10). Across the 
democracy literature, popular control has often been conceptualized in terms of three dimensions, 
which roughly coincide with Rubenstein’s first three normative benefits: vertical accountability (i.e., 
promoting preferences of accountability holders), horizontal accountability (i.e., increasing rule-
following by power wielders), and universal suffrage (i.e., fostering valuable substantive or procedural 
norms).  
By contrast, substantive democracy refers to democracy as a system of political and civil rights (Dahl 
1999: 20). In substantive definitions, it is not the popular control over government but the extension of 
fundamental rights that are defining for democratic systems. Substantive definitions of democracy thus 
do not focus on democratic institutions, but rather on democratic politics and how they affect or are 
being affected by the rights of the participants involved. In other words, substantive definitions high-
light “the degree to which an individual citizen is able to participate in the decisions which affect his 
or her life” (Kaldor and Vejvoda 1997, cited by Luckham et al. 2001: 10). Generally, the literature 
distinguishes between more narrowly defined political rights that determine citizens’ rights in the po-
litical sphere and civil rights that more broadly circumscribe individual rights in the economic and 
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social sphere. For example, political rights such as freedom of speech and opinion (i.e., providing use-
ful information) and freedom to form and join organizations (i.e., strengthening civic virtue and self-
development) do not constitute themselves the exercise of democratic power, but rather appear as a 
necessary requirement without which no competition or participation among a large number of people 
takes place (Dahl 1971: 3). Examples of civil rights, in turn, such as individual rights to privacy and 
property or collective workers’ rights, “though arguably not strictly essential to the functioning of 
democratic institutions and procedure, tend to develop among a people who govern themselves demo-
cratically” (Dahl 1999: 20), that is, they help to constitute nondomination in Rubenstein’s terms.  
On these substantive dimensions of democracy, as argued by Rubenstein, standard accountability gen-
erally outperforms surrogate accountability in all phases of the accountability process. Since accounta-
bility holders know their preferences better than anyone else (standard-setting), they are best at provid-
ing useful information to others about the local contexts in which they live (information phase). More-
over, direct engagement in the debate with power wielders strengthens civic virtues and self-
development of the participants (debate phase). Finally, standard accountability arrangements endow 
accountability holders with the capacity to sanction the power wielder in case of illegitimate use of 
political power (judgment phase), and thus constitute – quasi by design – “the perfect antidote to dom-
ination” (Rubenstein 2007: 621, 631).  
Yet, external interventions that directly target citizen demand for democratic accountability as moti-
vated by the goal of “deepening democracy” can reduce at least some of the most detrimental effects 
of domination (Rubenstein 2007: 629). For instance, when donors condition their aid on the existence 
of political rights, they increase the space for domestic accountability holders’ genuine action. It has 
also been observed that in a post-conflict context, donors “may facilitate the reconstruction of demo-
cratic politics – helping all of the main political parties get back on their feet, aiding the establishment 
of an electoral commission, sponsoring large-scale civic-education programs, and other related tasks” 
(Carothers 2009: 8). As these examples suggest, citizens do not become undominated just because 
donors try to strengthen their voice and capacity, but they can mitigate at least some of the domina-
tion’s most pernicious effects. Accordingly, we may hypothesize that, in general, external strategies 
aimed at strengthening partisan accountability in aid-receiving countries do not work, because funda-
mental political and civil rights must be claimed and cannot be bestowed. However, these strategies 
may have a small positive impact on substantive democracy in authoritarian or otherwise troublesome 
contexts.  
On the procedural dimensions of democracy, by contrast, there are several areas, where an external 
strategy aimed at strengthening formal accountability “can sometimes secure at least some of the bene-
fits of standard accountability” (Rubenstein 2007: 631). Such a strategy is geared towards the govern-
ment’s supply of democratic accountability, with the overall goal of institutionalizing “good govern-
ance” in recipient regimes. Following Rubenstein, surrogate accountability arguably performs better 
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than standard accountability when donors enforce rule-following by the power wielder and when do-
nors insist on valuable substantive or procedural norms, whereas it almost always performs worse than 
standard accountability when donors promote accountability holders’ preferences (Rubenstein 2007: 
631). Surrogate accountability is said to yield the most benefits, when the judgment whether the power 
wielder has fulfilled his or her obligations towards accountability holders is not dependent on subtle 
interpretation of local context and when the power wielder is held accountable for moral obligations 
that pertain to large groups of marginalized people (Rubenstein 2007: 629). Accordingly, we may 
hypothesize that external strategies aimed at strengthening formal accountability have a positive im-
pact on procedural democracy in aid-receiving countries, when external actors promote rule-following 
of power wielders that is not context-specific (e.g., the rule of law) and procedural norms that apply to 
many people (e.g., participatory decision-making). By contrast, when a surrogate promotes the prefer-
ences of democratic accountability holders on their behalf (e.g., poverty reduction), there is always the 
danger of paternalism, resulting in a negative impact on procedural democracy. Because the surrogate 
is independent of the accountability holder in conceptual terms, this means that the former cannot be 
held accountable by the later (Rubenstein 2007: 624). As a consequence, surrogates should get into 
dialogue with accountability holders and seek authorization from those for whom they substitute. Ac-
cording to Rubenstein, this would constitute the best way to avoid paternalistic treatment of democrat-
ic accountability holders in surrogate accountability (Rubenstein 2007: 629).  
In sum, as this discussion has shown, external intervention strategies, by which donors may intervene 
on behalf of national democracy, can be distinguished according to their democratic targets and aid 
modalities. First, we may ask whether they aim at promoting formal accountability (procedural de-
mocracy) or partisan accountability standards (substantive democracy); and second, whether they rely 
on standard or surrogate accountability forums for the delivery of aid to achieve this target.  
 
Synthesis and outlook of chapter 3 
This chapter put the focus on accountability when analyzing the aid-democracy nexus because an ac-
countability lens enables us to integrate development and democracy perspectives, which have often 
been kept separate in scholarly debate and aid practices. More specifically, this chapter has made three 
proposals: First, by drawing on the long and distinguished history of the concept, this chapter pro-
motes the use of a social concept of public accountability that keeps normative standards separate from 
institutionalized forums in order to analyze the different goals of foreign transparency and accountabil-
ity initiatives. Second, by digging deeper into the theoretical traditions of the concept, this chapter 
proposes to analyze the different mechanisms within institutionalized accountability forums according 
to two alternative conceptions of the legitimacy of political authority. Finally, by examining the typol-
ogies of public accountability and its promotion in the democracy and development literature, this 
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chapter proposes to describe surrogate accountability strategies according to the type of domestic ac-
countability forum they support, but to evaluate them according to the type of mutual accountability 
standard donors have in mind.  
In sum, this chapter provides the analytical framework to describe different strategies and mechanisms 
for enhancing public accountability across space and time in the global governance of aid (chapter 4) 
and to consider different goals related to foreign transparency and accountability initiatives for evalu-
ating the impact of development aid on democratic change in recipient countries (chapter 5). As an 
introduction to these two empirical analyses, the following chapter describes the general set-up of the 
international aid architecture.  
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3. Policy 
The previous chapter brought the democracy and development literature into dialogue. It showed that 
the mechanisms for infusing global governance of aid with legitimacy have changed in mainstream 
development thinking. In particular, it argued that there had been a shift from a delegation model to a 
participation model of public accountability that underpins recent reform proposals for a more rights-
based (aid as entitlement) and collaborative development approach (aid as a partnership). This chapter 
aims to describe the historical and political context of the PRS approach. The central question that 
guides this context analysis is whether development policies have become more political over the last 
two decades. To answer this question, this chapter analyzes aid policies in the domestic and mutual 
accountability fields, since donors may either provide direct support for key domestic accountability 
institutions (direct method) or they may indirectly support domestic accountability by insisting in mu-
tual accountability forums that aid is well accounted for (indirect method). Through tracing aid poli-
cies over time in documents that made an important contribution to the new thinking around the na-
tional and global governance of aid, this chapter reveals that over the last two decades there has been a 
general trend towards more political and rights-based forms of aid policies both in the domestic and 
mutual accountability fields. The chapter is divided into three sections, of which the first sketches the 
main changes in conditional program lending by the international financial institutions, followed by 
two descriptive analyses of the way the World Bank has on its own and in collaboration with other 
partners fostered domestic accountability in developing countries.  
 
3.1. The historical and political context  
3.1.1. The threefold shift in development policy 
The introduction of the PRS approach must be seen in the historical and political context of a funda-
mental reorientation in the delivery of development assistance. Over the last two decades, there have 
been far-reaching changes in the global aid architecture. Key to these changes has been an increased 
focus on accountability relations between donors and recipients of foreign aid. Drawing on previous 
research (in particular, Booth 2003b; Eberlei 2005; Fraser and Whitfield 2009; Piron and Evans 2004; 
and Santiso 2001a), this study argues that the interesting thing about the new focus on mutual ac-
countability in the global governance of aid is that it adds a political dimension to the international aid 
effectiveness agenda and to the economic reform agenda of the IMF and World Bank, mandated not to 
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meddle in politics.46 In particular, the new perspective on mutual accountability propagates a shift in 
development policy from a narrow focus on borrowing governments and state elites to broad-based 
participation by the general public and the poor in particular (new partners), from donor-driven policy 
blueprints to policy dialogue around country-owned strategies (new principles), and from individual 
project and sector activities to program-based aid and joint budget support (new practices).  
Introduced in 1999, the PRS approach by the IMF and World Bank has represented the centerpiece of 
the new aid agenda the international community has turned towards of late. It builds on ample evi-
dence of past failure in the era of structural adjustment lending and “proposes a shift towards modali-
ties of aid that give recipient-country governments more scope to make decisions based on their own 
priorities” (Hyden 2008: 259). Signaling an improvement on the technocratic decision-making model 
that characterized earlier development efforts, the PRS approach quickly emerged as the key instru-
ment for access to debt relief and financial assistance from both institutions. The PRS approach was 
welcomed right from the beginning by many other donors, since it provided a framework around 
which they could coordinate, align, and harmonize their assistance to recipient countries (Fraser and 
Whitfield 2009: 82). The PRS approach was also quickly accepted by many developing countries, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, since it was an integral part of the process by which they could 
qualify and receive debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC initiative (Fraser and Whitfield 2009: 81-82). 
The idea behind this initiative was that debt relief would free resources in national budgets, which 
recipient governments then could spend on basic social and economic infrastructure for the poor as 
outlined by their national poverty reduction strategies (White and Dijkstra 2003: 12).47 Finally, the 
PRS approach was also embraced by many civil society actors in recipient countries (and abroad), 
since the new participation conditionality helped them to obtain a seat at the policy table (Cox, 
Thornton and Cameron 2006: iv).  
As argued in the literature, the introduction of the PRS approach must be seen against the background 
of two forces during the late 1990s. At that time, a growing sense of uncertainty within the World 
Bank prompted by a number of unforeseen experiences coincided with external pressure for debt re-
lief, as evoked by global civil society (De Haan and Everest-Philipps 2007: 4). First, an intensive de-
bate around the effectiveness of structural adjustment lending created and heightened “a crisis of con-
fidence” in the World Bank itself (Pender 2001: 400).48 This crisis was fed both by the failure of mar-
                                                     
46 Despite that mutual accountability has been framed largely in apolitical terms, some implications of this new 
principle of development cooperation have turned out to be rather political and thus highly sensitive for recipi-
ents and donors alike (Piron and Evans 2004: 35; Santiso 2001a: 169; OECD 2008b: 24).  
47 While the original HIPC initiative launched in 1996 did not yet contain a link to poverty reduction, this 
changed with the introduction of the Enhanced HIPC initiative in 1999. The enhanced initiative almost doubled 
the amount to be provided for debt relief through “lowering the criteria below which debts were considered un-
sustainable” and linked it more closely to poverty reduction (Thomas 2001: 43; White and Dijkstra 2003: 12). 
48 As John Pender argues, the appointments of President Wolfensohn (June 1995), who was carving a new mis-
sion for the World Bank, and Chief Economist Stiglitz (February 1997), who was known in particular for his 
“market failure” emphasis, may well be seen as a response to this internal sense of having lost control (Pender 
2001: 404).  
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ket-oriented development strategies in the Sub-Saharan African context (World Bank 1994) and, on 
the other hand, the success of state-led development strategies in the East Asian context (World Bank 
1993). For better or worse, these experiences called into question the fundamental tenets of the policy 
framework prescribed by the IMF and World Bank so far (Pender 2001: 402). In addition to this inter-
nal crisis, the international financial institutions were faced with widespread critique and pressure 
from the outside. A broad civil society movement rallied under various advocacy campaigns at the end 
of the millennium (e.g., Fifty Years is Enough, IDA 10 and Jubilee 2000). This broad movement 
called for more nuanced, context-sensitive and flexible policy advice in addressing the negative con-
sequences of structural adjustment lending; for an increase in debt relief by the international communi-
ty; and for a shift towards proactive promotion of poverty reduction in making this debt relief pro-poor 
(White and Dijkstra 2003: 12; De Haan and Everest-Philipps 2007: 5; Scholte 2011: 98-99).49 The 
PRS approach was the most evident outcome of these internal and external pressures on the IMF and 
World Bank’s development approach. In particular, because it “incorporated much civil society cri-
tique, linked debt relief to a strengthened poverty focus, and emphasized (recipient) country ownership 
and in-country consultative processes” (De Haan and Everest-Philipps 2007: 4). Table 3-1 depicts the 
historical juncture in multilateral development assistance through comparing the IMF’s and World 
Bank’s new development approach based on poverty reduction strategy papers and general budget 
support in comparison with their traditional lending approach that dominated in the era of structural 
adjustment. In the following, I will briefly review these two main approaches to multilateral develop-
ment assistance in terms of their respective partners, principles, and practices.  
Table 3-1: The historical juncture in multilateral development assistance 
Development era Structural adjustment lending Poverty reduction lending 
Partners Shareholders: 
Individual donors 
State elites 
Stakeholders: 
Donor community 
Recipient state 
Organized society 
Principles Washington Consensus: 
Macroeconomic stability 
Financial liberalization 
Trade liberalization 
Privatization 
Deregulation 
Mutual Accountability: 
Result orientation 
Strategic partnership 
Country ownership 
Long-term perspective 
Comprehensiveness 
Practices Sector support: 
Top-down approach 
Reforms imposed from outside 
Secret negotiations 
Budget support: 
Bottom-up approach 
Nationally defined priorities 
Collaborative endeavor 
 
                                                     
49 For a good review of these global campaigns, see the edited volumes by Fox and Brown (1998) and Scholte 
(2011). 
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3.1.2. Structural adjustment lending 
3.1.2.1. Old partners: shareholders 
The era of structural adjustment lending lasted from 1980 to the late 1990s. During this period, the 
World Bank did not doubt the primary objective of its development efforts, namely “the achievement 
of rapid and sustained economic growth” (Pender 2001: 398). This objective was regarded as uncon-
troversial as it was not only shared by its sister institution, the IMF, but was also widely accepted as 
the first (and often single) development priority among many other donors.  
Shareholders on both sides of the aid relationship dominated the delivery of multilateral development 
assistance. Since their countries became independent, state elites in recipient countries have “loudly 
and successfully demanded a monopoly over aid resources” (Van de Walle 2001: 196). They saw for-
eign aid primarily as a means to maintain their grip on political power, since it offered opportunities 
for patronage, repression, and demobilization of threatening interest groups, while the poor popula-
tions did not feel any welfare effect. This led to the effect that a negative image of “the state” was 
widespread among Washington’s policy-makers. They tried to minimize its role. State expenditures 
and interventions into the free play of market forces were reduced to the minimum, “since the state 
was seen as an ineffective resource allocator” (Pender 2001: 399; Meyer and Schulz 2008: 4). The 
corresponding advice for recipient governments of multilateral development assistance was to get “out 
of the way” so that private markets would produce economic growth and function efficiently (Stiglitz 
1998a: 1). For example, IMF and World Bank policies encouraged many Sub-Saharan African go-
vernments to abandon protectionism and foster infant industries and primary commodity exports as the 
centerpiece of their national economic strategy (Pender 2001: 399).  
 
3.1.2.2. Old principles: Washington Consensus 
In the beginning of the 1990s, John Williamson coined the term “Washington Consensus” as short-
hand for describing “a desirable set of economic policy reforms” about whose proper deployment both 
the “political” Washington of the US Congress and the “technocratic” Washington of the international 
financial institutions can muster a “reasonable degree of consensus” (Williamson 1990: 7). In his 
words, the Washington Consensus represents the “lowest denominator of official Washington”, in 
terms of policy advice given to countries under economic stress (Williamson 2000: 251-252).  
Table 3-1 subsumes these policy measures under five guiding principles of policy-based lending by 
the IMF and World Bank at that time. Accordingly, structural adjustment lending should promote 
macroeconomic stability (e.g., fiscal discipline, prioritization of public expenditure, and tax reforms); 
financial liberalization (e.g., interest rate liberalization, competitive exchange rate); trade liberalization 
(e.g., liberalization of trade and inflows of foreign direct investment); privatization (of state enterpris-
es); and deregulation (of state controls) (Williamson 1990, 2000: 252-255).  
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Probably due to its simplicity, the Washington Consensus reached enormous popularity within devel-
opment circles. However, this strength has also been its greatest weakness.50 As its critics note, most 
of the reform programs set out in the original consensus consisted of relatively simple policy changes 
that did not require deep-seated institutional change (Rodrik 2006: 978). The simple mantra of “stabi-
lize, privatize, and liberalize” could easily be managed by “economists using little more than simple 
accounting frameworks” (Stiglitz 1998a: 5; Rodrik 2006: 973). Similarly, the term “Washington Con-
sensus” was reduced in later usage in recognition of the primacy of the market in this strategy – and in 
contradiction to the intents of its intellectual father51 – to a synonym for a neo-liberal ideology based 
on the reliance upon market forces (Fine 2001: 3; Williamson 2000: 251).  
 
3.1.2.3. Old practices: sector support 
The introduction of structural adjustment lending marks the beginning of program lending by both 
economic multilaterals, meaning that this type of aid is not intended for specific projects but supports 
the implementation of a medium-term program (3-4 years) of policy or institutional reform. The 
World Bank officially began with conditional program lending in the 1980s, when it designed its first 
structural adjustment loans, while IMF lending was all program lending since its formation in 1944.52 
In retrospect, the circumstances have been unique in the late 1970s and early 1980s. On the one hand, 
the Bank’s traditional project lending approach came under pressure during the oil crises of 1973/74 
and 1978/79 and then the debt crisis in 1982, which resulted in a downward spiral of economic and 
political decay in many developing countries (White and Dijkstra 2003: 6). On the other hand, the shift 
from project lending to program lending has also been attributed to internal challenges of this type of 
aid modality. Most importantly, there was an increasing awareness within the Bank that a project can-
not be “an island of success in a sea of failure” (White and Dijkstra 2003: 9). In other words, the effec-
tiveness of project loans in achieving rapid and sustained economic growth in developing countries 
that suffered from a combination of external shocks and bad policies was seriously questioned (White 
and Dijkstra 2003: 9). In response to these external and internal challenges for project financing, the 
World Bank began to design structural adjustment programs, which were thought of as a kind of shock 
therapy to get recipient countries on the right track by bringing the necessary reforms.53 In line with 
                                                     
50 In retrospect, the World Bank refers to these five principles as the major “development controversies of the 
1990s” (World Bank 2005a). 
51 Notwithstanding its resistance to this reduction of meaning in the later use of “his” term, Williamson conceded 
later on that the Washington Consensus in the original sense “did indeed focus principally on policy reforms that 
reduced the role of government, such as privatization and the liberalization of trade, finance, foreign direct in-
vestment, and entry and exit” (Williamson 2000: 255). 
52 Structural adjustment programs are only weakly supported by the Bank's Articles of Agreement that limit its 
financial assistance to a specific project – “except in special circumstances” (Article V, Section 1 (b) of the 
IDA’s Articles of Agreement). 
53 Structural adjustment programs by the World Bank have been defined as “non-project lending to support pro-
grammes of policy and institutional change necessary to modify the structure of the economy so that it can main-
tain both its growth rate and the viability of its balance of payments in the medium term” (Greenaway and Mor-
rissey 1993: 242). 
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the shift from project- to program-based lending, the conditions attached to structural adjustment pro-
grams switched from the local to the sectoral level. Conditionality in structural adjustment programs is 
ex-ante in the sense that the disbursement of these loans is made conditional to the prior agreement by 
recipient governments to implement the reform policies of the Washington Consensus (Collier 1999: 
322; Pender 2001: 399). While the specific content varied with the particular sector which should be-
come adjusted, the overall number of conditions increased considerably in the 1980s (Mosley, Harri-
gan, and Toye 1991: 44).  
Conditional program lending under the Washington Consensus has been criticized heavily.54 Among 
the many critics, I will follow Adam Przeworski (1991) who has criticized the old practices in three 
different ways. First, decision-making in structural adjustment lending follows a top-down approach 
that leaves out the people at the bottom. As Przeworski puts it, market-based reforms as advocated by 
the IMF and World Bank are “a strategy of control from above”, whereby “the success of the bitter-
pill strategy depends on its initial brutality, on proceeding as quickly as possible with the most radical 
measures, on ignoring all the special interests and all immediate demands” (Przeworski 1991: 183).  
Second, market-oriented reforms as advocated by the international financial institutions are imposed 
from the outside without any concern for particular country contexts. Przeworski puts it as follows; 
they consist of a “technical economic blueprint based on theories developed inside the walls of North 
American universities and often forced on governments by the international lending agencies” (Prze-
worski 1991: 183). The enforcement of market-oriented reforms thereby works through the conditions 
attached to structural adjustment loans (Przeworski 1991: 184).  
Third, negotiations over structural adjustment loans and conditions attached to them occur between a 
select few representatives of a small set of ministries and donors behind closed doors. As argued by 
Przeworski, market-oriented reforms often “involve choices that are not easy to explain to the general 
public and decisions that do not always make sense to popular opinion” (Przeworski 1991: 183). 
Broader involvement of civil society organizations and in particular those who represent large parts of 
the population – trade unions, political parties, and other encompassing organizations – is thus not 
warranted (Przeworski 1991: 182-183).  
In sum, policy-based lending in the era of structural adjustment relied on a close relationship between 
borrowing governments and the international financial institutions for implementing technical-
economic blueprints. Furthermore, the market-oriented principles of structural adjustment were often 
forced on recipient countries by the Washington-based international financial institutions who mutual-
ly agreed as to the “medicine” their clients need. And finally, the past aid practices served to direct 
                                                     
54 There is an impressive body of research which has noted the general failure of the IMF and World Bank’s 
traditional type of conditionality to bring about market-oriented policy reforms (e.g., Mosley et al. 1991; Kahler 
1992; Nelson and Eglington 1992, 1993; Collier 1999; Killick 1997). 
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government accountability towards individual donors by eliminating any government discretion and 
broader political ownership of the reform agenda in recipient countries.  
 
3.1.3. Poverty reduction lending 
3.1.3.1. New partners: stakeholders 
Under the presidency of James Wolfensohn (1995 until 2005), the World Bank made poverty reduc-
tion the ultimate goal of all its activities. The United Nation’s (2000) Millennium Development Goals 
provided the universal mandate for this change in the mission of the World Bank. However, while 
firmly embedded in the international aid architecture, this goal was not beyond dispute within the 
Bank – probably because it made the delivery of development assistance more complex.55  
In the era of structural adjustment lending, multilateral development assistance has been a rather ex-
clusive affair between the international financial institutions and their clients, that is, the borrowing 
governments. The IMF and World Bank, respectively their shareholders, provided financial resources 
and borrowing governments implemented market-oriented reforms in return. The citizens in recipient 
countries were not involved in these aid-for-policy deals but were merely treated as beneficiaries or 
needy target groups for foreign intervention. This changed with the introduction of the PRS approach, 
where the active participation of a range of new partners, especially within organized civil society, is 
deemed crucial for its success. In contrast to structural adjustment lending, citizens actively participate 
in poverty reduction lending. The World Bank’s PRSP Sourcebook (2002), admittedly the first refer-
ence for anyone interested in the PRS approach56, defines participation in poverty reduction lending as 
“the process by which stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, policymaking, 
resource allocations, and/or program implementation” (World Bank 2002: 237). Since the new ap-
proach should be tailored to individual country context, no definition of these stakeholders is given. 
Nevertheless, the Sourcebook provides some examples of “key stakeholder groups” – a kind of pro-
cess advice that has been taken on board with the same seriousness by highly indebted, aid-dependent 
countries as the former Washington-driven policy advice. Accordingly, key stakeholders are the gen-
eral public (particularly the poor and vulnerable groups); the government (civil servants and elected 
representatives); civil society organizations (covering a broad spectrum of non-profit organizations); 
                                                     
55 As noted by insiders at the Bank, there was a “veritable crusade” underway to make poverty reduction the 
main goal of all its development efforts (Kanbur and Vines 2000: 100-102). While poverty reduction still forms 
part of the Bank’s mission today, economic growth resurrected as a second goal under the heading of “shared 
prosperity” besides “ending extreme poverty” in the reformulation of the Bank’s mission under the presidency of 
Jim Yong Kim in 2013 (see World Bank website).  
56 The PRSP Sourcebook is “a compilation of chapters and annexes commissioned by the World Bank and IMF” 
that describe in detail what is expected from recipient governments if they wish to participate in the PRS initia-
tive. In essence, the Sourcebook is “the ‘how to’ book for the PRSP process. It invariably embodies the princi-
ples, beliefs, and values of the major IFIs driving the initiative” (Youash 2003: 3). 
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the private sector (represented through umbrella groups and professional organizations); and donors 
(World Bank 2002: 250).  
 
3.1.3.2. New principles: mutual accountability 
For a long time, the parameters of aid have been defined mainly by donors and not by recipients. In 
particular, structural adjustment lending has a long legacy of failed donor-driven policy blueprints. 
Looking back, the World Bank (1998) self-critically notes that in those countries without a strong 
domestic constituency for reform, structural adjustment lending has failed. While it is not true that all 
countries that have received large amounts of aid have had bad policies, it has become clear that 
“[f]oreign aid cannot take the lead in promoting reform if there is little local movement in that direc-
tion” (World Bank 1998: 47-48). In 1999, the introduction of the PRS approach formalized the grow-
ing acceptance that aid only works if it is aligned with countries’ own policies and systems. Accord-
ingly, “good policies” are those that are both technically sound, in the sense of being oriented towards 
development outcomes, and politically owned, in the sense of being seen as legitimate, by citizens and 
their governments in recipient countries (Booth and Fritz 2008: 1; World Bank 2002: 275).  
Table 3-1 summarizes the new principles guiding multilateral development assistance, which have 
been first outlined in Wolfensohn’s (1999) proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework 
(and subsequently refined in later progress reports, see World Bank 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 
2001b). Accordingly, poverty reduction lending by the IMF and World Bank should be country-driven 
(promoting national ownership of strategies through broad-based participation of civil society); re-
sults-oriented (translating broad development goals into prioritized public policy actions); comprehen-
sive (based on a multidimensional understanding of poverty); partnership-oriented (involving coordi-
nation of recipient government, domestic stakeholders, and external partners); and based on a long-
term perspective (as opposed to a short-term focus on means and immediate policy impacts) (World 
Bank 2001a). As an early progress report underscores, the Comprehensive Development Framework 
should not be seen as a “blueprint”, but rather as some "compass” reflecting the growing convergence 
within the Bank on a new approach to development. At the same time, the report emphasizes that there 
exist strong linkages between the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework and broader 
international efforts, coordinated by the OECD, to identify basic principles for enhancing aid effec-
tiveness (World Bank 1999: 1). This broader aid agenda has summarized the new principles in a 
framework of mutual accountability.  
 
3.1.3.3. New practices: budget support 
Similar to structural adjustment lending, poverty reduction lending supports the implementation of 
policy or institutional reforms in the medium term (3-4 years). However, while poverty reduction lend-
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ing bears a resemblance to structural adjustment lending in operational terms, the new practices under 
the PRS approach differ from past practices in that they address the three main critiques of structural 
adjustment lending as discussed above.  
First, the introduction of broad-based stakeholder participation in national decision-making gave the 
predominantly top-down approach to conditional program lending in recipient countries a remarkable 
bottom-up spin.57 Guided by the findings of own empirical research on the positive effects of partici-
pation at the project level (see Narayan 1994; Isham et al. 1995; Sara and Katz 1998, Isham and 
Kähkönen 2002a, 2002b), the IFIs (with the World Bank leading the efforts) required that recipient 
governments involve major domestic stakeholders in public policy formulation and monitoring in the 
hope that this would tackle the underlying politics of underdevelopment and exclusion in recipient 
countries, which had been neglected so far. In practice, this means that developing countries seeking 
debt relief and poverty reduction lending by the international financial institutions had to prepare a 
national development strategy and a corresponding reform agenda for promoting growth and reducing 
poverty (outlining among other things, macroeconomic policies, government spending targets as well 
as social development programs). They had to do that in a participatory manner, “so that ownership of 
government policies would also be enhanced” (White and Dijkstra 2003: 13).  
Second, the reform agenda for reducing poverty in highly indebted, aid-dependent countries is not 
imposed from outside, but is derived from nationally defined priorities. In a remarkable retrospective 
on Economic growth in the 1990s (2005), the World Bank self-critically notes that in the era of struc-
tural adjustment lending donor-driven rules were meant to downturn the role of the state in develop-
ment. However, as experience shows “government discretion cannot be bypassed”; it needs to be 
“managed and checked, not replaced by rules” (World Bank 2005a: 14). Conditional program lending 
has thus been modified under the new approach. In particular, ex-ante conditionality that has guided 
the disbursement of structural adjustment loans in support of particular policy (or institutional) re-
forms has been replaced by ex-post conditionality managing tranche releases of poverty reduction 
loans in support of the general budget. In practice, this means that several donors directly support the 
recipient government’s budget and take their conditions for tranche release from the government’s 
own policy agenda, that is, the national poverty reduction strategy paper or equivalent (White and 
Dijkstra 2003: 13).  
Third, poverty reduction lending under the PRS approach is a collaborative endeavor among the IMF 
and the World Bank based on recipient countries' own policies, systems, and procedures. In a joint 
retrospective of Bank-Fund collaboration (2007), an external review committee finds that some of the 
best examples of collaboration occur when both institutions have essentially been mandated to pursue 
                                                     
57 From the early 1980s, non-governmental development organizations began to promote the participation and 
investment of local populations in their projects at the community level. Today, one might say that it has become 
standard practice in foreign aid that intended beneficiaries are consulted – at least during the project design – to 
take into account their views (Brett 2003: 5; Burkie 1993; Chambers 1983; Korten 1987). 
134 
joint products, whereas problems can occur when collaboration is left to the initiative and judgment of 
individuals alone (External Review Committee and Malan 2007: 25). In this regard, programmatic 
support of national budgets is viewed as an important aid coordination and harmonization devise, 
while at the same time improving and reinforcing recipient countries’ systems. In practice, this means 
that the IFIs in collaboration with other donors jointly support the implementation of a national devel-
opment strategy – without prescribing particular macroeconomic policies, as was the case with the 
earlier generation of policy-based financial support. “Instead, they do what they can to assist the coun-
try’s authorities to make the national budget the centerpiece of a results-oriented national policy sys-
tem” (Booth and Fritz 2008: 7). Multi-donor budget support thereby appears both as an instrument for 
decreasing external accountability and increasing domestic accountability at the recipient country lev-
el.  
In sum, the new focus on stakeholder participation and collaboration among all aid partners marks an 
apparent shift away from a close relationship between borrowing governments and the international 
financial institutions for implementing Washington-driven policy blueprints towards a broader part-
nership around country-owned development strategies. Moreover, the new principles do not target the 
content of development strategies (as the Washington Consensus did) but aim at guiding development 
practitioners on the process of formulating and monitoring national development strategies. And final-
ly, the new aid practices do not direct government accountability towards donors, but instead try to 
improve and reinforce government accountability towards citizens based on donors’ reliance on recip-
ient countries' own policies, systems, and procedures.  
 
 
3.2. Domestic accountability within national governance systems 
This section looks at the IFIs’ policies in the domestic accountability field. In particular, the way how 
the World Bank monitored national governance systems under the PRS approach is assumed to offer 
valuable clues on the IFIs’ policies for empowering domestic constituencies and elected bodies that 
can hold their governments accountable in recipient countries. The guiding question is whether there 
has been any policy change in the domestic accountability field with the introduction of the PRS ap-
proach. To answer this question, I will look at the different types of domestic accountability forums 
the World Bank has monitored and directly supported over time at the recipient country level.  
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3.2.1. Donors’ direct support of domestic accountability 
Domestic accountability refers to the institutional arrangements between citizen and state in recipient 
countries, whereby the latter is meant to be accountable to the former. Domestic accountability may be 
defined narrowly in relation to foreign aid, that is, “the extent to which citizens can hold the state ans-
werable for its relationship with, and agreements with, donors” (Domingo et al. 2009: 10) – or more 
broadly in relation to public policy, that is, “the ability of the citizens to hold the state answerable for 
its actions, and ultimately to impose sanctions for poor performance” (Hudson 2009: 1). Domestic 
accountability involves a wide range of stakeholders, including the executive, parliament, judiciary, 
civil society organizations, political parties, and the media, concerning the management of aid – and 
beyond (Domingo et al. 2009: 4).  
However, domestic accountability tends to be weak in many recipient countries, and poor governance 
has been considered as one of the main obstacles for development (Domingo et al. 2009: 4). This con-
sideration has given rise to an increasing donor focus on supporting good governance in recipient 
countries along with their efforts to improve the effectiveness of aid (Booth and Fritz 2008; Meyer 
2009). Given that institutions deliver better services when they are held to account, improving domes-
tic accountability is said to be a goal that can be supported by all countries that are committed to sus-
tainable poverty reduction and democratic ownership of their development agendas (Hudson 2009: 4).  
As implied by a frame of aid as an entitlement, direct support of domestic accountability often comes 
in the form of governance programs aimed at empowering domestic stakeholders for holding power 
wielders accountable. However, while donors agree in their recognition of domestic accountability as 
an essential dimension of good governance in recipient countries, general knowledge about foreign 
transparency and accountability initiatives and how they are linked to national governance systems is 
still incremental (McGee and Gaventa 2013: 8; O’Neil et al. 2007: xix). If donors would provide aid in 
ways that are based on a fuller understanding of, and respect for, the prevailing governance context in 
recipient countries, then “the scope and capacity of domestic accountability can be shaped by aid 
flows” (Hudson 2009: 21). This research willingly complies with this research request. It intends to 
increase the understanding of the way the IFIs, in particular, have supported domestic accountability in 
recipient countries. To find out whether there has been a change in the IFIs' policies to enhance the 
scope and capacity for domestic accountability, I screened the way the World Bank has monitored and 
supported national governance systems since the introduction of the PRS approach. In doing so, I first 
drew on existing research and other donor approaches to highlight the specificities of the World 
Bank’s policies in the domestic accountability field. In a second step, I compared the World Bank’s 
support to national governance systems in terms of different types of domestic accountability forums 
they have subsequently tried to strengthen over time.  
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To start with, the World Bank (with the IMF lagging) has been at the forefront in shaping the govern-
ance agenda but has been late with recognizing accountability as an essential element thereof. It was 
only with the publication of the third Global Monitoring Report (2006) on progress towards the Mil-
lennium Development Goals (MDGs) that the Bank outlined a more comprehensive national govern-
ance approach. The primary focus of this report is “[m]easuring and monitoring governance, in sup-
port of greater accountability and better MDG outcomes” (World Bank 2006: xvii). This report em-
phasizes that domestic accountability in relation to aid comprises only a small part of the governance 
agenda. Both donors and recipients of aid “are to be accountable more broadly for enhancing the 
checks and balances fundamental for development” (World Bank 2006: 121). To establish governance 
as an ongoing part of MDG monitoring, the Global Monitoring Report provides a broader governance 
framework that enables a better understanding and a way of going forward in strengthening domestic 
accountability at the recipient country level (World Bank 2006: 10).  
Governance monitoring and support have become a “growth industry” (World Bank 2006: 126). To 
cut through the complexity of governance assistance, I will refer to three other governance approaches 
besides the one of the World Bank. These are (in alphabetical order): the DFID’s governance frame-
work that sets out how the United Kingdom monitors and supports governance in recipient countries 
(DFID 2006, Moore and Teskey 2006); FRIDE’s oversight triangle that analyzes the interaction be-
tween foreign aid delivery and the domestic political economy (Meyer and Schulz 2007, 2008; Meyer 
2009); and GOVNET’s whole system-approach that has been mainstreamed in the OECD-DAC guide-
lines on accountability and democratic governance (Hudson 2009; OECD 2014). To get a better un-
derstanding of the World Bank’s national governance approach, I will highlight the similarities and 
differences to these other approaches.  
First, the World Bank’s framework for monitoring country governance shares with the British De-
partment For International Development (DFID) a three-fold conception of governance. Following 
DFID, good governance requires three things: capability, i.e., the ability of the recipient state to per-
form specific functions, broadly understood as the formal and informal context in recipient countries; 
accountability, e.g., the ability of organized society to scrutinize public institutions and governments 
and hold them to account; and responsiveness, e.g., the extent to which public institutions and policies 
respond to citizens’ aspirations and needs. All three elements of the DFID’s Capability, Accountabil-
ity, and Responsiveness (CAR) framework are needed for increasing the effectiveness of the state and 
improving the lives of the citizens who fall under its jurisdiction. To this end, close monitoring of all 
components represents a necessary aspect (DFID 2006: 20). The World Bank also lists three elements, 
which it interprets as the subsystems of national governance. They too, need to be explicitly moni-
tored, in order to be improved. In particular, the Bank argues that national governance can be im-
proved via building bureaucratic capabilities; improving service provision front-line; and strengthen-
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ing national check and balance institutions. All of these three subsystems provide entry points for gov-
ernance reforms (World Bank 2006: 13-15).  
The Bank’s governance framework thus shares with DFID’s CAR framework a focus on demand-side 
accountability (i.e., checks and balances), supply-side responsiveness (i.e., service provision) and in-
stitutional context (i.e., bureaucratic capabilities). It differs, however, in its conceptualization of de-
mand-side accountability. While the World Bank considers the “political governance” subsystem rela-
tively difficult to monitor (and as such, no support is provided), demand-side accountability in the 
DFID framework “includes, ultimately, the opportunity to change leaders by democratic means” 
(DFID 2006: 20; World Bank 2006: 11-12, 125).  
Second, while the World Bank avoids direct engagement with the electoral process, it shares with 
FRIDE’s work on aid effectiveness and democratization a focus on governance institutions that over-
see the executive branch of government. “Improving governance”, as the Global Monitoring Report 
indicates, “means engaging with institutions outside the central government (parliament, local com-
munities, civil society, and the media) and supporting them to complement ongoing work with central 
government institutions” (World Bank 2006: 6). In particular, the report argues that strong national 
check and balance institutions are essential, since “[t]hey help [to] keep the executive arm of govern-
ment focused on the public purpose” (World Bank 2006: 159). Likewise, the work by FRIDE58 argues 
that donors’ direct support to supervisory actors in recipient countries may contribute to a deepening 
of democracy broadly understood as “the process which facilitates the increasing institutionalisation of 
substantial, inclusive and rights-based participation of citizens within the state’s decision-making pro-
cesses” (Meyer and Schulz 2007: 4). By contrast, donors’ intimate working relationship with central 
government agencies “could hamper the democratic process and lead to negative “side-effects” for 
democratic ownership and domestic accountability” (Meyer and Schulz 2008: 42). FRIDE’s research 
notes that much of current thinking on democracy uses a framework of “concentric circles” with verti-
cal accountability and the electoral process in its core, followed by horizontal accountability and cer-
tain political rights on a second layer. A final layer of societal oversight consists of certain civil socie-
ty qualities, including organized society along the lines of interest groups (Meyer and Schulz 2007: 8). 
Like FRIDE, the World Bank seems familiar with this framework of concentric circles. In particular, 
the Global Monitoring Report identifies a constellation of check and balance institutions consisting of 
an “inner constellation” of direct oversight, a “middle constellation” of impartial dispute resolution, 
and an “outer constellation” of civic voice (World Bank 2006: 159).  
Both FRIDE and the World Bank thus think of domestic accountability in terms of different layers of 
supervisory actors and oversight institutions, which they disaggregate in terms of distance from the 
executive authority they oversee. Both approaches also perceive the outer “constellation” or “circle” of 
                                                     
58 FRIDE was an independent think tank based in Madrid, which ceased its activities in December 2015. 
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societal oversight as a vital complement to and not a replacement of more traditional executive con-
straint. They differ, however, in their rationale for strengthening organized society vis-à-vis the recipi-
ent state emphasizing either the enforcement (i.e., democratic oversight) or answerability dimension of 
accountability (i.e., state responsiveness) (Meyer and Schulz 2008: 8; World Bank 2006: 160).  
Third, like the OECD, the World Bank recommends a system-wide approach for monitoring and im-
proving governance in recipient countries. Research by the Governance Network (GOVNET) of the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) points out that domestic accountability relations 
between citizens and the state are embedded in specific country contexts with their particularities of 
formal and informal power. Thus, governance programs need to look at the emergence and operation 
of whole “accountability systems” in recipient countries, rather than on “key accountability institu-
tions” (Hudson 2009: 6, 20-21). A system-wide approach requires the “active involvement of a wide 
range of actors and institutions” (i.e., state and non-state, formal and informal). It also requires provid-
ing support in a manner that is less focused on building the capacities of individual stakeholders but 
more on constructing “strong constituencies and coalitions for change” by building links between do-
mestic actors and institutions (Hudson 2009: 11, 19; OECD 2014: 27). Similarly, the Global Monitor-
ing Report notes that “there is no unique path to good governance” (World Bank 2006: xix). Devel-
opment outcomes in any specific case depend on the operation of a country’s governance system that 
“comprises the full array of state institutions and the arrangements that shape the relations between 
state and society” (World Bank 2006: 123-124). Each of these institutions “needs the capacity to per-
form his or her function effectively” (World Bank 2006: 124). However, as the Global Monitoring 
Report states, the public bureaucracy need not perform at the highest levels of efficiency for govern-
ance to be “good enough” (Grindle 2004). More important is that “the accountability arrangements 
built into the national governance system [are] mutually reinforcing, so that the system can self-
correct. Failure in one part of the system (such as corruption in the use of public funds) generates pres-
sures from other parts (parliament, courts, or citizen groups) to refocus on the public purpose” (World 
Bank 2006: 127). To generate greater accountability and build demand for good governance, a key 
message of the report is that national governance systems should be monitored regularly because this 
can help to develop realistic goals and sequencing of reforms against which progress can be traced 
(World Bank 2006: xix, 2).  
Both, the OECD and the World Bank thus emphasize that governance programs need to take the polit-
ical context in recipient countries into account. This means understanding the “political realities on the 
ground” in order to identify entry points for governance reforms (OECD 2014: 14, 49; World Bank 
2006: 136, 151). It also means building on existing country systems and procedures in seeking “a good 
fit” between the reform agenda and the political context rather than applying standardized “best prac-
tice” (OECD 2014: 68; World Bank 2006: 151). More generally, both the OECD and World Bank thus 
recommend that aid should be provided in ways that encourage good governance, rather than “deplet-
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ing” or “undermining” already weak country systems (OECD 2014: 15; World Bank 2006: 140). How 
such a system-wide approach may look like is depicted schematically in Figure 3-1. This figure shows 
a government’s accountability towards development actors at the recipient country level.  
Figure 3-1: Development actors and accountability relationships in a national governance system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: domestic accountability demands come from (1) electoral, (2) social, (3) political, (4) and administrative 
accountability forums, supported by (5) democratic and/or (6) surrogate accountability holders. 
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As shown by Figure 3-1, a national governance system comprises three sets of development actors – 
the recipient state, organized society, and the donor community. These three sets of actors constitute a 
dynamic configuration of formal and informal power within which various domestic stakeholders in-
teract. While all three sets of development actors are part of a national governance system, the dashed 
lines of the circles show that their boundaries are not fixed and clear-cut. At the intersection of the 
donor community and the recipient state, for example, we find the executive who sits on both sides of 
the negotiation table, acting both as debtor and creditor of the international financial institutions 
(Kahler 1992: 102). The recipient state and organized society, too, overlap concerning political socie-
ty. Following Scholte (2011), there exists an important qualitative difference between civil society and 
political society, since they represent “very different (albeit potentially complementary) ways of exact-
ing accountability from governance authorities” (Scholte 2011: 38). While operations of civil society 
actors are guided by “logics of deliberation and participatory democracy”, electoral-legislative strate-
gies of political parties rather follow the “logics of plebiscites and representative democracy” (Scholte 
2011: 38). Depending on political realities on the ground, local governments and the media may be 
subsumed either under political society or civil society.  
Figure 3-1 also shows that domestic accountability in recipient countries is multidimensional. Follow-
ing the theoretical outline in chapter 2, domestic accountability in national governance systems flows 
vertically between organized society and the recipient state, including (1) electoral accountability and 
(2) societal accountability; as well as horizontally between different state institutions, including (3) 
administrative accountability and (4) political accountability. These four domestic accountability fo-
rums may be supported by (5) democratic and/or (6) surrogate accountability holders. To visualize the 
accountability relationships that the IFIs directly supported under the PRS approach I borrowed 
FRIDE’s symbol of “a triangle of supervisory actors” – national assemblies, auditing institutions and 
civil society – to which they added media and local governments later on as lying somewhere between 
these three poles (Meyer and Schulz 2008: 3, 9). I find the image of an oversight triangle particularly 
useful because it highlights the three main mechanisms of executive restraints (administrative, social, 
and political) that the IFIs consider central to monitoring and supporting national governance systems 
under the PRS approach.59  
The following section provides a brief review of the World Bank’s national governance system ap-
proach for strengthening domestic accountability. It summarizes the evidence on the Bank’s direct 
support to domestic accountability in its various dimensions (administrative, social, and political) con-
sidering the reasons given why the World Bank has provided support to a particular accountability 
forum and the manner how the World Bank has framed the support to a particular accountability fo-
                                                     
59 However, in the governance framework of the World Bank, this triangle might be more adeptly being called “a 
triangle of implementing and supervisory actors”, since almost all of these key actors and institutions are ful-
filling a double role as government watchdog and service provider to the poor under the PRS approach. 
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rum at the policy level. The three poles of the oversight triangle sketched above will structure my dis-
cussion accordingly.  
 
3.2.2. The World Bank’s direct support of domestic accountability 
3.2.2.1. Administrative accountability: mandate institutions 
The term “good governance” has first been introduced by the World Bank in its report on Sub-Saharan 
Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (1989). At that time, the World Bank was confronted with 
a dilemma. On the one hand, the Bank could not remain passive given the heavy critiques of the social 
costs and poor results of structural adjustment programs without losing its credibility as a leading de-
velopment agency. On the other hand, the Bank’s mandate prohibited taking political considerations 
into account. The discovery of the governance issue then presented itself as a way out of this “politi-
cal” dilemma. The concept allowed the World Bank to address the broader political context in borrow-
ing countries without violating its apolitical mandate (Fuster 1998: 51).  
Good governance has been defined in the foreword of this pioneering Bank report as “a public service 
that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its pub-
lic” (World Bank 1989: xii). In line with this early definition, World Bank support to national govern-
ance systems has traditionally aimed at strengthening administrative accountability. In particular, pub-
lic administration and financial management agencies have been targeted by the Bank, including both 
cross-cutting control agencies as well as staff and line agencies within the public bureaucracy (World 
Bank 2006: 126, 139). Examples of the former include mandated agencies being responsible for the 
budget process, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, and civil service management; whereas the 
latter set of service providers within the public bureaucracy includes sectoral line ministries, autono-
mous frontline providers, and regulatory agencies (World Bank 2006: 126). The justice system plays a 
dual role. Whereas its mandate within the public bureaucracy consists of “overseeing service provision 
and regulatory agencies” (World Bank 2006: 126, 127), it may also provide “dispute resolution ser-
vices to society” as a balance institution (World Bank 2006: 126, 127).  
Before 2000, as the Bank notes, the profile of administrative accountability support remained low, 
since “its focus on building country systems was at odds with the dominant approaches to providing 
aid and technical support through self-standing projects, hermetically sealed off from often dysfunc-
tional public sectors” (World Bank 2006: 139). Only with the introduction of the PRS approach in 
1999, the public bureaucracy came to be regarded as a critical vehicle for the provision of program-
based aid based on multi-donor budget support (World Bank 2006: 139). However, as the first rounds 
of implementing these new aid modalities showed, a focus on formal governance reforms did not offer 
an easy solution to poor governance in many developing countries (World Bank 2006: 140). Due to 
“clientelism, extended civil conflict, and the evasion of formal rules and external scrutiny” (World 
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Bank 2006: 145) recipient countries’ performance on public financial management has been quite 
uneven. The World Bank’s more political approach of supporting administrative accountability in 
recipient countries since the mid-2000s thus focuses more on improving access to justice and on the 
links between formal and informal institutions in the governance of a country (World Bank 2006: 
167).  
 
3.2.2.2. Social accountability: organized society 
Traditional support to national governance systems as implemented by the World Bank since the mid-
1990s has tended to focus on formal and horizontal mechanisms of accountability within the recipient 
state. However, critics point out that in developing countries with low education rates and high socie-
tal inequality formal avenues for demanding accountability from public officials usually stay beyond 
the reach of “those adversely affected by poor service provision” (Hickey and Mohan 2008: 237). As 
argued by the literature on participatory governance (see Cornwall et al. 2000; Cornwall and Coelho 
2007; Fung and Wright 2003; Gaventa 2004), the introduction of novel aid modalities, like the PRS 
process that promoted informal and vertical mechanisms of accountability between the recipient state 
and organized society must be seen in reaction to this critique (Hickey and Mohan 2008: 238).  
While the World Bank has promoted a participatory development approach from the mid-1990s, it was 
only under the Wolfensohn presidency when direct support to social accountability mechanisms be-
came standardized for poverty reduction lending. Yet, most early World Bank documents sketched a 
somewhat technical understanding of the recipient state’s engagement with “civil society and the pri-
vate sector”. For example, the World Bank’s PRSP Sourcebook (2002) holds that civic participation at 
the macroeconomic level should provide policymakers with useful inputs into their decision-making 
and policy implementation, suggesting a broad range of participatory mechanisms helping to move the 
process “from inputs to outputs to outcomes to impact” (World Bank 2002: 239-238).  
This rather technocratic approach to civic participation has been modified in the Bank’s Global Moni-
toring Report in 2006, where “civil society and the private sector” were substituted with the more po-
litical and at the same time, less contested notion of “citizens and firms” (World Bank 2006: 11). De-
spite that electoral accountability as the fundamental mechanism of citizen control is still worked 
around (e.g., by noting that on a daily basis, the role of citizens and firms – as users and providers of 
public services, including regulatory services – rests more on a participatory than delegation logic), 
there are signs for a more political approach towards social accountability with regard to the second 
generation of PRSPs (World Bank 2006: 127, 159). For example, a first sign is that not the consulta-
tion of civil society organizations, but the creation of an enabling “environment” for voice and ac-
countability lies at the center of the World Bank’s attention (World Bank 2002: 245; World Bank 
2006: 159). A further sign for a more political approach is that the World Bank emphasizes that civic 
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participation should be underpinned by access to high-quality information provided by national media. 
“Independent media”, as the Bank report notes, are “a critical link in the accountability chain between 
the government and the governed” (World Bank 2006: 161). Mass media thereby can function both as 
a mechanism for voice (e.g., articulating citizen preferences) and accountability (e.g., detecting state 
corruption) (World Bank 2006: 161). The role of the media in the World Bank’s national governance 
approach thus seems to have shifted from a vehicle of recipient governments for disseminating infor-
mation to civil society (as with the first-generation PRSPs) to an independent actor of political society 
monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions (in the second-generation 
PRSPs) (World Bank 2002: 243; World Bank 2006: 163).  
 
3.2.2.3. Political accountability: balance institutions 
Notwithstanding the institutionalization of civic participation in the formulation and monitoring of 
national development strategies, the critique of the way aid was delivered by the World Bank and oth-
er donors did not stop with the rise of the participation agenda. In particular, it was criticized that the 
principle of country ownership was equivalent to a rather technocratic application of participatory 
“tools and methodologies” in the PRS process, undermining independent oversight and the separation 
of powers within states (Hatcher 2009: 139; He and Warren 2011: 275; Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007: 
784). Likewise, organizational learning within the Bank has increasingly contributed to the insight that 
political accountability has been the missing link in the original) PRS approach. For example, a World 
Bank study on the practical challenges for implementing the new approach, calls attention to the “ac-
countability gaps” between the PRS and the budget process. While both processes offer scope for en-
hanced domestic accountability, donors have tended to focus on narrow technical solutions to the chal-
lenge of linking PRSs and budgets (World Bank and GTZ 2007: xiii). To forge ownership beyond a 
narrow group of technocrats, different actors from the recipient state and organized society need to be 
brought together to strengthen the budget as a process to implement political decisions (World Bank 
and GTZ 2007: 18). Particularly in financially poor-performing, low-income African countries, where 
policies are deteriorating, and poverty is getting worse, as noted by another World Bank publication, 
accountability has been the “big gap” (Collier 2005: 116). Not accountability to the IFIs or the broader 
donor community, but accountability to domestic populations. Revisiting conditionality in these coun-
tries, it is argued that it can become more legitimate if donors insist on accountability to citizens (Col-
lier 2005: 116). With bilateral and multilateral donors increasingly shifting part of their development 
aid to general budget support, transparency and accountability around national budgets are absolutely 
fundamental (Collier 2005: 116). The domestic institution that is crucial in this respect is the parlia-
ment and its role in the PRS process epitomizes this shift in accountability.  
Theoretically, parliaments are thought to be fundamental for ensuring the effectiveness and legitimacy 
of national governance systems, since they provide the crucial link between vertical accountability 
144 
(where parliamentarians are being held accountable by voters) and horizontal accountability (where 
the parliament holds the executive accountable). As the central arena of political accountability, they 
are said to contribute to good governance in three ways (Hudson 2009: 13): through representation 
(i.e., collecting, aggregating, and expressing citizens’ interests); through legislation (i.e., passing laws 
and setting the legal framework); and through oversight (i.e., controlling the executive branch of gov-
ernment, including budgetary oversight. Democratic theory thus envisions important functions of the 
legislative branch of government for democracy and political accountability.60  
However, a closer look at the World Bank’s early guidance on the role of parliaments in the PRS pro-
cess reveals that the political content of these legislative functions has been rather limited. Following 
Michael Youash (2003), the PRSP Sourcebook reveals a conception of parliament as “just another 
stakeholder” among many intra-governmental participants (Youash 2003: 6). At the same time, the 
involvement of members of parliament in societal consultations beyond government means that the 
“parliament is entirely left aside as an institution” through which citizen demands can be channeled 
into the formal system. Instead, the PRS process in the books relies “heavily on bodies that have fewer 
claims to representativeness in society than parliament” (Youash 2003: 7). Moreover, Youash (2003) 
criticizes that poverty reduction strategies are a fait accompli when they reach the parliament and as a 
result, its legislative function is, in effect, “relegated to ‘inputs-oriented’ oversight, unable to effective-
ly articulate opinions as they relate to policy, priorities, and the translation of these into budgets” 
(Youash 2003: 5, 7). And finally, with regard to the parliament’s budgetary oversight, he criticizes that 
the executive can evade accountability for the political priorities it has set in the budget, because, ac-
cording to the Sourcebook, it is solely expected to comply “with internationally established norms in 
prudent public financial management” (Youash 2003: 4). Not surprisingly, previous research thus 
showed there was limited participation by parliaments in the first generation of PRSPs. Parliamentary 
involvement has occurred mostly informally through the participation of individual members of par-
liament and not as part of the regular political process in recipient countries. As a result, general 
knowledge by legislators and legislative staff about the PRS process and content remained rather 
weak. In Tanzania, for example, most legislators had never heard of the PRS approach four years after 
its introduction by the Bank (Eberlei and Henn 2003: 27; Gould and Ojanen 2003: 94; Hubli and 
Mandaville 2004: 1).  
From around the mid-2000s, the World Bank increasingly took national legislatures and their role in 
demanding political accountability into account. For example, the Global Monitoring Report empha-
sizes that “[s]trong checks and balance institutions are key to a well-functioning national governance 
system” (World Bank 2006: 159). While other development actors can substitute them at least for 
                                                     
60 A possible fourth way, depending on the system of government, is through selection and deselection of gov-
ernment (i.e., electing and removing the executive). However, most countries participating in the new develop-
ment approach have presidential systems that do not foresee this possibility (Eberlei and Henn 2003: 18). For a 
comparative analysis of these legislative functions in four African countries, see Barkan et al. (2004). 
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some time, they can never replace them all the time. In the long run, as the Global Monitoring Report 
states, there is no way around “the national legislature, to which the executive generally is directly 
accountable” (World Bank 2006: 167). The role of parliament is seen in keeping “the executive arm of 
government focused on the public purpose” (World Bank 2006: 159). Accordingly, parliaments are 
seen as vital for fighting corruption; for increasing transparency on the use of public resources; and for 
raising the legitimacy of state institutions (World Bank 2006: 159). This new focus on parliaments 
sharply contrasts with their previous absence. As previous research notes, the earlier neglect of politi-
cal check and balance institutions has been nurtured by serious doubts among many donors about the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of these institutions in recipient countries (Eberlei and Henn 2003: 11). 
As Pascale Hatcher notes, “[u]ntil recently, the Bank has been keen to justify such absence by empha-
sizing MPs’ long-lasting record of predatory behavior as well as their lack of capacity…. [However], 
the poor scorecard of many parliaments does not justify their exclusion from PRSs precisely because 
their weaknesses are probably no worse than that of other stakeholders that have indeed been main-
streamed in the PRS process” (Hatcher 2009: 123). The World Bank’s new emphasis on national 
check and balance institutions seems to confirm that this insight has finally reached the heart of the 
self-proclaimed “knowledge Bank” (Barkan, Adamolekun and Zhou 2004: vi).  
 
3.2.2.4. Trend towards supporting entire domestic accountability systems 
To summarize, this section has identified three strategies for directly supporting domestic accountabil-
ity by the World Bank. These strategies consecutively build on each other over time. Drawing on Wil 
Hout and Richard Robinson (2009) who have analyzed the evolution of the idea of governance in the 
development discourse, I argue that it is possible to identify three generations of domestic accountabil-
ity support.61  
The first generation has focused on the technical aspects of designing and sequencing governance 
reforms as a means to strengthen administrative accountability in recipient countries. The discovery of 
the governance issue in the early 1990s must be seen as a response to the failure of one-sided econom-
ic policy advice in the era of structural adjustment lending in bringing about sustainable development 
results, particularly in the African context (World Bank 1989, 1992). However, early World Bank 
reports on governance expressed a narrow view of governance through their emphasis of technocratic 
measures to improve government effectiveness and to provide a legal framework for market-based 
development (Hout and Robinson 2009: 2).  
With the second generation, participation was scaled up from the project to the national level in order 
to enable more social accountability of recipient governments. The rise of the participation agenda in 
                                                     
61 Similar arguments have been made in the literature concerning the IFIs' conditional program lending (White 
and Dijkstra 2003). 
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the late 1990s added an explicit bottom-up twist to the former supply-side governance reforms by 
strengthening demand-driven public accountability. At the end of the millennium, pressure from both 
within and outside the Bank has triggered its new participatory approach that has inspired, and vice 
versa has been inspired by similar ideas and initiatives within the broader international aid architec-
ture. As Hout and Robinson note, “[th]e World Bank’s CDF, worked out in the first few years of 
James Wolfensohn’s presidency, the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach and the call for a post-
Washington Consensus (Stiglitz 1998a) were all markers of the second phase” (Hout and Robinson 
2009: 2).  
The third generation lasting for around a decade now focuses on creating strong check and balance 
institutions to “constrain the arbitrary and discretionary use of state power” (World Bank 2006: 164) 
and strengthen political accountability within the recipient state. The promotion of a system-wide ap-
proach must be seen as an attempt to locate participatory approaches within a wider approach to 
strengthening a country's political system and social empowerment (Brett 2003: 19). While the partici-
patory approach to development in the second generation has been acknowledged to represent a clear 
improvement over the former governance approach, this third generation is driven by an increasing 
awareness on part of the World Bank and wider development circles of “the importance of power, 
politics and social conflict in shaping development outcomes and the difficulties of addressing these” 
through existing (participatory) governance programs (Hout and Robinson 2009: 2). Driven by an 
interest of “simply understanding the way political systems work in developing countries”, donor in-
terventions in national governance systems have “become progressively more intense and focused” 
(World Bank 2005a: 302; Booth and Fritz 2008: 26).  
Importantly, and in contrast to Hout and Robinson (2009), these three generations should not be re-
garded as successive phases substituting each other, but rather, as being jointly constitutive of a gen-
eral trend towards more political forms of external intervention. Being complementary in their focus 
on various mechanisms of restraints, these three generations jointly and progressively have broadened 
the perspective on domestic accountability in recipient countries. Together, these three generations 
have shifted the World Bank’s understanding of domestic accountability from a narrow and technical 
focus on building bureaucratic capabilities (administrative accountability) and improving service pro-
vision front-line (social accountability) to a broader and more political understanding of domestic ac-
countability through their focus on strengthening check and balance institutions in national governance 
systems (political accountability).  
A similar trend toward a broader and more political understanding of accountability can be observed 
for donor policies in the mutual accountability field, which is the topic of the next section.  
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3.3. Mutual accountability within the global aid architecture 
This section looks at the way the IFIs’ monitoring and direct support of national governance systems 
are embedded in the broader global aid architecture. In particular, the way how mutual accountability 
has been mainstreamed in the international aid effectiveness agenda is expected to offer interesting 
insights on donor’s indirect strategy for supporting domestic accountability through insisting on mutu-
al accountability in the delivery and management of aid. This section asks whether there has been any 
policy change in the global aid architecture with the introduction of the mutual accountability princi-
ple. To answer this question, it analyzes the conduct for which donors and recipients hold each other 
accountable within the global aid architecture, including the different types of mutual accountability 
standards that have developed over time at the international level.  
 
3.3.1. The new compact on mutual accountability 
In the development field, mutual accountability generally refers to the basic principle that aid interme-
diaries are responsible for executing their powers according to certain performance standards. At the 
policy level, aid intermediaries are called “development partners” who take responsibility for the de-
livery and management of aid. The responsibility of these development partners then may be under-
stood narrowly in relation to one another, that is, the felt responsibility to comply with “the commit-
ments they have voluntarily made to one another” (Droop et al. 2008: 4) – or more broadly in relation 
to wider publics, that is, the joint responsibility they have to the intended beneficiaries of their partner-
ship as well as to their respective citizens at the domestic country level “for development and aid ef-
fectiveness results” (Steer et al. 2009: 8).  
As implied by a frame of aid as a partnership, the notion of a “compact” has been widespread in the 
literature for describing the principle of mutual accountability. It thereby links sovereign responsibility 
for good governance in recipient countries with better aid quality and sharply increased aid volumes 
by donor countries, or, to put it simply, it trades “good governance against good aid” (Meyer 2009: 1; 
Rocha Menocal and Mulley 2006: 5). In analytical terms, mutual accountability has been defined as “a 
compact that aims to create a more balanced partnership between donors and recipient governments, 
by binding members together through shared values and reciprocal commitments in a voluntary pro-
cess” (Steer et al. 2009: 6). This “new compact on mutual accountability” (Rogerson 2005: 532) is 
said to have spelled out more clearly the terms of engagement in the field of development cooperation, 
that is, the shared agenda, including the principles of cooperation, as well as the mutual obligations 
and reciprocal commitments between donors and recipients of foreign aid (Santiso 2001a: 171).  
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Through linking governance in recipient countries with more and better aid from donor countries the 
new compact on mutual accountability “has attracted global attention and stirred expectations of im-
portant improvements in ‘North-South’ relations’” (OECD 2011b: xviii). At the same time, and de-
spite significant international attention, progress towards mutual accountability has been slow. The 
official evaluation of the Paris Declaration finds that among the basic principles for enhancing aid 
effectiveness mutual accountability has advanced least, when tracked against “the number of partner 
countries that undertake mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid 
effectiveness, including those in this Declaration” (Paris Declaration, Indicator 12). This may partly be 
because there is a general lack of knowledge and understanding of mutual accountability (OECD 
2008b: 26; OECD 2011b: 55). But the main reason, as the mid-term and final evaluation reports sug-
gest, is that mutual accountability is not solely about measuring progress on one single performance 
indicator, but also includes domestic accountability mechanisms both in aid-receiving and in aid-
donating countries, largely explaining the political sensitivity surrounding it (OECD 2008b: 24; 
OECD 2011b: 37). Domestic transparency and accountability mechanisms in both donor and recipient 
countries are seen as “prerequisite conditions” for mutual accountability, and some of these are widely 
found to be missing or inadequate (OECD 2008b: 24-25; OECD 2011b: 37).  
In light of these findings, this research takes a different approach. I depart from the position that mutu-
al accountability must not be understood as a general principle which can be measured against some 
technical indicators of progress. Instead, I conceptualize mutual accountability as a field or a configu-
ration of power that has been built over the last two decades, and which interacts with the field of do-
mestic accountability at the recipient (and donor) country level. The new compact on mutual account-
ability is enshrined in several international agreements and global initiatives that span this new field. I 
consider the following eight agreements to have built and extended the new aid compact (in chrono-
logical order):  
• the Millennium Declaration (United Nations 2000) 
• the Comprehensive Development Framework (World Bank 2001a)  
• the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (United Nations 2002)  
• the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (OECD 2003)  
• the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2005a)  
• the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD 2008a)  
• the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development (United Nations 2008)  
• the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (OECD 2011a)  
These international agreements – individually being framed as a declaration, framework or agenda – 
collectively form the backbone of what has been circumscribed as the “the new aid architecture” 
(Meyer and Schulz 2007: 2). Being unified in their spirit, these agreements outline the new rules of the 
game, by which development cooperation is “gradually becoming a rule-governed activity, with stand-
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ards of behaviour set out in generalised form at the international level and translated into specific 
commitments at country level” (Cox et al. 2006: iii). However, while performance standards in terms 
of enhancing aid effectiveness and poverty reduction are recited like a mantra, the more implicit polit-
ical objectives are usually not spelled out. The following analysis of the wider context of the PRS ap-
proach will thus enter the largely uncharted political territory of the international aid effectiveness 
agenda.  
To find out whether there has been a political shift in global aid policies, I screen the meaning of mu-
tual accountability in these international agreements. In line with my typology of surrogate accounta-
bility forums, I consider three different types of conduct – policies, finances, and process – for which 
development partners may be held accountable. The analysis of these three variants of mutual ac-
countability then proceeds in two steps. In a first step, I describe the conduct about which development 
partners have to render an account as codified in the various declarations, agendas or frameworks. In a 
second step, I analyze whether the normative standards used for evaluating the behavior of develop-
ment partners have changed over time by focusing explicitly on the political dimensions of the interna-
tional community’s aid effectiveness agenda.  
As noticed by many scholars, the principle of mutual accountability encompasses both accountabilities 
between donors and recipient countries and between recipient country governments and their citizens, 
and as such, goes directly to the “heart of the wider contract between states and citizens” (Hickey and 
Mohan 2008: 253; Horner and Power 2009: 4; Mfunwa 2006: 6; Meyer and Schulz 2007: 3; Steer et 
al. 2009: 17; Vielajus et al. 2009: 5). However, there is only little scholarly work that has analyzed the 
contemporary aid architecture from an explicit democratic perspective. Stefan Meyer and Nils-Sjard 
Schulz (2008), for instance, argue that the “Paris Declaration enshrines the potential for a more politi-
cal perspective on the changing aid relationships” (Meyer and Schulz 2008: 31). In particular, the Par-
is principles of mutual accountability and ownership go beyond the mere aid relationship and are 
meant to trigger a process of deepening democracy (Meyer and Schulz 2007: 3, 4). In practice, howev-
er, there is a gap between the grandiose universal principles that enshrine this political spirit and the 
technical coordination structure contained in the Paris Declaration to measure progress in implement-
ing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness. If democratic practices are to deepen, it is paramount to 
tie the “spirit” of the aid effectiveness agenda to internationally agreed standards of democracy and 
human rights (Meyer and Schulz 2008: 31). Likewise, Lisa Horner and Greg Power (2009) argue that 
there has been a “general reluctance to connect the aid effectiveness agenda explicitly to underlying 
values” (Horner and Power 2009: 13). Given the predominant goal of eradicating poverty, the focus of 
the aid effectiveness agenda and the associated literature tends to be on “effective developmental 
states” that are capable of reducing poverty, “rather than on building democratic states per se” (Horner 
and Power 2009: 7). Perhaps as a result of this neglect in scholarly debate and aid practices, unrealized 
synergies between the political and economic dimensions of development exist. Better recognition and 
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more open discussion of the norms and values underpinning development cooperation, particularly 
concerning democracy, are thus required for the aid effectiveness agenda to realize its political poten-
tial (Horner and Power 2009: i, 2, 28).  
This research concurs with the claim that the new compact on mutual accountability enshrines the 
potential for a more political understanding of development cooperation. However, it differs from 
earlier efforts to describe this compact in that a much longer period is analyzed in search of the norma-
tive standards underpinning mutual accountability. It also differs from previous research in that it con-
siders several variants of mutual accountability between donors and recipients of foreign aid.  
Table 3-2 presents the three variants of the new compact on mutual accountability. It sets out the broad 
parameters of these three variants in terms of the shared principles of the international aid effective-
ness agenda as well as the mutual obligations and reciprocal commitments between donors and recipi-
ents.  
Table 3-2: The mutual accountability principle within the global aid architecture 
Principle 
Result orientation 
(program accountability) 
Strategic partnership 
(fiscal accountability) 
Country ownership 
(process accountability) 
Recipient  
obligation 
Leadership &  
monitoring (focus on  
development outcomes) 
Transparency &  
accountability (manage  
development resources) 
Coordination &  
consultation (broaden  
development process) 
Recipients  
commit to… 
…formulate a national 
development strategy; 
…translate strategy into 
a policy reform agenda 
and to monitor progress 
…increase transparency 
in public financial  
management;  
…strengthen domestic  
accountability system 
…coordinate support by  
external partners;  
…consult domestic  
stakeholders in the  
process 
Donor  
obligation 
Alignment  
(support national  
development plans) 
Harmonization  
(share information and  
encourage collaboration) 
Facilitation  
(support capacity- 
building in-country) 
Donors  
commit to… 
…respect national  
development priorities; 
…rely on national  
monitoring systems 
…improve information- 
sharing on aid;  
…establish common  
arrangements and to 
simplify aid procedures 
…strengthen capacities 
of recipient government;  
…enhance capacities  
of all other  
domestic stakeholders 
International  
agreements 
MDG (2000) 
CDF (2001) 
Monterrey (2002) 
Rome (2003) 
Paris (2005) 
Accra (2008) 
Doha (2008) 
Busan (2011) 
 
First, recipients and donors have agreed on basic principles for making aid more effective. These have 
also been called the “axiomatic norms of the way aid should be delivered and relationships between 
donors and recipients reshaped” (Meyer and Schulz 2008: 1). And they recur within the aid architec-
ture, albeit under different names, time and again. Since my focus lies on embedding the PRS ap-
proach within the broader global aid architecture, I take the principles of the World Bank’s Compre-
hensive Development Framework – country ownership, strategic partnership and result orientation – 
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as a default62, and compare these with those of other declarations and agendas by the United Nations 
(UN) and the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In this context, it is 
important to note that mutual accountability should not be considered as a stand-alone principle, but 
must be seen in relation to the other principles. There is growing recognition within scholarly debate 
and development practice that mutual accountability is cross-cutting to all other aid effectiveness prin-
ciples, since it refers to the overall package of shared principles, mutual obligations and reciprocal 
commitments in the global governance of aid (Horner and Power 2009: 4; Meyer and Schulz 2008: 4; 
OECD 2008b: xii).  
Second, recipients and donors have mutual obligations as embodied in reciprocal commitments they 
have voluntarily agreed to one another. To put it simply, recipients are accountable for three things: 
good policies, good finances, and good processes. For each type of conduct, there is complementary 
conduct expected of donors. If we combine their mutual obligations, the three variants of mutual ac-
countability then could be summarized as donor alignment for good policies; donor harmonization for 
good finances and donor facilitation for good processes. These three variants of the new aid compact 
are omnipresent in the current aid architecture but have often been hidden due to the fluidity of the 
development discourse that subsumed them under different aid principles with every new agreement. 
A focus on the type of conduct for which donors and recipients hold each other accountable allows 
identifying them more clearly.  
Third, there has been a shift in the international community’s focus on mutual accountability from 
development outcomes to development resources and to the development process. In particular, the 
foundation stones of the international aid effectiveness agenda (i.e., the MDGs and the CDF) have 
emphasized the need to achieve sustainable development outcomes, whereas the mobilization and 
management of development resources stood central at the landmark events in Monterrey, Paris, and 
Rome. The more recent meetings in Accra, Busan, and Doha, in turn, have broadened the perspective 
on development processes at the national and global level. Thus, there has been a definite shift in the 
meaning of mutual accountability across various international agreements and global initiatives. How-
ever, as we will see below, this change in focus did not lead to a replacement of earlier variants of 
mutual accountability, but to an expansion of the original aid compact with three different variants of 
mutual accountability existing on equal footing.  
Before I outline these three variants in more detail, an explanatory note on some key terms used for 
labeling the new partners, principles, and practices is helpful, if one is not to get lost in donor talk.  
A first term is “stakeholders” used for denoting the new aid partners. Stakeholders in the current aid 
architecture are of two kinds. There are domestic stakeholders and external stakeholders. Domestic 
                                                     
62 Two other principles of the CDF (i.e., comprehensiveness and long-term perspective) have not been mentioned 
here, because they do not address the effectiveness of aid delivery but the content of development strategies. 
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stakeholders are situated at the recipient country level and may be understood as the poor groups being 
directly affected or – more broadly – the citizens and their representative national institutions being 
indirectly affected by the joint development efforts of donors and recipient governments. External 
stakeholders nowadays dubbed “external partners” or “development partners” are those who provide 
financial and technical support to recipient governments, particularly bilateral and multilateral aid 
agencies or the donor community in more general terms.  
A second term that needs some additional explanation is “ownership”, or more precisely, “country 
ownership” used for denoting the principle that most observers thought of as coming first among all 
aid effectiveness principles enshrined in the global aid architecture. Ownership has also been called 
“the guiding philosophy” (Droop et al. 2008: 10) of the aid effectiveness agenda based on the growing 
recognition within the international community that development cannot be done to a country, but the 
country must do it by itself (World Bank 2001a: 7). However, while most development partners agree 
on this basic insight, the meaning of the ownership principle differs fundamentally over time and 
across the various international agreements. Two different connotations of ownership can be identified 
as underpinning mutual accountability. Ownership may either imply a more “country-led” approach 
whereby recipient governments and not donors take the lead in setting development priorities, or a 
more “participatory” approach marked by broad-based participation of organized society (and not just 
recipient governments) in setting these priorities (Radelet 2006: 14). In the first case, ownership refers 
to the mutual accountability domain where recipient governments are taking a stronger role as com-
pared to their external partners, while in the second case ownership refers to the domestic accountabil-
ity domain where domestic stakeholders are playing a far more active role than before (Radelet 2006: 
14). To keep these two domains rhetorically separate, I will speak of “government leadership” when I 
refer to the mutual accountability domain and “country ownership” when I refer to the domestic ac-
countability domain – notwithstanding the actual terminology used in the respective international 
agreement.63  
Finally, new aid practices labeled as “alignment” or “harmonization” require some additional explana-
tion as their meaning is not evident to outsiders of the development field. Alignment and harmoniza-
tion are considered to enhance recipient country ownership. Alignment asks donors to align their de-
velopment assistance with national priorities and results-oriented strategies set out by recipient coun-
tries and to progressively depend on national systems and procedures, rather than establishing parallel 
systems of their own (OECD 2005b: 13). By contrast, harmonization asks donors to harmonize their 
policies and procedures and to develop organizational incentives to foster management and staff 
recognition of the benefits of harmonization (OECD 2005b: 13). I thus speak of alignment when I 
refer to the country-led coordination of aid practices, while speaking of harmonization when I refer to 
the collaboration among donors themselves. While alignment and harmonization are treated separately 
                                                     
63 Similar efforts to keep these two different understandings of the ownership principle separate has been made 
by introducing the term “government ownership” for the former, or “democratic ownership” for the latter type. 
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here, the two are intrinsically related. Jointly, these new aid practices are designed to address what 
analysts have dubbed the “vicious cycle” of weak governance and aid ineffectiveness nurtured by 
quite powerful incentives for non-cooperation on both sides (Booth and Fritz 2008: 6; de Renzio 2006: 
635; Horner and Power 2009: 4; Steer et al. 2009: 16). Harmonization and alignment of donor practic-
es should thus not be seen as ends in themselves but as means for helping to improve the coordination 
of aid, thereby also increasing the scope for domestic accountability.  
 
3.3.2. Three variants of the mutual accountability compact 
3.3.2.1. Program accountability 
The first variant of mutual accountability focuses on the outcomes of development efforts by donors 
and recipients of foreign aid. At the recipient country level, the outcomes are the results achieved by 
national development programs. Therefore, this particular variant of mutual accountability is being 
called program accountability. The principle of “result orientation” guides program accountability. 
This principle, also being called the ”managing for results” principle is born out of the joint recogni-
tion of development partners that – in the end – they are accountable for and judged by citizens and 
taxpayers of all countries whether their collective development efforts had any real and sustainable 
impacts on the lives of people (Accra, para. 10).  
The Millennium Declaration (United Nations 2000) defines the general goals in the development field. 
Commonly known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), they read as follows: “We will 
spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing condi-
tions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected. We are com-
mitted to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race 
from want” (MDGs, para. 11). Over the last two decades, the Millennium Declaration has figured as 
the reference for all international agreements and global initiatives aimed at enhancing the effective-
ness of aid. All of them also mention the results principle, since it provides the crucial link between 
this global vision and the actual progress being made towards that vision’s goals (CDF, para. 45). 
Within this “universal mandate for development” (Busan, para. 3), the reduction of poverty had priori-
ty right from the beginning as shown by its identification as the central objective of the Comprehen-
sive Development Framework (CDF, para. 45). A reason might be that results-oriented management is 
facilitated by clarity about its goals. In this light, a focus on poverty alleviation as the primary objec-
tive of all development efforts gives strength to the new aid agenda. Seen from this perspective, the 
name chosen for the key instrument to put the World Bank’s new development approach into practice 
undoubtedly enhanced its results focus: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are documents 
that depict national development strategies aimed at reducing poverty. Correspondingly, those that 
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formulate and implement these strategies will be held accountable for the extent that their efforts had 
(or had not) any positive and lasting impact on the lives of poor people (Accra, para. 22).  
The Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)64 spearheaded the whole discussion on 
results-oriented management of development. First and foremost, as the former World Bank President 
James Wolfensohn pictured it, recipient governments “must be in the driver’s seat on the road to effec-
tive development” (Wolfensohn 1999: 9). They should own and direct the policy agenda, while at the 
same time being supported by their development partners sitting in the back row of the car (World 
Bank 1999, para. 9). Following Wolfensohn, the obligation recipient governments have towards their 
development partners is to “determine goals and the phasing, timing and sequencing of programs” 
(Wolfensohn 1999: 9). This obligation rests on two commitments, on which the Comprehensive De-
velopment Framework has been most explicit. First, recipient governments commit to taking the lead 
in the formulation of a long-term, national vision setting out their own development objectives and a 
medium-term, national development strategy (e.g., PRSP) setting out prioritized public policy actions 
(e.g., sectoral and cross-sectoral strategies) to achieve these objectives (CDF, para. 13, 15). Second, 
recipient governments commit to developing arrangements “in-country” for monitoring progress 
“against key dimensions of the national and sector development strategies” (CDF, para. 46; Paris, pa-
ra. 44).  
On the other side of the accountability relationship, the obligation donors have towards recipient gov-
ernments is to align their strategies to the national development strategies and their respective devel-
opment priorities (CDF, para. 39). Responsibility for program accountability seen from the donors’ 
side comes in two forms. First and foremost, donors commit to respect government leadership in de-
fining their own development strategies and public policies (Monterrey, para. 40; Paris, para. 15). As 
being specified by the Paris Declaration and reaffirmed in the Accra Agenda for Action, this involves 
among others that donors should not only base their overall support on national development strategies 
(Paris, para. 16) but also “change the nature of conditionality” (Accra, para. 25). In particular, they 
should link their funding to a single framework of conditions derived from the national development 
strategy (Paris, para. 16). Donors then should align their monitoring of these conditions with national 
monitoring and performance assessment frameworks (CDF, par. 51-53; Paris, para. 44; Accra, para. 
23). Second, donors also commit to relying on “results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks” 
(Paris, para. 45) in a manner that enables recipient governments “to assume a greater leadership role 
and take ownership of development results” (Rome Declaration). Since donors and recipient govern-
ments have a shared interest in being able to monitor progress and measure impact, this commitment 
shows up in almost all international agreements. It includes among others that donors should prioritize 
                                                     
64 Since no final outcome document exists, this analysis is based on Wolfensohn’s proposal for a Comprehensive 
Development Framework (1999) and the fourth progress report on the implementation of this framework (World 
Bank 2001a), which elaborated more clearly than the foregone progress reports all the constitutive elements of 
this approach.  Unless otherwise noted, quotes refer to the latter. 
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analytical work which underpins recipient countries’ own national development strategies (CDF, par. 
38); that they should assess performance together with recipient governments based on a manageable 
number of output and outcome indicators drawn from national development strategies (CDF, para. 47; 
Busan, para. 18); and that they should provide support to national statistical, monitoring and evalua-
tion systems to enable results-focused strategic planning processes (CDF, para. 53; Paris, para. 44; 
Accra, para. 23; Busan, para. 18).  
In sum, regarding program accountability, recipient governments have to render an account to their 
development partners about the result orientation of their national development strategies and their 
efforts at monitoring progress in implementing these medium-term strategies. Donors, in turn, have to 
render an account to the recipient government about the alignment of their strategies and monitoring 
procedures with national development strategies and monitoring systems.  
 
3.3.2.2. Fiscal accountability 
The second variant of mutual accountability concerns the fiscal accountability of donors and recipients 
of foreign aid. At the recipient country level, the focus of fiscal accountability lies on the public finan-
cial management of domestic and international resources being provided for financing development. 
Fiscal accountability is guided by the principle of a “strategic partnership” between donors and recipi-
ent governments in terms of their joint responsibility for transparent and accountable public systems 
for the mobilization and management of development assistance. The adjective “strategic” thereby 
points to the desired cultural and behavioral changes on donors’ side to work together with recipient 
governments and other external partners “particularly in support of the neediest, and to maximize the 
poverty reduction impact of official development assistance” (CDF, para. 35; Monterrey, para. 40).  
The Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development signed in 2002 was the first international 
agreement that has spoken of a “new” type of partnership. The consensus that was built in Monterrey 
holds that effective partnerships are based on shared responsibility among developing and developed 
countries to ensure that development resources are created and used effectively in a transparent and 
accountable way (Monterrey, para. 8). Given that official development assistance still is the largest 
source of external financing for many developing countries, the consensus holds that the mobilization 
and management of the development resources are “critical to the achievement of development goals 
and targets of the Millennium Declaration” (Monterrey, para. 39). Good governance thereby plays a 
crucial role – concerning two levels: At the national level, a “transparent and accountable system for 
mobilizing public resources and managing their use” by recipient governments is recognized to be 
essential (Monterrey, para. 15). At the global level, the strengthening of “coherence, governance, and 
consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading system” is considered to be the neces-
sary complement to national development efforts (Monterrey, para. 52).  
156 
The Rome Declaration on Harmonisation signed in 2003 brought good governance between donors 
and recipients to the negotiation table. In direct support of the “broad agreement” reached by the inter-
national community in Monterrey, Rome called on donors to harmonize their operational policies, 
procedures, and practices and to align with national budget cycles (Rome Declaration). This call rested 
on the widespread critique of the high transaction costs for recipients and the further reduction of li-
mited domestic capacities due to the “totality and wide variety of donor requirements and processes” 
(Rome Declaration). While the Rome Declaration lists “good practices” that address the deficits of 
past ways of delivering aid, it may be seen rather as a declaration of intent than as a reflection of actual 
practice. Yet, it paved the way for more fundamental changes in global aid policies, to which donors 
and recipients of foreign aid have agreed in the subsequent high-level forum in Paris.  
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which was signed by over one hundred donor and recipi-
ent countries in 2005, defined general principles and monitorable indicators to reform the delivery and 
management of aid (Paris, para. 1). Due to its broad support coalition and its specific proposals for 
reform, it has gained an eminent position within the current aid architecture. According to the Paris 
Declaration, effective aid requires leadership by recipient governments in setting the policy agenda 
(good policies); backed by harmonization and alignment of financial support by donors (good financ-
es); along with results-based management and mutual accountability (good processes). The Paris Dec-
laration went beyond reaffirming the statements made in Rome to harmonize and align aid delivery by 
specifying indicators, timetables and targets for the monitoring the implementation of voluntarily 
agreed commitments among donors and recipients of aid (Paris, para. 3, 8-11). The Declaration also 
went beyond the notion of a “consensus” that has been forged at Monterrey by introducing the princi-
ple of mutual accountability that calls on aid donors and recipients to hold each other accountable for 
the implementation of so-called “partnership commitments” (Paris, para. 9, 13). Recognizing that it 
will need more than a vaguely defined consensus, the Declaration states that the implementation of 
these partnership commitments “will require continued high-level political support, peer pressure and 
coordinated actions at the global, regional and country levels” (Paris, para. 8). Therefore, aid recipients 
and their development partners agreed in Paris to measure mutual progress against twelve specific 
indicators65 in “a spirit of mutual accountability” (Paris, para. 8).  
I will now take a closer look at the mutual obligations and specific commitments of donors and recipi-
ent governments within the financial variant of mutual accountability. According to these three inter-
national conferences, the obligation recipient governments have in terms of fiscal accountability is to 
enhance transparency and accountability of their countries’ public financial management system 
(Monterrey) in order to enable progressive reliance by donors’ on these systems (Rome). More specif-
ically, they should take the lead in carrying out diagnostic reviews and performance assessments of 
                                                     
65 Among these twelve indicators, nine indicators measure progress on the principles of alignment and harmoni-
zation of aid practices, whereas the other three principles of the Paris Declaration – country ownership, manag-
ing for results and mutual accountability – are only captured each by one single indicator. 
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country systems and procedures; and then, based on these findings, undertake the necessary reforms 
for managing their countries’ development resources – including foreign aid – in a more effective, 
transparent, and accountable way (Paris, para. 20). Two basic commitments by the recipient govern-
ment show up in the current aid architecture. A first commitment by the recipient government is to 
make the management of public funds more transparent, for example, by reporting timely and reliably 
on budget execution (Paris, para. 25). A second commitment by the recipient government is to make 
the domestic systems for managing public finances more accountable, for example, by fighting corrup-
tion at all levels (Monterrey, para. 13; Paris, para. 4).  
On the other side of the accountability relationship, the obligation donors have in terms of fiscal ac-
countability is to share information on aid flows and collaborate in the delivery of aid – albeit a sub-
stantial increase in aid volume is part of the deal, as the appeal by the international conferences on 
financing for development show (Monterrey, para. 42; Doha, para. 43). The Paris Declaration identi-
fies a rather impressive and precise catalog of desired donor behavior in terms of fiscal accountability. 
To reduce “the often excessive fragmentation of donor activities at the country and sector levels” (Pa-
ris, para. 6), donors first commit to establish common arrangements and simplify procedures in their 
day-to-day management of aid. This means, among other things, that donors use, where feasible, pro-
gram-based aid modalities and joint financial arrangements at the country level (Paris, para. 32); that 
they rely on government budget cycle and accounting mechanisms, and provide more predictable aid, 
that is, disburse aid according to an agreed multi-year schedule (Paris, para. 26); that they progressive-
ly depend on national procurement systems and untie their aid, that is, free aid from the condition that 
it be used to procure goods or services from the provider of aid (Paris, para. 30, 31); that they “work 
together to reduce the number of separate, duplicative missions to the field and diagnostic reviews” 
(Paris, para. 32); while at the same time, making full use of their respective comparative advantage in 
promoting selectivity and division of labor at the sector or country level (Paris, para. 33, 35; see also 
the Rome Declaration on Harmonization that has put these and similar issues on the agenda).  
To “enable more accurate budget, accounting and audit by developing countries” (Accra, para. 24), a 
second commitment by donors concerns the availability and public accessibility of aid information. 
Over time, the information donors committed to share was progressively extended. Donors first com-
mitted to sharing solely information on “aid flows” (Paris, para. 49), which later became information 
on “volume, allocation and, when available, results of development expenditure” (Accra, para. 24), 
and finally, information on “publicly funded development activities, their financing, terms and condi-
tions, and contribution to development results” (Busan, para. 23). Information-sharing by donors could 
even be strengthened by implementing “a common-open standard for electronic publication of timely, 
comprehensively and forward-looking information on resources provided through development coop-
eration” (Busan, para. 23).  
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In sum, recipient governments that receive general budget support have to render an account to donors 
about the degree of transparency and accountability of their national public financial management 
systems. Donors, in turn, have to render an account to recipient governments about the degree of their 
reliance on general budget support and their collective efforts aimed at sharing information and in-
creasing collaboration among all aid partners.  
 
3.3.2.3. Process accountability 
The third variant of mutual accountability emphasizes the participation of various stakeholders, re-
spectively partners, in the development process. The principle that guides this “process accountability” 
is commonly referred to as “country ownership”, that is ownership by the recipient state and organized 
society – not to be confused with top-down “government leadership” as in the two other variants of 
mutual accountability.  
When the World Bank introduced the concept in 1999, country ownership basically meant to broaden 
the support base of the recipient government’s policy agenda, as stated in the Comprehensive Devel-
opment Framework: “Building country ownership is a time-consuming process that requires mutual 
trust between the government and domestic stakeholders, and between the country and its external 
partners. It also calls for an inclusive approach through national consultations to define the national 
vision or framework and build reasonable consensus around it” (CDF, para. 20). However, over time, 
this somewhat technical notion of country ownership has been augmented with more political content 
as the international agreements following the Paris accord show.  
The Accra Agenda for Action signed in 2008, and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-operation signed in 2011 as well as the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development signed in 
2008, have many characteristics in common. All of them welcome the efforts that have been made so 
far to make aid more effective, in particular, the initiatives that produced the Monterrey Consensus and 
the Paris Declaration (Accra, para. 5; Busan, para. 6; Doha, para. 46). They acknowledge that progress 
has been made in advancing the aid effectiveness agenda by the previous meetings, but at the same 
time, they recognize that this progress has been uneven and neither fast nor far-reaching enough for 
realizing the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 and beyond (Accra, para. 6; Busan, para. 6, 13, 
15; Doha, para.  3). Thus, all three conferences call for “improving efforts” (Busan, para. 7) to “accel-
erate progress” (Accra, para. 11) by “taking concrete actions” (Doha, para. 1) to implement the inter-
nationally agreed commitments made by their predecessor conferences. However, these more recent 
agreements do not simply call for more of the same – even though reaffirming of preceding commit-
ments takes much space in the documents. Instead, they recognize that there needs to be a more sys-
tematic and coherent approach (Accra, para. 3) since the global aid architecture has changed signifi-
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cantly and has become more complex in the last years (Busan, para. 5; Doha, para. 47). Two trends are 
reflected in the three conference documents:  
First, all three documents differ from the foregone declarations in that they note that new aid providers 
and new aid modalities have been entering the stage of development cooperation (Accra, para. 9; 
Busan, para. 5; Doha, para. 47). In particular, they recognize that the aid architecture “has evolved 
from the North-South paradigm” (Busan, para. 14) in that “more development actors […] have been 
increasing their contributions and bringing valuable experience to the table” (Accra, para. 9). As high-
lighted by the Partnership document of Busan, there are “a greater number of state and non-state ac-
tors, as well as co-operation among countries at different stages in their development, many of them 
middle-income countries” (Busan, para. 5) that have become important providers of development as-
sistance. These new development actors also utilize new aid modalities, like South-South and triangu-
lar development cooperation or new forms of public-private partnership, which provide “additional 
diversity of resources for development” (Busan, para. 5, 14). In this new “global partnership for sus-
tainable development” (Doha, para. 2), civil society and the private sector form an integral part, as the 
high-level forum in Busan shows. Unlike earlier meetings, representatives from different public, civil 
society, private, parliamentary, local and regional organizations were welcome in Busan. They signed 
the Partnership document alongside the high representatives from developing and developed countries 
and the heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions (Busan, para. 1). While differences 
between aid providers as well as aid modalities are acknowledged, all development partners are said to 
be part of a “new, inclusive and representative global partnership” in which they participate on the 
basis of common goals and shared principles for effective development cooperation (Busan, para. 2, 
36).  
Second, and probably in relation to the above mentioned trend – where simultaneously new state ac-
tors opposing democratic practices and new non-state actors advocating human rights enter the new 
global partnership – another trend that can be observed is that democracy and human rights enter the 
international aid effectiveness agenda as the declarations of Accra, Busan, and Doha show. In accord-
ance with the Millennium Declaration (MDGs, para. 24) these documents recognize more explicitly 
than their predecessors that promoting democracy and strengthening the rule of law as well as the re-
spect for all internationally recognized human rights is an integral part of development cooperation 
(MDGs, para. 24, Busan, para. 3).  
A more political understanding of the ownership principle is a notable feature of these agreements. For 
example, in the Accra Agenda for Action “country ownership is the key” and said to be “first priority” 
among the “challenges to accelerate progress on aid effectiveness” (Accra, para. 8). While reaffirming 
the need for government leadership in setting the results-oriented policy agenda, the Agenda empha-
sizes that country ownership implies a more “open and inclusive dialogue on development policies”, 
in which parliaments play a critical role (Accra, para. 13). The Busan Partnership is even more explicit 
160 
on the issue of country ownership. Development can only succeed if the country owns it, implement-
ing approaches that are tailored to country-specific situations and needs (Busan, para. 11). Busan thus 
calls on development partners to “deepen, extend and operationalize the democratic ownership of de-
velopment policies and processes” (Busan, para. 12). As the final report of the evaluation of the Paris 
Declaration states, an important message from the Accra forum is that the engagement of actors out-
side the executive branches of central governments is likely to provide a stronger base for implement-
ting the aid effectiveness agenda (OECD 2011b: 10). To this end, capacity-building support for na-
tional parliaments and local governments to fulfill their supervisory roles – beyond service-delivery 
and backed by adequate resources – is seen as essential (Busan, para. 12, 21). Democratic mechanisms 
of control also gain prominence in the Doha Declaration on Financing for Development. Whereas the 
first conference on financing for development recognized that effective partnerships for the mobiliza-
tion and management of development resources are based on “national leadership and ownership of 
development plans” (Monterrey, para. 40, 61), a more political notion of country ownership has been 
used in the outcome document of the follow-up conference in Doha. The Doha Declaration emphasi-
zes that the new global partnership for sustainable development must take the “different characteristics 
and specificities of each country” into account and that there is “no one-size fits-all formula that will 
guarantee effective assistance” (Doha, para. 9, 46). Rather, the “best results of aid” are achieved “by 
engaging with parliaments and citizens in shaping those policies and deepening engagement with civil 
society organizations” (Doha, para. 46).  
In parallel with these more political notions of ownership, we also find more references to internation-
ally recognized human rights in the outcome documents of Accra, Busan, and Doha. For example, all 
of these agreements recall that gender equality is a basic human right and a fundamental value in its 
own right; and at the same time, that women empowerment is a prerequisite for achieving inclusive 
and sustainable economic growth, poverty reduction, and development effectiveness (Accra, para. 3; 
Busan, para. 11; Doha, para. 4). Therefore, as argued in Accra, donors and recipient have the joint 
responsibility to ensure that their respective development plans, programs, and policies are “designed 
and implemented in ways consistent with their agreed international commitments on gender equality” 
(Accra, para. 13, cf. good policies). Moreover, external partners committed in Doha to further promote 
and reinforce gender-responsive public management, including gender budgeting through capacity-
building of domestic stakeholders at the recipient country level (Doha, para. 19, cf. good finances). 
And finally, donors and recipients agreed in Busan not only to address gender equality and women 
empowerment in all aspects of their joint development efforts but also to integrate gender targets in 
their mutual accountability mechanisms at the international level (Busan, para. 20, cf. good processes). 
A second example that has increasingly been linked to the international level across these three recent 
initiatives is the fight against corruption. Whereas in earlier agreements corruption was perceived as 
inhibiting donors from relying on domestic systems in recipient countries (Paris, para. 4), and was thus 
predominantly situated at the recipient country level, it was gradually transferred to the global level in 
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the later agreements. The Accra Agenda was the first to call on both donors and recipients “to do their 
utmost to fight corruption” and to respect the principles they have agreed on under the UN Convention 
against Corruption (Accra, para. 24). The meeting in Doha brought the problem of illicit financial 
flows, i.e., capital flight and money laundering, to the table and called on developing and developed 
countries to combat corruption “in all of its manifestations” (para. 20, 21). In Busan then, development 
partners heeded this call, as shown by their adherence to “a culture of zero tolerance” for all corrupt 
practices and illicit financial flows consistent with the UN Convention against Corruption and other 
agreements, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (Busan, para. 33).  
Correspondingly, we see this more political and rights-based approach to development back in the 
mutual obligations and reciprocal commitments between donors and recipients in terms of their ac-
countability for “good processes”, at which I will take now a closer look. The obligation recipient 
governments have in this variant of mutual accountability is to lead consultation and coordination of 
all participants involved in development cooperation at the recipient country level, that is, domestic 
stakeholders and external partners (Busan, para. 25). This obligation rests on two commitments by 
recipient governments for process accountability. First, recipient governments commit to taking the 
lead in coordinating all aid in dialogue with external partners. This commitment shows up in all inter-
national agreements from Washington (CDF, para. 33) to Busan (para. 25). It means that important 
forums for aid coordination and political dialogue should be held in-country and be chaired by the 
recipient government itself, such as the regular Consultative Group and Roundtable meetings (CDF, 
para. 33; Paris, para. 14). It also means that recipient governments should identify areas for long-term 
capacity development and integrate them in their national development strategies (CDF, para. 31; Par-
is, para. 23, Accra, para. 14).  
Second, recipient governments commit to consult domestic stakeholders in the process and to take 
their views into account when formulating and implementing the national development strategy. Over 
time, the notion of stakeholder consultation has changed considerably in the build-up of the current aid 
architecture: The Comprehensive Development Framework by the World Bank – commonly perceived 
as one of the pioneers in the area of ownership (see Johnson and Wasty 1993; Entwistle and Cavassini 
2005) – emphasizes that a broad-based “participatory approach involving all key stakeholders” is 
needed to achieve “genuine country ownership” (CDF, para. 25). This statement is echoed in the rather 
technical declarations of Rome and Paris, where recipient governments agreed to encourage the partic-
ipation of civil society and the private sector through broad consultative development processes (Paris, 
para. 14). Within the subsequent and more political agreements of Accra, Busan and Doha, by con-
trast, recipient governments agreed not merely to consult civil society, but also to deepen their en-
gagement with civil society organizations (Doha, para. 46), because they are recognized “to play a 
vital role in enabling people to claim their rights in promoting rights-based approaches” (Busan, para. 
22). Moreover, recipient governments agreed to “work more closely with parliaments and local author-
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ities in preparing, implementing and monitoring national development policies and plans” (Accra, 
para. 13), and thus increasing government accountability not only vertically towards their citizens, but 
also horizontally vis-à-vis other governing bodies. In accordance with the scholarly debate, we thus 
observe a similar trend in the build-up of the current aid architecture from a participatory approach to a 
rights-based approach to development, which can be traced in time through the various international 
agreements.  
The obligation of donors thereby is to facilitate country ownership over the development process. 
More precisely, donors should respect country ownership over the development process and help 
strengthen domestic capacities to exercise it (Paris, para. 15). In analogy to the two commitments by 
recipient governments for strengthening process accountability, donors’ commitments regarding the 
facilitation of country ownership over development processes are twofold.  
The first commitment by donors has been to strengthen the capacities of recipient governments in 
leading and managing development processes. Yet again, the Comprehensive Development Frame-
work (CDF, para. 11) paved the way for the widespread recognition that without robust capacity recip-
ient countries “cannot fully own and manage their development processes”, as the Accra Agenda for 
Action notes almost ten years later (Accra, para. 14). However, with the more political notion of own-
ership that emerged over time, the particular activities subsumed under this commitment have also 
changed. In the early, more technical agreements, support to country ownership by donors meant that 
donors should support countries – read, recipient governments – in building adequate institutional 
capacity to develop and implement national development strategies, e.g., through using mid-term ex-
penditure frameworks and other technical tools advised by the international community (CDF, para. 
31; Paris, para. 4, 15). By contrast, the later, more political agreements highlight that capacity-building 
efforts by donors should be “demand-driven” and “aligned with the priorities and policies set out by 
developing countries themselves” (Accra, para. 14; Busan, para. 11) and that donors should make 
greater use of country-led coordination arrangements, including strengthening “delegated coopera-
tion”, i.e., delegating sufficient authority to country offices and field staff (Accra, para. 23; Busan, 
para. 25).  
Whereas the first commitment refers to donors’ efforts aimed at strengthening process accountability 
top-down through building the capacity of recipient governments, the second commitment by donors – 
which has gained only recently prominence within the current aid architecture – has been to strengthen 
process accountability bottom-up through increasing the capacities of “all relevant stakeholders” to 
promote domestic accountability at the recipient country level (Busan, para. 23). It was only in 2008 
that donors agreed to provide capacity-building support to other domestic stakeholders within and 
beyond the recipient state, including civil society, so as they can assume an active role in policy dia-
logue with the central government (Accra, para. 13). Three years later, this commitment is reaffirmed 
as follows: donors agree to work together with recipient governments and other external partners to 
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build an “enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights, that maximizes the contri-
butions of civil society organizations to development” (Busan, para. 22). The role of civil society ac-
tors thereby shifted from engaging in consensual dialogue with the recipient state over development 
policies and service delivery to “enabling people to claim their rights” in shaping development policies 
and “in overseeing their implementation” in a context of broader public accountability (Busan, para. 
22). Capacity-building support by donors in this more political version thus focuses on empowering 
citizens in order to demand accountability from government representatives.  
In sum, regarding process accountability recipient governments have to render an account to external 
partners, technically, about their capacity to lead the country’s development process and politically, 
about their responsiveness to the needs and interests of domestic stakeholders. External partners, in 
turn, have to render an account to recipient governments about their technical assistance to building in-
country capacities and their own political role in domestic accountability systems.  
 
3.3.2.4. Trend towards invoking democratic standards of mutual accountability 
To summarize, mutual accountability is understood as a cross-cutting principle to all other principles 
in the contemporary aid architecture – both technically and politically. In its technical interpretation, 
the principle of mutual accountability is boiled down to a narrow set of “specific indicators” (Paris, 
para. 8) used for assessing “mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effective-
ness” (Paris, para. 50). As the above analysis has shown, development partners hold each other ac-
countable for three things – development outcomes, development resources, and development pro-
cesses. Mutual accountability mechanisms have been developed for all of these three broad fields. In 
its political interpretation, the “spirit of mutual accountability” (Paris, para. 13) is tied to normative 
standards used for evaluating aid relationships between donors and recipient. Previously, I have identi-
fied three accountability standards in the development literature – effectiveness, governance, and em-
powerment – that may underlie the conduct for which an accountability forum is holding an actor ac-
countable. Invoking a “spirit” of mutual accountability thus presupposes a relationship between donors 
and recipients where there is a general recognition of the norms and rules that lend legitimacy to this 
relationship. Moreover, these norms and rules enable evaluating their respective performance in terms 
of development outcomes, resources, and processes. 
In this final section, I seek to find out whether mutual accountability standards have changed in the 
development field. To identify these normative standards within the global aid architecture, I look at 
the common goals, shared principles and joint commitments specified across the various international 
agreements and global initiatives. Evidence from the global policy framework shows that over the last 
two decades the development agenda, including the common goals to be achieved by the international 
community, has broadened; that the shared principles designed to guide development efforts have 
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become more democratic; and that the joint commitments agreed by all development actors have in-
creasingly been linked to internationally recognized human rights, including the right to development. 
I will comment shortly on each of these three observations.  
A first trend that can be observed is that new goals aimed at improving governance and empowering 
citizens have entered the international aid effectiveness agenda. At the millennium turn, the interna-
tional community combined their forces to launch the Millennium Development Goals. In parallel, 
they set up the international aid effectiveness with the common goal to increase the “effectiveness in 
poverty alleviation and sustainable development” (Wolfensohn 1999: 2). To make aid more effective, 
the main instrument proposed was one single, Comprehensive Development Framework under gov-
ernment leadership (CDF, para. 34). This framework was said to improve donors’ collective impact in 
reducing poverty through putting recipient governments in charge of development strategies and pro-
grams, engaging civil society and the private sector in projects and programs, and sharing information 
and cooperation among all participants involved in projects and programs (Wolfensohn 1999: 24-28). 
Over time, however, more political goals entered the international aid effectiveness agenda.  
Along with the aid effectiveness goal, a complementary goal that has been increasingly stated is the 
“strengthening of governance” (Paris, para. 1) – particularly in countries with “weak governance and 
capacity” (Paris, para. 7). The Monterrey Consensus has been most explicit on the donor's rationale for 
supporting good governance in recipient countries. Given that "corruption is a serious barrier to effec-
tive resource mobilization and allocation, and diverts resources away from activities that are vital for 
poverty eradication and economic and sustainable development”, combating corruption is seen a prior-
ity (Monterrey, para. 13, 15). However, despite the United Nations’ repeated reference to democratic 
institutions and governance (Doha, para. 43; Monterrey, para. 11), early high-level forums on aid ef-
fectiveness understood the governance goal in a rather technical sense as improving the effective gov-
ernance of aid (Paris, para. 38; see also the Rome Declaration). This changed only with the following 
high-level forums on aid effectiveness, which stated more explicitly than before that “aid is only one 
part of the solution to development” (Accra, para. 3; Busan, para. 28). While it may play a “catalytic 
and indispensable role” in alleviating poverty and improving governance, the long-term goal must be 
to “increase independence from aid” (Accra, para. 32; Busan, para. 9) through empowering citizens 
and domestic constituencies. At the forums in Accra and Busan, donors and recipients of foreign aid 
thus called for increased attention to domestic accountability systems where state and non-state actors 
will hold each other accountable for own policies, revenues and processes (Busan, para. 28). To 
achieve sustainable results lasting beyond the delivery of aid, “addressing inequalities of income and 
opportunity within countries and between states” is seen to be essential (Accra, para. 3).  
A second trend that can be observed over time is that the two basic principles – national ownership 
and global partnership – that guide joint development efforts have been understood in a more political 
sense. In the early agreements, national ownership meant “active” (CDF, para. 21), or “effective” (Par-
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is, para. 14) leadership by recipient governments over their policy agendas and national development 
strategies. Government leadership then was closely linked with “strategic” partnership – taken to mean 
close collaboration among all “players in the development field” (Wolfensohn 1999: 21) – and an 
overall focus on results-oriented management of development assistance (Paris, para. 43). The trinity 
of outcome orientation, government guidance and close collaboration among all development partners 
is said to be more effective in achieving poverty alleviation and sustainable development than previous 
efforts and would also help to build “a sustainable international architecture for the coming millenni-
um” (Wolfensohn 1999: 31). In later agreements, the focus on development results remains, but the 
general reading of both the ownership and partnership principles changes. Country ownership is un-
derstood to be “stronger” (Accra, para. 8), respectively more “democratic” (Busan, para. 12), when 
recipient governments engage with national parliaments and local governments, since they play critical 
roles in ensuring broad-based ownership of countries’ development agendas and processes (Accra, 
para. 13; Busan, para. 21). Global partnerships, in turn, are understood to become more "effective" 
(Accra, para. 9) and “inclusive” (Busan, para. 11), “when they fully harness the energy, skills, and 
experience of all development ators”, including organized civil society, based on the recognition of 
their different and complementary roles in the field (Accra, para. 16; Busan, para. 11). The global aid 
architecture of today thus reveals a more political understanding of the ownership and partnership 
principles as compared to the initial proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework by Wolf-
ensohn two decades ago.  
A third trend that can be observed across the current aid architecture is that joint commitments by do-
nors and recipients have been increasingly embedded in an international framework of human rights. 
Even though internationally agreed human rights, including the right to development, were an integral 
part of the MDGs (para. 24), early agreements on aid effectiveness did not mention them. With excep-
tion of the UN conferences in Monterrey (para. 11) and Doha (para. 2) where the commitment to hu-
man rights is quasi inherent (considering that the UN also drafted the MDGs), the big players, that is, 
the “World Bank and its major partners” (CDF, para. 1), focused – at least in the beginning – on defin-
ing the new rules of the game for themselves. Early agreements, such as the Comprehensive Deve-
lopment Framework and the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, were written by a narrow group of 
leading donor agencies that did not take other development actors and ideas into account, as later do-
cuments reveal (Busan, para. 7). Instead, they jointly committed to redirect their agencies in a way that 
is more results-based and less volume- or procedure-based (Wolfensohn 1999: 1) by harmonizing their 
“operational policies, procedures, and practices” with those of recipient countries (Rome Declaration) 
in order “to raise productivity and yield measurable results in reducing poverty” (Monterrey, para. 46).  
However, in parallel with the extending circles of development partners, joint commitments within 
later agreements increasingly referred to internally accepted norms and rules to lend legitimacy to 
global partnerships. While embracing the diversity of all development partners (Accra, para. 19), these 
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agreements embed the international aid effectiveness agenda within a broader field of human rights – 
including the rule of law, gender equality, disability and environmental sustainability (Accra, para. 3; 
Busan, para. 11; Doha, para. 2). Based on mutual respect for internationally recognized human rights 
(Accra, para. 13), they thus forge unity among a broader range of development actors that use more 
diverse development approaches than ever before (Busan, para. 1). However, linking joint commit-
ments with internationally agreed human rights (and more informal democratic norms) does not only 
serve as a unifying means for a heterogeneous development community in search of shared values and 
standards of behavior, but also contributes to the strengthening of the global governance of aid itself, 
through increasing the possibility of consequences in case that commitments are not upheld.  
In sum, the evidence in this analysis has shown that the conduct for which donors and recipients hold 
each other accountable varies considerably across international agreements. However, it has also 
shown that the standards that underlie this conduct have changed at the same time. In particular, mutu-
al accountability shifted from a narrow technical understanding introduced to measure the progress of 
aid effectiveness reforms to a broader political understanding implying a more political and rights-
based approach to the governance of aid and beyond.  
 
Synthesis and outlook of chapter 4 
This chapter has argued that over the past two decades a more political spirit has been introduced into 
the global aid architecture. More specifically, it has argued that the introduction of new aid partners, 
new aid principles and new aid practices has added a political dimension to the IFIs’ economic reform 
agenda and the international community’s aid effectiveness agenda. To identify this political spirit, 
this chapter has traced the way donors have supported domestic accountability both at the level of 
national and global aid policies. The national policy analysis has shown that the IFIs’ support to do-
mestic accountability forums that monitor compliance of recipient governments with citizens’ needs 
and interest has successively broadened to support entire national governance systems. The global 
policy analysis has shown that the international community has progressively embedded mutual ac-
countability standards used to assess mutual progress in terms of development outcomes, resources, 
and processes within a formal human rights framework and more informal democratic norms. 
In sum, through tracing the policy changes in the domestic and mutual accountability field, evidence 
from these two analyses shows that the PRS approach does indeed differ from earlier development 
efforts in terms of enhancing the scope for domestic accountability. However, since the changes cap-
tured here relate to official policies enacted by the heads and high representatives of the international 
financial institutions and the international community, the next chapter will address the open question 
of how far aid relationships have actually changed in the daily practice between donors and recipients 
of foreign aid.   
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4. Development practice I: change in aid relations? 
4.1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, donors efforts at increasing the sustainability of foreign aid have signifi-
cantly changed. With the introduction of the mutual accountability principle into the current aid archi-
tecture, donors have increasingly sought not only to increase the effectiveness of foreign aid but also 
the accountability among aid intermediaries. Beyond increasing the level of accountability in the glob-
al governance of aid, many also consider this new “spirit of mutual accountability” (OECD 2005a, 
para. 8) as an important driving force in strengthening democratic accountability in developing coun-
tries (e.g., Gaventa 2006: 11; Hickey and Mohan 2008: 237, Mfunwa 2006: 21; Meyer and Schulz 
2008: 31). As the IMF and World Bank’s PRS approach has been utilized right from the start as the 
operational framework for developing countries and their development partners to put this new spirit 
into practice, this chapter thus seeks to answer the question if and how the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
approach has changed the relations between donors and recipients of foreign aid as compared to ear-
lier development efforts.  
The conceptual framework of this research proposes to look at the interplay of domestic and mutual 
accountability fields at the recipient country levels. These fields do not represent one particular pro-
cess, but must be understood as a collection of multiple processes, temporarily sustained by the parties 
involved, and nested within or overlapping with other accountability fields. Thus, mutual accountabil-
ity for aid can be imagined as being embedded within and interacting with domestic accountability 
systems in aid-receiving countries. Applying such a field perspective to the PRS approach, this re-
search identifies two fields where external partners and domestic stakeholders interact. The first field 
typically consists of some sort of consultative process by which governments solicit input from vari-
ous domestic stakeholders and then incorporate these preferences in their formulation of national pov-
erty reduction and/or development strategies (in short, the PRS field). Given that the compulsory par-
ticipatory process has been considered by many as the most innovative element of the IFIs’ new de-
velopment approach (Molenaers and Renard 2006: 28; Morrison and Singer 2007: 722), most of the 
specialized PRS literature only refers to this first accountability field under the PRS approach (see, 
e.g., Fraser 2005; Lazarus 2008; Molenaers and Renard 2006; Rombouts 2006). However, there is a 
second field where governments negotiate with external partners – including the IMF and World Bank 
– their general budget support aimed at implementing the national development strategy (in short, the 
GBS field). Negotiations over budgetary aid are said to occur in “a virtually participation-free zone” 
between a handful of selected representatives (GTZ 2005: 15). Especially in so-called “post-
conditionality regimes” (Harrison 2001), these negotiations between donors and recipients of budget-
ary aid then find their continuation in the close collaboration between aid specialists from both sides 
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for supporting public financial management reforms (de Renzio 2006: 635). This second field of pub-
lic accountability (given the public nature of the general budget) under the PRS approach should not 
be neglected when we analyze the shift in aid relations between donors and recipients of foreign aid.  
General budget support is thus an integral part of the overall PRS approach. However, those who fi-
nance the general budget act as surrogates of democratic accountability holders, that is, poor citizens 
in recipient countris who are not able to pay their taxes but are governed by the resulting policies. 
Given the involvement of external development partners in these national political arenas, I speak of 
two parallel surrogate accountability fields with regard to PRS formulation (the PRS field) and PRS 
implementation (the GBS field) that overlap and interact with each other. These two surrogate ac-
countability fields are embedded within a third field, which is the much broader field of democratic 
accountability at the recipient country level (the DEM field). Accountability in this last field runs both 
vertically and horizontally between the recipient state and organized society, but excludes representa-
tives of the donor community.  
Through using the concept of surrogate accountability as an analytical lens, this research provides a 
more comprehensive and democratic understanding of accountability than the one that has formerly 
shaped current development thinking and practice. As I postulate here, the two aid modalities of the 
PRS approach (i.e., the PRS process and GBS operations) determine two fields of surrogate accounta-
bility where development actors meet within institutionalized accountability forums. Accordingly, 
donors may use different strategies, apply different mechanisms and may have different goals in mind 
for demanding accountability from recipient governments within these two surrogate accountability 
fields. Depending on the interaction of surrogate accountability with democratic accountability, the 
democratic potential (or lack of it) of the PRS approach may thus differ.  
Accountability has long been missing as a topic in the specialized PRS literature. Instead, scholarly 
debate has evolved around the principles of ownership and partnership as the central axes of dispute. 
However, as time went by, accountability has increasingly been taken up as a topic – both by sympa-
thetic insiders (see Malena et al. 2004; World Bank and IMF 2005; World Bank and GTZ 2008) and 
critical outsiders of the PRS approach (see Hickey and Mohan 2008; Komives 2011; Winters 2010). 
While they radically differ in their appraisal of the new approach’s development potential, none of 
these studies has looked explicitly at the democracy-related potential of the PRS approach. By con-
trast, this research takes a different approach. It draws on the long and distinguished history of the 
concept in democratic theory (in particular, Borowiak 2011; Bovens 2007; Bovens et al. 2008; Grant 
and Keohane 2005; and Philp 2009) and on the in-depth knowledge available in development practice 
(in particular, at the World Bank) in order to develop a better understanding of the interplay of demo-
cratic and surrogate accountability fields. Through describing the accountability arrangements and the 
normative standards that have accompanied them in the course of the time, the qualitative analysis 
aims at bringing both the practical tension between different accountability arrangements and the nor-
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mative potential of the PRS approach that lies at the interfaces of these accountability arrangements to 
the fore.  
In order to describe these interfaces between different accountability fields, the insider knowledge of 
people and organizations working with the PRS approach is considered to be most useful. Unlike the 
IMF, the World Bank has followed an active approach in both the PRS and GBS field. Data for this 
research thus solely comes from World Bank staff having worked in institutionalized accountability 
forums under the PRS approach.  
In line with the conceptual framework of the present study, this chapter analyzes the various aid mo-
dalities under the PRS approach in three steps (each covering one section below): First, I will map the 
accountability fields and their interaction under the PRS approach in order to assess whether the 
World Bank’s strategy for promoting domestic accountability has actually changed as compared to 
earlier development efforts. Second, I explore the accountability models under the PRS approach in 
order to assess whether the World Bank’s mechanisms for holding recipient governments accountable 
have actually changed over time. Third, I identify the accountability standards under the PRS approach 
in order to assess whether the goals to be achieved by the World Bank’s new aid modalities have actu-
ally changed as compared to past practices.  
Throughout the whole analysis, I strive to distinguish between the normative standards used by aid 
practitioners to evaluate actual accountability arrangements and the objective description of these in-
stitutional accountability arrangements. For each of the three sections below, two questions helped me 
to keep these two conceptual aspects of accountability separate. In particular, I asked how the people 
at the World Bank see the PRS approach themselves? And do we find any change over time in the 
World Bank’s internal guidance as compared to past practices? In the former case, I will speak of the 
World Bank's strategic discourse, while in the latter case, I will refer to the World Bank’s operational 
practice.  
Using interview and survey data from a sample of 50 World Bank experts who have worked in 20 
countries with second-generation poverty reduction strategies, the qualitative analysis offers anecdotal, 
but comparable evidence on the shift in aid relationships under the PRS approach as shown by changes 
in the World Bank’s strategic discourse and operational practice.  
Results from the qualitative content analysis show that the Bank increasingly used a more indirect 
strategy for promoting domestic accountability based on a mix of technical assistance and political 
dialogue aimed at strengthening the answerability of recipient governments within the domestic elec-
toral and political arena; also, that this change in strategy went along with a shift towards more partic-
ipatory mechanisms used by the Bank for holding recipient governments accountable in its operational 
practice; and finally, that the goals to be achieved by the Bank’s new aid modalities were found to 
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have changed also as compared to earlier structural adjustment lending, because World Bank staff 
evaluates the PRS approach ten years after its introduction in the aid architecture not only on the basis 
of its development potential but also based on its democratic potential.  
The chapter starts with a review of those contributions within the specialized literature that have taken 
the concept of accountability as an analytical lens to analyze the PRS approach. Given the obvious 
research gaps, three main objectives are derived from the literature review delineating the area of re-
search. In the next step, the research design and method is presented. In the following three sections, 
the three research objectives are explored one by one through extracting information from the expert 
interviews and the survey of World Bank staff. The chapter then concludes with a discussion of the 
findings.  
 
 
4.2. Previous research 
4.2.1. Internal reviews 
Over the past two decades, there have been far-reaching changes in the global aid architecture, marked 
by a three-fold shift from a narrow focus on borrowing governments and state elites to broad-based 
participation by the general public and the poor in particular (new partners), from donor-driven policy 
blueprints to policy dialogue around country-owned strategies (new principles), and from individual 
project aid and sector activities and to program-based aid in support of the general budget (new prac-
tices). Key to these changes has been an increased focus on accountability in the relations between all 
development actors – recipient state, organized society, and donor community – in recipient countries. 
Internal reviews by the IMF and World Bank have increasingly taken this new focus on public ac-
countability in the governance of aid into account.  
First, sympathetic insiders have used the concept of social accountability to take the new societal part-
ners in the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of national development strategies into ac-
count. The Participation & Civic Engagement Group in the Social Development Department of the 
World Bank has been pioneering in this respect by introducing the social accountability concept within 
the Bank’s thinking and reviewing emerging practice (see Malena, Forster and Singh 2004 for a con-
ceptual clarification, and subsequently McNeill and Malena 2010 for an overview of its application in 
the practice). Placing themselves in a long line of research promoting public accountability through 
market-based mechanisms (see Hirschman 1970; Paul 1992; and Ackerman 2004), social accountabil-
ity is portrayed in a conceptual input to the debate at the World Bank as “an approach toward building 
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accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e., in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society 
organizations who participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability” (Malena et al. 2004: 3). 
In this particular conception, social accountability refers less to a specific theoretical type than to the 
broad range of participatory mechanisms (beyond voting) that citizens can use to hold power wielders 
accountable, such as participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking, citizen monitoring and 
evaluation of public service delivery (Malena et al. 2004: 3). Especially those mechanisms that direct-
ly involve ordinary citizens in the processes of allocating, monitoring and evaluating the use of public 
resources are said to be most effective because it is the flow of these resources that puts policies into 
action (Malena et al. 2004: 10). Given that social accountability mechanisms directly strengthen the 
voice and capacity of citizens (especially poor citizens) to demand greater responsiveness from public 
officials and public servants, they are seen as complementary to conventional mechanisms of public 
accountability (Malena et al. 2004: 1, 4). It has been argued that their impact is greatest and most sus-
tainable when social accountability mechanisms transgress the boundaries between state and society, 
what led some scholars to speak of “transversal”, “hybrid” or “diagonal” forms of accountability (see 
Ackerman 2004; Goetz and Jenkins 2001).  
Second, sympathetic insiders have promoted the principle of mutual accountability as cross-cutting in 
nature to all other principles for making aid more effective and results-oriented. Early observers of the 
PRS approach were calling attention to the fact that despite being framed in terms of ownership and 
partnership, accountability as a term was largely missing in the international financial institutions’ 
internal documentation of their new approach (Whaites 2000: 16). It was only with the publication of 
their joint review of the PRS approach in 2005, subtitled Balancing Accountabilities and Scaling Up 
Results (World Bank and IMF 2005) that the principle of mutual accountability found its way into 
mainstream thinking at the headquarters in Washington. Mirroring the latest trends in the global aid 
architecture, this joint document discusses PRS implementation through a framework of balancing 
accountabilities – including accountability of governments to citizens and donors as well as accounta-
bility of donors to developing countries. The key message given is that there is “no inherent tension 
between domestic and external demands for better financial management and results-oriented perfor-
mance” (World Bank and IMF 2005: 42). Accountabilities are in balance if “aid that is provided in a 
mutually accountable way reinforces rather than detracts from domestic accountability (World Bank 
and IMF 2005: 70). The PRS approach then must be seen as the operational framework to put the 
principle of mutual accountability into practice. To this end, efforts are needed by developing coun-
tries and donors alike. Developing countries need to set their development priorities in a way that fa-
cilitates donor alignment and harmonization. Donors, in turn, need to recognize that domestic process-
es to formulate an effective and sustainable development strategy take time and should not be under-
mined by donors searching for easier options of aid delivery (World Bank and IMF 2005: 47). “Given 
the role of the Bank and the Fund in introducing the PRS approach, they have a particular responsibil-
ity to be aware of how their actions influence the process” (World Bank and IMF 2005: 48).  
172 
Third, sympathetic insiders have perceived of general budget support as a means for improving the 
quality of governance and enhancing intra-state accountability in recipient countries. Following the 
2005 review, a joint study commissioned by the World Bank and the German Development Coopera-
tion (World Bank and GTZ 2007) calls attention to the “accountability gaps” between the PRS and 
budget process (World Bank and GTZ 2007: 19). The study notes that PRS-budget links have been 
considered as necessary for successful PRS implementation for some time. They are also increasingly 
recognized as vital for enhanced domestic accountability (World Bank and GTZ 2007: vii). In prac-
tice, however, asymmetries of ownership and weak domestically-driven incentive structures can ham-
per the development of effective accountability mechanisms inside government (World Bank and GTZ 
2007: 17, 26). Donors have addressed these fractures in domestic planning and budget processes 
through a focus on narrow technical instruments – including the enforcement of pro-poor spending 
priorities, the introduction of mid-term expenditure frameworks and results-oriented program budget-
ing (World Bank and GTZ 2007: 19). However, these measures have not forged ownership beyond a 
narrow group of technocrats and have not created adequate institutional incentives for integration. This 
report thus argues that if the goal is to move beyond narrow technical solutions to broader institutional 
reforms, “different actors need to be brought together to strengthen the budget as a process to imple-
ment political decisions” (World Bank and GTZ 2007: 18). Standing in a tradition of German democ-
racy scholars (e.g., Lauth 2004; Merkel et al. 2003; Merkel 2004) that emphasizes statehood and the 
rule of law, the study recommends “to improve core policy processes and  internal accountability”, 
including “building policy links ‘from the budget up’, rather than ‘from the PRS down’” (World Bank 
and GTZ 2007: 42-43). 66  
In sum, the IMF and World Bank have taken the issue of accountability on board with regard to the 
PRS approach’s new partners (social accountability), new principles (mutual accountability) and new 
practices (intra-state accountability). In general, these internal reviews sketch a largely positive picture 
of the way how foreign aid and domestic accountability interact. However, these sympathetic reviews 
have also evoked criticism from wider academic circles that comment directly on the Bank and Fund’s 
own presentation of the aid-accountability nexus under the PRS approach.  
 
4.2.2. Critical outsiders 
While the body of independent, critical research on the PRS approach is rather extensive, there are 
only few studies that explicitly look at accountability issues with regard to the latest development ini-
tiative. To the best of my knowledge, there are only three external studies that have analyzed the PRS 
                                                     
66 See Boogaards (2009: 408) with respect to this tradition in the German-language literature on defective de-
mocracy. German Development Cooperation (GTZ) has also been among the most fervent advocates of institu-
tionalizing participation and has repeatedly pleaded for a strengthening of horizontal accountability mechanisms 
within the PRS approach (see, e.g., Eberlei 2001; Eberlei and Henn 2003; GTZ 2005; and Eberlei 2007). 
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approach through an accountability lens. While each of these studies is focused on a different aspect of 
the threefold shift in development policies – new partners, new principles, new practices – all of them 
can be placed within the critical governance strand of the specialized PRS literature.  
The first study by Kristin Komives (2011) criticizes the way social accountability was institutionalized 
under the PRS approach. Based on field research in Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua, this study re-
volves around a critique of the type of accountability that civil society actors were technically able 
and/or politically willing to claim in the various stages of the PRS process. Beyond technical problems 
like a lack of resources or human capacities in civil society organizations which may hamper efforts 
by organized civil society to monitor and track development results, the study argues that “[d]ebates 
about policies and resources are fundamentally political, and these debates do not stop once a PRSP is 
formally approved” (Komives 2011: 315-316). Evidence from the three case studies shows that newly 
elected presidents were not committed to the development strategies formulated under their predeces-
sors. Moreover, civil society actors were primarily interested to participate in the PRS process because 
it provided valuable access to policy-makers and funding opportunities. In comparison, in all three 
countries, civil society actors showed comparatively less interest to engage in monitoring policies and 
evaluating government performance (Komives 2011: 315). In line with existing research on the PRS 
process (see Gould 2005; Lazarus 2008), this pattern is explained by the existence of a coalition of 
public and private interests – including donors, government bureaucrats and selected societal members 
of middle-class, professionalized groups – who “captured” the participatory process and used it as 
platform for advancing their own business interests. Even in countries where civil society has been 
very active, social accountability mechanisms under the PRS approach have not succeeded in empow-
ering civil society to hold governments accountable for their development strategies and measurable 
development results (Komives 2011: 315).  
Similarly, a second study by Matthew Winters (2010) criticizes that mutual accountability as the 
cross-cutting principle of the PRS approach has not been realized so far. A growing emphasis on coun-
try ownership speaks to donors’ awareness of their accountability to aid recipients (Winters 2010: 
235). However, despite the commitments they made in the high-level meetings on aid effectiveness to 
increase mutual accountability in the way they deliver and manage aid, this study argues that donor s’ 
own accountability to aid-receiving countries and end-users within them has not increased despite 
recent pushes for more participation of domestic stakeholders in the PRS process (Winters 2010: 237). 
In particular, the lack of variation in the content of development programs between countries and be-
tween PRSPs and older lending programs both point to a lack of donor accountability in the design 
stage of contemporary aid programs. In addition, the study questions whether the use of the PRS ap-
proach brings about donor accountability to end users in the implementation stage of aid programs. If 
anything, current aid practices rather seem to tilt the accountability balance towards donors at the ex-
pense of domestic stakeholders. Reasons for this unduly high focus on external accountability are in-
174 
herent to the PRS process itself, namely the external legacy, the parallel planning process, the weight 
of donor analysis and the use of conditionality (Winters 2010: 237). In light of these asymmetries in 
mutual accountability, the study concludes that it is not clear yet whether stakeholder participation the 
PRS process is “more than just window dressing”, given that “end users and governments have not yet 
succeeded in holding donors accountable for the type of aid that they are providing” (Winters 2010: 
238).  
A third study by Sam Hickey and Giles Mohan (2008) questions the assumption that the new practices 
of general budget support comprise a recipe for greater domestic accountability and achievement of 
pro-poor results. Rather, evidence from Bolivia and Zambia indicates that “PRS priorities are not 
translated into budget allocations, which inevitably limits their pro-poor impact” and “the role of fund-
ing agencies in promoting greater levels of pro-poor accountability in relation to the budget […] has 
also been ambiguous” (Hickey and Mohan 2008: 248). This study cites three critical problems sup-
porting this claim. First, pro-poor accountability mechanisms under the PRS approach, and in particu-
lar those that rely on certain forms of civil society participation “are largely discretionary and lack 
significant disciplinary power” (Hickey and Mohan 2008: 234). Second, donors have failed to over-
come the contradictions regarding their own role in securing the pro-poor policy agenda within recipi-
ent countries. Third, the PRS approach may be seen in a long row of development approaches that 
have focused on technical solutions and quick fixes rather than on “the deeper forms of politics that 
might underpin effective accountability mechanisms within developing countries” (Hickey and Mohan 
2008: 234). In line with the other two studies, this study thus concludes that “[b]uilding accountable 
systems of bureaucratic governance is not simply a technocratic project, but is critical for a substantive 
politics of democratization which goes to the heart of the wider contract between states and citizens” 
(Hickey and Mohan 2008: 234). However, due to their exclusive focus on the PRS approach's primary 
objective of reducing poverty, all of these three studies may also be criticized for having missed the 
chance to explore the democracy-related potential of the PRS approach in more depth.  
 
4.2.3. Analyzing the spaces of surrogate accountability 
The above literature review has shown that the appraisal of the PRS approach greatly varies with the 
position the authors occupy in relation to the aid industry. Friendly reviews from inside present it as a 
“new way of doing business” (OED 2004: 4) that simultaneously enhances domestic accountability in 
recipient countries. In particular, they argue that social accountability mechanisms strengthen “the 
voice and capacity of citizens (especially poor citizens) to directly demand greater accountability and 
responsiveness from public officials and service providers” (Malena et al. 2004: 1); that aid that is 
provided in a mutually accountable way can strengthen “many of the foundations for scaled-up devel-
opment results” (World Bank and IMF 2005: 49); and that general budget support provides the neces-
175 
sary incentives for a well-functioning domestic accountability system, which in turn is a crucial pre-
requisite “for a government to be accountable to its citizens” (World Bank and GTZ 2008: 86).  
By contrast, critical outsiders do not believe that the new approach to development has enhanced the 
scope for domestic accountability. In particular, they argue that social accountability arrangements 
provide access to resources for civil society actors, which often are more important to them than secur-
ing the interests of the impoverished populations they claim to represent (Komives 2011: 302); that an 
unduly high focus on external accountability demands has led to the same, not very poverty-reducing 
policy prescriptions as in pre-PRS aid programs (Winters 2010: 237); and that the new practice of 
general budget support allowed donors to effectively insert themselves into domestic accountability 
systems of recipient states, whereby the lines of accountability between “states and citizens inevitably 
become blurred and confused” (Hickey and Mohan 2008: 239).  
However, none of these studies that looked at the PRS approach through an accountability lens paid 
much attention to the political goal dimension. Neither advocates nor critics of the PRS approach dis-
cuss how particular aid modalities being promoted under the PRS approach do affect (or do not affect) 
democratic accountability in recipient countries. Therefore, this chapter aspires to close this research 
gap by analyzing how the aid modalities of the PRS approach interact with democratic accountability 
systems, and by assessing whether these aid-accountability dynamics have changed over time. In more 
general terms, the analysis aims at understanding an increasingly important, but still relatively unex-
plored challenge for the development community and policymakers alike: the promotion of public 
accountability through various aid modalities, and their interaction with broader processes of democra-
tization in the developing world. By addressing this challenge, the chapter proceeds through three 
analytical steps. It seeks to provide new insights on the following three linked issues:  
• Accountability strategies: First, I analyze the World Bank’s strategy in relation to different 
fields of public accountability and their interaction at the recipient country level.  
• Accountability mechanisms: Second, within these fields of accountability I analyze the mech-
anisms used by the World Bank for holding recipient governments accountable by tracing 
their roots back to distinct models of public accountability in democratic theory.  
• Accountability goals: The last issue I analyze are the specific goals that may underly the 
World Bank’s strategy for promoting domestic accountability according to various standards 
of public accountability that might not be visible due to the new aid rhetoric.  
The PRS approach seems particularly useful for analyzing these issues, given its central position in the 
global aid architecture. Yet, it is important to note that this chapter does not evaluate the impact of the 
PRS approach on democratization (which will be the topic of the next chapter), but rather seeks to 
explain how aid modalities and democratic accountability interact and to assess whether the accounta-
bility relationships between donors and recipients of foreign aid have changed over time.  
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4.3. Research design 
4.3.1. Selection of country experts 
Donors’ strategies, mechanisms, and goals for promoting domestic accountability under the PRS ap-
proach were explored in an in-depth analysis of the practical experiences (and perceptions thereof) of 
50 staff members of the World Bank’s African Region Department. Data was gathered by means of 
expert interviews at the headquarters in Washington, and by an online survey among field staff in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
The decision was made to focus on the World Bank rather than on the IMF because, among the inter-
national financial institutions, only the Bank’s staff have insider experience on both aid modalities 
under the PRS approach due to their involvement in GBS operations and their facilitation of the PRS 
process in recipient countries. By contrast, the Fund’s staff have generally fallen short of active partic-
ipation in the PRS process. A lack of clarity of the IMF staff’s role has generally led to a “hands-off” 
approach in the interest of domestic ownership (IEO 2004: 63). Unlike the IMF, the World Bank sees 
its role – beyond providing financial support to national development strategies – in facilitating the 
participatory process by which the government solicits inputs from domestic stakeholders (World 
Bank 2002: 254). As such, the knowledge of World Bank staff of both PRS formulation and imple-
mentation provides an excellent opportunity to compare the interactions between external partners and 
domestic stakeholders within and across different aid modalities associated with the PRS approach.  
I further decided to focus on the African Region Department of the World Bank on the basis of the 
twin criteria of, first, this world region being most vulnerable to the power of the international finan-
cial institutions; and, second, of being the region most deeply exposed to the new ideas and practices 
under the PRS approach. Findings of the aid and democratization literature suggest that the power of 
external donors to press for both economic and political reforms has nowhere been greater than on the 
African continent. Targeted aid always comes with conditions attached and aid conditionality is said to 
be more effective if governments are highly dependent on aid (see Brown 2005; Diamond 1995; and 
Nelson and Eglington 1992). Indeed, as can be seen from Table 4-1, the Sub-Saharan African region 
receives substantially more official development assistance (ODA) measured as a percentage of its 
gross national income (GNI) than any other region (3.25%). An important driver of high levels of aid 
dependency seems to be general budget support (GBS) that has become an increasingly important 
modality for aid delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa according to the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting 
System. Since 2000, 60 to 70 percent of overall GBS funding consisted of disbursals to Sub-Saharan 
African countries, where it may compromise up to 30 percent of central governments’ budgets (Knoll 
2008: 5, 12).  
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Table 4-1: Aid dependency and PRSP dissemination around the world 
Aid World 
Sub- 
Saharan  
Africa 
East  
Asian  
& Pacific 
Europe  
& Central  
Asia 
Latin  
America &  
Caribbean 
Middle East  
& North  
Africa 
South  
Asia 
ODA (% of GNI) 0.19% 3.25% 0.04% 0.05% 0.20% 0.48% 0.76% 
PRSP (1st) 59 32 4 9 6 2 6 
PRSP (2nd) 35 23 2 6 1 0 3 
Total 67 34 6 11 7 2 7 
Note: aid figures (World Bank 2013b); PRSP board presentations as of June 2010 (World Bank 2010). 
 
A second argument to focus on Sub-Saharan Africa besides the high aid dependency in this region is 
the prominence of the PRS approach in this part of the world. Table 4-1 depicts various figures related 
to the distribution of PRSPs in six regions in the world. Among a total of 67 countries worldwide that 
have embarked on the approach when I started this research, more than half were Sub-Saharan African 
countries. A reason for this predominance among Sub-Saharan African countries surely lies in the PRS 
approach’s origins in the context of the Enhanced HIPC initiative. Since they were generally more 
debt-ridden than the rest of all countries eligible for concessional IMF and World Bank lending at that 
time, they figured prominently among the early adopters of the new development approach (Piron and 
Evans 2004: 3). However, an assessment of the PRS approach that is exclusively based upon the first 
generation of PRSPs, as Holvoet and Renard (2007) argue, “may fail to capture the dynamics over 
time” (Holvoet and Renard 2007: 69). Therefore, I restricted the focus of this research to those coun-
tries in Sub-Saharan Africa with second-generation PRSPs.The presentation of at least two full-PRSPs 
at the board level during the period under study served as an indicator for the availability of this pro-
cess information among World Bank staff.  
 
4.3.2. Data collection procedure 
Having chosen the global aid agency and the world region through which to explore the interaction of 
the PRS approach with domestic accountability, I sought to identify people at the World Bank who 
were specifically related to its work in Sub-Saharan Africa. The sampling of experts and data collec-
tion was done in a two-step process. In the first round, following a purposive sampling method (Judd 
et al. 1991) experts were included with practical knowledge of the Bank’s support in these African 
countries with second-generation PRSPs. In a second round, a chain-referral sampling method (Babbie 
1992) was used to identify further potential experts that were asked to participate in an online survey 
in order to achieve broader country coverage.  
In the first round, I personally conducted one-to-one interviews with strategically selected persons 
within the African Region Department of the World Bank, who were closely aligned with the Bank’s 
policy-based lending operations in their countries of experience. If possible, the task team leaders of 
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general budget support operations as identified from the World Bank’s Project Database were contact-
ed, previously, directly by email. If this was not possible, the country program coordinator was con-
tacted for helping to find the “right” person to interview. In advance, an outline of the questions to be 
discussed was sent to all interviewees. 14 semi-structured in-depth interviews then were conducted in 
the offices of the respective experts in Washington or on the telephone (November – December 2010). 
Each interview lasted between 45 minutes and 90 minutes. Except for one person (where minutes were 
taken), all interviewees agreed to have their interviews tape-recorded and fully transcribed.  
In the second round, I invited field staff in various country offices who were recommended by the 
interviewees of the first round to participate in an online survey. The survey was based on the same 
questionnaire that had been discussed with World Bank staff at the headquarters in Washington. How-
ever, while this chain-referral method of sampling was particularly helpful in finding experts within an 
organization of global dimension, it was prone to producing a bias, since it reduced the likelihood of a 
representative sample. As a partial response to this problem, I directly contacted a handful of potential 
experts from countries that had not been covered in the first round. The first contact with potential 
experts was by email with a direct link to the online survey. In absence of an answer, two reminders 
were sent. In total, the survey was online for a period of three months (February – April 2011), and 36 
World Bank staff participated.  
As a result of this sampling procedure, information has been gathered on 20 out of those 23 Sub-
Saharan African countries that have presented at least two PRSPs to the boards between 1999 and 
2010.67 Of these 20 countries, each country has been covered by one to five respondents. Most of the 
total 50 respondents had practical experiences with the second generation of the PRS approach in their 
respective countries (41 out of 50), but more than half of them were already on board with the first 
generation (30 out of 50) and one third were still participating in the formulation process of a coming 
third generation (17 out of 50). While all respondents have been directly involved in either the formu-
lation or implementation of a country’s poverty reduction strategy (or national equivalent), they dif-
fered in terms of their professional background and work experience. Table 4-2 depicts these varia-
tions within my sample of World Bank experts.  
  
                                                     
67 Country coverage is depending on the availability of World Bank staff to participate in the interviews or the 
survey. The 20 countries that have been covered are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The three countries that fulfill regional and process criteria, but could not be 
included in this research despite efforts being made to contact country experts are Cape Verde, Rwanda, as well 
as Sao Tome and Principe. 
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Table 4-2: Professional background and work experience of interviewed World Bank staff 
Expert 
Average number of years 
working for the World Bank 
Average number of years 
working in the country 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
of total 
Economist 10.7 5.6 34 68% 
Manager 19.8 3.5 6 12% 
Officer 11.0 7.4 5 10% 
Specialist 12.6 9.0 3 6% 
Missing   2 4% 
Total 12.0 5.8 50 100% 
Note: 2 respondents have not released personal information. 
 
As can be seen from Table 4-2, two third of the people in the sample were country economists (34 out 
of 50 respondents), while the non-economists within the sample have been classified as country man-
ager (6), country officer (5) or country specialist (3). 21 of the 50 respondents have been task team 
leaders of general budget support operations and thus responsible for coordinating the Bank’s financial 
support with other donors and aligning it to the recipient countries’ poverty reduction strategies. Given 
their involvement in a field that is usually hidden from the public eye, their knowledge and experience 
have deemed particularly useful for gaining insights on the interplay of foreign aid and democratic 
accountability. On average, respondents have been working 12 years for the World Bank, of which 
half of the time (5.8 years) for the country where they worked under the PRS approach. Regarding 
their professional background and work experience, a clear pattern can be derived from Table 4-2. 
Across the sample, country managers (19.8 years) and economists (10.7 years) have worked longer for 
the World Bank as an organization, whereas country officers (7.4 years) and specialists (9 years) gen-
erally possessed more work experience and knowledge of specific countries. World Bank respondents 
all agreed to be listed as respondent in the annex of this research (see Annex 4-1), but were guaranteed 
anonymity for the writing process. Thus, only numbers (R1 to R50) without any identifier, alphabeti-
cal or otherwise, are used when referring to them in the text.  
 
4.3.3. Qualitative content analysis 
To analyze both the strategic discourse and the operational practice of the World Bank under the PRS 
approach, data were analyzed by qualitative content analysis. The qualitative content analysis aims at 
interpreting a text by systematically extracting the available information. This method was chosen, 
first, because of its usefulness to extract the “political” information from a sometimes highly “tech-
nical” discourse surrounding the World Bank’s intervention in recipient countries. In more practical 
terms, a second reason for choosing qualitative content analysis was its appropriateness to reduce the 
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huge amount of information received from World Bank experts. To analyze the data, I used the open 
source program MIA provided by Jochen Gläser and Grit Laudel (2010b).68  
In contrast to other mainstream qualitative methods (like thick description, sequence analysis, coding, 
etc.), qualitative content analysis differs in two respects (Gläser and Laudel 2010a: 46-47). First, in-
formation is extracted and then assigned to specific analytical parameters, from where the information 
is further processed, synthesized, dropped, and so forth – independent from its original context. How-
ever, it is important to note that the subsequent analysis uses descriptive statistics of specific questions 
as a means for structuring general findings. Second, the analytical framework used for extracting the 
information from the text has to be developed in advance. Accordingly, variables, values, and corre-
sponding indicators have been derived from the theory before the analysis has been conducted.  
The analysis of the interview and survey data then went through three methodological steps. In a first 
step, statements from transcription files were extracted and categorized according to whether they 
included information on specific fields of public accountability at the recipient country level, on spe-
cific models to control the use of public power within institutionalized accountability forums, or on 
specific standards that may underlie strategies for promoting public accountability at the recipient 
country level. In case of doubt, the default was to categorize them under specific fields of public ac-
countability (until new insights compelled another arrangement). The information from the extraction 
tables, then, was compiled in three extraction tables retaining the source.  
In a second step, data were sorted according to the variables, values, and indicators derived from the 
analytical framework developed ex ante. Following this categorization, data was further processed in 
terms of summarizing similar arguments, removing redundancies, and resolving apparent contradic-
tions between expert statements. Through several re-analyses of the initial data going back and forth 
between theory and evidence, arguments have been refined and re-grouped in three thematic summary 
tables.  
In the last step, finally, the arguments depicted in the thematic summaries were analyzed in light of 
gaining insights into, first, the strategic discourse at the Bank, that is, how people working at the 
World Bank perceive the PRS approach themselves, and second, whether operational practice at the 
Bank has changed under the PRS approach. Overall, the information sought in the interviews and sur-
vey with Bank staff aimed at unpacking the “political” dimension of the accountability relationships in 
which the World Bank is involved. Since this was assumed to be a difficult topic as to receiving direct 
answers from World Bank staff given the Bank’s economic mandate, questions were framed in the 
“technical” language of country ownership, stakeholder participation and good governance which has 
also dominated the PRS literature. The full questionnaire is reproduced in Annex 4-2.   
                                                     
68 For more details on this type of analysis and guidelines on how to use the MIA program, see Gläser and Lau-
del (2010a: 197-260) and the authors’ personal websites. 
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4.4. Mapping accountability fields 
4.4.1. Analytical framework for mapping fields of public accountability 
The objective of this section is to map the accountability fields and their interaction under the PRS 
approach in order to assess whether the World Bank’s strategy for promoting domestic accountability 
has actually changed as compared to earlier development efforts. The analytical framework is based on 
theoretical contributions of accountability scholars in the democracy and development literature who 
described different types of domestic accountability and their interaction with foreign transparency 
and accountability initiatives. As the level where the accountability relationship unfolds is given (that 
is, the recipient country level), the analysis focuses on mapping the four main dimensions of such in-
stitutionalized public accountability fields as they have been classified in the literature, namely the 
actor (or power wielder), the conduct for which the actor is being held accountable, the forum (or ac-
countability holder) that holds the actor accountable and the consequences that follow from this ac-
countability relationship. Table 4-3 shows the analytical framework including variables, values, and 
indicators that have been used to identify the different fields of accountability in order to analyze 
whether the World Bank’s strategy for promoting accountability in aid-receiving countries has 
changed under the PRS approach.  
First, it has been asked what type of actor has to render an account. As outlined by Bovens (2007), 
public organizations are composed of many individuals. If we want to hold them accountable, we first 
have to figure out who is going to render an account, what Bovens has called the “problem of many 
hands” (Bovens 2007: 458). In the development field, accountability relationships between donors and 
recipients of foreign aid have been framed as a contract, as an entitlement, and as a partnership. In line 
with these three frames of aid, donors may hold recipient governments accountable either as public 
organizations that have to render an account for their performance (‘corporate’); or they may hold the 
person at the top of the public organization accountable for the performance of all other public offi-
cials (‘representative’); or they may hold any public official personally accountable for the perfor-
mance of the public organization as a whole (‘collaborative’).  
Having identified the actor, we may ask for what conduct the actor is being held accountable. As out-
lined in the previous chapter 3, recipients and donors of foreign aid have mutual obligations as embod-
ied in reciprocal commitments they have voluntarily agreed to in the current aid architecture. The new 
compact on mutual accountability then comes in three different variants, namely as program accounta-
bility (‘policies’), as fiscal accountability (‘finances’), and as process accountability (‘processes’). 
Theoretically, it is assumed that the type of conduct for which an actor is being held accountable can 
be combined with any type of actor that has to render an account.  
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Table 4-3: Analytical framework for mapping fields of public accountability 
Variables Values Indicators Theoretical background 
Actor Corporate Management 
Consultation 
Aid as a contract: 
Organizational: a unitary actor with no identification 
of the individual who is accountable 
Representative Leadership 
Arbitrage  
Aid as an entitlement: 
One for all: a pyramidal image of large, bureaucratic 
organizations where the highest ranking official  
assumes responsibility and takes all the blame 
Collaborative Coordination 
Dialogue 
Aid as a partnership: 
All for one: in small, collegial bodies any member 
could be held personally accountable for the conduct 
of the organization as a whole 
Conduct Policies Strategy 
Agenda 
Good policies: 
Formulation of a national development strategy 
Translation into a policy reform agenda 
Finances Budget 
System 
Good finances: 
Transparency in public financial management 
Accountability in managing public funds 
Processes Partners 
Stakeholders 
Good processes: 
Coordination of support by external partners  
Consultation of domestic stakeholders in the process 
Forum Administrative Mandate 
Oversight 
Mandate institutions: 
Mandated horizontal accountability 
Formal oversight 
Political Balance 
Check 
Balance institutions: 
Balanced horizontal accountability 
Partisan check 
Social Invitation 
Voice 
Civil society: 
Invited vertical accountability 
Formal voice 
Electoral Empowerment 
Choice 
Political society: 
Claimed vertical accountability 
Partisan choice 
Obligation Incentives Negative 
Positive 
Compliance-based accountability systems: 
Accountability as result of cost-benefit calculations 
Assistance Technical Direct capacity-building support: 
Accountability as a result of third-party involvement 
Dialogue Political Integrity-based accountability systems: 
Accountability as a result of moral convictions 
 
Looking at the other side of domestic accountability relationships, the third question is which forum is 
holding the actor to account. If we combine the seminal distinction between horizontal and vertical 
accountability in the democracy literature (see O’Donnell 1994) with the more hidden distinction be-
tween formal and partisan accountability in the development literature (see Carothers 2009; Philp 
2009), we arrive at four ideal-typical strategies of foreign transparency and accountability initiatives. 
Accordingly, possible strategies of external intervention may be classified according to whether they 
strengthen mandate institutions (‘administrative’) or balance institutions (‘political’) at the intra-state 
level; or whether they focus on giving voice to citizens (‘social’) or increasing their choice in policy-
making (‘electoral’) at the state-society level.  
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Finally, we may ask why the actor has to render an account to the forum. As argued by global govern-
ance scholars, consequences that follow from accountability arrangements at the global level may be 
situated along a continuum with the two poles compliance-based as opposed to integrity-based ac-
countability systems (Risse 2005: 168-169). Compliance-based accountability systems use promises of 
reward and threats of punishment to motivate actors to follow the norms and rules of the system, 
whereas integrity-based accountability systems recognize that some degree of discretion and trust are 
inevitable in every public accountability arrangement (Philp 2009: 37). In the field of international 
development cooperation, the literature usually outlines three sets of instruments (independent of their 
purpose) donors can use to promote domestic accountability at recipient country level. The so-called 
“tool box for external action” (Börzel, Pamuk and Stahn 2008: 11) contains political conditionality 
used to manipulate the cost-benefit calculations of recipient governments (‘incentives’); political dia-
logue with recipient governments as to make them voluntarily comply with shared agendas and recip-
rocal commitments (‘dialogue’); and direct technical assistance to domestic constituencies to hold 
their governments accountable themselves (‘assistance’).  
 
4.4.2. Accountability fields: aid modalities as spaces where aid partners meet 
The focus of this subsection is on the World Bank’s strategy for promoting domestic accountability 
under the PRS approach. In particular, it analyzes the strategic discourse of World Bank staff on the 
two aid modalities set up under the PRS approach in terms of their ability to promote domestic ac-
countability and how they are set rhetorically apart from the broader field of democratic accountability 
at the recipient country level. In the following analysis, the mapping of these different fields of surro-
gate accountability under the PRS approach was done based on a broad range of questions aimed to 
receive information on the specific forums where domestic stakeholders and external partners meet. In 
particular, Bank staff were asked whom they perceive as the owners of the PRS process both in terms 
of technical management and political leadership (see Annex 4-2, questions 2.2., 2.3., 2.6., 2.9., 2.10., 
2.11.). World Bank staff were also asked to provide information on the type of domestic stakeholders 
and the manner how they have participated in PRS formulation (see Annex 4-2, questions 2.13., 2.1.4., 
2.1.5., 2.16.); on the type of financial support external partners provided to PRS implementation (ques-
tions 2.4., 2.5., 4.1., 5.1.); and to describe PRS monitoring by domestic stakeholders and external part-
ners (questions 2.17., 2.18., 3.4., 4.2., 4.3., 4.4., 4.5).  
To start with the guiding philosophy of the new development approach, all World Bank staff at the 
African Region Department were asked who should be the owners of the PRS process. Among all key 
stakeholder groups (as indicated in the PRSP Sourcebook), an overwhelming majority of the inter-
viewees sets the government ranking first. Only 5 out of 45 respondents who answered this question 
did not assign the government the highest priority on a scale from very low to very high priority. In 
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these five cases, the highest priority was always given to the general public. 4 out of 45 respondents 
assigned highest priority to several stakeholders. In these cases, ownership was perceived to be shared 
between the government and civil society (3 respondents) or between donors, the government, and 
civil society (1 respondent). World Bank staff thus clearly see the government as owner of the PRS 
process but are cautious in assigning clear responsibility. The reason is, as several respondents point 
out, that the government is not a unitary actor but consists of “multiple actors”, both on a technical and 
a political level (R3, R6, and R7).  
On a technical level, specialized state agencies and technicians within the ministries are responsible 
for PRS formulation and implementation. They bear responsibility for two tasks with regard to the 
PRS approach. One is the production of the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). The other task 
is the coordination of all policy-based lending that is pledged against the PRSPs. In the majority of 
African countries (14 out of 20 countries), these two tasks are executed by specialized state agencies. 
In the remaining countries (6 countries), the task is assumed by regular government structures. Most 
African countries have set up a specialized agency inside the core ministries of finance and planning 
(13 countries). For reason of simplicity, I will call this specialized agency “the PRS unit”. Sometimes, 
the PRS unit is also situated at the interface of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning, 
receiving technical support from capable technicians of either ministry (4 countries). Only in a few 
cases is the PRS unit set up outside regular government structures, for instance, at the office of the 
(Vice-)President or Prime Minister (3 countries). While most countries have one PRS unit, two coun-
tries have set up a special foreign aid unit besides the PRS unit. In these cases, the PRS unit usually 
represents some sort of a “side office” that manages the consultation of domestic stakeholders, while 
the foreign aid unit is seen as a more “home-grown office” that coordinates financial support by exter-
nal partners (R10).  
On a political level, the responsibility for PRS formulation and implementation is assigned to the do-
mestic authorities and the top political level of the recipient country, that is, the President, the Prime 
Minister, the Minister of Finance and/or Planning, the Ministers of different sectors, the Vice-
President and so forth. Their commitment to the PRS approach is assessed by World Bank staff in two 
ways. On the one hand, commitment is assessed upfront on the basis of speeches by reform-minded 
political leaders. World Bank staff sees the government as their service partners in delivering aid to 
citizens. Thus, despite the fact that speeches are not an objective measurement, government commit-
ment has to be there. Otherwise, there is no long-term relationship. Respondents report that they start 
from where the commitment is and then try to make sure that the government is committed to the poli-
cies they support. On the other hand, they also assess government commitment on the basis of their 
working relationship with the political regime of the day. The political situation in recipient countries 
may change due to elections or a military coup, but policy-based lending is said to continue if the go-
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vernment is committed to working together with the World Bank on improving its public financial 
management.  
In sum, whether the national poverty reduction strategy is produced primarily for donor consumption 
or whether the government is really committed to its pro-poor policies is framed in the World Bank’s 
strategic discourse in terms of technical vis-à-vis political ownership. Technical ownership means that 
capable technicians formulate an operational reform agenda against which donor support can be 
pledged and coordinated. Political ownership means that top politicians express their commitment to a 
national poverty reduction strategy, which is then followed by policy actions. Importantly, political 
and technical ownership may not be the same but must be assessed in one reform at a time.  
From this technical-political divide around the ownership issue the questions arise what types of sur-
rogate accountability arrangements do exist under the PRS approach and how do they interact with 
domestic accountability systems in recipient countries? Jointly, practical experience by the World 
Bank staff hints at three different fields of accountability that may interact with each other at the recip-
ient country level. At the rhetorical level, however, World Bank staff keeps these three fields separate 
due to their institution’s strictly economic mandate.  
Table 4-4 shows the three fields of public accountability at the recipient country level where govern-
ments are being held accountable by domestic stakeholders according to the World Bank’s strategic 
discourse. In the following, I will describe these three fields one by one as they are portrayed by the 
Bank’s staff.  
 
Table 4-4: Fields of public accountability under the PRS approach 
Field DEM GBS PRS DEM 
Actor Representative  
(horizontal) 
Collaborative 
(core ministries) 
Corporate  
(line ministries) 
Representative  
(vertical) 
Conduct Finances 
(financial  
performance) 
Finances 
(budget support) 
Processes  
(partner  
coordination) 
Policies 
(reform agenda) 
Processes  
(stakeholder  
consultation) 
Policies 
(political  
ownership) 
Forum Political  
(balance  
institutions) 
Administrative  
(mandate  
institutions) 
Social  
(civil society  
& the media) 
Electoral  
(political society &  
local governments) 
Consequences Dialogue 
(performance) 
Incentives (neg.) 
(budget) 
Assistance  
(coordination) 
Incentives (pos.) 
(agenda) 
Assistance 
(consultation) 
Dialogue 
(ownership) 
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4.4.2.1. The PRS field 
Actor: government as a corporate actor 
The first space of public accountability where domestic stakeholders and external partners meet is the 
PRS field. Government is being held accountable in the PRS field as a corporate actor. In practice, the 
government technicians, that is, those state agencies who are editing the directives of the political 
leaders like the PRS unit and the line ministries are the ones being held accountable within this partic-
ular field. Participation of the PRS unit is seen as having been high to very high, because it is respon-
sible for the preparation of draft documents; the dissemination of drafts among the wider public; the 
selection of stakeholders within and outside government from which to solicit inputs on drafts; and in 
the end, for putting the whole document together in conjunction with the line ministries. While partic-
ipation by the PRS unit has been high by design, participation by the line ministries varied as reflected 
in the PRS document itself. As a corporate actor, government commitment is perceived to vary with 
the level of technical capacities generally available within the state administration. Commitment by 
the PRS unit then is assessed by its formulation of an operational PRSP based on inputs from domestic 
stakeholder consultation, whereas commitment by line ministries is judged on the basis of their sec-
toral alignment within these PRSPs. In sum, the PRS unit and (to a lesser degree) the line ministries 
are perceived in organizational terms by the interviewees as unitary actors that are accountable for the 
technical execution of political directives.  
 
Conduct: stakeholder consultation and reform agenda 
As a corporate actor in the PRS field, the government is held accountable both in procedural and pro-
duct terms. In procedural terms, the government is held accountable for its consultation of domestic 
stakeholders in the process and for taking their views into account when formulating and implement-
ing the national poverty reduction strategy. Since its inception in the global aid architecture in 1999, 
the PRS process has been portrayed as a means for incorporating the needs and interest of domestic 
stakeholders in national policy-making. In the strategic discourse at the World Bank, this translates 
into the consultation of representatives of civil society and the private sector in special workshops and 
at large stakeholder meetings. Alternatively, representatives of civil society and the private sector were 
said to have participated as members in thematic and sectoral steering committees in the PRS field that 
are responsible for elaborating a national poverty reduction strategy and monitoring its implementation 
through annual progress reports.  
In product terms, the government is held accountable for the formulation of a policy reform agenda. 
Since the World Bank wants to use the PRSPs as the basis for direct budgetary support, there are two 
minimal requirements regarding the content of these documents: one is the inclusion of the budget; the 
other is that the monitoring and evaluation function is included. However, several interviewees criti-
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cize that PRSPs are not very operational documents since they do not easily translate into (operational) 
budgets. Moreover, benchmarks for monitoring and evaluation are generally absent or very weak mak-
ing accountability for results rather difficult to achieve. At the same time, they recognize that these are 
rather challenging processes for countries with very low capacities. Most of the interviewees thus said 
that they were already pleased when they could see at least some efforts to link key budgetary priori-
ties to the PRSP or some attempts at the individual ministerial level for aligning their budgets with the 
PRSP.  
 
Forum: civil society and the media 
In the PRS field, World Bank efforts generally targeted social accountability forums in recipient coun-
tries. Two elements characterize social accountability forums. First, citizens are invited in social ac-
countability forums to participate in national policy-making with organized society acting as a partner 
of the recipient state. Participation by civil society and the private sector in the formulation and im-
plementation of the national development strategy has become the mantra of the PRS approach. Inter-
viewees were quick to assure that nobody was excluded from the process and everybody aligned to the 
consensus built under the PRS approach. Especially in politically fragile countries, interviewees af-
firmed that the government went through extra efforts to invite the key social groups of the country. 
Yet, the manner how the government involved civil society (and to a lesser degree, the private sector) 
in the PRS process differed from country to country. In general, it was a rather complicated process. 
Domestic stakeholders were invited to participate at different stages of the policy-making process and 
on different policies covering both sectoral and cross-cutting issues. Furthermore, stakeholders were 
consulted in different regions of the country reaching down to the level of local communities. Local 
media were also invited to cover the regional consultations of civil society representatives. Radio and 
television discussions in local languages have been important in this regard to disseminate the content 
of national poverty reduction strategies.  
The second element of social accountability forums is that they serve to give voice to citizens. Accord-
ing to World Bank staff, stakeholder consultations served three different purposes, namely to draft the 
PRSP together with government technicians, to discuss the government’s draft PRSP, and to validate 
and endorse the final PRSP. However, whether those who were effectively invited could voice their 
view on the national poverty reduction strategy, is mostly seen to depend on their technical capacities. 
Participation exercises were seen as quite difficult in low-income countries with low capacities. For 
example, several respondents report that the majority of civil society organizations is not able to en-
gage in meaningful dialogue with government officials who are technically much more capable. While 
there has been an open door for participation, the problem remains that weak organizations cannot 
bring their interests to the agenda, even if they are represented at the table. But stakeholder participa-
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tion is also seen to depend on the political will to open the process to civil society representatives. 
Especially in countries with a socialist past, the PRS process is said to have been very inclusive. In 
these countries, the government was quite sympathetic to institutionalize citizens’ involvement 
through plenty of committees and civil society organizations even led some of these committees.  
 
Consequences: positive incentives and technical assistance 
In the PRS field, the World Bank used two different instruments aimed at the promotion of social ac-
countability in recipient countries. A first instrument has been positive incentives offered to the tech-
nicians in the line ministries to produce a national poverty reduction strategy on which the World 
Bank could base their support. In practice, this meant that the PRS unit (or the core ministry leading 
the effort) gave the message to the line ministries that being part of the process will lead to more fi-
nancial resources – and that did happen for those ministries that could come up with results-oriented 
programs that were in line with the PRSP. For the technicians in the line ministries, alignment of sec-
tor plans was thus an instrument of aid solicitation. In effect, they tried to get their own sector pro-
grams into the text. However, the flip side of this instrument was that the resulting documents were 
not very well prioritized. PRSPs often consisted of summing-up sector priorities and policy goals ra-
ther than coordinating development programs across ministries.  
A second instrument used by the World Bank for promoting social accountability has been technical 
assistance to the specialized state agency managing the whole PRS process (in most cases, the PRS 
unit). In practice, this meant that the World Bank had plenty of guidelines about what a PRSP should 
look like and a whole arsenal of participatory methodologies they offered governments as advice to be 
taken in the process – and that is what they did. Especially in countries with fewer donors, World 
Bank staff saw themselves as having a greater “chance to peek in to help the process happening” (R8).  
In sum, the World Bank holds corporate government actors accountable in the PRS field for their for-
mulation of national reform agenda and their consultation of domestic stakeholders. This strategy for 
promoting domestic accountability aims at strengthening social accountability forums at the recipient 
country level by using positive incentives and technical assistance.  
 
4.4.2.2. The GBS field 
Actor: government as a collaborative actor 
The second space of public accountability where domestic stakeholders and external partners meet is 
the GBS field. Unlike the PRS field where the government is basically seen as a corporate actor, 
World Bank staff sees the government as a collaborative actor in the GBS field. More specifically, the 
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public officials who are entering into joint donor-recipient dialogue and collaborate with donors in the 
GBS field are the ones being held accountable. In most cases, these are people from the finance and 
planning ministries (respectively, the foreign aid units inside these core ministries) who bear planning 
and budgetary responsibilities. Their tasks include inter-ministerial coordination; monitoring and eval-
uation; the production of statistics; and the dialogue with donors. Their participation is seen as very 
high as they are driving forces within the recipient state and are preparing the various frameworks 
donors have been asking for, like the macroeconomic framework, the general mid-term expenditure 
framework, and the ferformance assessment framework for multi-donor budget support. Government 
commitment in the GBS field is seen as really being dependent on the persons or the unit in charge of 
these pivotal functions within the state administration. As reported by several interviewees, the per-
sons or collegial bodies who carry out these tasks are often the same – irrespective of their institutional 
set-up within the regular state administration. Whether these state officials are committed or not, is 
then assessed by a government’s general “track record” (R4) as measured by their compliance with 
joint donor-recipient agreements. In sum, the strategic discourse at the World Bank shows that Bank 
staff is working closely with individual public officials in small collegial bodies, who are being held 
accountable for the performance of the state administration in general.  
 
Conduct: partner coordination and budget support 
As a collaborative actor in the GBS field, the government is held accountable for its procedural and 
financial conduct. Regarding process, the government is held accountable for the coordination of all 
development partners and their support of the general budget. The idea of the new global development 
partnerships is to harmonize and simplify donor procedures and to align their assistance so as to align 
better to domestic budget cycles, and thereby provide more predictable aid, that is, disburse aid ac-
cording to an agreed multi-year schedule. In order to do so, the World Bank made an effort to increase 
donor coordination at the Board and sectoral level. Simultaneously, it tried to foster the idea at the 
recipient side that it is important to monitor since donors wanted to use the government's own monitor-
ing system for budget support operations. However, in practice, as several respondents report, the 
monitoring system under the PRS approach has not worked well. The government introduced a com-
plicated monitoring framework, set up outside existing institutions and done mainly for donor con-
sumption. Moreover, government leadership in the coordination of external partners has proven to be 
rather difficult, as the government is facing a table with a broad range of donors providing budget 
support (and some not, but who are still very vocal) who are jointly negotiating the actions to be taken 
from a joint policy matrix.  
Regarding finances, the government must render an account to its external partners about the direct 
budgetary support it has received. In the case of the World Bank, financial support to low-income 
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countries comes in the form of Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) that is, annual operations 
that support the general budget in order to reduce poverty in recipient countries. PRSCs were intro-
duced in Bank lending in 2001 when donors moved towards general budget support  Across the devel-
oping world, PRSCs then quickly became a sort of “brand name” (R3, R8) for good-performing coun-
tries with pro-poor policies. In order to receive this nice label, the budgetary allocations in key sectors 
such as health and education were monitored quite closely by the World Bank, as many respondents 
confirm. Since donor monitoring of budgetary allocations is much less on the macro level, but more on 
the sometimes tiny details of the sector level, the harmonization process is said to have increased 
weighs heavily on recipient governments under the PRS approach.  
 
Forum: mandate institutions 
In the GBS field, World Bank efforts basically targeted administrative accountability forums at the 
recipient country level. Administrative accountability forums display two characteristics. First, admin-
istrative accountability forums exert formal oversight over governments, that is, they monitor the gov-
ernment’s performance in formal terms, and second, they have a specific mandate in doing so. Regard-
ing the existence of formal oversight, World Bank pressure for improving internal and external audit 
functions of the government may be taken as a prime example for this type of donor strategy. And 
these efforts had an impact on practice. Several interviewees acknowledge that the government finally 
established supreme audit institutions, such as the Court of Auditors, the Chamber of Account, and the 
General Finance Inspection Directorate, due to multiple donor influences. Given that the World Bank 
directly supports the government’s general budget, it aimed at building and strengthening the capaci-
ties of mandated state agencies that would exert formal oversight around GBS operations. Yet, while 
the World Bank worked closely with recipient governments to put in place this kind of public over-
sight institutions, their political autonomy, and technical capacities were often considered to be low.  
Regarding their specific mandate, the kind of audit institutions that were promoted within the GBS 
field did not specifically look at the PRS document (not to mention the PRS process); they just moni-
tored budget execution. Despite this narrow focus, donors had a lot of trouble in getting governments 
to audit the budget. For example, two respondents report that they are still stuck with very basic ac-
counting issues in their countries, such as long back-logs of the financial accounts provided by the 
government. Notwithstanding the relatively long delays of five years and more, the World Bank keeps 
on pushing them, because otherwise, as they say, they would lose credibility in the eyes of their coun-
terparts (R8, R9). Whether recipients government audit their budgets is thus seen to depend on donor 
leverage and harmonization of external efforts.  
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Consequences: negative incentives and technical assistance 
In the GBS field, the World Bank used a mix of instruments, termed as “carrots and sticks” (R1, R6) 
to make governments receiving general budget support accountable to administrative accountability 
forums. First, the “stick” has been negative incentives with regard to the internal and external audit 
functions. In practice, this meant that World Bank staff gave the message to their counterparts from 
the finance ministry (respectively, the foreign aid unit inside one of the core ministries) that govern-
ments have to audit their budgets if they are to receive financial support on an annual basis from the 
World Bank. They told them that donors agreed that there needs to be an external audit of the general 
budget in order to give direct budgetary aid. And although the initial reaction by their counterparts was 
that they have no control over the supreme audit institutions and that there should thus be no condi-
tionality on that, donor conditions on institutional reforms, such as the publication of the audit reports, 
in combination with a lot of technical assistance (see below), have been instrumental in getting domes-
tic systems to request these reports on their own.  
Second, the “carrots” that the World Bank used for strengthening administrative accountability have 
been technical assistance to governments for strengthening their own monitoring and evaluation sys-
tems. The idea that governments would report on an annual basis on the degree of success of their 
programs was a remarkable thing. However, the drama in many African countries is that these domes-
tic systems are very weak. In practice, therefore, this meant that the World Bank provided a lot of 
technical assistance to increase the capacities of the monitoring and evaluation department, usually 
embedded in the planning ministries. This happened in a rather harmonized and partnership-oriented 
way, as all donors provided technical assistance for improving domestic monitoring and evaluation if 
the government asked for it.  
In sum, the World Bank holds collaborative government actors accountable in the GBS fields for their 
implementation of the national reform agenda via the use of general budget support and their coordina-
tion of external partners. This strategy for promoting domestic accountability aims at strengthening 
administrative accountability forums at the recipient country level by imposing negative incentives 
and offering technical assistance.  
 
4.4.2.3. The DEM field 
Actor: government as a representative actor 
Having looked at the two surrogate accountability fields of the PRS approach (i.e., the PRS and GBS 
field), I will look now on how these two fields have been rhetorically set apart from the broader field 
of democratic accountability in the World Bank’s strategic discourse. In the DEM field, World Bank 
staff frame the government as a representative actor who is being held accountable by domestic con-
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stituencies at the recipient country level. As a representative of the people, the government is said to 
be held accountable in two different ways.  
First, the government – often referred to in terms of top-level politicians, like the (State) President, the 
(Prime) Minister, or the ruling party – is vertically accountable to its citizens. Participation by repre-
sentative actors in the PRS field is said to be low because they are generally not involved at stakehold-
er meetings. Their commitment is said to vary with the degree of political ownership they have over 
the reform agenda that comes out of the participatory process in the PRS field. However, assessing 
government ownership is not easy. While some World Bank staff argue that political ownership of the 
PRSP in their country is high, because there were numerous signals to donors separate from the PRSP 
that there is a strong government commitment to reduce poverty, other staff argue that political owner-
ship is only high, when the PRSP is close to the manifesto of the ruling party, respectively the gov-
ernment’s electoral platform at the time when it was elected. In the end, what matters, is not what poli-
ticians say, but whether they are implementing what they say they will implement. Whether the gov-
ernment really owns the national development strategy, can thus only be assessed by their implemen-
tation of the reform agenda.  
Besides their accountability to its citizens, the government – in this case referred to as the executive 
branch, the cabinet, or those domestic authorities that have the power to decide – is also horizontally 
accountable to other state agencies within the recipient state. Participation by representative actors in 
the GBS field is said to be high since they always come in at the really sensitive issues either in the 
preliminary conceptualization or at the tail end when the money-giving is decided. In-between, they 
exert their political influence primarily via the state agency in charge. Government commitment to the 
agreements made with external partners in the GBS field is said to vary with their financial perfor-
mance, especially with their efforts aimed at increasing transparency and accountability around na-
tional planning and budget processes. Again, World Bank staff disagrees with regard to this commit-
ment. Some respondents claim that governments show a high commitment to the processes introduced 
by the PRS approach. In particular, they claim that having a national planning commission and a na-
tional development strategy is not something that is new to African countries. Such autonomous plan-
ning institutions have existed since the end of colonial times. The PRS approach with its focus on in-
ter-ministerial coordination thus was good to renew this planning focus within state administrations. 
Other respondents are more skeptical and maintain that the whole institutional set-up shows that power 
wielders are not interested in increasing transparency and accountability around the national budget 
process. In particular, the PRS unit is said to report directly to the president or some other high-
ranking state authority exerting financial control. Commitment then can only be assessed by the exe-
cution of the budget. While there have been good transparency and accountability initiatives, like the 
setting-up of an anti-corruption bureau or the country's participation in the Extractive Industries 
193 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), real commitment only shows, as one respondent claims, when govern-
ments attach a monetary value to the words they say (R8).  
In sum, World Bank staff perceives governments as representative actors who should own their na-
tional development strategies and who should have their finances in good order, as they are held ac-
countable for their performance by domestic constituencies.  
 
Conduct: political ownership and financial performance 
As a representative actor, the government is held accountable by domestic constituencies for its politi-
cal agenda and its formal execution of public duties. In line with this formal-partisan distinction, ex-
ternal actors are thus often confronted with two problems when they try to align their assistance to 
domestic policies, systems, and procedures (i.e., the DEM field). First, political ownership by the gov-
ernment may be questionable and second, the financial performance of the government may be poor.  
With regard to political ownership, interviewees recognize two recurring situations. A first situation 
may be that no other national development plan besides the PRSP exists, respectively, older existing 
development plans by the government have been replaced or unified with a national PRSP making it 
the only political agenda of the government (10 out of 20 countries). A second situation occurs when a 
parallel or overlapping national planning document does exist at the recipient country level besides the 
PRSP. These documents generally come either in the form of a long-term country vision (6 countries) 
or in the form of a medium-term government agenda (4 countries). In either case, the question arises 
on which document the government will render an account: is it on the PRSP or is it on the govern-
ment’s own development plan? Donors generally do not want the government to have two agendas. A 
convenient way to circumvent this dilemma, as World Bank staff reports, has therefore been to dress 
up the PRSP as the “implementation plan” of the broader country vision or the “operational frame-
work” of the more disputed government agenda, both of which are seen as more country-owned than 
the PRS document itself (R1, R6, R9, R25, R38).  
With regard to financial performance, low-income African countries under second-generation PRSPs 
can be split into two groups. A first group consists of the “good performers” with at least one full pro-
grammatic PRSC series (10 out of 20 countries). Beside the good performers, there exists a second 
group of the same size (10 countries), the so-called “poor performers”. Unlike the former, these coun-
tries have not received PRSCs, just started with their first PRSC series, or their first PRSC series has 
been discontinued – despite having produced a national PRSP. According to the interviewees, there 
were multiple reasons why these countries have not received a full programmatic PRSC series. A first 
reason has been that the country was still under a structural adjustment program when PRSCs were 
introduced in World Bank lending. Another reason has been that there was too much political uncer-
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tainty in the recipient country due to civil wars, military rule or a coup d’état, which did not allow any 
World Bank lending at all. A final reason has been that the World Bank had broader concerns about 
governance issues and public financial management, what has precluded them – in conjunction with 
other donors – to give general budget support. However, in none of these countries was the way how 
domestic stakeholders participated in PRS formulation a reason to exclude them from GBS operations. 
The participatory process is given “zero weight” in the Country Performance and Institutional As-
sessment (CPIA) index used by the World Bank to determine its lending decisions.  
 
Forum: balance institutions, local governments, and political society 
In the DEM field, representative governments have to render an account to electoral and political ac-
countability forums in recipient countries. However, neither in the PRS field nor in the GBS field have 
these two types of domestic accountability forums been targeted, according to the World Bank’s staff 
strategic discourse.  
First, electoral accountability forums empower citizens to make political choices in domestic politics 
with organized society acting as a counterweight to the recipient state. However, with the PRS pro-
cess, this is not the case. The manner how citizens have participated did not serve to build a political 
society that could enforce accountability from public officials. For example, the fact that citizens have 
been invited by the government in national policy-making did not result in formal mechanisms for 
institutionalizing this kind of popular control beyond the PRS process. The same may be said for the 
media who have not acted as an independent watchdog of incumbent regimes, as evidenced by their 
low coverage of the PRS process in between large stakeholder meetings. Civic participation was not 
something that was claimed by the people, but something that was given to them. While governments 
were said to always invite the “representatives” of the people, it has been difficult for World Bank 
staff to assess “how” representative these representatives were. Moreover, governments’ communica-
tion and sensitization strategies are not said to have strengthened the electorate in recipient countries. 
The average voter did not receive the relevant information to hold the government accountable. In 
most cases, the national development strategy was only translated to English and/or French for donors, 
but not to local languages for a wider audience. The only domestic institution that effectively partici-
pated in the PRS process and could claim to act as a representative of local populations were the local 
governments. However, in the predominantly centralized African states, local governments usually 
have very little discretion in terms of planning as there is no local budgetary responsibility. Local gov-
ernments were thus not seen as having much power in holding central government accountable for its 
public policies.  
Besides empowering the citizenry, the second element of electoral accountability forums is that they 
allow citizens to make political choices. However, most respondents claim that citizens did not have 
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much choice in terms of the content of the PRS document. Rather, the PRS process must be seen as 
“validation exercise” (R13, R14), whereby the government sells the document to its domestic consti-
tuencies. Representatives of civil society and the private sector were often consulted at a later stage in 
the PRS process after the PRSP draft has been prepared by the core ministries at the central govern-
ment level. As a result, societal participation has often been more limited to making suggestions and 
proposals on how to improve the PRS draft, rather than formulating the strategy together. Similarly, 
local governments were involved mainly through the dissemination of annual progress reports, as they 
were called upon when the document was done. Local governments and civil society actors outside the 
capital were not really heavily involved in the political decision-making process. Therefore, quite a 
few respondents assume that the PRS process cannot be judged independently from the overall legiti-
macy of the political regime.  
In sum, the discourse among World Bank staff shows that the PRS process has not empowered citi-
zens so as being able to hold central government accountable for its public policies. They, in fact, have 
had no choice in deciding what the content of these policies are.  
Like electoral accountability, the promotion of political accountability at the recipient country level 
has been considered as a largely political strategy that is not compatible with its mandate and has thus 
not been targeted by the World Bank under the PRS approach. Political accountability forums display 
two characteristics. First, political accountability forums can effectively impose political sanctions on 
other state agencies accused of wrongdoing or disregard of the people’s will, that is, they are control-
ling the abuse of political power; and second, only the existence of a general balance between separate 
countervailing powers that are being forced to share authority enables them to do so. Given that the 
parliament has an important role to fulfill in reviewing how the money was spent in the previous year 
before they approve the current budget proposal, one should expect that parliamentary involvement 
would feature prominently among external actors’ efforts to increase transparency and accountability 
around the national budget process.  
However, political accountability forums were usually not targeted by the World Bank’s effort. Two 
reasons may be derived from the World Bank discourse. A first reason given is that none or only weak 
representative institutions existed that could effectively balance the executive’s power. This was the 
case, for example, after a coup when the parliament has been dissolved with immediate effect. Except 
for these emergency situations, some parliaments were also seen by World Bank staff as being com-
pletely ineffective in their regular functioning. For example, parliaments are perceived to be in “in odd 
dysfunction” in the sense of being paralyzed by an abundance of “deep politics” amongst themselves, 
and between themselves and the executive. In other countries, parliaments were said to be not very 
active in that they approve everything that the executive branch of government wants from them. In 
addition, some members of parliament were also portrayed as being illiterate or closely aligned with 
business interests. Whether the problem is ineffectiveness or corruption, World Bank staff generally 
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question that parliaments can figure as a countervailing power to the executive as their involvement is 
not seen to make a big difference.  
A second reason given is that there does not need to be an institutional political check on the execu-
tive’s use of power. According to World Bank staff, the executive branch of the government bears sole 
responsibility for the policy and institutional reform agenda that the Bank supports. Some staff reports 
that recipient governments see the PRSP as an executive branch document that informs but not as a 
law that is formulated by parliament. Accordingly, formal approval of the PRSP by the legislative is 
not considered to be necessary. In most countries, the PRSPs (and subsequent annual progress reports) 
were presented to the parliament or national assembly, which had a discussion on it, in some cases, 
even an informal review, but in any case, they did not endorse the political priorities of the govern-
ment’s strategy. The democratic role of parliament as law-giver is thus completely ignored in the 
Bank’s strategic discourse. Instead, the role of parliament is seen in monitoring general budget com-
pliance. In this oversight role, national parliaments are said to have been “on board, definitely and for 
everything” (R8, R9). They formally approved the budget and World Bank loans, they did financial 
audits, and they issued reports on the use of budget resources in priority sectors. Beyond monitoring 
the financial performance of the executive, the parliament is also praised for having widened the pub-
lic debate during the budget approval process, which is said to have really made a difference.  
In sum, the discourse among World Bank staff shows that the GBS operations give balance institutions 
and especially parliaments more opportunities to become formally involved in the national budget 
process, but they do not strengthen real political checks between fields of interlocking government 
power.  
 
Consequences: political dialogue 
Under the PRS approach, political and electoral accountability forums have not been targeted by the 
World Bank – at least not directly. Political dialogue is the only instrument available to donors for 
exerting at least some influence with regard to the democratic accountability field (i.e., the DEM 
field). According to World Bank staff, this dialogue comes in two forms.  
First, particularly in countries which have some sort of electoral mechanism, there is always policy 
dialogue. This dialogue takes election dates into account because it aims at building political owner-
ship with regard to difficult policy reforms that target large parts of the electorate and thus generate 
resistance from within government. As part of the PRS process, policy dialogue always happens at 
higher government levels, in an early process stage, on an informal basis, and in a much more harmo-
nized way than with earlier development efforts. By contrast, in countries with rather weak electoral 
accountability mechanisms, there has been a lot of thinking and strategy design on decentralization 
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and critical institutional reforms. For example, several interviewees noted that the participation of 
local governments in the PRS process is really dependent on whether they receive the financial re-
sources to satisfy the needs of their voters. These needs are, as several surveys have shown, always the 
same, such as health, education, electricity, water, roads, and waste management. In the eyes of these 
interviewees, it would, therefore, be better to directly support local governments, so that they could 
satisfy the needs of their people. However, the transfer of financial resources to domestic actors be-
yond central government might violate the Bank’s apolitical mandate. The only avenue available to 
World Bank staff thus has been to start a political dialogue with the government on decentralization 
reforms and local planning so they could transfer more money to local governments, thereby making 
themselves accountable to their domestic constituencies.  
Second, particularly in countries with rather weak political checks and balances, dialogue on govern-
ance is said to be everywhere. This dialogue aims at improving financial performance with regard to 
the national budget process, whose degree of openness to outsiders mirrors the degree of political ac-
countability and executive constraints in a country. As part of GBS operations, joint donor-recipient 
dialogue on national governance has thus focused on increasing citizens’ involvement in the budget 
process, the degree of information they receive, and the possibilities of getting involved in national 
decision-making. As a result of this dialogue, citizens were involved either directly in various steering 
and oversight committees or more indirectly, via the national parliaments that were involved in the 
action matrix for general budget support, that is, the annual review process of GBS operations. By 
contrast, countries with rather strong horizontal accountability mechanisms need no external encour-
agement for citizen involvement. According to some World Bank staff, donors should not interfere 
with the domestic process in countries where there is already some amount of transparency and ac-
countability of ministers to the parliament. Rather, the dialogue should focus on how much of the 
budget is open for reallocation. Considering the realities on the ground, countries usually have not 
much room for financial maneuver, but the debt relief initiative has allowed them some more freedom.  
In sum, the World Bank holds representative government actors accountable in the DEM field for their 
political ownership of the national reform agenda and their financial performance in using general 
budget support. However, in the World Bank’s strategic discourse the Bank does not directly intervene 
in electoral and political accountability forums at the recipient country level. The only instrument the 
World Bank uses is political dialogue for convincing representative actors to become more accounta-
ble to their domestic constituencies.  
 
4.4.3. The shift in strategic orientation 
The focus of this subsection is on the change in the World Bank’s operational practice under the PRS 
approach. In particular, it analyzes whether the conduct and consequences that follow from the interac-
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tion of these two specific surrogate accountability fields with the broader field of democratic account-
ability have changed over time. In the following analysis, this question is approached from the per-
spective of tension between these three different fields of accountability that may have induced exter-
nal partners to change their strategy. Accordingly, World Bank staff was directly asked whether they 
have felt any tension between country ownership and Bank intervention and whether they have experi-
enced that, as a consequence, country commitment or World Bank support under the PRS approach 
has changed over time (see Annex 4-2, questions 2.3., 5.5., 6.1.). More indirectly, World Bank staff 
also provided information on changes in the conduct for which aid recipients were held accountable by 
their donors (questions 2.7., 2.8, 5.2., 5.3., 5.4.) Table 4-5 presents aggregate numbers with regard to 
the type of tension felt by World Bank staff (see question 6.1.).  
Table 4-5: Tension of the PRS approach in recipient countries 
Tension DEM-GBS GBS-PRS PRS-DEM Number of responses Percentage of total 
Yes 7 8 11 26 54% 
No 4 7 11 22 46% 
Total 11 15 22 48 100% 
Note: N=50, 5 missing, 6 respondents without reason-giving, 5 respondents with tension at two interfaces,  
2 respondents with tension at three interfaces, number of responses is thus 48. 
 
What can be seen from Table 4-5 is that more than half of the interviewed World Bank staff (54%) has 
felt some tension between country ownership and Bank intervention. Moreover, this tension is three-
fold and it exists between the formulation and implementation process of the national poverty reduc-
tion strategy (PRS-GBS); between the domestic budget process and external support of the general 
budget (DEM-GBS); and between donor-driven planning cycles and country-owned electoral cycles 
(PRS-DEM).  
In contrast to the subsection before, which showed that World Bank staff aims at keeping these three 
fields of public accountability separate in their strategic discourse, this table gives a different picture. 
It shows that these accountability fields interact, as felt by the majority of the interviewed Bank staff 
in their daily business. Moreover, the empirical findings from the interviews and the survey also show 
that there is a collective pattern of how the World Bank has responded to this tension over time. This 
strategical shift in operational practice will be described in the following.  
 
4.4.3.1. GBS-PRS field tension 
Tension exists, first, at the interface of the GBS and PRS fields. The formulation of the PRS document 
is inherently linked with its implementation through GBS operations. Donors ask governments to pre-
pare – with the participation of key domestic stakeholders – a series of policy actions they want to take 
and then governments negotiate with the World Bank (and other donors), which of these policies they 
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are going to support. 15 respondents mentioned this interface. Half of the respondents felt some ten-
sion in practice (8 respondents), while the others did not (7 respondents).  
Those who did not feel any tension see GBS operations including the conditions attached as a “wholly 
different machinery” (R2) without any in-built connection to the PRS process. While they 
acknowledge that donors need a such a document on which they can base their financial support, the 
PRS document is said to fit only minimal requirements (the PRS side) and that the necessity of align-
ing World Bank lending to the PRS document is fairly loose (the GBS side). According to these re-
spondents, World Bank conditionality as part of their GBS operations has thus nothing to do with 
country ownership of the PRSPs (without GBS-PRS tension: R2, R8, R9, R20, R27, R33, and R36).  
However, half of those who referred to the GBS-PRS interface did actually feel tension in practice. In 
particular, the delay in the preparation of an operational reform agenda caused problems for external 
partners who were involved in its implementation via GBS operations. Yet, the tension is said not to 
be so much about the Bank's conditionality but about the countries' ability to formulate a comprehen-
sive and tenable strategy. The following excerpt is typical in this regard:  
“For sure, the tension did exist, as due to limited capacity in the formulation of medium- 
to long-term development strategies, which are sound, with quantifiable targets and indi-
cators and within a sustainable financial framework. Formulating a PRS takes time. The 
first PRS was finalized after seven drafts and the second PRS after five to six drafts. So 
one needs patience to follow-up on these processes, which can take at least 24 months to 
finalize.” (R29) 
Almost all respondents of this group said that governments did not, or could not comprehensively 
articulate a good reform program achieving some medium-term objectives that could serve as an ade-
quate basis for partnership with the World Bank and other donors. In particular, lacking realism in 
terms of targets, prioritization in relation to policy actions, and bad costing with regard to the budget 
link were cited as problems. In sum, the key challenge for the World Bank has thus been to support 
PRS implementation and to ensure that commitments made in the PRS document translate into actual 
results on the ground (with GBS-PRS tension: R5, R11, R12, R29, R30, R38, R46, and R48).  
In light of these challenges, the World Bank changed its operational practice with regard to the align-
ment of World Bank lending to the content of PRS documents. Before the PRS approach was intro-
duced, there was no alignment of World Bank lending to national development plans. This changed 
with the introduction of PRS approach, in particular with the donor requirement that countries had to 
prepare a poverty reduction strategy if they were to receive debt relief and general budget support by 
the IMF and World Bank. While there had to be such a PRS document, alignment of Bank lending to 
the first-generation of PRS documents was rather loose and more in terms of the same overall objec-
tives or directions. The only issue mentioned by World Bank staff was speed. The whole PRS process 
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was very time-consuming. As a result, the Bank came under pressure in its own time schedule, be-
cause it had to wait for some countries to complete their PRSPs before starting with its lending opera-
tions.  
This direct link between Bank lending and the government’s policy agenda has ended with the second-
generation of PRS documents. It is only the Bank’s overall Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and 
not the specific lending operations that need to be aligned to the PRSP. PRSP and PRSC series are 
done together because the government did not want to have the World Bank wait in providing general 
budget support. At the same time, it is very difficult nowadays for the World Bank to politically justify 
their financial support if it cannot be linked back to the country’s national development strategy. In 
this regard, several respondents report that the Bank’s lending operations have been very well or even 
“100% aligned” (R6) to the national poverty reduction strategy. But since PRSPs are very general and 
abstract documents, it is easy to align with them. The language used in the PRS documents is often not 
specific enough to determine how well World Bank lending is aligned to the country strategy. Align-
ment of general budget support to the content of second-generation PRS documents has thus become 
both more political and more indirect.  
In line with this more indirect and political interplay of World Bank lending with PRS documents of 
recipient governments, the World Bank has also increasingly used a softer approach in the different 
stages of the PRS process. With regard to the PRS formulation stage, for example, World Bank staff 
had a lot of comments on the content of first-generation PRS documents, for instance, that the national 
strategy should focus more on gender or on agriculture. Staff also say that they almost sat down with 
the governments to write their PRS draft. Over time, however, domestic capacities in writing these 
documents increased. Especially with the experience of producing annual progress reports, countries 
learned what kind of policies the World Bank would monitor, and the World Bank thus gave more 
policy space in the formulation stage.  
A similar development can be observed with regard to the PRS implementation stage. The first PRSCs 
series were discontinued when serious problems of implementing reforms surfaced, such as lack of 
compliance with the macroeconomic framework. In case of minor implementation problems, such as a 
lag in implementing agreed to policy actions, lending amounts decreased. Unlike the first series, the 
World Bank’s reaction to a lack of progress in PRS implementation was much softer in the second 
series of PRSCs. In particular, there has been a change in the Bank’s operational practice saying that 
the Bank should show more understanding for country-specific problems, and be prepared to wait. 
Difficulties in establishing a credible macroeconomic framework or the non-compliance with agreed 
actions have thus not led to discontinuation or decrease of lending amounts as before but to delays in 
disbursement. The World Bank thus walked away from planned schedules, signaling that it can wait 
until a government arrives at a more credible position.   
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4.4.3.2. DEM-GBS field tension 
Second, tension exists at the interface of the DEM and GBS fields. The domestic budget process inter-
acts with multi-donor budget support through governments’ annual report on budget execution and 
donors’ annual tranche release of committed budget contributions. The idea is that donors agree with 
governments on a reform program with the intention to provide annual budget support because gov-
ernments do not have the financial resources. However, direct budgetary support is also linked to fi-
nancial performance, which may create tension. Among the 11 respondents that mentioned this inter-
face, 4 respondents could not feel any tension, while 7 respondents felt such a tension.  
The first group does not agree with the concept of an inherent tension between ownership and condi-
tionality as suggested by the interviewer. Rather, they emphasized that this is a misunderstanding on 
the World Bank’s lending requirements, as a lot of the World Bank’s policy actions were in the area of 
good governance. Ownership by the country is not contrary to demanding institutional reforms. For 
example, respondents maintain that strong institutions of public oversight have been introduced from 
the outside, but they could also become owned from the inside. Once the reform agenda has been 
worked out and the proper institutions have been put in place, it is easy to provide general budget sup-
port. Alignment of World Bank lending to the domestic budget process was thus not seen as a problem 
within this first group, because a lot of what the World Bank did was about strengthening domestic 
accountability of power wielders (without GBS-DEM tension: R14, R19, R33, and R47).  
By contrast, alignment of World Bank lending to national budget cycles within the second group was 
seen to be potentially conflictive, as the following quote shows:  
“Yes, there certainly was tension, in part because the definition of ownership was not 
clarified in practical terms when it comes to program decisions. Disbursement became 
the critical criteria.” (R24)  
Respondents situate the reasons for this tension both at the recipient and donor side. On the one hand, 
there may be little ownership by the government. The Bank’s conditionality on a particular reform, for 
example, may be questioned by the government who is not ready to implement this action, and that 
reflects this tension. On the other hand, the problem may rather lie with the alignment and harmoniza-
tion of external partners. Bank staff notes that ownership depends a lot on the government’s capacity 
to negotiate with donors. Particularly in countries with large donor communities, aid coordination is 
said to take a long time. There is a tendency for participation from the early stages of writing the ac-
tion matrix for budget support. It then takes a long time to harmonize all donors, which hampers the 
predictability of GBS operations and thus the execution of the general budget (with GBS-DEM ten-
sion: R4, R15, R16, R17, R24, R37, and R38).  
The provision of general budget support is one of the hallmarks of the PRS approach. However, the 
alignment of this type of financial assistance to the domestic budget process has caused problems in 
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practice. When the World Bank started with programmatic PRSC series, World Bank staff tried to 
align annual tranche release to the fiscal calendar of the recipient government. However, they were 
faced with many practical problems from their own institution when trying to do so. For example, 
Bank staff mention that the World Bank’s internal guidelines did not allow easy realignment of exist-
ing lending cycles (except when providing budget support for the first time in a country); that the pro-
cesses of donor harmonization are difficult to combine with budget preparation as in the books; and 
that the government’s and World Bank’s fiscal years and corresponding timetables often did not 
match, which meant that the government received the money too late in their fiscal years.  
Despite these technical challenges, there were also political problems that made the alignment of an-
nual budget support to the government’s budget difficult. On the one hand, the provision of direct 
budgetary aid meant that it increased the pressure on the World Bank to disburse within the fiscal year 
of the government – even though there was a lack of progress. Donor support was under a formal as-
sistance framework and they had to deliver because the government had already integrated the project-
ed amount in its budget. On the other hand, since several donors jointly supported the budget of the 
government, this also increased the risk that donors disagree in their assessment of the government’s 
past performance and their future commitments.  
In 2004, thus only three years after having introduced programmatic PRSC series in their lending port-
folio, the World Bank formally replaced the PRSC acronym with the DPL acronym, which stands for 
Development Policy Loans. At the same time, the Bank informally maintained the PRSC acronym in 
parallel due to its success among the good performing countries. Like PRSC, DPL is an acronym for 
general budget support but DPL is broader because it is not only about poverty reduction. Unlike 
PRSC, general budget support under the DPL acronym does not need to be programmatic, because it 
may be given only once. Yet, the important point is that the new operational guidelines mandate that 
all DPLs should be consistent with the PRSP or its equivalent. While World Bank staff criticizes that 
the Bank produces labels and acronyms so rapidly that it becomes difficult to stay up-to-date, they 
value the new instrument because DPLs provide the flexibility that other instruments are not available 
to provide.  
In line with this change in operational practice, current World Bank lending is said to come in “many 
different shades of grey” (R10) in order to accommodate to different country circumstances. Especial-
ly in the first (and sometimes in the second) PRSC series, there was not much space if the domestic 
context for GBS operations was difficult. In response to major governance problems, such as a politi-
cal coup or an outbreak of electoral violence, direct budgetary support by the World Bank has been 
completely discontinued. In case of minor governance problems, for example, when the government 
did not comply with important institutional reforms or when a major corruption case was made public, 
PRSCs have been scaled back and the money has sometimes been spent on investment projects in-
stead.  
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By contrast, in most of the second PRSC series, the Bank has focused more on maintaining the ability 
of domestic systems to deliver rather than to uphold the conditions of their own lending procedure. In 
2007 and 2008, for example, the global financial crisis, as well as local food and fuel crises, led to 
huge budget needs in recipient countries, which in turn, increased the pressure on the World Bank to 
reduce the budget gap. In more than half of the otherwise good-performing African countries with 
PRSCs, amounts thus increased in relation to what was promised in budget discussions and in re-
sponse to a special situation. However, as argued by World Bank staff, there may be minor ups and 
downs over time, but no change in the overall strategy. The new default is that the amount disbursed is 
not different from the amount committed in the Bank’s country-specific assistance strategy but there is 
more discussion on financial performance. Moreover, the introduction of DPLs meant that the World 
Bank received an instrument to deal with short-term budgetary needs of both poor performers and 
good performers alike. While the new instrument helped the Bank to handle an emergency situation in 
poor-performing countries, a shift from PRSCs to DPLs and back has also been common among good-
performing countries where stand-alone DPLs were used particularly in difficult years, when the re-
form agenda was lagging due to economic or political reasons.  
 
4.4.3.3. PRS-DEM field tension 
A third type of tension arises at the interface of the PRS and DEM fields. In particular, donor-driven 
planning cycles around national poverty reduction strategies and country-owned electoral cycles may 
not be congruent. Donors expect that the governments in power – whether elected or not – own the 
national reform agenda, which they have developed together with key domestic stakeholders, and that 
they take actions to implement this agenda. This interface was most often referred to as a source of 
tension among the interviewed World Bank staff (22 respondents). However, there is no unanimous 
feeling of whether these two cycles are related or not, as the two groups who did feel some or did not 
feel any tension are of same size (11 respondents).  
The first group holds that the PRS and electoral cycle are independent of each other. They argue that 
the PRS process is a development planning instrument and the resulting PRS document is not an elec-
tion program. Nevertheless, this group rates political ownership as being high, because governments 
have presented their PRS documents as their own national development plans. Since independence, 
governments in these countries always had national development plans and the whole process leading 
to its preparation has been based on domestic processes for elaborating such a plan. While the World 
Bank and other donors may have provided inputs during planning, this was not heavy-handed, and it 
was taken as advice. Respondents consider the PRS process in their countries as best practice given 
that the central governments have made big efforts to consult with all people upstream, and to dissem-
inate the document downstream. Correspondingly, in a context where elections are held only irregular-
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ly, there is thus no need for aligning the PRS and the electoral cycle (without DEM-PRS tension: R1, 
R12, R13, R17, R21, R23, R30, R31, R33, R35, and R44).  
By contrast, the second group sees the PRS and electoral cycle clearly related. The following quote is 
typical for this group:  
“Yes, I felt the tension between PRS and ownership and recommended the Bank pays 
more attention to the large parties' programs when setting out its strategic direction and 
embarking on new projects.” (R39) 
These respondents argue that the government has not been committed to the PRS process because 
everybody knew that the process in these cases had been introduced by the World Bank and the IMF. 
Although the World Bank did everything possible to convince the government to assume political 
ownership over the PRS document, an obvious inconsistency remains between requiring such a PRSP 
and also requiring ownership of the PRSP. In countries where elections are regularly held, this tension 
was epitomized by the existence of two government agendas, that is, the PRS document on the one 
hand and the ruling party’s program on the other. While donors want the government to design a re-
form agenda that is broadly owned within and beyond the government, respondents tell that the dia-
logue on this issue has not been easy (with DEM-PRS tension: R2, R5, R6, R10, R22, R25, R32, R38, 
R39, R42, and R43).  
Regarding the alignment of PRS and electoral cycles, a trend from a technical and donor-induced pro-
cess to a more political and government-driven process can be observed over time. When the PRS 
approach was introduced, the preparation of a PRSP was one of the conditions for the participation in 
donors’ debt relief initiative. Many interviewees reported that the timing of the PRS process was do-
nor-induced and perceived as such by recipient governments. In theory, as some World Bank staff 
argue, the different timetables for the PRS and electoral cycles exclude the possibility of aligning the 
two. The PRS cycle usually covers a 3-year period, whereas national elections in the recipient coun-
tries are held every 5 to 7 years, creating a lag between electoral cycles and PRS processes. Moreover, 
national elections may delay or even distort the elaboration of a PRSP. Key domestic stakeholders 
may not be available during election campaigns and newly elected governments may not feel commit-
ted to the PRS document that has been prepared by their predecessors. But sometimes, even though 
these two calendars do not overlap, a “happy coincidence” (R8) of PRS and electoral cycle has been 
observed by World Bank staff when a new administration came on board precisely at the start of a new 
PRS cycle.  
Over time, however, the timing and alignment of the PRS process to the electoral cycle became more 
government-driven and political. Two situations may be distinguished. In the first situation, the gov-
ernment made an effort to align the PRS process to the electoral cycle despite resistance from donors. 
For example, a few respondents report that – although donors expressed concern about the pace of the 
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process – the top political leadership drove the PRS process ahead rather rapidly in order to put forth 
the resulting national development strategy as an achievement of the ruling party and/or president. In 
the second situation, the government refused to align the PRS process to the electoral cycle as sug-
gested by its external partners. A few respondents report that the World Bank tried – together with 
other donors – to have the PRS process start after the elections, because of the risk that the ruling party 
program and/or presidential agenda and the PRS document will differ. However, these attempts were 
blocked by the recipient governments in saying that there is a “large consensus among the political 
class” of not using the PRS process as “a tool for gaining political reward, neither from ruling parties 
nor the opposition” (R29). The PRSP should thus be a “national kind of movement, which goes be-
yond any party-kind of agenda” (R5). In either case, many respondents think that alignment does not 
make a difference, because nobody expected elections to bring a political change. In their view, the 
government in power leads the PRS process, and it will not change in color, “even if personalities 
change” (R6).  
In line with this more political and government-driven process, the instruments that the World Bank 
used to increase participation of domestic stakeholders in national policy-making have become more 
indirect. In the beginning, and respondents are quite clear on that, there was conditionality associated 
with the PRS process. Through broad-based participation of stakeholders in the preparation of the PRS 
document, recipient countries, in effect, directly “bought into the HIPC initiative” (R13). Given that 
the PRS process was supported by technical assistance from all donors, governments thus had a real 
interest in adopting the model. However, as many interviewees claim, the link between the PRS pro-
cess and the financial rewards provided through the debt relief initiative “has overshadowed any other 
principle” (R33). Political ownership is said to have been weak because the PRS process was geared 
solely towards external funding mobilization. Governments followed technical guidelines on how to 
produce a PRSP in order not to risk their debt relief.  
Over time, the World Bank has followed a more indirect strategy for promoting citizen participation in 
national policy-making. In particular, the PRS process and how it has been used by the Bank has been 
evolving. While the importance of the PRS process as a means for accessing funding by external part-
ners has become less important, the political dialogue surrounding the participation of domestic stake-
holders in these surrogate accountability fields has become more important. In the future, as a few 
respondents report, the World Bank will focus on new methodologies for improving country owner-
ship, such as the training of journalists and the broadcasting of radio programs in local languages. 
Government ownership is also said to become stronger with the second generation of PRS documents 
because the top political level has driven the process. The subtle change of names and priorities in the 
coming third generation of national development strategies (including growth, employment, and infra-
structure beyond poverty reduction) is seen as prime evidence in this regard. At the same time, re-
spondents recognize that stakeholder consultation in the second round was more “top-down” (R10) in 
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that more priorities were set by the government early in the process. In general, World Bank staff 
seems more aware that national development strategies are owned by a small number of people within 
the government, and that a broad national consensus is probably more of an ideal than a practice. In 
general, reform priorities are not the same for everybody within the recipient state and among partici-
pants from civil society.  
In sum, what this subsection has shown is that there is a slow, but steady change both in targets and 
instruments of the World Bank’s strategy for promoting domestic accountability. In particular, when 
the PRS approach was introduced, the World Bank followed a direct strategy based on the use of posi-
tive and negative incentives for building the capacities of social and administrative accountability fo-
rums at the recipient country level. However, as a way of reducing the practical tension between dem-
ocratic and surrogate accountability fields, the Bank increasingly used a more indirect strategy based 
on a mix of technical support and political dialogue aimed at strengthening the answerability of recipi-
ent governments within the electoral and political arena at the recipient country level.  
 
 
4.5. Exploring accountability models 
4.5.1. Analytical framework for exploring models of public accountability 
Given that the notion of accountability is also used to legitimize governance arrangement, the objec-
tive of this section is to explore the theoretical models of accountability on which the PRS approach is 
based in order to assess whether the World Bank’s mechanisms for holding recipient governments 
accountable have actually changed over time. The analytical framework used for exploring different 
accountability models is based on the theoretical contributions of global governance scholars, in par-
ticular, Grant and Keohane (2005), who differ between delegation and participation as two fundamen-
tal logics or models for holding power to account. Since these models have their roots in different 
theoretical notions of legitimacy, they lead to different strategies and mechanisms for accountability in 
practice (Grant and Keohane 2005: 32). Having mapped the two surrogate accountability fields that 
have been targeted by the World Bank’s strategy in the previous section, I will focus now on exploring 
the models by which development partners hold each other accountable within these two accountabil-
ity fields.  
Table 4-6 shows the analytical framework including variables, values, and indicators that have been 
used to identify the different models of accountability in order to analyze whether accountability 
mechanisms between donors and recipients of foreign aid have changed under the PRS approach.  
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Table 4-6: Analytical framework for exploring models of public accountability 
Variables Values Indicators Theoretical background 
Delegation Instrumental Principals 
Agents 
Principal-agent model: 
Hierarchy 
Discipline 
Collective action problems 
Discretionary Citizens 
Representatives 
Republican-federalist model: 
Institutions 
Delegation 
Regulating gaps 
Participation Instrumental Demos 
Officials 
Participatory democracy model: 
Visibility 
Participation 
Generating community 
Discretionary Peers 
Specialists 
Deliberative democracy model: 
Mutuality 
Dialogue 
Collective problem solving 
 
The operationalization through indicators of the four theoretical models largely follows the scheme as 
given by Grant and Keohane (2005: 31). They propose to distinguish accountability mechanisms 
providing a map from outcomes to sanctions along two dimensions. First, we may ask who is entitled 
to hold the powerful accountable (Grant and Keohane 2005: 32). This question concerns the forum and 
whether it is composed of those entrusting actors with powers (‘delegation’) or of those being affected 
by their actions (‘participation’). In the latter case, accountability mechanisms concentrate on the ans-
werability dimension of the concept. Participatory approaches serve to increase the responsiveness of 
power wielders to the people as a whole. In the former case, the forum “need not be the people as a 
whole, but could be some elite group or institution that entrusts power wielders with power” (Grant 
and Keohane 2005: 31). They use accountability mechanisms that concentrate on the enforcement 
dimension of the concept.  
Second, within these two basic models of accountability, we may further ask how much discretion do 
power wielders have (Grant and Keohane 2005: 31). This question focuses on the nature of the actor 
and whether power wielders are regarded as instrumental agents (‘instrumental’) or as discretionary 
authorities (‘discretionary’). Discretionary authorities are held accountable through “a variety of 
mechanisms for judgment after the fact”, such as general checks and balances or the ex-post monitor-
ing of their behavior, including their punishment with sanctions (Grant and Keohane 2005: 33). Im-
portantly, the forum does not aim at directing the behavior of discretionary authorities beyond the 
definition of their office’s duties (Grant and Keohane 2005: 31). Instrumental agents, by contrast, are 
held accountable not only through ex-post mechanisms but also through accountability mechanisms 
that direct the actions of power wielders ex ante. While punishment may occur in case of the agent’s 
deviation from the instructions given by the forum, it is not seen as essential as with discretionary 
authorities (Grant and Keohane 2005: 31).  
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The combination of the actor and the forum dimensions yields four possible accountability mecha-
nisms, which largely correspond to the four models of public accountability that have been identified 
at the (sub-)national level in democratic theory (see Borowiak 2011). These are the following: First, 
the principal-agent model where power wielders act as agents of principals who have delegated pow-
ers to them (i.e., the instrumental variant of the delegation model). Second, the republican-federalist 
model where power wielders act as representatives of citizens who have entrusted them with public 
responsibilities (i.e., the discretionary variant of the delegation model). Third, the participatory democ-
racy model where actions of power wielders are what the people instructed them to do in their role as 
public officials (i.e., the instrumental variant of the participation model). And finally, the deliberative 
democracy model where policies followed by power wielders lead to outcomes approved by those 
affected, which leads the affected constituencies to confer additional powers to the policy specialists 
(i.e., the discretionary variant of the participation model).  
 
4.5.2. Accountability models: theoretical blueprints that frame aid principles 
The focus of this subsection is on these four theoretical models of accountability that may lend legiti-
macy to the governance of aid. In particular, it analyzes the strategic discourse of World Bank staff for 
legitimizing the accountability mechanisms by which they hold domestic power wielders accountable. 
The question of how World Bank staff justifies the Bank’s intervention in domestic accountability 
systems was approached through asking them what ownership in the context of the PRS approach 
meant to them personally. They were asked to define it or to give an example (see Annex 4-2, ques-
tions 2.1.). In order to identify the theoretic model of accountability that may be hidden behind the 
ownership rhetoric, all answers to the ownership question were first split into two parts, one for the 
power wielder (or actor) and one for the accountability holder (or forum). Next, the roles of power 
wielders and accountability holders were analyzed individually according to the analytical framework 
outlined above. This procedure revealed four theoretical models of public accountability that World 
Bank staff used to legitimize institutionalized accountability arrangements under the PRS approach.  
Table 4-7 presents aggregate numbers with regard to the theoretical roots’ of World Bank staff’s stra-
tegic discourse on the ownership principle (question 2.1.). 
Table 4-7: Models of public accountability used in the ownership discourse 
Model Instrumental Discretionary Number of responses Percentage of total 
Delegation 18 12 30 50% 
Participation 11 19 30 50% 
Total 29 31 60 100% 
Note: N=50; 2 missing; 12 respondents with two power configurations, number of responses is thus 60. 
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As can be seen from Table 4-7, World Bank staff equally refers to the delegation model (50%) and the 
participation model (50%) when trying to circumscribe the ownership principle. In theoretical terms, 
this means that those entrusting power wielders with power and those being affected by the recipient 
government’s actions (and inactions) are judged to be similarly important in demanding accountability 
from power wielders. Ownership as the guiding philosophy of the PRS approach is thus not an exclu-
sive domain of one particular model of accountability.  
Moreover, a large number of World Bank staff recognizes multiple configurations of power at play 
under the PRS approach. 12 out of 48 respondents who have answered this question referred to two 
different theoretical models for holding power to account, making the total of responses (60) larger 
than the number of persons interviewed (50). In the following, I will describe these models of ac-
countability one by one as they are used by World Bank staff in their strategic discourse.  
 
4.5.2.1. The principal-agent model 
A first accountability model that was mentioned by 18 respondents is the principal-agent model (i.e., 
the instrumental variant of the delegation model). The idea hereby is that power wielders act as faithful 
agents of principals who have empowered them (i.e., delegation of de facto power). The following 
definition is a typical example of ownership understood in principal-agent terms:  
"Ownership of activity in my personal view means that the client wants the entire activity 
and sets aside the necessary resources to successfully implement the activity.” (R39)  
Respondents that refer to a principal-agent model argue that ownership is not so much about stake-
holder participation in the PRS process, but more about external support of the national budget pro-
cess. The principals in this model are the World Bank, the IMF and all other donors who provide 
budget support based on national poverty reduction strategies. The agents are the recipient govern-
ments who implement these country strategies via their own national budget process. Behind the own-
ership rhetoric, a delegation logic is revealed, whereby the aid-receiving agents are held accountable 
by the aid-donating principals. For example, many respondents affirm that ownership is a concept that 
originally came from donors. Donors have asked governments of developing countries to formulate a 
national development strategy and an operational roadmap to attain their strategies’ objectives. This 
reform agenda should set achievable, quantitative targets within a sound macroeconomic framework. 
In return, donors provided funding to the governments’ general budgets and could imprint in national 
discussions. However, these discussions have become more complex and donors – despite their provi-
sion of support – cannot do it for the government.  
Recipient governments in the principal-agent model act as instrumental agents of aid-donating princi-
pals who have provided them with money and corresponding advice. For example, World Bank staff 
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often refer to governments as their principal interlocutor, that is, those “with whom they are trying to 
let them do the right thing, themselves” (R1) In this regard, government commitment and understand-
ing of the strategy, including all its development priorities is perceived to be crucial. Government-
agents are thought to implement the reforms that are in the strategy. Their broad and active engage-
ment already in the formulation stage thus shows that they are serious about solving the problems of 
the country and implementing the strategy. Governments are held accountable ex post by donors who 
monitor the implementation of the reform agenda, ideally, with indicators defined by the governments 
themselves. But governments are also held accountable ex ante, for example, through their elaboration 
of a mid-term expenditure framework, which provides relevant information to the governments and 
their development partners on sectoral alignment within the annual budget process. Donors further 
require that domestic stakeholders need to be part of the process. This process is facilitated by the 
donors through providing financing and technical assistance.  
In sum, what this list of donor-driven tasks basically shows is that an understanding of ownership 
based on a principal-agent model of accountability grants little discretion to political leaders, but pro-
vides strong incentives to them for doing what their financial sponsors ask them to do (with principal-
agent model: R1, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7, R8, R10, R16, R17, R18, R22, R29, R35, R37, R38, R39, and 
R50).  
 
4.5.2.2. The republican-federalist model 
A second accountability model that was mentioned 12 times is the republican-federalist model (i.e., 
the discretionary variant of the delegation model). Unlike the instrumental variant, the idea behind this 
variant of the delegation model of accountability is that power wielders do not act as agents of princi-
pals, but as representatives of citizens who have entrusted them with public responsibilities (i.e., dele-
gation of de jure power). If magistrates feel responsible for their behavior in office while being 
checked by their dependence on citizens, this is often circumscribed as good governance, as the fol-
lowing example shows:  
"For me, ownership is very closely linked to good governance. For me, it makes sense to 
talk about ownership, if you have a government in place that follows the principles of 
good governance. So it’s not that you have an executive that signs off the PRSP, but that 
you really have a process in place, where the government is able to engage with citizens 
on the PRSP. That is essential, what I would consider being ownership.” (R11)  
Respondents that refer to the republican-federalist model argue that ownership is not so much about 
the faithful implementation of the strategy, but more about the clear assignment of responsibility 
through the delegation of authority to the centers of governmental power. In this model, citizens are 
the ones who delegate formal power to representative institutions. Political representatives of the citi-
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zenry govern based on the principle of separation of powers and mutual checks and balances. Owner-
ship definitions that refer to the republican-federalist model usually focus on the delegation of authori-
ty within national governance systems. For example, a lot of respondents argue that ownership means 
that the country has the right to make the final decisions. They emphasize that the government re-
sponds to the country’s own needs and challenges and as a result, the national strategies and activities 
correspond to country priorities. This implies, in turn, that countries develop their national strategies 
by themselves, without the intervention of the World Bank or any other donor. In an ideal situation, 
this would mean that national development strategies (as well as any other kind of political visions, 
policies and action plans of national dimensions) have been discussed and endorsed by representative 
institutions.  
Recipient governments in the republican-federalist model basically act as discretionary authorities, 
since citizens do not instruct country representatives ex ante. Rather, they judge their behavior after 
the fact. For example, given that the national development strategy is part of the government’s own 
agenda that is being discussed and endorsed by the parliament, the government as owner of the politi-
cal reform agenda should have “some incentives and stake in getting results” and “be accountable for 
failure as well (R33). Similar arguments show that ownership implies that governments need to be 
held accountable – “democratically or otherwise” (R12) – and in a somewhat weaker version, that 
there must “exist at least some degree of accountability” (R33). Recipient governments should be 
“ready to defend and be held accountable for the strategy” (R36), since “ownership means taking 
things for your own account” (R27).  
In sum, among the four models of accountability invoked by World Bank staff to legitimize their in-
terventions, respondents who understand ownership based on a republican-federalist model of ac-
countability link the two concepts of ownership and accountability most clearly with each other (with 
republican-federalist model: R8, R11, R12, R15, R19, R23, R24, R27, R33, R34, R36, and R37).  
 
4.5.2.3. The participatory democracy model 
A third accountability model that was mentioned 11 times is the participatory democracy model (i.e., 
the instrumental variant of the participation model). In contrast to the delegation model, the participa-
tion model is based on the idea that policy-makers give an account to those being affected by these 
policies, commonly called stakeholders in the development discourse. In the instrumental variant of 
the participation model, the term “stakeholder” basically refers to those who are governed by these 
policies, in other words, to the people in recipient countries. The following definition of ownership 
gives a practical example of what the Anti-Federalists have termed the “the great body of the people” 
(Centinel):  
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“I think it means that the strategy is organic in that it is the government, and more broad-
ly, its citizens, that endorse the strategy, who have developed the strategy, and that really 
want to carry out the strategy including any reforms that are in the strategy. In other 
words, it is not externally imposed.” (R2)  
Respondents that refer to a participatory democracy model argue that ownership is about a broad-
based participatory process, by which public officials are held accountable by the demos, the ultimate 
sovereign in a democracy. In turn, this means that the generating of political issues has to come from 
within recipient countries. Donors are not be involved in the preparation of poverty reduction strate-
gies, because these strategies should represent national interest and political objectives, not those of 
outside institutions. Ownership definitions that refer to the participatory-democracy model usually 
focus on the participation of nationals, that is the people of the country themselves. For example, 
many respondents argue that ownership means that the national poverty reduction strategy has been 
elaborated and adopted by the citizens and their authorities. In an ideal world, this would be a mass-
type process with full participation of civil society at large. As a result, poverty reduction strategies 
would then respond to the wishes of the people, particularly the poor. Given that poor people are those 
who are supposed to get governmental services, the reasoning goes, they are the ones who should say 
where the government is going to put money to deliver services. However, most respondents think that 
political practice is very far from that ideal world. They would already consider the participation of the 
key representatives of the big social groups, which would cover a broad spectrum of the population as 
desirable. With regard to the end results of this process, the argument is made that the more these na-
tional strategies, policies and action plans respond to the wishes of the people, the better it would be.  
The public officials in this model of accountability generally have very little discretion, because they 
are acting as instrumental agents of their political constituencies. For example, many respondents ar-
gue that the national poverty reduction strategy should be fully adopted by the government as it re-
flects the views, the thinking, and the wishes of the citizens of a country. At the least, if the process is 
conceived from outside, citizens should buy into it and their interests should be taken into account. 
Ownership of the PRS process thus starts with wide consultation of the population in different parts of 
the country and at various stages of the decision-making process. And it ends when the PRS document 
is communicated to the general public. This process is managed by public officials who reach out to 
domestic stakeholders who, in turn, participate in strategy formulation and dissemination of annual 
progress reports. Through the transparent and participatory process, World Bank staff hopes that the 
government’s strategy is also reflecting what the society at large wants to do because, in the end, they 
are the ones who have made the promises.  
In sum, key to an understanding of ownership based on a participatory democracy model of accounta-
bility is, as in ancient Athens, the sense of belonging to a political community collectively governing 
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itself (with participatory democracy model: R2, R5, R9, R13, R14, R21, R31, R38, R43, R46, and 
R47).  
 
4.5.2.4. The deliberative democracy model 
The last model of accountability, that was mentioned 19 times, is the deliberative democracy model 
(i.e., the discretionary variant of the participation model). Like the principal-agent model as its theore-
tical opposite, the deliberative democracy model has often been used by the interviewed World Bank 
staff to legitimize their own intervention. In the discretionary variant of the participation model, the 
term “stakeholders” is understood rather broadly, as the following example shows:  
“The PRSP must be owned by the government and indicate the strategy for reducing pov-
erty among the people. In this respect, the government must facilitate the whole process 
of formulation and implementation. We must ensure that the PRSP is not narrow, but 
brings on board the view of all important stakeholders in the country. We are an im-
portant stakeholder just like CSOs and our role may be to provide technical support 
based on our global knowledge of how these things are done around the world.” (R42)  
As this example shows, stakeholders in the deliberative democracy model fall into two groups. There 
are domestic constituencies being affected by the policies and there are external partners who support 
the policy specialists in the policy-making process. Both types of stakeholders can legitimately be 
understood as a kind of fellow peers of the recipient government. While the former are members of the 
same political community, the latter recognize each other as partners within the global development 
community. In line with these two types of stakeholders, two respondents make a difference between 
“internal” and “external” ownership. External ownership is said to be a function of government leader-
ship, that is, the ability of policy specialists to formulate and implement a strategy for reducing pov-
erty among the people in the country. Internal ownership, in turn, is said to be a function of citizen 
empowerment, that is, the degree to which the average citizen owns the reform (R6, R10). Notwith-
standing the ownership rhetoric, the deliberative logic of generating public accountability shows itself, 
for instance, when respondents argue that ownership means that the government builds reasonable 
consensus with key stakeholders around a path eventually chosen for policy implementation. To this 
end, the government discusses policy options transparently with key stakeholders; policy options are 
based on country circumstances; and the government needs to be open to alternative views brought 
into the discussion. As a result of this deliberative process, all stakeholders should know what imple-
mentation means and – in the best case – be convinced that the reform is for their own good. Owner-
ship according to the deliberative democracy model thus basically means an understanding of why a 
particular reform makes sense. The participatory process thereby serves to unblock the political situa-
tion to take a reform.  
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Unlike the instrumental variant, the discretionary variant of the participation model does not focus on 
public exposure of the power wielders behavior, but on the quality of the public debate. How this de-
bate is organized in detail is largely seen to lie in the responsibility of the recipient government that is 
leading the process. Recipient governments are generally credited with a much larger leadership role 
than in the former model because they are said to drive the process. For example, many respondents 
argue that ownership means that the government leads the process (with determination). In particular, 
the argument is made that the government is pushing forward its own development agenda and that the 
governmental structures in charge take the lead in the formulation and implementation of a country’s 
development process. The policy agenda then is legitimate to the extent that the government can speak 
for the people as a whole against special interest. Therefore, at some level or stage, there is participa-
tion by representatives of the people. Since there are not many mature democracies on the African 
continent, World Bank staff is searching for consultation with a range of domestic constituencies, such 
as civil society, the private sector, local governments, or “whatever you have if you look at the issue 
ownership” (R2, R11). However, World Bank staff also acknowledges that in democracies with legit-
imate governments, this kind of participation conditionality is seen to be more of a problem. They see 
themselves only as accompanying the process, but not substituting for national authorities leading the 
process.  
In sum, key to an understanding of ownership based on the deliberative democracy model of account-
ability is the wish of having all people feeling like they agree – even if this universal standard of ac-
countability might never be met (with deliberative democracy model: R2, R6, R7, R10, R11, R20, 
R21, R23, R25, R26, R28, R29, R30, R32, R40, R41, R42, R44, and R45).  
 
4.5.3. The change in accountability mechanisms 
The focus of this subsection is on the change in mechanisms by which actors are held accountable 
within surrogate accountability fields under the PRS approach. In particular, it analyzes whether the 
operational practice of how the World Bank holds recipient governments accountable has changed 
over time. In the following analysis, this question has been approached by a number of questions as to 
the behavior of the World Bank itself and with regard to different stages of the PRS process. Regard-
ing PRS formulation, World Bank staff was asked whether the World Bank has taken more of a pas-
sive or active approach in their countries and whether they could give examples of and/or reasons for 
an active or passive approach in order to illustrate what this means (see Annex 4-2, questions 3.1., 
3.2., 3.3.). With regard to the implementation stage, World Bank staff were asked how they keep track 
of the development process in their countries and whether external consultants have been hired by the 
government (see Annex 4-2, questions 3.4. and 2.12.). In order to identify a possible change of ac-
countability mechanisms in operational practice, I first allocated all answers to the field in question, 
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i.e., the GBS or PRS field. Within this field, I then identified the respective pole of the accountability 
relationship, i.e., power wielder or accountability holder. Lastly, I took a closer look at the time period 
during which the respondent has been working in the respective country, i.e., first or second (and in 
some cases, even third) generation. This procedure revealed that the mechanisms used by the World 
Bank for holding recipient governments accountable have changed over time (see Table 4-8).  
Table 4-8: Mechanisms of public accountability used in development practice 
Time GBS PRS 
1st generation Delegation-instrumental Delegation-discretionary 
2nd generation Participation-instrumental Participation-discretionary 
 
Table 4-8 shows the underlying accountability mechanisms for each field of surrogate accountability 
over time. While these accountability mechanisms do exist in parallel, given that the World Bank’s aid 
modalities (i.e., the PRS process and the GBS operations) also function as parallel spaces where do-
mestic stakeholders and external partners interact, the interesting thing is that there has been a general 
shift in mechanisms used in the World Bank’s operational practice over time. Evidence from the quali-
tative content analysis indicates a shift from a delegation to a participation model for both aid modali-
ties under the PRS approach. In the following, I will trace this shift in accountability mechanisms 
within both fields of accountability under the PRS approach (i.e., the PRS and GBS fields) based on 
the insights given by the interviewed World Bank staff.  
 
4.5.3.1. PRS field: first generation 
In the first generation, the PRS process was the key to debt relief by the international community. 
There is wide agreement among the interviewees about this fact. This global initiative came from a 
broad civil society movement that rallied under various advocacy campaigns at the end of the millen-
nium and not from any donor or the recipient countries themselves. Nevertheless, under the Enhanced 
HIPC initiative bilateral donors were the driving force, since they wanted to increase the capacity of 
recipients countries to borrow anew through wiping out the old debts. In turn, the IMF and World 
Bank made the preparation of a PRSP a requirement for low-income countries to gain access to multi-
lateral development assistance. Thus, the PRS process, besides being a requirement for access to debt 
relief, has been monitored by the international financial institutions as part of their general lending and 
reporting procedure. In particular, the Joint Staff Assessments (JSAs) written by Bank and Fund staff 
provided an official “assessment” of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Annual Pro-
gress Reports (APRs). These staff assessments then were sent to the Boards of the two sister institu-
tions. As required by staff guidelines, every joint assessment of PRSPs and APRs had a paragraph or a 
section on the participatory process leading to the preparation of these documents. However, this was 
“not any formal way to track the participatory process” (R10). According to World Bank staff, they 
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only described but did not qualify the process. Since the Bank had no specific benchmarks for as-
sessing the process, they had “to use own judgment with regard to the degree of participation of the 
various stakeholders in the process” (R13).  
Due to its link with debt relief and the broader Millennium Development Goals, donor commitment to 
the PRS process was generally very strong. For example, the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) was mentioned quite often by interviewees as a donor who provided a lot of financial support 
and played a very important role in the preparation of the country documents. The World Bank itself 
also facilitated the consultation process, but at the same time tried – in contrast to the UNDP and other 
donors – to keep at an arm’s length by not drafting the PRS document. Facilitation of the PRS process 
usually meant that the government relied on consultants paid by the international community “to help 
with whatever was needed” (R5). These external consultants assisted governments, for instance, by 
showing examples of PRS processes in other countries, because governments often did not know what 
a PRS process should look like. Interestingly, the use of consultants has varied among borrowing gov-
ernments. While some governments were not eager to use the money offered by donors and tried to get 
a lot done by themselves, other governments considered the use of consultants as “free work” (R9) and 
a way of side-stepping the obligation of following the pay scale in the public sector.  
In sum, accountability mechanisms in the PRS field of the first generation are based on a delegation 
model, where a broad, global civil society movement pressed for a new development approach in re-
turn for debt relief. As such, not the citizens in recipient countries, but the citizens in donor countries – 
organized in a broad global civil society movement – have been the driving force in empowering re-
cipient countries. In turn, governments were seen as discretionary authorities of recipient countries. 
They were free to use (or not to use) external assistance on the PRS process, which was assessed only 
ex post through donors’ joint reporting on national PRS documents.  
 
4.5.3.2. PRS field: second generation 
In the second generation, the direct link of the PRS process with debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC 
initiative disappeared. In the past, the PRS process had been monitored by World Bank staff through 
the writing of Joint Staff Assessments (JSA) on the government’s Annual Progress Reports (APRs). 
But currently, as emphasized by many interviewed staff, they no longer need to report on the quality 
of country documents. Since 2004, these documents are only presented to the Boards, that is, they can 
discuss them, but they do not vote, approve, or endorse them in any form. Moreover, the joint report-
ing by IMF and World Bank staff has changed in that their “assessments” have been replaced with 
“advisory notes”, which are no longer a requirement for most cases. The only documents IMF and 
World Bank staff still are required to do are the Joint Staff Advisory Notes (JSAN) on full-fledged 
PRSPs or on APRs in case that the country has not yet reached the completion point under the En-
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hanced HIPC initiative. This change in staff guideline basically reflects a change in the audience. Not 
those who are delegating power (i.e., citizens in donor countries), but those who are affected by it (i.e., 
citizens in recipient countries) have become the relevant public for the World Bank in the second gen-
eration of PRSPs. Due to this change in audience, donor reporting to the Boards in the form of JSANs 
is seen to have become a completely useless task that is “dying its own death” (R6). Although JSANs 
have become “much more open-read” (R1), they are not used anymore as an instrument to provide 
guidance to the government on stakeholder participation. Instead, the focus lies on holding big public 
events inside the recipient country where the government would report on an annual basis to domestic 
stakeholders and external partners on the degree of success of its national development program. At 
these public events, which are organized by recipient governments themselves, there is an enormous 
amount of media presence and participation by civil society. In the second generation of PRSPs, gov-
ernments are thus not held accountable via donor reports, but through public exposure of their own 
annual progress reports.  
Over time, outside support of the PRS process became less, because recipient governments have inter-
nalized the process. As a result, the number of external consultants decreased. In the second genera-
tion, the “core structure of government” (R11) is said to have managed most of the PRS process. The 
fact that more local than external consultants were hired also points to this increase in country capaci-
ties. Even in those cases where consultants still have been hired, respondents emphasize that their 
function has changed. While in the first generation external consultants assisted primarily in producing 
the externally required PRSPs, in the second generation they have been working more on specific as-
pects underlying the production of these documents. According to World Bank staff, public officials 
are “smart enough to know that there is a lot of input that comes from donors in terms of analytical 
work they can use” (R6) and they thus have “a huge list of things they want the World Bank to do” 
(R5). Particularly in the area of poverty analysis, the Bank’s “groundwork” is said to underpin any 
PRSP and is always done. PRS documents may thus be described as written by government officials, 
but they definitely draw from “information for which there was support of consultants everywhere” 
(R5).  
In sum, accountability mechanisms in the PRS iterations of the second generation are based on a par-
ticipation model, where citizens in recipient countries have increasingly been involved in the annual 
review process of the government’s reform agenda. In this context, it is seen as crucial that the nation-
al development strategy emerges from domestic struggles and visions and is not imposed by foreign 
actors. The role of recipient governments in the PRS field also changed. While governments were seen 
as discretionary authorities of recipient countries in the first generation, they came to be regarded as 
instrumental agents of their people in the second generation. Notwithstanding that the ability of public 
officials to manage the PRS process has increased, citizens were also empowered through the opening 
of the annual review process to domestic stakeholders.  
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4.5.3.3. GBS field: first generation 
While World Bank staff do not see themselves as having been (directly) involved in the PRS field, 
where “the international community” (i.e., citizens from donor countries) for the first generation and 
“domestic stakeholders” (i.e., citizens from recipient countries) for the second generation are per-
ceived as being the relevant accountability holders, the IMF and World Bank’s role comes clearly into 
view in the GBS field.  
In the first generation, GBS operations were monitored by the international financial institutions as in 
the past through conditionality – although it is common for World Bank staff to speak of “triggers” 
and “prior actions” now. For a long time, there has been the rule that the World Bank and the IMF do 
not duplicate their conditionality. However, the current aid architecture has made the negotiations 
between donors and recipients of foreign aid “more lengthy and complex” (R6), since triggers and 
prior actions on general budget support go beyond the World Bank and the IMF’s cross-conditionality. 
In particular, conditions taken from a joint policy matrix need approval by the government and all its 
budget partners at the negotiation table, which enforces discipline and external control on donors in 
the GBS field. The main difference with the Bank’s former structural adjustment lending is that PRSC 
series focus on and pressurize two to three very important reforms among the eight to ten triggers usu-
ally covered in each series. When PRSC lending was introduced, it became “orthodoxy” (R10) inside 
the World Bank and other donors to focus on a limited number of things they asked the recipient gov-
ernment to do. For their own monitoring, donors negotiated and agreed with governments on a 
“shortlist” (R9) that was smaller and had fewer things on it than the government had proposed.  
Due to its link with conditionality, governments that received general budget support are seen as in-
strumental agents of those donors that provided funding to the general budget. In the first generation, 
the World Bank provided technical assistance and funding to their counterparts in the governmental 
ministries on how to formulate an operational policy framework on poverty reduction. This meant, for 
example, that the World Bank paid for the PRS unit and the technical staff running the office, that its 
own staff worked with their counterparts from the core ministries on public expenditure reviews; and 
that the Bank sponsored a high-level technical mission in Washington inviting the key staff of the PRS 
unit and the core ministries to discuss PRSP drafts and share good practices with the country team. 
Technical advice also came in the form of short-term consultants paid by donors to assist recipients in 
drafting their PRS documents. These short-term consultants assisted the government “task team” 
(R42) in PRS formulation. They worked “behind the scene” (R36) and were “much more than a sim-
ple facilitator” (R13) in that they helped governments to elaborate on their strategies. However, recipi-
ent governments not only received external support via consultants for preparing their PRS documents, 
but they were also instructed directly by donors when they were drafting them. For example, it was 
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noted that the World Bank and other donors had an impact on the content of the PRS documents by 
participating in draft validation workshops and commenting on PRS drafts and monitoring indicators.  
In sum, first-generation accountability mechanisms in the GBS field are based on a delegation model, 
where the World Bank and other donors monitor a small number of policy and institutional reforms, 
which they pressurize in return for general budget support from their side. They exert their power 
through negotiations with the governments on the donor’s shortlist – constrained only through their 
own commitment to harmonization that forces external discipline and control on them. Recipient gov-
ernments, and in particular, donors’ counterparts in core ministries, are seen as instrumental agents 
who receive technical advice and funding in the course of the process. However, recipient govern-
ments are also instructed at the higher level by donors who are engaging in harmonized policy dia-
logue and sending formal messages to the domestic authorities on PRS drafts at an early stage of the 
formulation process.  
 
4.5.3.4. GBS field: second generation 
As with the second generation in the PRS field, a similar shift has occurred over time inside the GBS 
field from an accountability mechanism based primarily on the delegation of power (as described in 
the first generation above) to one that functions via the participation of those affected by this power (in 
the second generation). Affectedness thereby needs to be understood rather broadly, including not only 
domestic stakeholders but also external development partners who can be affected by the behavior of 
recipient governments in the GBS field. In effect, an actual participation trend inside the World Bank 
could be identified. At the recipient country level, participation by the World Bank moved from short-
term consultants financed by the Bank to support the PRS unit; to long-term assistance of the PRS unit 
by the Bank’s own poverty economists; up to “a gradual and general move towards more World Bank 
presence in the field” (R4). Over time, the decentralization of World Bank activities meant that its 
staff increasingly became involved in the participatory processes in the recipient countries themselves. 
For example, it was noted that the GBS operations have been monitored by World Bank staff, which 
were part of the national decision-making process. Looking inside, the people working on policy-
based lending within the World Bank are staff from the Poverty Reduction and Economic Manage-
ment (PREM) division – usually the economists. As task team leaders, they work on two levels: On 
the financial level, they lead the budget support operations, and on the policy level, they coordinate 
and organize the ideas among the different sectors. Together with the economists of the IMF, they are 
also responsible for writing the JSANs on the government’s national development strategy. In doing 
so, the Fund’s economists basically focus on the macroeconomic framework, while the economists 
from the Bank – in their own words – “do all the rest” (R2), for instance, summarizing all the sector 
comments provided by the complete country teams. The important point about these documents 
(which the making of had become a completely useless task, as we have seen above) is that the people 
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at the World Bank who do the reporting have been involved in the entire PRS formulation and imple-
mentation process at the recipient country level and they have been following this process rather close-
ly. Their specialized knowledge is based on the task team leader’s own observations and informal 
discussions with country participants. World Bank respondents who have been involved in the process 
say that they generally have “a lot of personal sources and in-depth knowledge of the context” (R2) 
and that they were pretty free to comment on what they thought could “add value through suggesting 
improvements” (R11). Moreover, World Bank staff increasingly see themselves not as sole principal 
of their clients, but as one among many development partners on whose knowledge the policy special-
ists of the government can draw. They participate “just like other donors” (R13) in the ongoing discus-
sion with the government. These discussions are not specifically related to the formulation of PRS 
documents, but to their implementation through lending operations in the GBS field.  
With the rise of political dialogue as the main instrument for holding governments accountable, gov-
ernments increasingly were seen not as a delegate but as a trustee of domestic stakeholders and exter-
nal partners. As in the first generation, the World Bank also provided technical assistance and funding 
to governments in the second generation – but its support came only in conjunction with the broader 
development community and on government request. As many respondents report, this meant that the 
World Bank provided background materials and support whenever it was called upon; that the World 
Bank – in pursuing the goal to reduce poverty – pledged support for any possible demand for technical 
assistance and funding; and that the World Bank normally would not get too involved in sectoral strat-
egy development unless a certain sector asked for help. In general, World Bank staff emphasize that 
they let the government take the political lead. This means that the World Bank is not involved in the 
drafting of the PRS documents in the second generation. Participation by external partners comes at a 
late stage of the stakeholder consultation process, usually once the draft PRSP was elaborated or even 
approved. Given the low capacities in recipient countries, the only thing that the World Bank still does 
is “technical backstopping”, as one respondent puts it, “to help them to do it much better” (R14).  
In sum, there has been a subtle shift towards accountability mechanisms that follow a participatory 
logic, by which donors hold governments in the GBS field accountable. Along with this shift in ac-
countability mechanisms, the self-perception of those holding power wielder to account has changed 
slightly. Whereas in the first generation the international financial institutions saw themselves as prin-
cipals who monitored the development performance of their clients, in the second generation external 
development partners would rather focus on being part of the government’s own decision-making 
processes. Recipient governments, in turn, are seen as trustees of those being affected in the second 
generation, where the World Bank as one among many development partners participates in ongoing 
political dialogue.  
In sum, what this subsection has shown is that power wielders are increasingly held accountable by 
mechanisms that follow a participatory logic with regard to both surrogate accountability fields under 
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the PRS approach. From the perspective of World Bank staff, the number of participants increased in 
both surrogate accountability fields through the inclusion of either more domestic stakeholders in the 
formulation or more external partners in the implementation stage of the PRS approach. Yet, the role 
of recipient governments differs in these two fields. While they are increasingly seen as an instrumen-
tal agent of their own people in the PRS field, their discretion in the GBS field has increased: here 
recipient governments were seen more and more as trustees of the broader development community.  
 
 
4.6. Identifying accountability standards 
4.6.1. Analytical framework for identifying standards of public accountability 
Given that the strategic rationale of donors for promoting domestic accountability may be hidden be-
hind the technocratic language used by the international financial institutions, the objective of this 
section is to identify the various normative standards of accountability that underlie the institutional-
ized surrogate accountability arrangements of the PRS approach. This is done in order to assess 
whether the goals to be achieved by the World Bank’s new aid modalities have actually changed as 
compared to past practices. The previous two sections have analyzed the strategies and mechanisms 
for promoting domestic accountability in relation to two surrogate accountability fields in recipient 
countries. The question that arises is what the actual effects of these accountability arrangements are. 
However, before we can assess the actual effects we need to know how to judge these effects. In other 
words, we need to know what the normative standards are that underlie a particular accountability 
relationship. Accountability standards define the conduct and consequences that follow from an ac-
countability relationship as well as the obligations and rights of the parties involved in this relation-
ship. They thus set the normative content of an accountability relationship.  
The assessment of normative standards may be difficult in development practice because aid practi-
tioners may not be aware of these standards or they may not be considering alternatives to those set by 
their own institution. To gain a clearer picture of the goals the main aid architects have had in mind 
when they introduced the PRS approach, and then, again, ten years thereafter, this section makes em-
pirical use of an assessment tool developed by Mark Bovens, Thoma Schillemans, and Paul ‘t Hart 
(2008). They claim that the existing literature on public accountability is “remarkably light on assess-
ment tools and methods” (Bovens et al. 2008: 230). Yet, a multiplicity of answers to the underlying 
question about the normative standards appear – albeit implicitly – time and again in the literature. 
Bovens and colleagues deserve credit for summarizing these scattered pieces of evidence and integrat-
ing them into an analytical assessment tool that can be used to “to arrive at a systematic intersubjective 
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evaluation of a given accountability arrangement” (Bovens et al. 2008: 239). In particular, they sug-
gest assessing public accountability arrangements by analyzing their effects for each phase of the ac-
countability process. Having identified the public spaces and the theoretical models of the institution-
alized accountability arrangements under the PRS approach, I now focus on the normative standards 
by which World Bank staff evaluates the behavior of recipient governments in these surrogate ac-
countability fields. In doing so, I combine the assessment tools of Bovens et al. (2008) with the defini-
tion of these standards in the specialized literature on transparency and accountability initiatives in the 
development context (see Malena et al. 2004; McGee and Gaventa 2013; and O’Neil et al. 2007).  
Table 4-9 provides a summary of the analytical framework used to identify the different standards of 
accountability in order to analyze whether the goals the World Bank has been following under the PRS 
approach have changed as compared to past practices.  
Table 4-9: Analytical framework for identifying standards of public accountability 
Variables Values Indicators Theoretical background 
Effectiveness Information Performance Effectiveness perspective: 
Information: development partners and key stake-
holders informed about government performance 
Debate: an ongoing, consequential dialogue about  
performance feedback 
Judgment: voluntary anticipation and adoption of  
lessons learned by public executives 
Debate Feedback 
Judgment Lessons 
Governance Information Power Governance perspective: 
Information: institutional countervailing powers  
monitor executive behavior 
Debate: conform to domestic rules, regulations, and 
norms 
Judgment: credible sanctions to punish and deter  
executive misbehavior 
Debate Rules 
Judgment Sanctions 
Empowerment Information Rights Empowerment perspective: 
Information: rights-based participation of citizens in 
political decision-making 
Debate: in accordance with the needs and interests of 
those being affected 
Judgment: significant incentives for government to 
respect and deepen citizen rights and control of  
political decisions 
Debate Interests 
Judgment Incentives 
 
Following Bovens et al. (2008), accountability practices may be assessed according to three normative 
perspectives on the rationale of public accountability. Adapting these three perspectives to the devel-
opment context, I speak of the effectiveness perspective, the governance perspective, and the empow-
erment perspective.  
First, in the “effectiveness perspective”, efforts aimed at strengthening transparency and accountability 
around aid should enhance the effectiveness of aid delivery. The basic idea is that accountability ar-
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rangements provide donors and recipients of foreign aid “with feedback-based inducements to increase 
their effectiveness and efficiency” (Bovens et al. 2008: 232). The focus lies very much on achieving 
desirable development outcomes, most prominently, poverty reduction. To identify this perspective in 
practice, we may ask first, whether the accountability arrangement in question yields an accurate, 
timely and clear diagnosis of the executive actors’ development performance; second, whether the 
accountability arrangement induces ongoing, consequential dialogue among the three key groups in 
aid delivery – donor community, recipient state and organized society – about performance feedback; 
and third, whether the accountability arrangement makes executive actors voluntarily anticipate good 
practices and adopt “the lessons learned from performance feedback and stakeholder dialogue” 
(Bovens et al. 2008: 232). In sum, accountability arrangements that stimulate public executives and 
aid agencies to focus consistently on achieving desirable development outcomes are key to the effec-
tiveness perspective.  
In the second perspective, what I call the “governance perspective”, initiatives aimed at strengthening 
transparency and accountability around aid should improve the quality of governance within – and 
increasingly beyond – the recipient state. The basic idea is that accountability arrangements are essen-
tial in order “to withstand the ever-present tendency toward power concentration and abuse of powers 
in the executive branch” (Bovens et al. 2008: 231). The focus thereby lies heavenly on strengthening 
the rule of law as well as the democratic process in order “to prevent or at least uncover and redress 
abuse of public authority and public resources” (Bovens et al. 2008: 232), including foreign aid, on the 
part of the executive branch of government. To identify whether accountability practices contribute to 
good governance and procedural democracy within recipient countries, we may ask, first, whether the 
institutional countervailing power that monitors executive behavior has enough investigative powers 
and information-processing capacities to credibly check executive behavior; second, whether the de-
bate between the actor and the forum centers on the conformity of executive behavior with domestic 
rules, regulations and norms; and last but not least, whether the forum that judges executive behavior 
has enough sanctioning power at its disposal to credibly punish and deter executive misbehavior 
(Bovens et al. 2008: 231). In sum, central to the governance perspective is “the extent to which an 
accountability arrangement curtails the abuse of executive power and privilege” (Bovens et al. 2008: 
231).  
A third perspective has been called the “empowerment perspective” because strengthening transparen-
cy and accountability around aid should empower the people of recipient countries, particularly the 
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in society. At the center of this logic of accountability is that 
public accountability arrangements legitimize government actions by including all those being signifi-
cantly affected by them in the process of discussion and decision-making. The focus thereby lies very 
much on building an enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms, so as citizens can assume an active role in the policy dialogue with their governments. 
224 
Questions to identify this perspective include, first, whether citizens and their representatives have the 
right to be informed about the conduct of those who make the political decisions and the social conse-
quences of that conduct; second, whether the debates between the accountability forum and the actor 
concentrate on the accordance of these decisions with the needs and interests of national citizens; and 
third, whether the judgment by the forum provides sufficient incentives for political decision-makers 
to respect and deepen citizens’ rights and control of political decisions (Bovens et al. 2008: 231). In 
sum, what matters, in the end, is whether an accountability arrangement gives all citizens and their 
representatives the right to participate equally in policy formulation and implementation (Bovens 
2008: 238).  
 
4.6.2. Accountability standards: normative rationales used by aid practitioners 
The focus of this subsection is on the normative standards of accountability that provide a rationale for 
the World Bank’s effort at promoting transparency and accountability around their assistance. In par-
ticular, it analyzes – based on the three perspectives outlined above – the perceived impact of the 
World Bank’s intervention under the PRS approach and the recommendations that have been given in 
this regard by the interviewed World Bank staff. Assuming that political goals do not figure on their 
institution’s development agenda, World Bank staff were asked directly whether they think that their 
assistance has had a direct impact on good governance and/or democratization in their countries during 
the last decade. Based on their experience, the follow-up question was which recommendations the 
World Bank and the IMF can draw from this experience in terms of increasing country ownership of 
the national development strategy (see Annex 4-2, questions 6.3. and 6.5).  
Combined results to these two questions are presented in Table 4-10. This table shows that despite its 
economic mandate all three perspectives figure in the World Bank's strategic discourse. However, 
individual assessments of accountability practices and corresponding recommendations do differ 
strongly. In the following, I will describe these positive and negative appraisals of the PRS approach, 
which have been grouped according to, first, the normative perspective on public accountability, sec-
ond, the operational phase of a standard accountability process.  
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Table 4-10: Recommendations for country ownership according to public accountability standard 
Standard Governance Effectiveness Empowerment 
Information Forum has enough  
investigative powers and 
information-processing 
capacities to credibly 
check executive behavior? 
Forum yields an accurate, 
timely and clear diagnosis 
of important dimensions of 
development actors'  
performance? 
Forum has the right to 
claim information from 
decision-makers about 
their conduct and the  
social consequences 
thereof? 
 Yes: continue to  
strengthen domestic fi-
nancial systems 
Yes: share knowledge and 
advice; strengthen PRS 
links to the budget 
Yes: continue to account 
for local circumstances 
in setting standards 
 No: strengthen real  
political checks and  
balances 
No: drop link between 
PRS and budget  
operations; align budget 
support to the country 
vision instead 
No: adhere to the  
principles of the  
approach, but put  
nationals in charge of the 
process 
Debate  Interaction concentrates 
on the conformity of  
executive behavior with 
domestic laws and norms? 
Ongoing dialogue with 
external partners and 
domestic stakeholders is 
about performance  
feedback? 
Discourse centers on the 
accordance of political 
decisions with the needs 
and interests of citizens? 
 Yes: ensure gradual con-
vergence of domestic and 
external systems; talk 
with governments about 
anti-corruption plans 
Yes: reinforce regular 
monitoring; broaden 
stakeholder participation 
Yes: support in-country 
dialogue on development 
priorities; align the PRS 
cycle better to political 
cycle 
 No: focus on real priorities 
in public investment to 
know where the money 
is spent 
No: stop pushing  
stakeholder participation; 
support sector strategies 
that also bring in other 
partners 
No: do not support a PRS 
blueprint; pay attention 
to programs of political 
parties 
Judgment Credible sanctions to  
punish and deter executive 
misbehavior? 
Voluntary anticipation 
and adoption of lessons 
learned from stakeholder 
dialogue? 
Sufficient incentives to 
respect the political and 
civil rights of citizens? 
 Yes: increase donor 
knowledge; improve  
donor coordination 
Yes: build technical  
capacities; let nationals 
define development  
priorities 
Yes: promote domestic 
demand for good  
governance; support 
governance reforms with 
local support 
 No: use conditionality 
again; be selective 
No: conduct retrospective; 
change approach 
No: do not impose  
ownership requirements 
 
4.6.2.1. The effectiveness perspective 
The first perspective focuses on increasing the effectiveness of aid and the question, whether the new 
aid modalities under the PRS approach stimulate aid intermediaries to focus consistently on achieving 
desirable development outcomes.  
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Information phase 
Optimists within this perspective claim that the PRS approach has yielded an accurate, timely and 
clear diagnosis of the government's development performance. In particular, they argue that the inter-
national financial institutions' new development approach has introduced a charter of shaping govern-
ment policies around one specific document. This has facilitated the discussion of development issues 
because in the past there were just government statements on development, but nothing like a full-
fledged national development strategy. To make these national strategies more realistic and to ensure 
that finances are used efficiently and effectively, optimists recommend that the IMF and World Bank 
should provide technical assistance and sound economic policy advice to assist governments in de-
signing evidence-based development programs. The international financial institutions should help 
their country partners to define realistic growth scenarios, to identify trade-offs, and to develop a 
standard program classification. Above all, it is recommended that the Bank and the Fund work with 
the government to align national and sector strategies more closely to the budget.  
By contrast, pessimists within the effectiveness perspective claim that the PRS approach does not have 
to yield an accurate, timely and clear diagnosis of the government's development performance. While 
it has brought some rationalization in terms of preparing and aligning different sector strategies, na-
tional poverty reduction strategies have not been seen as essential. Instead, a country’s own develop-
ment vision is seen as more important than the international financial institutions’ poverty reduction 
initiative. Therefore, pessimists recommend that the IMF and World Bank should drop the link be-
tween their lending instruments and the national poverty reduction strategies and align their financial 
support with existing national strategies. Pre-PRS national development plans and long-term country 
visions should be accepted and supported by international financial institutions if they are viable and 
well prepared.  
 
Debate phase 
With regard to the debate phase, optimists within the effectiveness perspective agree that the PRS 
approach has enriched and facilitated the dialogue about development performance feedback. In par-
ticular, domestic stakeholders are said to participate more in the in the definition of priorities, in the 
design of policies, and in the methodology of poverty reduction programs than with earlier structural 
adjustment programs. Moreover, the government is said to be more accountable to citizens and donors, 
since there is “constant reporting on PRS outcomes” (R9). To improve the dialogue among domestic 
stakeholders, optimists recommend that external partners should improve the reporting and reinforce 
the monitoring and evaluation of the content of poverty reduction strategies. Moreover, external part-
ners should keep on emphasizing the need to carry along other domestic stakeholders and support 
them directly by providing information in due time and engaging in systematic outreach activities. In 
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the end, greater trust and coordination among all stakeholders will help to define the appropriate path 
towards poverty reduction.  
However, pessimists within the effectiveness perspective counter that the dialogue about development 
performance feedback has not improved. Quite to the contrary, “interacting with civil society and all 
of this ownership debate” (R6) is seen to have weakened the way the World Bank works and has not 
brought any results at the domestic level. While pessimists do not deny that the process of preparing a 
national development strategy should be participatory and broadly representative of the diverse view-
points among organized society, they call attention to the fact that there are very few “carrots and 
sticks” that the World Bank and other partners can use today to force governments to do it. Moreover, 
they call for more pragmatism among external partners with regard to broad-based consultation pro-
cesses, because they can become much too expensive very quickly. Since aid delivery has become 
increasingly ineffective, pessimists thus recommend that the World Bank should stop pushing stake-
holder participation and, instead, support sector strategies that also bring other development partners 
to the negotiation table. In particular, the Bank should pick politically non-contentious, sound sector 
strategies in areas such as infrastructure, basic health interventions, and nutrition that provide a base 
for economic growth. It may even be more effective to move external funding to those competing sec-
tors that show more progress on policy reforms and are then rewarded.  
 
Judgment phase 
Finally, with regard to the judgment phase, optimists within the effectiveness perspective argue that 
under the PRS approach development partners voluntarily anticipate and adopt the lessons learned 
from performance feedback and stakeholder dialogue. For example, optimists argue that there has been 
a constant learning process at the World Bank that allowed them to reinforce even further the aid mo-
dalities available today. Correspondingly, there has been an improvement in aligning national poverty 
reduction strategies to the MDGs, since recipient governments used the PRS approach as a tool for 
delivering on its development programs. Optimists cite a broad range of lessons they learned over the 
past years. One lesson is to find the “government champions” (R5), that is, the key people to get in-
volved in aid delivery because they share with the Bank the poverty reduction objective and want to 
achieve it in a manner the Bank believes is a good one. In turn, this implies that the Bank should make 
limited use of external consultants but develop the capacities at the recipient country level. This in-
volves not only building appropriate technical capacities of the national agencies that manage the de-
livery of aid but also developing national capacities over the medium to long term, “starting with trai-
ning young people in universities across the world” (R32), because they would then be able to trans-
form their countries’ way of doing business. Another lesson is that the Bank should listen to the go-
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vernment and other stakeholders in the country in order to make sure that it supports a process or strat-
egy “that really reflects the priorities of the beneficiaries” (R3).  
Pessimists within the effectiveness perspective question that governments are committed to continuous 
improvement by stakeholder dialogue-induced focus on pro-poor results. They claim that they felt 
strong resistance of their partners in government who only responded to what the Bank wanted to hear. 
In their opinion, the PRS approach should be changed. However, since external partners base their 
assistance on poverty reduction strategies, they think that it is hard to omit these documents. Pessi-
mists thus recommend that the Bank should conduct a retrospective in order to learn whether poverty 
reduction strategies still hold value today.  
In sum, World Bank staff in support of the effectiveness perspective recommend that development 
partners should help build the technical capacities of domestic stakeholders so they can define their 
own priorities by their own approaches, while critics of the effectiveness perspective recommended an 
end to pushing broad-based stakeholder participation, and, instead, to support sector strategies that 
also bring in other development partners.  
 
4.6.2.2. The governance perspective 
The second perspective focuses on improving the quality of governance within the recipient state and 
the question, whether the new aid modalities under the PRS approach curtail the abuse of executive 
power and privilege.  
 
Information phase 
Optimists within this perspective claim that it is not broad-based consultation of domestic stakehold-
ers, but general budget support by external partners that helped to gather information on executive 
behavior. In particular, the GBS operations surrounding the PRS approach are said to have added 
much value to the work of the World Bank, because they helped to put in place new institutions or 
have strengthened existing ones that address poor governance within recipient countries. The process 
of providing annual budget supports is perceived to have improved the level of accountability in the 
management of public resources because within the domestic budget process public oversight institu-
tions were involved “to assert their authority and see themselves in achieving the expected results” 
(R42). And while their effectiveness remains to be seen, their creation and the fact that there is much 
greater interest in good governance with the new aid dynamics must be appreciated. Given that the 
multiplier effect of any small improvement in national systems is actually quite large, optimists within 
the governance perspective recommend that donors providing general budget support should continue 
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to work with governments to strengthen these systems, such as building capacities of external audit 
institutions and improving public financial management.  
The pessimists within the governance perspective counter that external efforts for strengthening do-
mestic systems had only a minimal effect on the governance environment because governance issues 
cannot properly be distinguished from the political process. Many things contribute to good gover-
nance in recipient countries and while recipient governments seem to be more accountable to their 
people, it is questionable if it has something to do with the PRS approach because it is difficult to se-
parate the forces. Moreover, pessimists hold that even if the PRS approach has achieved good eco-
nomic governance, it surely has not resulted in improved political governance. To strengthen real po-
litical checks on executive behavior, pessimists within the governance perspective recommend that 
stronger institutions need to underpin the PRS approach: involving parliament in the monitoring and 
approval of the executive’s national development strategy.  
 
Debate phase 
With regard to the debate phase, optimists within the governance perspective claim that the interaction 
between the executive branch of government and those monitoring its behavior has focused a lot on 
public financial management and oversight, auditing and control. While pro-poor programs and pro-
jects by the World Bank existed before, in many recipient countries donors felt the need “to fix the 
pipes” (R3), that is, the necessity to improve the quality of the national governance system through 
which their money flows. And even though political issues are not (and cannot be) explicitly targeted 
due to its mandate, the World Bank has focused much more on resource allocation, accountancy 
mechanisms and broader governance concerns under its new development approach. In line with this 
new focus, optimists within the governance perspective recommend that the World Bank should try to 
talk with the executive branch of government about their management of public resources and their 
anti-corruption plans. In countries where the PRS approach is the norm, they stress the importance of a 
“gradual convergence with the domestic political and accountability processes” (R33). If the World 
Bank succeeds in getting the principles of the approach, like sector alignment, budgeting strategies, 
monitoring of implementation and results, enshrined into their budget systems, then the PRS approach 
is not needed anymore.  
Again, pessimists within the governance perspective contend that the interaction between the execu-
tive branch of government and the donor community has improved the debate on the conformity of 
actions with principles of good governance. According to them, the influence of the PRS approach 
was not very visible, because it permeated the governance structures of the recipient state, where en-
forcement of the rule of law is often weak. Alternatively, pessimists recommend that the World Bank 
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should focus on decisions for public investments to know where the government actually spends the 
money.  
 
Judgment phase 
Regarding the judgment phase, optimists within the governance perspective affirm that donors were 
able to exercise credible deterrence vis-à-vis the executive with their GBS operations. In particular, 
donors providing general budget support have “pushed a lot for transparency, accountability, and good 
financial management” (R12). Also, the World Bank is getting more and more interested in improving 
the quality of governance through increasing the accountability around aid. World Bank decisions are 
increasingly seen to have political consequences and the Bank is more and more mindful of this effect 
and tries to improve its approach. Optimists thus recommend that the World Bank should deepen its 
knowledge on governance and accountability in order to adapt to changing circumstances and practic-
es. In addition, they recommend that donors providing budget support should increase their coordina-
tion. In particular, they recommend that the IMF should insist more that “governments implement their 
budgets the way they are written” (R9) and not override their deficits. To have more leverage, it would 
be useful to have the two sister institutions giving the same message in the sense that both institutions 
should write the message in their staff reports and then send it to their respective Boards.  
By contrast, pessimists within the governance perspective challenge the notion of credible deterrence 
of budget-supporting donors vis-à-vis recipient governments. According to them, donors have given 
up their leverage view, as they are trying to build good governance together with their country part-
ners. The World Bank is said to be “a bit schizophrenic” (R6) since it oscillates between leveraging 
reforms and feeling the pressure to disburse. Pessimists within the governance perspective thus re-
commend that the World Bank should focus more on its own goals and take up a leveraging view 
again, such as using policy conditions. The World Bank should also be more selective and prepare for 
the eventuality where there will be no agreement. This is exactly what ownership implies.  
In sum, World Bank staff in support of the governance perspective recommends that the international 
financial institutions should improve their knowledge and coordination in providing general budget 
support, while critics of the governance perspective recommend that the World Bank should focus 
more on what the Bank itself wants to do, and to return to their traditional lending approach.  
 
4.6.2.3. The empowerment perspective 
The third perspective focuses on strengthening political and civil rights of organized society, and the 
question, whether the new aid modalities under the PRS approach give all citizens and their represent-
atives the right to participate equally in the political decision-making process.   
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Information phase 
Optimists within this perspective argue that the PRS approach had a modest impact on increasing civil 
liberties because people are better informed than they used to be and as a result, “scandals are blown 
out in the public” (R9). In particular, the broad-based consultation of civil society is said to have cre-
ated a “social infrastructure” (R19) that was not available before, which raised people’s hopes and 
made them pay more attention. Moreover, it made the national development strategy serve the political 
cycle. The corresponding recommendation for the World Bank is rather simple: continue to account 
for local circumstances when setting standards.  
In contrast to the optimists, pessimists within the empowerment perspective do not perceive the PRS 
approach to have increased civil liberties in recipient countries. Its contribution is said to be marginal 
because degrees of civil liberties came before that with the change of regime. Political and civil rights 
have not improved or even deteriorated depending on a country’s participation in the PRS approach. 
Rather, political governance in recipient countries is said to have improved in response to the pressure 
of donors. Accordingly, pessimists recommend that the World Bank and other donors should adhere to 
the principles of the approach, but stop driving the process. Country nationals should be put in charge 
of the process and define their own development priorities by their own development approaches.  
 
Debate phase 
With regard to the debate phase, optimists within the empowerment perspective claim that the gov-
ernment’s discourse with the people has improved or is improving. Particularly in countries that were 
closed, the PRS approach has helped to allow for dialogue between domestic authorities and their con-
stituencies. It has provided more information on pro-poor policies as the basis of this dialogue and has 
thus strengthened the democratization process in these countries. In other words, it has created a feed-
back loop to let the government know what kind of policies the people at the local level were interest-
ed in and how they saw their implementation. In particular, locally elected representatives were said to 
have “felt the hot seat” (R9), because people were asked to vote on things within their line of sight, 
like electricity and water services. According to the optimists, the PRS approach has thus instituted 
this culture that recipient governments have to deliver instead of waiting for the donors to pay because 
the electoral rhetoric shows that governments sense that citizens will judge them according to whether 
things are better. However, optimists are realistic enough to see that citizens are not yet at the point of 
using their vote to reward or punish policy, because “democratization is kind of a hard thing to put 
together in many places” (R9). Optimists within the empowerment perspective recommend that exter-
nal actors should support the policy dialogue in the country and try to figure out how to make the PRS 
process more participative, since recipient countries may have different forms of political exclusion. In 
addition, they recommend aligning the PRS process to the national political cycle.  
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By contrast, pessimists within the empowerment perspective do not perceive that the government’s 
discourse with the people has improved in terms of focusing on their needs and interests. Rather, gov-
ernments or people within the government are said to follow their own agenda. In order to increase 
their standing in the world, they were more interested in “majoring progress in improving the MDGs 
than in accounting to anybody” (R13). Due to peer pressure, the PRS approach thus may have in-
creased governments’ efforts at increasing transparency, but not their accountability towards domestic 
constituencies. The only way out is seen in discontinuing the PRS approach. Pessimists argue that 
while a government in an authoritarian country can enact a blueprint for development, these are empty 
documents because citizens have no mechanisms to hold the government accountable to its own strat-
egy. Pessimists thus recommend stopping pushing PRS blueprints, because the World Bank cannot 
have a policy framework that it can sell to everybody. As an alternative, pessimists suggest that the 
World Bank and other donors should pay more attention to the ruling party’s program – while respect-
ing opposition’s demands to the greatest degree possible – when setting out their strategic direction 
and embarking on new projects.  
 
Judgment phase 
Regarding the judgment phase, optimists argue that the PRS approach can provide incentives for na-
tional decision-makers to respect and deepen citizens’ rights and their control of political decisions. 
While the domestic context is clearly most influential, external actors can play a catalytical role at 
best. Particularly when aligned to the domestic context, donors can help to contribute to good govern-
ance in recipient countries. The most promising channel is seen in strengthening domestic demand for 
good governance. However, the World Bank should not be “naïve in thinking that only the PRS pro-
cess will bring about change” (R26), but it should actively promote the demand side of governance 
through transparency and support of political reforms for which there is local support. For example, 
many respondents report that the PRS approach had an indirect positive influence on good governance 
through its promotion of ongoing decentralization reforms.  
Pessimists within the empowerment perspective rather perceive the opposite to be true. According to 
them, democratization and good governance are all domestically determined. There is nothing that 
donors or the international community can do to influence political processes from the outside. De-
mocracy is a “local dish” (R31) and demands its own narrative to be sustainable. Moreover, pessimists 
within this perspective are not aware that the PRS process should or could be linked to democratic 
transitions in recipient countries. They highly doubt the PRS process has this transformative potential. 
Consequently, pessimists recommend not making civic participation in the preparation of a PRSP a 
donor requirement. A voluntary approach towards citizen inclusion in national decision-making would 
be better because the compulsory participatory process created incentives for autocratic governments 
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to do a “wrong kind of consultation” (R10). While it probably had been a mistake on part of the inter-
national community to insist on the participatory process, a voluntary participatory process would at 
least give clear signals to donors about the government’s intent to be responsive to its citizens. In gen-
eral, however, pessimists hold that the international financial institutions can do “very little in terms of 
increasing country ownership” (R16) because their mandate is limited to economic issues, but owner-
ship is a political issue that has to be sorted out domestically.  
In sum, World Bank staff in support of the empowerment perspective recommends that the World 
Bank should continue to promote the demand side of governance but only if there is also local support, 
while critics of the empowerment perspective recommend that the Bank should adhere to the princi-
ples of the PRS approach but not impose them on recipient countries.  
 
4.6.3. The transformative potential of the PRS approach 
The focus of this subsection is on the transformative potential that may underlie the World Bank’s new 
development approach. In particular, it analyzes the relative importance of the goals that follow from 
these normative perspectives in different country contexts and ten years after the PRS approach has 
been introduced. In the following analysis, it will be shown that, parallel to the tension of the PRS 
approach, its potential also lies at the interfaces of spaces where domestic stakeholders and external 
partners interact, and their embeddedness in the broader field of democratic accountability in recipient 
countries. The analysis is based on information provided by the answers to two questions that concen-
trate on the normative content of the PRS approach. First, World Bank staff was asked whether they 
would say that the PRS approach is more successful in achieving good governance in countries with a 
higher or, rather, with a lower starting level of democracy and/or sophistication of institutions. Given 
that the PRS approach has been implemented now for more than ten years, World Bank staff was fur-
ther asked whether they think that the PRS approach still holds value for the IMF and World Bank or 
whether they think that it needs to be changed (see Annex 4-2, questions 6.2. and 6.4.).  
Table 4-11 presents aggregate numbers with regard to the transformative potential, respectively value 
seen by World Bank staff ten years after the PRS approach made its entrance in the global aid archi-
tecture (question 6.4.).  
Table 4-11: Potential of the PRS approach in recipient countries 
Potential DEM-GBS GBS-PRS PRS-DEM Number of responses Percentage of total 
Yes 11 23 6 40 80% 
No 3 5 2 10 20% 
Total 14 28 8 50 100% 
Note: N=50; 6 missing; 4 respondents without reason-giving; 3 respondents with a change in value at one  
interface; 5 respondents with value at two interfaces, and 1 respondent with value at three interfaces, number of  
responses is thus 50. 
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Results show that a clear majority of the interviewed World Bank staff (80%) still see value in the 
PRS approach based on their experience of the first ten years of formulating and implementing nation-
al poverty reduction strategies. Furthermore, the interplay of different accountability fields is not only 
where the tension are but also where the potential of the PRS approach lies, namely in a country-
owned poverty reduction strategy that also serves as basis to forge development partnerships (PRS-
GBS); in a government-controlled domestic budget process that is also externally monitored (DEM-
GBS); and in a rights-based development approach that is increasingly being claimed by a nascent 
civil society (PRS-DEM).  
In contrast to the subsection before, which described three distinct normative perspectives held by 
World Bank staff to promote transparency and accountability around development assistance, this 
subsection focuses on the particular goals of the PRS approach that are derived from these three per-
spectives and on the conditions under which these goals could be achieved. In the following, I will 
analyze these goals and conditions based on evidence from the World Bank experts.  
 
4.6.2.1. GBS-PRS field potential 
In line with the institutional view of the World Bank, the majority of the interviewed staff (28 re-
spondents) sees the primary goal of the PRS approach in reducing poverty and promoting growth in 
developing countries.  
According to the advocates of the new development approach, the key value of the PRS approach is 
that it has strengthened the pro-poor focus of the World Bank’s development efforts. One respondent 
puts it as follows:  
“It is critical for countries to have a development strategy, and to know how they intend 
to reduce poverty. It is not important what the document is called. What important is that 
it should be a viable strategy and have good buy-in within the country." (R30) 
Developing countries need to have an integrated strategy to address the challenges of underdevelop-
ment, especially if they depend on external assistance. PRSPs provide the first point of reference for 
the IMF and World Bank to discuss with the government what they are going to support within the 
national development strategy. They thus provide the basis to forge partnerships with development 
partners. More specifically, respondents value that PRSPs and their underlying principles have shifted 
the focus towards the poor and the provision of basic social services, because, with PRSPs, domestic 
stakeholders participate more in the definition of the objective, the policy, and the methodology than 
with the former structural adjustment programs. World Bank support is said to have changed in terms 
of strengthening results-orientation and internal consensus-seeking regarding the long-term develop-
ment. However, it is crucial that the government also uses the PRSP as a development tool. According 
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to the majority of World Bank staff, these documents possess value only if the government is commit-
ted to achieving results under the PRS approach and does not hold itself accountable to any other plan. 
Success of the PRS approach thus depends ultimately on government leadership and what the govern-
ments make out of it (with GBS-PRS potential: R1, R3, R4, R5, R9, R10, R11, R13, R14, R16, R19, 
R26, R27, R29, R30, R32, R34, R37, R41, R43, R44, R45, and R46).  
By contrast, critics of the PRS approach that refer to the poverty reduction goal claim that poverty is 
still a challenge on the African continent and more effort is needed by development partners for eradi-
cating poverty in all its forms everywhere. These critics argue that the main problem is that the World 
Bank has been very ideological on the PRS approach, as opposed to its pragmatic approach with for-
mer structural adjustment lending. PRSPs are not as essential as some people within the World Bank 
believe (or wanted to believe) because poverty reduction has been a goal that was externally imposed, 
but did not figure among the countries’ own development priorities. Moreover, PRSPs may look good 
on paper, but they are not very useful for the Bank to identify areas to support. Preparing a national 
strategy for reducing poverty means making choices, but PRSPs do not make choices. Due to the in-
ternal consensus-seeking process, PRSPs are relatively general and vague and politically acceptable, 
but not very contentious or disciplining or prioritized. While the PRS approach used to be strong, giv-
en its pro-poor focus and financial leverage, critics hold that it is becoming weaker now. The PRS 
approach thus needs to change in order to be adapted to a changing world where global interaction 
plays a very significant role (without GBS-PRS potential: R6, R12, R27, R31, and R42).  
Bringing these two perspectives together, we can look at the conditions under which the goal of pov-
erty reduction may be achieved. Advocates and critics agree that the PRS approach is more successful 
in countries with higher levels of democracy and matured institutions at the start of the PRS process 
because democratic institutions and processes create the right conditions for developing a sound PRSP 
and implementing it effectively. The government is more accountable to the poor when people are able 
to vote and level power, which in turn causes better monitoring of the implementation of pro-poor 
policies. However, as a reference document for donors, the elaboration of a PRSP is not seen to be 
dependent on the type of political regime. The process of preparing a national poverty reduction strat-
egy and implementing pro-poor policies can be also very efficient in autocratic regimes that do not 
allow for any stakeholder participation in national decision-making. It does not need a democratically 
elected government per se to implement the PRS approach. Rather, PRSPs can play a useful role in 
both country contexts. While PRSPs cannot replace democracy, they are said: “to blossom in a demo-
cratic setting” (R14). By contrast, in countries with dysfunctional institutions, PRSPs can help to build 
a national consensus around a policy agenda, which will help in framing donor intervention. More 
important than the political regime are the technical capacities available in a country. Advocates of the 
PRS approach thus argue that there is no need to change the approach but to improve the PRSPs in 
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terms of their realism, their presentation, and their link to poverty reduction lending. The national de-
velopment strategy should be viable in order to achieve poverty reduction.  
 
4.6.2.2. DEM-GBS field potential 
Beyond poverty reduction, a second goal of the PRS approach that is often wrapped in financial terms 
is to strengthen the democratic process in recipient countries. This goal was mentioned by only half as 
many respondents who referred to the economic goal dimension of the PRS approach (14).  
According to the advocates of the political goal dimension, the PRS approach still holds value ten 
years after its introduction, because today the international financial institutions are essentially sup-
porting the government’s own budget process and domestic accountability institutions. The important 
innovation that had a substantial impact is that the donor community told the government to get all 
sectors together, to formulate a national development strategy, to link this strategy with the general 
budget, and that then donors would directly support and monitor budget execution. The following 
quote is typical for the political agenda related to the domestic budget process:  
“It is the budget process, that is in a sense the beginning of a serious discussion of the 
budget as a national instrument of economic policy. Depending on the level of democracy 
or participation within the country, this means that everyone – through the parliament – 
gets inside or gets at least to be involved in how the money is spent." (R8)  
In particular, GBS operations are breaking with past aid practices. Before, both line ministries and 
donors felt much more comfortable in dealing directly with each other. It was easier for line ministries 
to go directly to donor agencies for funding and get an own sort of budget support arrangement. But as 
a result, this bilateral way of delivering aid bypassed all domestic accountability institutions at the 
recipient country level. Today, all donors sit around a table with the government at big conferences 
where they deliberate and coordinate their general budget support. Line ministries, in turn, are told that 
they need to go to the Ministry of Finance, and to the Cabinet, and to the Parliament, or whatever insti-
tution is there, and actually jump into the fight and debate their own budgets. This is “sometimes ugly, 
sometimes painful, but that’s the democratic process” (R8). Opening the national budget process to 
outsiders is by far the most important initiative for these countries, because one project will make no 
difference, but changing the budget process in recipient countries does, because governments have 
complete ownership over their budgets, for better or for worse (with DEM-GBS potential: R4, R5, R6, 
R7, R8, R9, R11, R12, R15, R35, and R36).  
By contrast, those respondents who do not perceive the PRS approach as having strengthened demo-
cratic institutions and processes, argue that originally, when PRSCs were designed, there was the be-
lief that these are effective aid or assistance tools to execute the PRSPs and thereby strengthen domes-
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tic political systems given the quality of public financial management. But today, PRSCs have become 
“a machine” (R12) which is, once institutionalized, difficult to stop. Donors have forgotten why they 
have exactly supported domestic budgets in the first place. Today, general budget support is only a 
nice way for donors to disburse vast amounts of money. Looked at from the recipient side, PRSCs 
have become “entitlements” (R38) prompting little impetus on policy and institutional reforms. These 
critics thus see no value anymore in this type of donor assistance tool (without DEM-GBS potential: 
R12, R38, and R39).  
Critics and advocates of the political goal dimension agree that donors’ use of the instrument is crucial 
for its success. In particular, they argue that external forces definitely can have an impact, especially in 
highly aid-dependent countries with stable institutions and a long-standing relationship with the World 
Bank. In such an environment, multi-donor general budget support is surely more effective. But its 
impact is probably higher in countries, where there is a lower level of democracy. General budget 
support should thus be given first and foremost to countries with weak institutions and bad governance 
because it comes with many efforts to improve the system. While advocates argue that the PRS ap-
proach is more needed in countries starting with a low level of democracy, because even a dictator 
should be held accountable, critics put it the other way round in saying that the PRS approach is rather 
useless in any country with any kind of elections, because the ruling party has its own program for 
which it is held accountable by the electorate.  
 
4.6.2.3. PRS-DEM field potential 
A final goal of the PRS approach that appeared inherently in the answers of the smallest fraction of the 
interviewed World Bank staff (8 respondents) is to deepen democratic rights and practices in recipient 
countries.  
The compulsory participatory process is crucial to this perspective, as the following quote shows: 
“So, what I found was that the PRSP process had more important benefits than the actual 
PRSP, which is very difficult to do anyway. I mean, it is very hard for any country writ-
ing, basically, a blueprint for the next four years for development. But the process itself 
had all these important benefits, like being more open […] and transparent, and actually 
giving information and showing what the trade-offs are and how decisions are made.” 
(R2) 
According to the advocates within this perspective, the participatory process holds value in itself in 
terms of empowering domestic constituencies. Particularly in the first-generation of PRSPs, intervie-
wees report that they have witnessed a fascinating process with the result that they became actual con-
verts of the whole approach. In countries that have been relatively closed historically, the PRS process 
238 
is said to have had important benefits like opening a “window of opportunity” (R2) for civil society to 
participate and for government to be more open and transparent in its policy-making. In particular, the 
change in donor reporting from joint assessments to advisory notes written by Bank and Fund staff 
reflects this change in audience towards citizens in recipient countries (with PRS-DEM potential: R2, 
R5, R18, R20, R21, and R33).  
By contrast, those respondents who do not perceive the PRS approach as having strengthened demo-
cratic rights and practices claim that the PRS approach is dated and its value eroding. While they 
acknowledge that there used to be a positive value in the first rounds of PRSPs, with the second 
rounds, the participatory process become degenerate. In its present form, the PRS approach brings 
little added value “as long as it remains a requirement for the Bank and the Fund” (R17). Aid-
dependent countries are preparing their PRSPs only because the internal financial institutions are in-
sisting on it. But civil society participation is not truly home-grown, and is not claimed by domestic 
constituencies. Donors are driving the process, as shown by all the money that is wasted on the prepa-
ration of PRSPs (without PRS-DEM potential: R2 and R17).  
Advocates and critics of the PRS approach agree that the value of the PRS approach depends on the 
political regime. On the one hand, advocates assume that in less democratic countries there could be a 
demonstration effect by the PRS approach. If the participatory process is done well and genuinely, it 
could have a positive impact on the government to be more responsive to the needs and interests of its 
citizens. On the other hand, critics tend to think that in already highly democratic countries, an entirely 
donor-driven participatory process could have a counterproductive effect. However, both groups gen-
erally agree that it is not clear whether it can have an impact at all.  
To sum it up, the transformative potential of the PRS approach lies at the interfaces of different ac-
countability forums, encouraging (or impeding) domestic efforts aimed at achieving poverty reduction, 
procedural and/or substantive forms of democracy. While critics affirm that the approach has generally 
lost value over time, advocates, in turn, counter that the potential of the PRS approach can – depend-
ing on specific goal dimension – be especially valuable in high-capacity countries (poverty reduction), 
in aid-dependent countries (procedural democracy) and/or non-democratic countries (substantive de-
mocracy).  
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4.7. Discussion 
The question this chapter wanted to answer was if and how the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach 
has changed the relations between donors and recipients of foreign aid as compared to earlier devel-
opment efforts.  
Previous research approached this question from an economic perspective derived from the official 
goal of reducing poverty in developing countries. While sympathetic insiders claimed that aid relations 
have changed in terms of strengthening recipient government’s responsibility to its citizens, critics 
counter that this change has not been to the benefit of the impoverished populations in the developing 
world (see Hickey and Mohan 2008; Komives 2011; Malena et al. 2004; Winters 2010; World Bank 
and GTZ 2008; World Bank and IMF 2005). Through using the concept of surrogate accountability as 
an analytical lens, this chapter has provided a more comprehensive and democratic understanding of 
accountability than the previous concept that has shaped scholarly debate and development practice. It 
has not focused on assessing the pro-poor impact of the aid modalities under the PRS approach, but 
rather on understanding the new aid-accountability dynamics from a more political perspective.  
Given that many of these new dynamics are hidden from the public eye, empirical evidence of this 
chapter has been based on the expert knowledge and subjective experiences of those being directly 
involved in the new aid practices. More specifically, insights have been derived from people at the 
African Region Department of the World Bank who shared their knowledge on how they perceived 
aid delivery under the PRS approach and whether World Bank’s operational procedures have changed 
as compared to past aid practices. Using interview and survey data from a sample of 50 World Bank 
experts who have worked in 20 African countries with second-generation poverty reduction strategies, 
the qualitative analysis of this data has offered general and comparative evidence on the World Bank’s 
strategic discourse, but also on its changing operational practice under the PRS approach. In particular, 
aid relationships between the Bank and borrowing countries were found to have changed in three dif-
ferent ways.  
First, the qualitative analysis was able to show that when the PRS approach was introduced, the World 
Bank followed a direct strategy based on the use of positive and negative incentives for building the 
capacities of social and administrative accountability forums at the recipient country level. However, 
as a way of reducing the tension between surrogate and democratic accountability demands, the Bank 
increasingly used a more indirect strategy based on a mix of technical support and political dialogue 
aimed at strengthening the answerability of recipient governments within the domestic electoral and 
political arena. This finding speaks directly to previous research on social accountability mechanisms 
as a means of securing the interests of the poor beneficiaries and of those who claim to speak in their 
name (see Malena et al. 2004; Komives 2011). Both, sympathetic insiders and critical outsiders, have 
not looked beyond the compulsory participatory process in aid-receiving countries that has institution-
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alized an accountability arrangement giving citizens (especially poor citizens) voice to directly de-
mand greater responsiveness from service providers, but that has also provided an opportunity for civil 
society organizations to access resources and thereby secure their own organizational interests. Neither 
the “PRSP derivatives” (GTZ 2005: 15) for implementing national poverty reduction strategies nor 
their interplay with existing domestic accountability mechanisms have been considered by these 
scholars in the cited literature. By contrast, findings from this chapter suggest that different spaces or 
fields of accountability co-exist under the PRS approach and that their interaction causes tension in 
development practice. World Bank staff indicate that they felt contradictions under the PRS approach 
at the interface between the formulation and the implementation of the national poverty reduction 
strategy (PRS-GBS); also, at the interface between the domestic budget process and the harmonization 
and alignment of external operations in support of domestic budgets (DEM-GBS), and finally, at the 
interface between the externally-induced poverty reduction strategy cycle and the domestically-driven 
electoral cycle (PRS-DEM). As a way of reducing this tension, the Bank increasingly used a more 
indirect strategy based on a mix of technical support and political dialogue aimed at strengthening the 
answerability of recipient governments within electoral and political arenas at the recipient country 
level.  
A second result from the qualitative analysis is that this shift in strategic orientation went along with 
the introduction of increased participatory mechanisms for holding recipient governments accountable. 
While a broad range of theoretical models of democratic accountability is simultaneously used in the 
Bank’s strategic discourse to legitimize accountability arrangements surrounding aid, the analysis 
found that over time, the operational practice moved from the delegation logic inherent to traditional 
aid delivery to broad-based participation of domestic stakeholders and external partners in the govern-
ance of aid. This result may be compared with those internal reviews and outside critics that use the 
notion of mutual accountability to describe the PRS approach from an aid effectiveness perspective 
(see World Bank and IMF 2005; Winters 2010). While the international financial institutions claim 
that there is no inherent tension between domestic and external demands for better financial manage-
ment and results-oriented performance, critics do not see much change in the current aid architecture 
as donors’ own accountability towards governments and end users in recipient countries has not 
changed. Echoing the findings of the internal reviews, critics often adopt the language of the interna-
tional financial institutions as well. Unlike these earlier reviews of the PRS approach, this chapter has 
tried to go beyond the rhetoric of mutual accountability and has focused on the practical mechanisms 
by which development actors hold each other accountable. In particular, it showed that in the first 
iteration of the approach, in which public accountability was based on a delegation model, the particu-
lar accountability mechanisms granted legitimacy to donors for letting recipient governments define 
their own development priorities while being instrumental for recipient governments in reducing the 
number of conditions on multi-donor budget support. Over time, however, the legitimacy function 
changed. With the second iteration of the approach, in which public accountability in the PRS field 
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was based more on a participation model, the specific accountability mechanisms granted legitimacy 
to recipient governments for taking the interests of local populations into account, while they became 
instrumental for donors in allowing them to participate in national policy-making.  
Finally, qualitative results also showed that the goals to be achieved by the World Bank’s new aid 
modalities were found to have changed as compared to past aid practices. Today, development assis-
tance by the World Bank is evaluated primarily on basis of its contribution to reducing poverty in a 
developing country. However, by analyzing the perceived impact and recommendations related to 
particular phases of the surrogate accountability process, the more hidden democratic agenda comes 
into view. Beyond poverty, the analysis showed that the new aid practices also serve to strengthen the 
democratic process and citizens rights in developing countries through improving the quality of gov-
ernance institutions and deepening democratic practices. This final result may be compared with pre-
vious research on general budget support and the role donors have played in internal accountability 
systems of recipient states (World Bank and GTZ 2008; Hickey and Mohan 2008). While sympathetic 
insiders argue that general budget support provides the necessary incentives at the operational level of 
public administration for a recipient state to be accountable to its citizens, outside critics contend that 
the lines of accountability between governments and citizens have become blurred and confused 
through donors who are directly supporting the general budget. Empirical evidence of the last part of 
the qualitative analysis shows the necessity to clearly separate between normative standards and insti-
tutionalized arrangements of accountability. While both insiders and outsiders describe the same insti-
tutionalized arrangement within recipient states, they may evaluate these arrangements according to 
different normative perspectives – but this is often not made explicit. In general, previous reviews took 
the economic goal dimension as a benchmark for evaluating the new development approach. By con-
trast, this research revealed the more hidden democratic agenda underlying the PRS approach. In par-
ticular, the qualitative analysis showed that the interplay of different accountability fields at the recipi-
ent country level is not only where the tension, but also where the potential of the PRS approach lie, 
namely in a country-owned poverty reduction strategy that also serve as basis to forge development 
partnerships (PRS-GBS); in a government-controlled domestic budget process that is also externally 
monitored (DEM-GBS); and in a rights-based development approach that is increasingly being 
claimed by a nascent civil society (PRS-DEM). Among these three interfaces, the last two interfaces 
clearly aim at strengthening democratization processes in recipient countries.  
In sum, results from the empirical analysis suggest that the transformative potential of the PRS ap-
proach is not related to one specific aid modality, but lies at the interfaces between different aid mo-
dalities and national political systems. The two central aid modalities of the PRS approach represent 
different fields of accountability where donors may act as surrogates of citizens in holding govern-
ments accountable. Correspondingly, there is not one strategy or one mechanism or one goal, but dif-
ferent strategies and different mechanisms and different goals that the IMF and World Bank have used 
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for demanding accountability from aid recipient. These fields where donors hold recipient govern-
ments accountable are embedded within broader domestic accountability systems where accountability 
runs both vertically and horizontally between the recipient state and organized society. Depending on 
the specific interaction of the surrogate accountability process with the standard accountability process 
in recipient countries, the democratic potential of the PRS approach may thus differ.  
Based on these insights from the inner circle of the PRS approach, the next chapter will assess the 
impact of different types of multilateral development assistance on democratization processes in reci-
pient countries.  
 
 
  
243 
5. Development practice II: impact on democratization?69 
5.1. Introduction 
For decades, the IMF and World Bank have provided large volumes of foreign aid for implementing a 
specific set of policy reforms aimed at modifying the economy in developing countries. These eco-
nomic policies were often forced on recipient governments without taking the needs and interests of 
the affected populations into account (Przeworski 1991: 182-183). However, the way how the IFIs 
deliver aid to developing countries has fundamentally changed with the introduction of the PRS ap-
proach. The reform agenda is not imposed from the outside anymore but is derived from a broad-based 
participatory process within recipient countries themselves, by which domestic stakeholders define 
their own development priorities. Furthermore, aid modalities do not bypass democratic institutions 
and procedures. General budget support is viewed as an important aid coordination and harmonization 
devise that builds on and reinforces domestic accountability systems (de Renzio 2006: 629; Driscoll, 
Christiansen and Booth 2005: 34). Given that the new aid modalities rely on country systems and pro-
cedures, the question this chapter wants to answer is, whether and under which conditions this new 
type of aid, as opposed to other types of IMF and World Bank support, has made any meaningful dif-
ference in terms of strengthening democracy in recipient countries.  
International development aid has many important benefits such as providing goods and services to 
impoverished populations. However, development resources can also be problematic when they create 
cash flows that autocratic rulers find easy to appropriate for their own purposes (Bader and Faust 
2014; Boone 1996; Kosack and Tobin 2006). Taking an explicit “democratic accountability” perspec-
tive, this chapters proposes that the fundamental problem with foreign aid is that poor people, or the 
demos, in unstable and/or autocratic countries are often too weak to hold their governments accounta-
ble. They lack the capacity to sanction their rulers in case of poor performance. If democratic account-
ability in recipient countries does not work, then donors who seek to strengthen popular control in 
recipient countries have two options. They may either directly empower democratic accountability 
holders in order that they achieve the capacity to sanction their governments themselves or they may 
sanction recipient governments on behalf of the original accountability holders in surrogate accounta-
bility forums (Rubenstein 2007: 624).  
                                                     
69 A shorter version of this chapter has been published as “Aid Modalities Matter: The Impact of Different World 
Bank and IMF Programs on Democratization in Developing Countries”, in International Studies Quarterly 60 
(3): 427-439 (Sophia Limpach, together with Kassandra Birchler and Katharina Michaelowa). For the sake of 
consistency, plural verb forms concerning this publication have been replaced with singular forms, notably in the 
sections on data and operationalization (5.5.), research design (5.6.), and the first part of the statistical analysis 
on the general impact of different aid types on democratization (5.7.1 and 5.7.2.). 
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Recent field experiments in developing countries confirm that donor strategies aimed at enhancing the 
transparency of public policy and providing opportunities for public scrutiny can have substantial ef-
fects on political behavior (for an overview, see Humphreys and Weinstein 2009). Those studies find, 
for instance, that the threat of an audit reduces corruption (Olken 2007), and that citizen oversight has 
a powerful effect on the quality of local health-care delivery (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009). These 
findings suggest that when more information on politicians’ performance is available (e.g., relative to 
neighbouring communities), and also when voters’ knowledge of standards for evaluating local politi-
cians’ performance improves (e.g., through information about budget size and mandated responsibili-
ties), citizens are indeed more likely to sanction poor-performing officials on election dates and, as a 
result, politicians’ performance in fear of electoral sanctioning improves (Gottlieb 2016; Grossman 
and Michelitch 2018).  
An alternative strategy is that donors – as a surrogate – substitute for democratic accountability hold-
ers in one or several phases of the accountability process: setting standards, collecting information, 
going into the debate, and most importantly, passing judgment followed by sanctions (Rubenstein 
2007: 621-622). Given that sanctions are the weakest link under conditions of extreme inequality that 
are typical for many aid-receiving countries, the role of donors is most important in the last phase. 
International financial institutions sanction recipient governments by attaching conditions to the de-
velopment resources they provide. Defined as “a mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or 
promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an international financial institution or 
other agency will provide specified amounts of financial assistance” (Killick 1998: 6), aid conditional-
ity mainly serves as a sanctioning devise in surrogate accountability forums where domestic stake-
holders and external partners interact. Like the power of elections in the domestic realm, the power of 
conditionality as a sanctioning devise may stem both from its actual use (‘corrective effect’) and from 
the belief that it might be used (‘deterrent effect’).  
In this chapter, I take insights from the mutual accountability and global governance literature, and 
introduce both into the aid and democratization literature. Regarding the latter, I extend a recent trend 
in the aid and democratization literature that adopts a more nuanced approach than that of prior schol-
arship. It includes going beyond a general assessment of the actual impact of aid by differentiating 
between different institutional and political contexts on both sides of the relationship (see, e.g., Beazer 
and Woo 2016; Dietrich and Wright 2015; Marchesi and Sabani 2014). Regarding the former, I build 
on preliminary research on mutual accountability showing that aid intermediaries hold each other ac-
countable either for the content of aid or the process of delivering aid (see Steer et al. 2009). I also 
build on the distinction between standard and surrogate accountability in the global governance litera-
ture (Rubenstein 2007). As a concept, surrogate accountability differs from mutual accountability in 
that it recognizes the primacy of domestic accountability holders in the governance of aid and thus 
perceives accountability arrangements around aid from a more democratic perspective.  
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In line with these strands of the literature, I do not treat all aid-giving as the same but distinguish be-
tween different aid types, characterized by different strategies and modalities concerning democratic 
accountability. I argue that the impact of development aid on democratization in recipient countries is 
depending on the political context and the specific targets of the intervention strategy. I also argue that 
aid modalities can themselves influence relevant institutional and political settings at the recipient 
country level. Jointly, these characteristics of aid imply greater responsibility on the part of the donors 
who substitute for citizens during one or more phases of the standard accountability process.  
Whether donors can credibly fulfill this role as sanctioning authority on behalf of citizens in aid-
receiving countries depends on their power vis-à-vis recipient governments. Among all donors, the 
IMF and World Bank probably possess the highest leverage. Both are large donors, and their assis-
tance often comes with specific conditions that, despite statutory prohibition of political interference, 
entail strong political consequences for recipient nations (see Killick 1995). Since they also serve as 
role models for many bilateral donors, their influence may even extend beyond the effect of the inter-
national financial institutions’ own resources.  
Given the broad range of lending instruments specifically available to them for fulfilling their role as 
surrogate accountability holder, I also expect some variation in the impact of their development assis-
tance on democratization in recipient countries. Those aid types that strategically engage or at least do 
not bypass democratic accountability holders in the development process should positively affect de-
mocratization in recipient countries. In contrast, those aid types that actively undermine or simply 
neglect their authority in defining the content of development strategies should negatively affect de-
mocratization. To examine these differences, I sort the different aid activities into four major catego-
ries of lending instruments: (i) World Bank investment projects, (ii) IMF stabilization programs, (iii) 
the IFIs’ structural adjustment programs and (iv) their more recent lending programs based on poverty 
reduction strategies.  
Using panel data for a sample of 100 developing countries over a period of 30 years, and controlling 
for a number of alternative explanations, the statistical analysis offers suggestive, but robust evidence 
for the impact of development aid on democratization conditional on aid type, recipient regime, and 
donor coordination. Empirical findings show that among all aid types of IMF and World Bank sup-
port, program-based aid under the PRS approach indeed has the strongest impact on democratization 
in recipient countries since this aid type both targets and respects democratic accountability more than 
other types of financial support. Furthermore, statistical results emphasize the relevance of the initial 
level of human rights in recipient countries, if aid is targeted at strengthening citizen empowerment; it 
could not find a similar effect of the prior level of democracy in recipient countries, if aid is targeted at 
improving governance quality. Instead, the degree of donor coordination seems central if the purpose 
is to strengthen democratic accountability in recipient countries. Despite their individual positive ef-
fects, poverty reduction programs jointly have a negative effect on the recipient's democratic institu-
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tions and procedures, suggesting political costs for recipient countries due to the international financial 
institutions’ failure to coordinate.  
This chapter proceeds as follows: It first reviews important contributions of the aid and democratiza-
tion literature. Next, the theoretical framework and its implications for the relationships between the 
four different lending types and democratization are presented. The following three sections discuss 
the data and operationalization of the hypotheses, introduce the econometric estimation strategy, and 
present the aggregate and disaggregate results. In the last two sections, the statistical results are com-
pared with the practical insights from World Bank experts and discussed in light of the previous re-
search:  
 
 
5.2. Previous research 
Existing research on aid and democratization can be divided into three, partially overlapping, strands: 
pessimistic, optimistic, and conditional.  
Aid pessimists argue that foreign aid has a negative effect on democracy because it makes govern-
ments less accountable to their citizens. They assert that foreign aid is similar to other forms of non-
tax revenues, particularly oil, and other rents from mineral extraction. Tax revenues usually draw 
higher levels of public scrutiny and cannot easily be appropriated by the ruling elite. Foreign aid, how-
ever, reduces a government’s reliance on taxation, thereby replacing a relatively opaque resource flow 
for a more transparent one (see, e.g., Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2008; Knack 2004; 
Wright and Winters 2010).  
Conversely, aid optimists argue that aid is different from oil and other non-tax revenues. While these 
scholars generally acknowledge the negative baseline effect of non-tax revenues (including aid) on 
democratization, they claim that aid agencies can influence the impact of the resource transfer by im-
posing specific targets and choosing particular tactics that make aid money less vulnerable to appro-
priation by the state elites than the rents generated from natural resources (Bermeo 2011, 2016; Collier 
2006; Dietrich 2013; Dietrich and Wright 2015; Dunning 2004; Goldsmith 2001). In particular, aid 
specifically intended to improve government accountability and strengthen democratic institutions 
appears to have a positive effect (Carnegie and Marinov 2017; Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2007; 
Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2010; Nielsen and Nielson 2010; Scott and Steele 2011).  
Many of these more optimistic studies belong to the conditional strand within the aid and democratiza-
tion literature. They suggest that the impact of aid on democratization depends on aid type, the recipi-
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ent regime, aid-giving by other donors, and the time period allowed for aid to become effective (see 
Bermeo 2011; Dutta et al. 2013; Kersting and Kilby 2014; Kono and Montinola 2009; Licht 2010; 
Montinola 2010; Morrison 2007, 2009; Wright 2009). According to these scholars, past research on 
aid and democracy is flawed because it does not consider the conditions under which aid may have an 
impact on democracy. In particular, the willingness of the recipient regime to respect internationally 
agreed human rights and the cooperation among donors themselves stand out in this view. Moreover, 
timing is perceived as crucial in assessing the effects of aid on democracy.  
Analysis of the way how aid interacts with political regimes in recipient countries and the conditions 
under which aid can be more effective in fostering democracy is particularly relevant for the interna-
tional financial institutions because these institutions have the power and the means to intervene. First, 
their leverage capacity is presumably high, because the combination of their considerable resources 
with their use of conditionality gives the international financial institutions extraordinary power within 
the donor community at large. Since the IMF and World Bank do not have to bother about competing 
foreign policy agendas, their conditions are probably “much more extensively and consistently ap-
plied” across the developing world than those of bilateral donors (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 2, 33). In 
fact, bilateral donors often make financial commitments subject to countries being “on track” with IFI 
policy reforms, so that IFI interventions can have considerable leverage (Montinola 2010: 358). Sec-
ond, beyond their use of hard conditionality, the international financial institutions can also use softer 
means rooted in their sheer size and professionalism. Especially their new roles as “knowledge pro-
vider” and “active coordinator” of joint development efforts in recipient countries have enabled them 
to play a leadership role within the broader donor community (Brown and Fox 1998: 474-475; Kra-
marz and Momani 2013: 409; Olsen 2001: 147-148; White and Dijkstra 2003: 3).  
The effect of IFI lending on democratization has only been examined in few academic studies, perhaps 
because of the politically neutral appearance cherished and cultivated by these institutions. Barro and 
Lee (2005) examine the effect of the IMF’s stabilization programs on a number of different economic 
and political outcome variables, including democracy. Looking at the development of these variables 
over a period of five years, they find a small negative effect (Barro and Lee 2005: 1266). In contrast, 
econometric results by Nelson and Wallace (2005: 22-23) suggest that countries undergoing IMF pro-
grams show significantly stronger democratization and an increasingly positive trend over time. Final-
ly, Abouharb and Cingranelli’s (2006, 2007, 2009) pioneering analyses on the impact of IMF and 
World Bank lending on human rights finds that more prolonged exposure to structural conditionality is 
positively correlated with procedural democracy. However, it is negatively correlated with a wide 
range of civil, worker, and human rights that may be associated with substantive democracy. Some 
additional studies on the impact of the World Bank and the IMF on democratization exist, but they are 
constrained by more limited data coverage regarding time and geographical focus (Brown 2009; 
Moore and Scarrit 1990).  
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This research contributes to the literature by arguing that some of the seemingly contradictory effects 
observed in the existing studies could be related to specific types of IFI lending. More specifically, I 
argue that lending types differ in their set-up of surrogate accountability concerning democratic ac-
countability and – in line with the conditional strand in the aid and democratization literature – to po-
litical conditions at the donor and recipient side of the aid relationship. Like any accountability ar-
rangement, surrogate accountability arrangements display two characteristics: first, they set normative 
standards for evaluating the conduct of the power wielder, and second, they provide specific institu-
tionalized mechanisms to hold power wielders accountable for their conduct. If donors act as surro-
gates of citizens, they hold recipient governments accountable according to specific targets that define 
their intervention strategy, and they are doing so, within particular aid modalities. If we want to assess 
the democratic outcomes of foreign aid in recipient countries, we need first to know what the strategic 
focus and the modalities of a specific aid type are and under which conditions certain intervention 
strategies are most effective. In the following, I will thus first review how the literature has addressed 
these issues and then set forth a surrogate accountability framework to analyze the impact of different 
types of IFI lending on democratization in recipient countries.  
 
 
5.3. Theoretical framework 
5.3.1. Democratic targets 
The political effects of foreign aid may be based on different democratic targets that define donors' 
intervention strategies. The empirical literature on aid and democracy has generally distinguished be-
tween two types of aid: “development aid”, i.e., general development assistance aimed at enhancing 
economic growth and general welfare, as opposed to “democracy aid”, i.e., targeted democracy assis-
tance aimed at fostering fundamental freedoms and political rights in recipient countries. According to 
aid pessimists, development aid has no effect or a negative effect on democracy and the quality of 
governance in recipient countries (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Knack 2004; Rajan and Subramanian 
2007), since it provides state elites with a source of unaccountable revenue similar to or even worse 
than other non-tax revenues such as oil (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Djankov et al. 2008; 
Morrison 2009). By contrast, aid optimists confine their arguments to democracy aid whose delivery is 
associated with higher levels of democracy and civil liberties in their research (Finkel et al. 2007; 
Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2010; Scott and Steele 2011). It was only with the end of the Cold War and the 
diminution of geopolitical concerns that this type of political aid realized its full potential (Bermeo 
2011; Dunning 2004; Wrights 2009).  
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Scholars within the conditional strand of the literature suggest that both donor intent and delivery tac-
tics matter. For example, some argue that aid from democratic donors is given with the intent to trig-
ger democratic reforms, while the same is not true for aid from authoritarian donors (Bermeo 2011; 
Scott and Steele 2011). Others maintain that donors apply different tactics of delivering aid to recipi-
ents that may either come with or without the consent of the incumbent government (Dietrich 2013; 
Dietrich and Wright 2015). Thus, once these scholars take these differences into account, their find-
ings “do not fit neatly with ‘aid curse’ or ‘aid blessing’ labels” (Dietrich and Wright 2015: 232). 
Moreover, scholars within the conditional strand emphasize the need to disaggregate the dependent 
variable, since not all democracy aid is the same. To date, most research on aid and democratization 
estimates the impact of foreign aid on highly abstract, global indices of democracy (or a combination 
thereof), such as the regime indicator in the Polity database or Freedom House’s ratings of political 
freedom around the world. However, these broad indices are unable to capture more specific targets of 
donors’ democracy and governance assistance programs (Dietrich and Wright 2015: 217; Kalyvitis 
and Vlachaki 2010; 192).  
Exploring increasingly fine-grained data, a handful of studies estimate the impact of different types of 
foreign aid on a variety of democratic outcomes. Once they control for potential selection effects, an 
interesting picture emerges: Development aid (that comes with the consent of the recipient govern-
ment) may help to buy democratic reforms that are “largely procedural in nature, such as legalizing 
opposition parties and holding multiparty elections” (Dietrich and Wright 2015: 217). On the other 
hand, democracy aid (that comes against the will of the incumbent regime) may have a counterproduc-
tive effect on the human rights situation in a country, suggesting that authoritarian regimes facing in-
ternational pressure “become more zealous and intensify their efforts against the opposition” (Finkel et 
al. 2007: 434). The impact of democracy aid thus seems to depend on the specific target of this type of 
intervention strategy, and whether aid is delivered with the consent of recipient governments (donor-
to-government) or against the will of the incumbent regime (donor-to-civil society) (Dietrich and 
Wright 2015: 218; see also Carothers 2009).  
The IMF and the World Bank’s financial assistance to borrowing countries is delivered – by design – 
with the consent of recipient governments. Traditionally, it has come in the form of development aid 
aimed at promoting economic growth and general welfare. With the general move towards program-
based aid modalities in support of country-owned programs, however, multilateral development assis-
tance has also increasingly featured characteristics of democracy aid, for example, by focusing on 
improving bureaucratic capabilities, enhancing accountability in service delivery, and strengthening 
national check and balance institutions (World Bank 2006). Especially the delivery of development 
resources via national budgets is said to have a democratizing effect not only by reducing transaction 
costs generated by aid management but also by increasing governments’ accountability (Booth and 
Fritz 2008: 1; de Renzio 2006: 629; Driscoll et al. 2005 34; Meyer and Schulz 2008: 25). However, 
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whether this new delivery tactic has effectively strengthened democratic accountability in recipient 
countries has not been considered in the existing empirical literature that shies away from the political 
goal dimension of programmatic IFI lending.  
 
5.3.2. Aid modalities 
Different modalities of aid may themselves have political effects in recipient countries. In an excellent 
review of the empirical literature, Kersting and Kilby (2014) describe three different roles for aid in 
the promotion of democracy that differ in their time horizon.  
Over the course of decades, aid may act as a general input to democratization (Kersting and Kilby 
2014: 126). Foreign aid constitutes an important source of income for many developing countries. 
With this income, recipient countries can transform the structural conditions of their societies by pro-
moting growth, education and the expansion of civil society. These are key aspects of the moderniza-
tion account often believed to strengthen democracy in the long term, as discussed in the literature 
building on the modernization thesis (Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006; Lipset 1959; Prze-
worski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000).  
Over the short run, aid may act as a specific input to democratization (Kersting and Kilby 2014: 126). 
By providing technical assistance and funding to activities aimed at strengthening the internal govern-
ance and political efficacy of civil society, foreign aid can influence the political environment in recip-
ient countries. For example, aid targeted at public oversight institutions, such as ombudsmen, supreme 
audit institutions, anticorruption commissions, and the national legislature, may have a direct effect on 
the quality of governance in recipient regimes. But also aid that is directly targeted at those individu-
als, social organizations and independent media that challenge the incumbent regime can have a cata-
lytic effect through increasing their ability to engage effectively with state institutions (Carothers 
2009: 7; Dietrich and Wright 2015: 217; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2010: 189; Finkel et al. 2007: 410).  
Finally, aid may act as an incentive for democratization if it is conditioned on democratic reforms 
(Kersting and Kilby 2014: 126). In this last role, donors use foreign aid to induce the government or 
elements of civil society to undertake or advocate for democratic reforms. Donor leverage works via 
political conditions attached to economic aid flows. Unlike the other two roles, aid is not used as an 
input but as an incentive for democratization. While conditionality may come in the form of positive 
and negative sanctions, key to this last mechanism is that donors can credibly withhold aid when re-
cipients do not comply with democratic reforms (Dietrich and Wright 2015: 217; Dunning 2004: 412; 
Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2010: 189; Kersting and Kilby 2014: 126).  
The IMF and World Bank usually attach policy conditions to their financial support. Since they do not 
have to bother about competing foreign policy agendas, their use of conditionality has been regarded 
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“as a rough gauge of the maximum potential of the approach” (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 2, 33). 
Moreover, the incentive effect is probably large, as their “seal of approval” attracts funding from other 
sources (Brown and Fox 1998: 474-475). However, prior scholarship on the role of IFI lending as an 
incentive for policy reform has found “no clear association between the intensity of conditionality and 
success in implementation of promised reforms” (Santiso 2001b: 9). Multiple reviews of structural 
adjustment lending in different parts of the World have demonstrated the inability of the IFIs’ tradi-
tional form of ex-ante conditionality to act as a credible commitment devise in having a deterrent ef-
fect on aid recipients (see, e.g., Collier 1999; Kahler 1992; Killick 1998; Mosley et al. 1991).  
As a result of this critique, a new type of policy conditionality entered the stage of multilateral devel-
opment assistance. In place of conditions stated ex-ante, selective conditionality is only applied ex post 
(thereby, having a corrective effect). The idea behind selective conditionality is that the international 
financial institutions do not leverage things that the recipient country does not want to do and – if there 
is still a role to play for conditionality – only the results of these policies and not the instruments 
themselves are to be assessed (Booth and Fritz 2008: 14). Recent scholarship on the effectiveness of 
ex-post rewards of reforms provides evidence that performance-based aid may succeed where tradi-
tional forms of conditionality have failed, but may be rather weak, or even absent, under several cir-
cumstances related to both the donor and recipient side (see, e.g., Adam, Chambas, Guillaumont, Guil-
laumont Jeanneney and Gunning 2004; Beazer and Woo 2016; and Dreher, Öhler and Nunnenkamp 
2012).  
 
5.3.3. Political context 
Beyond the specific targets and aid modalities of the intervention strategy, the political effect of aid 
may also be conditional as to the political context on both sides of the aid relationship. On the recipi-
ent's side, there is abundant research on the political impact of development aid conditional on the type 
of recipient regime. A vast literature, highly reliant upon Bueno de Mesquita and colleague’s selec-
torate theory (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003) finds that aid improves political 
leader survival (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Kono and Montinola 2009; Licht 2010), thereby 
stabilizing the incumbent regime (Dutta et al. 2013; Morrison 2007, 2009; Wright 2009). While cur-
rent aid helps democratic leaders more than autocratic ones to remain in power, accumulated aid helps 
autocratic leaders more than democratic ones to survive (Kono and Montinola 2009; Licht 2010). The 
general conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is that foreign aid has an amplification effect, 
that is, “it makes dictatorships more dictatorial and democracies more democratic” (Dutta, Leeson, and 
Williamson 2013: 211).  
By contrast, selection effects may play a significant role in the allocation of targeted democracy and 
governance assistance. For instance, Nielson and Nielson (2010) argue that donors engage in “democ-
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racy triage”, that is, they target democracy assistance to countries where they believe it works best, 
what may explain the mostly positive effects of previous studies on democracy aid (Nielsen and Niel-
son 2010: 3). However, there is no consensus in the literature on how to deal with this problem. While 
the standard approach has been to address potential selection bias in democracy aid via instrumental 
variables analysis (Dietrich and Wright 2015; Finkel et al. 2007; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki 2010), other 
studies partly evade this problem by using sub-sample analysis (Bermeo 2011), quasi-experimental 
research designs (Carnegie and Marinov 2017), and matching techniques (Nielsen and Nielson 2010).  
Regarding the political context on the donor side, little is known on how the global aid regime affects 
the relationship between development aid and changes in the recipients’ political regime. The interna-
tional high-level forums on aid effectiveness repeatedly called on donors to better coordinate their aid 
(Monterrey in 2002) and to harmonize their operational policies, procedures, and practices (Rome in 
2003). In doing so, donors were encouraged to specialize, for example, by delegating, where appropri-
ate, authority to lead donors for the execution of programmes, activities, and tasks (Paris in 2005). 
However, most observers think that donors generally failed to keep their promises made at these meet-
ings. In particular, the existing literature on donor coordination and specialization finds that aid frag-
mentation has persisted and aid overlap increased, suggesting that donor coordination has not im-
proved but continues to worsen under the current global aid regime (Aldasoro, Nunnenkamp and 
Thiele 2010; Nunnenkamp, Öhler and Thiele 2013; OECD 2011b).  
Academic research increasingly points to the potential damage of donor proliferation and fragmented 
aid flows for the quality of governance and public sector capacity in recipient countries (e.g., Acharya, 
Fuzzo de Lima and Moore 2006; Bigsten 2006; Knack and Rahman 2004). As a research topic, how-
ever, donor coordination remains somewhat elusive. While donor specialization seems to be a neces-
sary (though not sufficient) condition for better coordination, a larger overlap of aid, in turn, does not 
necessarily imply less coordination (or more competition). The general conclusion that comes out of 
this literature is that more systematic academic research is needed to answer the question how the 
overlap of aid and the interaction of multiple donors affects the incentives of recipient governments 
and general development outcomes.  
This call for more research on donor coordination (or the lack thereof) is particularly relevant for the 
IMF and World, who provide a form of donor coordination by themselves, as they were set up and 
given the mandate to coordinate aid of their member countries (Bigsten 2006: 7). Despite the fact that 
their joint presence in individual countries and their overlap in working areas have been increasing 
over time, surprisingly, there has been only one econometric study that systematically analyzes the 
interaction between the IMF and World Bank (see Marchesi and Sirtori 2011). Using the simultaneous 
presence of both institutions in the same country as a proxy for Bank-Fund interaction, the authors 
find that the interaction between these two organizations has a positive and significant on economic 
growth, suggesting that greater cooperation leads to improved development outcomes (Marchesi and 
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Sirtori 2011: 287). This hypothesis is researched further in a follow-up study that examines the condi-
tions under which Bank-Fund interaction is beneficial to growth. Drawing on insights of field research 
by Fabricius (2007), empirical findings show that beneficial effects of joint interventions increase if 
the Bank and the Fund share information on behavior of power wielder, if they are not dependent on 
knowledge of local context but on their own specialized knowledge for going into debate with power 
wielder, and if they collaborate in sanctioning power wielders in case of poor performance (Marchesi 
and Sabani 2014: 27).  
 
5.3.4. Assessing the impact of surrogate accountability 
Bringing these variations in aid together, I propose to analyze the link between aid and democracy 
through a surrogate accountability framework. By conceptualizing donors as surrogates who intervene 
on behalf of weak citizens in the domestic political process in aid-receiving countries, this research 
provides a more comprehensive understanding of the causal mechanisms through which aid might 
influence democratization in recipient countries. In particular, I make three arguments that are clearly 
shown in Figure 5-1.  
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Figure 5-1: Democratic targets and the interplay of standard and surrogate accountability 
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First, I argue that donors hold recipients accountable according to different accountability standards – 
aid effectiveness, improved governance, and citizen empowerment – that result in different democratic 
outcomes in aid-receiving countries. If standard accountability mechanisms do not work, donors must 
decide whether they want to act as surrogates for weak citizens in their capacity for holding recipient 
governments accountable, or whether they want to help to develop the capacities of citizens in order 
that they can hold their governments accountable themselves. In the former case, donors may help to 
improve the quality of governance in recipient states, while in the latter case, donors may help to em-
power organized civil society. Different aid types thus reflect specific intervention strategies that may 
differ in democratic outcomes. To distinguish between different democratic targets, I measure the im-
pact of development aid both on procedural and substantive democracy. Procedural democracy thereby 
measures outcomes of an intervention strategy aimed at improving the quality of governance, while 
substantive democracy measures the success of donor efforts to target their aid at citizen empower-
ment. However, the degree to which these external intervention strategies can realize their democratic 
potential depends also on the manner how aid is delivered.  
Therefore, a second argument brought forward is that we need to look not only at the democratic tar-
gets but also at the interplay of different accountability processes – surrogate accountability and stand-
ard accountability – and how this interaction affects democratization in recipient countries. More spe-
cifically, I argue that the IMF and World Bank – in their role as surrogates of citizens – may hold gov-
ernments accountable not only for their public policies, but also for their public financial management, 
and their respect for adequate public processes via political conditionality. Beyond conditioning aid 
according to specific policy reforms (ex-ante or ex-post), the IFIs also condition their aid to institu-
tional reforms aimed at improving financial and procedural management of policy reforms: Whether 
or not aid can act as an incentive for democratization depends – as argued above – on the type of ac-
countability standards donors apply. If donors hold recipients accountable for their efforts aimed at 
improving governance quality (and thereby strengthen procedural democracy), political conditions 
attached to economic aid can have an impact, but this impact may work in both directions. Aid mo-
dalities where donors substitute for citizens’ authority in defining the content of public policies are 
expected to have a negative impact, while aid modalities where donors substitute only for citizens 
capacity in sanctioning poor financial performance and a bad process by recipient governments are 
expected to have a positive impact on procedural democracy. Donor conditionality works best, when 
judgment if the power wielder has fulfilled his or her obligations towards accountability holders is not 
dependent on the subtle interpretation of local context, and when the power wielder is held accounta-
ble for moral obligations that pertain to large groups of marginalized people (Rubenstein 2007: 629). 
By contrast, if donors want to directly empower citizens (and thereby deepen substantive democracy 
in the end), it is questionable whether political conditionality can have an impact at all, because stand-
ard accountability holders (i.e., citizens in recipient countries) outperform surrogate accountability 
holders (i.e., aid agencies intervening on their behalf) in all phases of the accountability process. Even 
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worse, if aid delivery neglects citizen rights and democratic practices, it may undermine the capacity 
of citizens to hold their governments to account, resulting in a deterioration of substantive democracy. 
However, as argued by Rubenstein (2007: 630-631), surrogate accountability holders can mitigate 
some of the most detrimental effects of domination, if donors attach conditions to their financial sup-
port that directly help to promote citizen empowerment, such as conditioning aid on citizen involve-
ment and democratic practices.  
Third, I argue that the success of donor strategies aimed at promoting democratic accountability in aid-
receiving countries depends not only on the specific democratic targets but also on the general political 
context. In line with the conditional strand of the literature, this research takes recipient and donor 
characteristics into account as political conditions that affect the link between aid and democracy. 
Despite the fact that democratic targets do not figure on the international financial institutions’ official 
agenda, this research argues that the impact of aid that is targeted at empowering citizens in recipient 
countries (i.e., substantive democracy) is conditional on the recipient regime. By contrast, the impact 
of aid that is targeted at improving governance in recipient countries (i.e., procedural democracy) is 
conditional on the coordination of donors. Finally, the political impact of aid that comes only with 
economic motives should not depend on recipient or donor characteristics.  
 
 
5.4. Hypotheses 
Based on common characteristics of their strategic focus and aid modalities, I identify four types of 
lending programs and use these to categorize the multiple financial instruments. Two questions guide 
this classification. First: is the content of development strategies defined by democratic accountability 
holders in order to make the government accountable to democratic constituents or do surrogate ac-
countability holders determine the policy content, in short, are accountability standards demos- or do-
nor-defined? Second: does the process of aid delivery take standard accountability arrangements into 
account, or do aid modalities rely on surrogate accountability arrangements that bypass democratic 
constituencies, in short, are democratic accountability arrangements respected or neglected? Using 
these guiding questions I identify four general program types: (1) World Bank Investment Projects 
(WB-INV), (2) IMF Stabilization Programs (IMF-STB), (3) the International Financial Institutions’ 
Structural Adjustment Programs (IFI-SAP), and (4) the International Financial Institutions’ Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Programs (IFI-PRS). Table 5-1 provides an overview of their different characteris-
tics and the individual lending instruments included in each group. For further details on my classifica-
tion procedure, and on the various financial instruments included in this account, see Annex 5-3.  
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The four program types differ in strategic focus and modalities of aid delivery. These have clear impli-
cations for democratization processes in recipient countries.  
Table 5-1: Types of IMF and World Bank Lending 
Introduced Type Eligibility Purpose Modality Duration Instruments 
1946 Investment  
project 
(WB-INV) 
All WB  
members  
Infrastructure  
& production 
Project aid  
(foreign  
investment) 
5-10 
years 
WB: Specific  
Investment Loan, 
Sector  
Investment and 
Maintenance 
Loan, Financial 
Intermediary 
Loan and  
Technical  
Assistance Loan 
1952 Stabilization  
program  
(IMF-STB) 
All IMF  
members  
Balance of  
payments  
Policy  
support  
(fiscal  
reforms) 
1-3 
years 
IMF: Stand-by 
Arrangement, 
Extended Fund 
Facility, Flexible 
Credit Line 
1980 Structural  
adjustment  
program 
(IFI-SAP) 
Only low-
income  
countries 
Economic  
growth  
Sector  
support 
(structural  
reforms) 
3-4 
years 
WB: Sector  
Adjustment 
Loan, Structural 
Adjustment 
Loan, Program-
matic Structural 
Adjustment 
Loan, Special 
Structural Ad-
justment Loan;  
IMF: Structural 
Adjustment Fa-
cility, Enhanced 
Structural Ad-
justment Facility 
1999 Poverty  
reduction 
strategy  
program 
(IFI-PRS) 
Only low-
income  
countries 
Poverty  
reduction  
Budget  
support  
(governance  
reforms) 
3-4 
years 
WB: Poverty  
Reduction  
Support Credit;  
IMF: Poverty  
Reduction and 
Growth Facility, 
Extended Credit 
Facility 
 
5.4.1. World Bank Investment Projects (WB-INV) 
The World Bank’s investment project financing (WB-INV) represents a majority of the Bank’s len-
ding portfolio and has constituted its core business since 1946. Investment projects aimed at building 
the physical and social infrastructure of a country have a medium- to long-term focus (5-10 years). 
Like most bilateral aid funds, investment projects provide funding to the government for general de-
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velopment purposes, for example, to cover specific expenditures related to the implementation of the 
project or the quality of assets being financed. Investment project financing is most widely used in the 
infrastructure, human development, agriculture, and public administration sectors.  
Despite these broad social implications, the affected population is usually not consulted with the defi-
nition of development priorities. Quite to the contrary, these big capital-intensive projects, such as the 
construction of a hydroelectric dam, have often led to expropriation and forced displacement of al-
ready marginalized social groups in remote areas singled out for foreign investment in the past (see 
case studies in Fox and Brown 1998). Given that citizens in recipient countries often lack channels for 
holding their own governments accountable, projects with high social (and environmental) costs are 
“often most likely to proceed where those most affected are denied basic rights” (Fox and Brown 
1998: 16). Furthermore, project aid bypasses democratic accountability institutions and procedures 
within recipient countries. Investment projects are negotiated between the executive and World Bank 
representatives, and legislatures typically do not participate in these discussions (Abouharb and 
Cingranelli 2007: 204). As a result, these projects are often funded outside the budget and therefore 
exempt from parliamentary review, which reinforces already-existing deficiencies in democratic over-
sight and procedure.  
Although investment projects may have beneficial effects by modernizing recipient countries’ infra-
structure in the long term, I expect that development aid in the form of investment project financing 
leads to deterioration of the quality of substantive democracy and worsens procedural democracy in 
recipient countries in the short to medium term.  
 
5.4.2. IMF Stabilization Programs (IMF-STB) 
The IMF’s core business (IMF-STB) is traditionally centered on financial assistance to member coun-
tries during a crisis, when they face a temporary balance of payment difficulties. The program duration 
of these financial instruments is thus usually restricted to 1-3 years. In return for the balance of pay-
ments support, the IMF typically requires that the borrower government initiates fiscal, monetary, and 
social reforms aimed at restoring the balance of payment viability and maintaining macroeconomic 
stability. In line with their economic targets, countries under financial stabilization programs need to 
reform their economy first, before they address political problems (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 
477). Fiscal austerity measures advocated by the Fund typically include tax increases and expenditure 
cuts, currency devaluations, and pension reforms. These “unpopular but necessary” reforms (Kalinow-
ski 2007: 346) are likely to cause political protest, as they cause hardship for the poorest and most 
vulnerable sections of society that are most dependent on state subsidies and valuable public services 
such as health and education (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006: 1003).  
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Given that some of these policy measures were thought to be most successful if they were introduced 
without warning (Przeworski 1991: 182-183), traditionally, the policy content of these programs has 
been defined behind closed doors. In this role, the IMF substitutes for national citizens in defining 
what the country (as a whole) needs, thereby limiting the national policy space. Besides, the crisis 
character of stabilization programs leaves no room for the involvement of democratic accountability 
institutions and due respect for the democratic process. The Fund primarily works with the finance 
ministry and other parts of the techno-managerial elite who are thought to need political protection 
against the manifold resistance of society (Przeworski 1991: 183-184; O’Donnell 1994: 60-61). As a 
result, governments facing a financial crisis often rule per emergency law. Decisions are taken by pre-
sidential decree or rammed through legislature (Przeworski 1991: 184).  
Similar to World Bank’s investment projects, I therefore expect that the resource inflow associated 
with the IMF’s stabilization programs negatively affects substantive and procedural dimensions of 
democracy by limiting the space for genuine political action and undermining the democratic process.  
 
5.4.3. Bank-Fund Structural Adjustment Programs (IFI-SAP) 
Collaboration between the World Bank and the IMF to support their member countries’ structural 
adjustment programs started in the 1980s and has increased since then. Joint guidelines help to ensure 
consistent support by combining the specific expertise and financial resources of each institution.70 
Structural adjustment programs can be stand-alone, but more often form part of a programmatic series 
of operations providing sector-wide support to borrower governments for a medium-term program (3-
4 years) of policy or institutional reform. The World Bank and the IMF disburse funds against the 
promise of structural reforms that traditionally cover the sectors of trade and economic management, 
agriculture and infrastructure, and financial and private sector development (Koeberle et al. 2005: 63; 
IEO 2007: 5; World Bank 2007: 6).  
From a democratic perspective, structural adjustment lending features both positive and negative char-
acteristics. On the negative side, it has been argued in the literature that market-oriented reform poli-
cies tend to weaken the role of the state and organized labor in economic activities through privatiza-
tion of state-owned enterprises and liberalization of labor markets. As implied by the term “Washing-
ton Consensus”, the international financial institutions largely define these market-oriented reforms, 
which do not necessarily reflect the views and interests of borrowing governments. Moreover, these 
market-oriented policies are also said to embody a neo-liberal perspective that tends to undermine 
collective labor rights of citizens because they represent potential obstacles to economic reform (Blan-
ton, Blanton and Peksen 2014: 326).  
                                                     
70 See Koeberle, Bedoya, Silarszky and Verheyen (2005: 76) and the report of the external review committee on 
Bank-Fund collaboration (IMF and World Bank 2007), which survey the evidence. 
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On the positive side, structural adjustment programs often stipulate institutional reforms that are in-
tended to support the implementation of policies, for example, by introducing transparency and in-
creasing efficiency in the public and private sectors. The IMF and World Bank possess significant 
leverage in this regard, as they can credibly commit to withholding funds in case of non-performance, 
particularly when they coordinate their interventions. Structural adjustment lending may thus also 
have beneficial effects on the quality of governance and public sector capacity (Brown 2009: 477; Cull 
and Effron 2008: 316). Moreover, recipients of adjustment lending typically face prolonged financial 
distress, rather than a temporary balance of payment problems. These governments cannot manage 
such a situation through emergency rule and executive decree but must open adequate domestic politi-
cal debate.  
I therefore expect that structural adjustment lending simultaneously has a positive effect on procedural 
democracy by conditioning aid on governance reforms, but a negative effect on substantive democracy 
by limiting the government’s policy space and undermining collective workers’ rights at the recipient 
country level.  
 
5.4.4. Bank-Fund Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs (IFI-PRS) 
Over time, the collaboration between the World Bank and the IMF on poverty-focused lending in-
struments has become more systematic. Poverty reduction strategy-based lending is similar to struc-
tural adjustment lending in that these lending instruments also take the form of programmatic support 
for medium-term policy and institutional reforms. However, their underlying strategic targets are dif-
ferent. Poverty reduction programs differ significantly from adjustment operations in that they support 
country-owned strategies aimed at achieving sustainable growth and, in particular, poverty reduction. 
With lending based on recipient countries’ poverty reduction strategies, both the World Bank and the 
IMF have moved away from a focus on donor-driven economic reforms, shifting focus on public sec-
tor governance and the domestic political process (see Koeberle et al. 2005: 62-3; IEO 2007: 5 and 16-
17; World Bank 2005b: 8-9).  
Aid modalities also show a greater variation than under structural adjustment lending. At least in prin-
ciple, support to the general budget is made on the condition of broad-based citizen involvement in the 
preparation and monitoring of national poverty reduction strategies. Societal actors can exploit this 
political space to engage in policy dialogue and oppose the arbitrary use of state power. Furthermore, 
general budget support comes with many efforts to improve public financial management and the na-
tional budget process. For example, the IMF and World Bank (in conjunction with the broader donor 
community) provide technical assistance and political advice on revenue administration, expenditure 
auditing, accounting, fiscal transparency, and parliamentary review. All these measures aim to make 
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public financial flow more transparent and to install appropriate checks and balances on executive 
behavior.  
Among all program types, poverty reduction strategy-based programs are the only type that is based 
on country-owned development strategies. Moreover, this aid type directly supports mechanisms for 
rule-following of the government and respect for the democratic process, which should increase the 
accountability of the government to democratic constituencies. I thus expect poverty reduction strate-
gy-based lending to have a positive effect on both procedural and substantive democracy.  
Table 5-2 presents the expected theoretical impact of program types on democratization in recipient 
countries. The causal mechanisms here are embedded in a framework of evaluating surrogate account-
ability arrangements in terms of their impact on procedural and substantive democracy.  
Table 5-2: Expected theoretical relationships between development aid and democratization 
 Surrogate accountability Procedural Substantive 
Type Strategic focus Aid modality democracy democracy 
WB-INV Foreign investments Project aid Negative Negative 
IMF-STB Fiscal reforms Policy support Negative Negative 
IFI-SAP Economic reforms Sector support Positive Negative 
IFI-PRS Governance reforms Budget support Positive Positive 
 
The “traditional” lending approaches (WB-INV and IMF-STB) should have a negative effect on de-
mocratization, as project-like and crisis-induced aid neither respects nor targets democratic accounta-
bility.  
Poverty reduction strategy-based programs (IFI-PRS) are expected to have a positive effect on democ-
ratization, as general budget support strategically targets and simultaneously respects democratic ac-
countability.  
The effect of structural adjustment programs (IFI-SAP) on democratization is expected to be positive 
for procedural democracy but negative for substantive democracy, as sector-wide financial support 
does respect but does not target democratic accountability.  
 
 
5.5. Data and operationalization 
To explore the impact of different types of IMF and World Bank lending, I undertake a panel data 
analysis based on annual data from 1980 to 2011 for approximately 100 low- and middle-income 
countries (see Annex 5-1 for a list of countries in the sample). Some data are not available for all 
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countries or years, so that the panel is unbalanced and the exact number of observations depends on 
the choice of variables. In the following discussion, I will only briefly discuss the different variables 
used. More detail can be found in Annex 5-2.  
 
5.5.1. Dependent variables 
In the first part of the analysis, I use a broad democracy index to compare the general impact of differ-
ent aid types on democratization. Democratization here is best understood as an incremental process, 
whereby a political regime shifts from autocracy towards democracy. From a theoretical perspective, it 
is difficult to define threshold values for democracy, autocracy, or hybrid regimes. Moreover, change 
can also happen in the opposite direction, namely towards greater autocracy. I therefore rely on the 
polity2 regime indicator, which measures the quality of a political regime on a continuous scale, which 
has been rescaled here to range from 0 (strongly autocratic) to 20 (strongly democratic). This measure 
of democracy is taken from the Polity IV data series, as described by Marshall and colleagues (Mar-
shall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011). As I am interested in explaining a move towards democracy, rather than 
a given level of democracy, I need to specify a dynamic model. I do so by introducing the lagged de-
pendent variable as a control for the level of democracy at the beginning of each period.  
In the second part of the analysis, I disaggregate the polity2 regime indicator to take a closer look at its 
original concept variables. Following recent calls to unpack composite democracy indices (see 
Coppedge and Gerring 2011), I measure the impact of development aid on different concepts and di-
mensions of democracy. A tripartite concept of procedural democracy stands behind the polity2 re-
gime index, including the three concept variables executive recruitment, executive constraints, and 
political competition. Jointly, they measure the existence of institutions and procedures through which 
citizens can hold power wielders democratically accountable (Marshall et al. 2011: 14). The scale of 
the three procedural democracy variables ranges from 1-8 (executive recruitment), 1-7 (executive con-
straints), and 1-10 (political competition), all from least to most democratic.  
To measure the impact of different aid types on substantive democracy, I rely on the empowerment 
rights index from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights dataset (2014). This broad index of 
human empowerment measures government human rights practices on a continuous scale from 0 (no 
government respect) to 14 (full government respect).71 Among its seven composite variables, I focus 
on freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, and workers’ rights.72 These three varia-
bles most closely approximate the extension of democratic rights and practices that are defining the 
                                                     
71 For more details on the dataset, see Cingranelli and Richards (2010). 
72 The other four composite variables of the CIRI human empowerment index are foreign movement, domestic 
movement, electoral self-determination, and freedom of religion.  
263 
concept of a substantive democracy.73 The scale of all three substantive democracy variables ranges 
from 0 (frequently violated rights) to 2 (fully respected rights).  
 
5.5.2. Explanatory variables 
In the first part of the analysis, participation in IMF-STB, IFI-SAP, or IFI-PRS is measured by a di-
chotomous variable for each program type in any specific year. The variable equals 1 if a country is 
financially supported by at least one of the lending instruments included in this program type (at any 
time of the year), and 0 otherwise. With this dichotomous coding scheme, I follow Vreeland (2003: 
18), as do many others (e.g., Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Sturm et al. 2005). Unlike the other three 
program types, there is little variation in the dummy variable for WB-INV, with an average of 83 
countries participating per year. This particularity can be attributed to the combination of long invest-
ment duration with high frequency of project occurrence. I deal with this problem by recoding WB-
INV as a categorical variable, regrouping investment projects into four types of financial instruments 
covered by the Bank’s Operational Policy (i.e., Specific Investment Loan, Sector Investment and 
Maintenance Loan, Financial Intermediary Loan, and Technical Assistance Loan) and reporting the 
sum of the types used for a country in any specific year. More details on the construction of the differ-
ent program types can be found in Annex 5-3.  
In the second part of the analysis, participation in any of these program types is measured under dif-
ferent conditions that may affect its impact. To measure the impact of program lending conditional on 
the type of recipient regime, I use an interaction term between program participation and the lagged 
dependent variable measuring recipient regime either in terms of governance quality (procedural de-
mocracy) or citizen empowerment (substantive democracy) prior to program participation. I hereby 
join a growing number of scholars who use interaction terms to assess the conditional impact of gen-
eral development assistance by bilateral donors (e.g., Dutta et al. 2013; Kono and Montinola 2009; 
Morrison 2009; Wright 2009) and multilateral donors depending on initial conditions in recipient 
countries (e.g., Beazer and Woo 2016; Montinola 2010). Likewise, I use an interaction term between 
individual Bank and Fund lending under the same lending type to measure the impact of programmatic 
lending conditional on Bank-Fund interaction. Given that traditional lending approaches (IMF-STB 
and WB-INV) do not overlap assuming interaction between the Bank and the Fund is not plausible. 
However, in response to changing realities of the global economy, overlap of activities and institution-
alized collaboration between the two sister organizations has increased (Fabrizius 2007: 3). I therefore 
code the newer lending types separately for the IMF (IMF-SAP and IMF-PRS) and the World Bank 
                                                     
73 For similar arguments concerning the civil liberties dimension of the Freedom House index, see Kalyvitis and 
Vlachaki 2010: 192. 
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(WB-SAP and WB-PRS) in order to assess their individual and joint effects on procedural and sub-
stantive democracy.  
 
5.5.3. Control variables 
In selecting control variables for this study, I rely on prior theory and research on structural conditions 
for democratic transitions (Doorenspleet 2004; Epstein et al. 2006; Gasiorowski 1995), on democratic 
diffusion (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Rudra 2005; Wejnert 2005; Starr 1991; Starr and Lindborg 
2003), and on democracy promotion by foreign actors (Bräutigam and Knack 2004; Finkel et al. 2007; 
Knack 2004; Pevehouse 2002; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). For details on the selection of each 
of these explanatory variables see Annex 5-4.  
To account for modernization effects, I use GDP per capita, GDP per capita change, and the urbaniza-
tion rate. Democratic diffusion processes can be thought of as global and/or regional phenomena. I 
measure global diffusion by the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, and regional dif-
fusion by calculating the change in the regional average value of the polity2 regime indicator over a 
given period of years for each of the five regions in my sample. To proxy economic and political in-
stability, I include the index of consumer prices and an index measuring a change in the level of armed 
conflict intensity.  
There are a number of other controls in cross-country analysis of democratization, such as dummies 
for the particular historical and cultural heritage of developing countries (see Clague, Gleason and 
Knack 2001; Linder and Bächtiger 2005). As long as these variables are time-invariant, their influence 
will be captured by individual country fixed effects (see below).  
 
 
5.6. Research design 
In order to take into account the nested structure of my data, I use panel estimation with fixed effects. 
This has the virtue of addressing omitted variable bias of cross-section data by controlling for unob-
servable country-specific variables that are correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables. A 
Hausman test strongly rejects random effects for all program types, confirming the need for fixed ef-
fects. My main specifications include fixed effects both for countries and for years (two-way fixed 
effects). Alternative estimation strategies based on panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) are dis-
carded, as the cross-country dimension of my sample clearly dominates. Remaining within-cluster 
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correlation is taken into account through robust estimation clustering at the country level. All estima-
tions were done by using Stata 11 software (StataCorp 2009).  
As my dynamic specification requires the inclusion of the initial level of democracy, simple fixed-
effects regression faces the problem of Nickell bias (Nickell 1981). While Monte Carlo analysis by 
Judson and Owen (1999: 12) shows that this bias is largely concentrated on the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable, doubts about the value of this coefficient affect the interpretation of the 
other coefficients even if they are consistently estimated (Birchler and Michaelowa 2016: 40). This 
implies that the interpretation of these fixed-effects models should focus on the direction and the sig-
nificance of the observed effects, rather than on their exact value.  
Like the aid and democratization literature in general, I also face a large number of other endogeneity 
problems. If the World Bank and the IMF prefer lending to democracies (which would violate their 
formal rules, but may still be plausible), then my model suffers from reverse causality with respect to 
all aid-related variables. The same problem arises if the level of democracy drives the demand for IMF 
and World Bank lending. This would be true, for instance, if IMF and World Bank programs were 
more common in less democratic countries because such countries have fewer veto players who can 
oppose these programs.  
Moreover, democracy likely affects some of the control variables, such as GDP. These problems are 
usually addressed by employing two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation with instrumentation of the 
endogeneous variables. Unfortunately, convincing instrumental variables are very hard to find. Ac-
cording to Clemens and colleagues (2012), the instruments used in the literature are generally so bad 
that it is more convincing to apply ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation while using first differ-
ences (or fixed effects), and an appropriate distinction between different types of aid. They further 
argue that using two-way fixed effects can take care of most of the endogeneity concern plaguing the 
aid and democratization literature. This suggests that additional instrumentation may be not only mis-
leading but also unnecessary.  
In my case, instrumentation is even more unreliable than in the cases Clemens et al. (2012) consider 
because I simultaneously need to instrument for four different aid variables. Hence, all attempts to 
obtain reasonable model specifications in this setting, using 2SLS, were bound to fail. As in most ca-
ses of this nature, there remains considerable concern about the strength and the exogeneity of the 
instruments. In terms of the sign and significance of coefficient estimates, I can easily produce results 
in line with my hypotheses, but the validity of the overall results remains questionable when using 
instrumentation. My main analysis therefore follows Clemens et al. (2012) who rely on simple two-
way fixed effects without instrumentation.  
Another important issue is to distinguish whether any effect I observe for the different lending pro-
grams is truly due to the nature of aid programs, or to the political climate during the period in which 
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this instrument was primarily employed. Bearce and Tirone (2010), for instance, argue that reduced 
geopolitical constraints after the end of the Cold War made it easier to enforce conditionalities, so that 
all types of aid may have become more effective. In this case, a program like the PRS may wrongly 
appear more effective than others, simply because it was introduced only in the late 1990s whereas 
other lending instruments were available throughout the whole period of analysis, including the diffi-
cult Cold War period. To avoid this problem, the main regression was rerun only for the period during 
which I actually observe PRS in the data (i.e., from 1999 onwards).  
Finally, as emphasized by Clemens et al. (2012), it is important to carefully consider the time frame 
within which any impact of aid should be expected. The effect of the international financial institu-
tions’ lending on democracy is unlikely to be immediate. Changes in political decision-making proce-
dures and economic policies take time, and this adjustment is what I hypothesize to bring about poten-
tial democratization (see also Kersting and Kilby 2014). I consider a time horizon of five years a rea-
sonable approximation. However, as there is little theoretical guidance on how long the period should 
be, I first compute some preliminary regressions, estimating my main specification over various time 
horizons (t+1, t+2, t+3, t+4, t+5). The results confirm that a five-year lag is appropriate. For all lend-
ing types except WB-INV, the absolute size of the coefficient and the level of precision (whether sig-
nificant or not) increases with the number of years these programs are in place. When change is meas-
ured within only one or two years, the overall regression is entirely dominated by the effect of the 
lagged dependent variable (see Annex 5, Table A5-1).  
 
 
5.7. Statistical results 
5.7.1. General impact of program lending on democratization 
The first part of the analysis assesses the general impact of different IMF and World Bank programs 
on democratization. Democratization thereby refers to changes in the quality of procedural democracy. 
Possible results in terms of substantive democracy and the conditions under which IFI lending may be 
more effective in promoting democratization are left for the second part of the analysis below.  
In Table 5-3, I present my results based on a five-year time lag between all explanatory variables (and 
controls) and the dependent variable.  
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Table 5-3: The general impact of different IFI programs on democratization 
Variables 
Two-way 
FE 
Two-way 
FE 
Two-way 
FE 
Country 
FE ≥ 1999 
Two-way 
FE ≥ 1999 
Country 
and Period 
Dummies 
WB-INV (t-5) -0.01 -0.11 -0.13 -0.21 -0.17 -0.13 
(0.94) (0.59) (0.47) (0.38) (0.46) (0.47) 
IMF-STB (t-5) -0.68 -0.51 -0.46 -0.31 -0.30 -0.59 
(0.12) (0.25) (0.29) (0.44) (0.47) (0.17) 
IFI-SAP (t-5) 1.26*** 0.72* 0.58 0.21 0.22 0.73* 
(0.00) (0.07) (0.12) (0.48) (0.47) (0.05) 
IFI-PRS (t-5) 1.92*** 1.31** 0.99** 0.68* 0.59 0.97** 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.10) (0.16) (0.02) 
Polity (t-5) 0.26*** -0.03 -0.03 0.26*** 
 (0.00) (0.65) (0.64) (0.00) 
GDP per capita,  -1.76** -1.19** -0.10 -0.33 -1.06* 
log (t-5) (0.01) (0.05) (0.90) (0.71) (0.06) 
GDP per capita  -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
change (t-5) (0.49) (0.35) (0.61) (0.51) (0.42) 
Urbanization  -0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.04 0.00 
rate (t-5) (0.76) (0.71) (0.38) (0.71) (0.95) 
Price level,  -1.16* -1.04** -0.15 -0.12 -0.96** 
log (t-5) (0.05) (0.04) (0.76) (0.83) (0.04) 
Trade openness,  0.24 0.11 -0.71 -0.83 0.25 
log (t-5) (0.77) (0.88) (0.34) (0.33) (0.72) 
Conflict  -0.39 -0.33 -0.22 -0.22 -0.27 
intensity (t-5) (0.19) (0.25) (0.35) (0.34) (0.32) 
Regional  0.05 -0.03 0.14 0.09 0.01 
diffusion (t-5) (0.76) (0.83) (0.66) (0.80) (0.89) 
1990-1999 2.50*** 
(0.00) 
2000-2011 2.85*** 
(0.00) 
Countries 107 100 100 98 98 100 
Observations 3234 2381 2374 1140 1140 2374 
R-squared 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.05 0.05 0.35 
Note: robust p-values (based on standard errors clustered at country level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In the first column, I start with a simple linear regression without control that is in line with my expec-
tation about the positive link between IFI-SAP and IFI-PRS and the level of procedural democracy. 
WB-INV and IMF-STB have negative coefficients, but are insignificant. When I add my control vari-
ables, these results remain unchanged, but I observe some drop in the coefficients of IFI-PRS and IFI-
SAP. When I add the lagged dependent variable in regression 3, in order to generate a dynamic model 
that controls for the initial level of democracy, these coefficients drop further, and IFI-SAP falls 
slightly below conventional significance levels (p-value=0.12). PRS programs have still a significant 
effect, and it remains when I restrict the time period to the years during which all the different lending 
programs have simultaneously been in place (regression 4), unless I additionally enter year fixed ef-
fects as in regressions 1-3 (regression 5). In regression 6 I use the full set of observations since 1980, 
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omit the year fixed effects, and include period dummies for the decade after the end of the Cold War 
(1990-1999) as well as the period with IFI-PRS fully established as a new lending instrument (2000-
2011). Here I recover the positive and significant effect of both IFI-PRS and IFI-SAP. The period 
dummies are significantly positive, which is in line with the generally higher level of democracy in 
these years in comparison to years of the Cold War period. Throughout all regression specifications in 
Table 5-3, the coefficients of WB-INV and IMF-STB remain negative but insignificant.  
To some extent, these insignificant results may be driven by the opposing effects of financial stabiliza-
tion programs (IMF-STB), and the democracy-enhancing effects of improved economic development 
(notably for WB-INV). Similarly, the negative and significant coefficients for GDP per capita and 
economic downturn suggest that the international financial institutions respond to recipient needs, i.e., 
allocating economic aid to countries where income is lower and prices are higher. However, it should 
be noted that generally, the inclusion of two-way fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable leaves 
little variation in the model to be explained. This is also obvious from the lack of significant coeffi-
cients for the control variables. It is even more remarkable that IFI-PRS remains positively significant 
throughout, except if the period of observation is additionally shortened to the years after 1998, in 
which case the p-value increases to 0.16. These results provide me with some confidence that PRS-
based lending shows some positive effect on the level of democracy, and that the positive coefficient 
for IFI-PRS captures more than just a favorable change in the general environment.  
 
5.7.2. Robustness tests 
In order to increase the confidence in my results, I carry out a number of additional regressions that are 
presented in Table 5-4. My main interest is to verify the results for IFI-PRS.  
As a first step, I rerun regression 3 of the previous table, but I omit the years during which countries 
have received only PRS-based lending and have not benefited from any other of the four lending pro-
gram types. This does not change the results. In the second regression, I examine whether the amount 
of lending or the type of lending influences democratization. I add an additional control for the volume 
of all lending received through the four program types. This additional variable is insignificant while 
IFI-PRS remains significant (with an almost unchanged coefficient). As the World Bank is often con-
sidered a lead donor, the PRS dummy could also capture bilateral aid. In the third regression, I there-
fore include a control for the volume of bilateral aid. This alternative aid variable is also insignificant, 
and although the size of the IFI-PRS coefficient is reduced to 0.85, it is still relatively close to the ini-
tial value and remains significant. The fourth regression controls for geopolitical considerations that 
may influence IFI lending (see, e.g., Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009a, b; Kilby 2006, 2011, 2013; 
Stone 2002, 2004) and democratization simultaneously. I do not observe any relevant changes in the 
results.  
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Table 5-4: Robustness tests 
Variables 
"Only PRS" 
excluded 
Including 
lending  
volume 
Including 
bilateral aid 
Including 
geopolitics Placebo 
System 
GMM 
WB-INV -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.13 0.03 1.42** 
(0.43) (0.44) (0.28) (0.51) (0.58) (0.01) 
IMF-STB -0.47 -0.47 -0.49 -0.44 0.07 -2.43 
(0.28) (0.29) (0.25) (0.31) (0.62) (0.21) 
IFI-SAP 0.58 0.49 0.56 0.49 0.04 -2.11 
(0.12) (0.20) (0.14) (0.19) (0.77) (0.38) 
IFI-PRS 0.94* 0.97* 0.85* 1.00* 0.19 4.94* 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.37) (0.06) 
Polity (lag) 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.24***  -0.42*** 0.72*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) 
GDP per capita, log -1.22** -1.34* -1.12* -1.32 -0.00 -0.08 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (1.00) (0.92) 
GDP per capita change -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.35** -0.05 
(0.34) (0.32) (0.48) (0.36) (0.05) (0.49) 
Urbanization rate -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.08 0.01 
(0.66) (0.64) (0.46) (0.62) (0.71) (0.79) 
Price level, log -1.08** -1.00* -1.03* -0.98* -0.05 -1.27 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.68) (0.38) 
Trade openness, log 0.04 -0.04 0.10 0.11 0.04 -1.55 
(0.95) (0.96) (0.89) (0.89) (0.44) (0.38) 
Conflict  intensity -0.32 -0.30 -0.35 -0.39 0.83*** -0.29 
(0.26) (0.32) (0.24) (0.17) (0.00) (0.76) 
Regional diffusion -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.11 
(0.88) (0.82) (0.92) (0.97) (0.54) 
Lending volume  4.32  
(INV+STB+SAP+PRS) (0.15)  
Bilateral aid 2.53  
(0.32)  
US military aid 0.003 
    (0.45)   
UNGA voting with US    1.68   
    (0.37)   
UNSC rotating member    -0.17   
    (0.64)   
Countries 100 87 100 87 100 100 
Observations 2367 2111 2345 2096 2670 2374 
R-squared 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.81 
Note: robust p-values (based on standard errors clustered at country level) in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. Regressions 1–4 and 6: Independent variables lagged by five years. In regression 1, for all countries, 
those years in which they received only PRS lending are excluded (7 observations lost as compared to Table 3, 
regression 3). Regression 5: Dependent variable (Polity)¼(t-1), aid programs (INV, STB, SAP, and PRS)¼(t), 
control variables¼(t-2). Regression 6: Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions: p¼0.70, Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) test for the differenced residuals: p¼0.95, number of instruments¼77. To avoid an excessive number of 
instruments, I collapsed them and limited the number of lags to 2 (using the Stata commands provided by Rood-
man 2006). Note, however, that results are extremely sensitive to changes in the specification, notably in the lag 
structure for the instruments.  
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The final two regressions take up remaining concerns with endogeneity. Regression 5 uses a placebo 
test to examine potential issues of reverse causality or co-determination for the lending programs. 
While I keep the control variables for the period before I measure democracy, I exchange the timing of 
the lending interventions and the democracy measurement. As a result, the dependent variable is 
measured before the international financial institutions’ interventions. If my previous result was the 
outcome of the World Bank and the IMF selectively providing aid to democratic countries, rather than 
promoting democratization through their interventions, the coefficient should still be significant. This 
is not the case. The results suggest that—in line with their formal rules—the World Bank and the IMF 
do not distinguish between political regimes when they make their lending decisions. This is also con-
sistent with Reinsberg’s (2015) finding that bilateral donors react to regime change by adjusting aid 
allocation, while the World Bank does not.  
Regression 6 presents an attempt to instrument all potentially endogenous variables. As I could not 
find convincing external instruments for a 2SLS model, I use system generalized method of moments 
(GMM), a method that has the additional advantage of being designed specifically for dynamic panel 
models (Blundell and Bond 1998). System GMM instruments the different variables considered as 
endogenous (including the lagged dependent variable) by their lagged levels and differences. The re-
sults on IFI-PRS remain in line with my previous estimations, with the coefficient becoming much 
larger. IFI-SAP and IMF stabilization programs remain insignificant. World Bank investment projects 
now show a positively significant coefficient. However, slight variations in the number of lags includ-
ed for the instruments or other minor changes in the specification strongly affect the coefficient esti-
mates in this model. Therefore, I urge caution in interpreting these results.  
My final robustness test examines the potential influence of outliers through cross-validation. I rerun 
Table 5-3, regression 3 one hundred times, each time omitting the observations for a different country. 
The resulting coefficient estimates and p-values for the four different lending types are presented in 
Figure 5-2.  
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Figure 5-2: Estimation results after case-wise deletion of countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: figure based on the regression specification of Table 5-3, regression 3 (i.e., two-way fixed effects, and sample covering the full period). 
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There is no evidence that the omission or inclusion of any individual country could change the general 
thrust of my argument. For World Bank investment projects and IMF stabilization programs, coefficients 
are always negative and insignificant (upper two panels of Figure 5-2). For the international financial in-
stitutions’ structural adjustment programs, the coefficient estimates are always positive and turn signifi-
cant when their values exceed about 0.60. For the international financial institutions’ PRS-based lending, 
all coefficient estimates are positive and significant to at least the 10% level. Their values range from 
+0.80 to +1.15.  
These robustness tests reinforce confidence in the results of Table 5-3. They confirm the positive relation-
ship between poverty reduction strategy programs and democratization. They equally confirm the less-
clear, but nonetheless positive, role of structural adjustment programs. And they generally reproduce the 
negative, but insignificant, results for IMF stabilization and World Bank project lending. Except for the 
insignificance of the traditional lending approaches (IMF-STB and WB-INV), these results are in line with 
my hypotheses about the effect of different types of IFI lending on changes in procedural democracy.  
While aid types that directly target and simultaneously respect democratic accountability seem most suc-
cessful, aid types that do not target, but at least respect democratic accountability can also have a limited 
positive effect.  
 
5.7.3. Impact of program lending on different democratic outcomes 
The second part of the analysis assesses the impact of different IMF and World Bank programs on differ-
ent democratic outcomes. Furthermore, this part of the analysis examines the conditions under which IFI 
program lending may be more effective in promoting democratization.  
Table 5-5 presents the disaggregate results for the procedural and substantive dimensions of democracy.74  
  
                                                     
74 For ease of presentation, I do not show estimated effects for the control variables but focus instead on the effects of 
my primary variables of interest, namely the participation in different program types. Full models with controls are 
available on request. 
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Table 5-5: The specific impact of different IFI programs on different democratic outcomes 
Variables WB-INV IMF-STB IFI-SAP IFI-PRS R2 Countries Observations 
Procedural democracy        
1980-2011        
Polity -0.13 -0.46 0.58 0.99** 0.36 100 2374 
(0.47) (0.29) (0.12) (0.04) 
Executive 0.01 -0.16 0.16 0.45** 0.23 100 2204 
recruitment (0.92) (0.23) (0.19) (0.03) 
   Executive -0.07 -0.09 0.13 0.28 0.26 100 2204 
constraints (0.23) (0.58) (0.40) (0.13) 
   Political competition -0.08 -0.17 0.38** 0.50** 0.44 100 2204 
(0.45) (0.45) (0.02) (0.03) 
Year ≥ 1999     
Polity -0.21 -0.31 0.21 0.68* 0.05 98 1140 
 (0.38) (0.44) (0.48) (0.10) 
Executive -0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.26 0.04 97 1060 
recruitment (0.79) (0.80) (0.51) (0.15) 
   Executive -0.02 -0.13 0.01 0.19 0.04 97 1060 
constraints (0.83) (0.37) (0.95) (0.19) 
Political competition 0.00 -0.11 0.20* 0.32 0.05 97 1060 
 (0.99) (0.62) (0.05) (0.14)    
Substantive democracy         
1980-2011        
Empowerment -0.07 0.09 0.25 -0.10 0.17 102 2157 
 (0.52) (0.69) (0.17) (0.72) 
   Freedom of 0.00 0.04 0.07* -0.04 0.11 102 2175 
speech (0.95) (0.33) (0.10) (0.57) 
Freedom of assembly -0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 0.13 102 2167 
& association (0.82) (0.69) (0.17) (0.58) 
Workers’ rights 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.16 102 2172 
 
(0.94) (0.85) (0.81) (0.99) 
   Year ≥ 1999     
Empowerment -0.02 0.16 0.36* -0.50* 0.08 100 1,092 
 (0.87) (0.52) (0.05) (0.08)    
Freedom of 0.04 0.07 -0.01 -0.16** 0.10 100 1095 
speech (0.29) (0.25) (0.83) (0.05)    
Freedom of assembly -0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.19** 0.04 100 1095 
& association (0.36) (0.69) (0.15) (0.01) 
Workers’ rights 0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.11* 0.11 100 1094 
(0.13) (0.93) (0.72) (0.05) 
Note: robust p-values (based on standard errors clustered at country level) in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. Estimates based on Table 5-3, regression 3 (i.e., two-way fixed effects, and sample covering the full period) 
and regression 4 (i.e., country fixed effects, and sample covering the period with IFI-PRS fully established as a new 
lending instrument (1999–2011)).  
 
Disaggregate results for the polity2 regime index show that the effects of development aid on the institu-
tional and procedural features of democracy are stronger in the full period (1980-2011) than in the re-
stricted time period (1999-2011). Confirming the aggregate results, estimation coefficients of traditional 
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lending programs (WB-INV and IMF-STB) are still insignificant and mostly negative for all three concept 
variables of the polity regime index. By contrast, estimation coefficients of IFI-SAP and IFI-PRS are posi-
tive in all estimations, but they differ in significance for different indicators of procedural democracy. 
While IFI-SAP demonstrates a positive and significant impact on political competition, IFI-PRS programs 
exhibit an additional positive and significant effect on executive recruitment and thus on the composite 
democracy index in the full period. When I restrict the sample to the years following the introduction of 
the PRS approach (≥1999), the size and significance of the coefficient estimates decrease. The overall 
variance explained by the different models also decreases. Still, IFI-SAP’s positive impact on political 
competition and IFI-PRS’s overall positive impact on the polity2 regime indicator stay significant.  
If I compare these results with the disaggregate results for the CIRI human empowerment index, I find 
that the effects of development aid on the substantive dimensions of democracy are significant only when 
I restrict the time period (≥1999). To start with, I find no significant association between traditional lend-
ing programs and citizen empowerment. If I look at the newer lending programs, I find that IFI-SAP posi-
tively affects citizen empowerment in recipient countries, whereas IFI-PRS negatively affect citizen em-
powerment in the period following the turn of the millennium. These significant results are not dependent 
on model specification, as I receive similar results in country-fixed effect regressions with period dum-
mies and country-fixed effect regressions for the restricted time period (see Annex 5-5, Table A5-2). 
Moreover, while IFI-SAP show no significant impact on any single dimension of human empowerment, 
IFI-PRS exhibit a negative and significant impact on all dimensions of substantive democracy – contrary 
to the poverty reduction strategy approach’s official rationale of giving voice (freedom of speech) by civil 
society participation (freedom of assembly and association) to the poor (workers’ rights). Although these 
results may seem at odds with intuition, they are predominantly in line with my theoretical framework 
suggesting that surrogates cannot promote democratic practice and substantive rights. Original accounta-
bility holders themselves must claim them. However, these negative, significant results might also be ex-
plained by the prior human rights record of an average country participating in PRS-based lending. To 
take possible selection effects of the IFIs’ new rights-based development approach into account, I evaluat-
ed its impact conditional on the initial level of citizen empowerment and government respect for human 
rights.  
 
5.7.4. Impact of program lending conditional on recipient regime 
Table 5-6 presents the results of different types of IFI lending conditional on the prior level of substantive 
democracy.  
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Table 5-6: Effects on substantive democracy conditional on recipient regime 
Variables Baseline 
Only  
autocracies 
Only  
democracies 
Traditional 
x CIRI 
Newer 
x CIRI All x CIRI 
WB-INV (t-5) -0.02 0.15 -0.24* -0.81***  -0.72*** 
(0.87) (0.24) (0.09) (0.00)  (0.00) 
IMF-STB (t-5) 0.16 -0.08 0.95** 0.48  0.55 
 
(0.52) (0.76) (0.04) (0.40)  (0.38) 
IFI-SAP (t-5) 0.36* 0.39* 0.22  0.27 0.40 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.39)  (0.53) (0.30) 
IFI-PRS (t-5) -0.50* -0.75** 0.22  1.22* 1.06* 
(0.08) (0.03) (0.62)  (0.06) (0.10) 
WB-INV x     0.09***  0.08*** 
Empowerment (t-5)    (0.00)  (0.00) 
IMF-STB x     -0.02  -0.04 
Empowerment (t-5)    (0.75)  (0.52) 
IFI-SAP x      0.01 -0.01 
Empowerment (t-5)     (0.80) (0.87) 
IFI-PRS x      -0.21*** -0.18*** 
Empowerment (t-5)     (0.00) (0.00) 
Empowerment (t-5) 0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.17** 0.06 -0.12 
(0.56) (0.66) (0.53) (0.02) (0.24) (0.10) 
GDP per capita,  -0.54 -2.91** 1.50 -0.65 -0.55 -0.48 
log (t-5) (0.63) (0.01) (0.26) (0.55) (0.62) (0.65) 
GDP per capita  -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
change (t-5) (0.32) (0.61) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.19) 
Urbanization  -0.07 -0.13** -0.05 -0.10** -0.08 -0.09* 
rate (t-5) (0.17) (0.04) (0.38) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) 
Price level,  -0.28 0.28 -0.21 -0.19 -0.21 -0.14 
log (t-5) (0.49) (0.61) (0.73) (0.63) (0.60) (0.71) 
Trade openness,  -0.79* -0.44 -0.59 -0.72* -0.69 -0.66 
log (t-5) (0.07) (0.51) (0.27) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
Conflict  0.36* 0.13 0.30 0.37* 0.34* 0.31 
intensity (t-5) (0.06) (0.67) (0.19) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) 
Regional  0.01 -0.13 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 
diffusion (t-5) (0.96) (0.48) (0.80) (0.54) (0.95) (0.87) 
Countries 100 69 53 100 100 100 
Observations 1092 636 456 1092 1092 1092 
R-squared 0.08 0.22 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.12 
Note: robust p-values (based on standard errors clustered at country level) in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. Estimates based on Table 5-3, regression 4 (i.e., country fixed effects, and sample covering the period with 
IFI-PRS fully established as a new lending instrument (1999–2011)). 
 
As a first step, I rerun the last regression of the previous table. Results show the baseline model estimating 
the general impact of different types of IFI lending on a country’s human rights record in the 1999-2011 
period when IFI-PRS was fully established as a lending instrument (regression 1). In the following two 
regressions, I examine whether the type of recipient regime influences the impact of IFI lending on civic 
empowerment in recipient countries. To this end, I split the sample into two groups roughly representing 
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“democracies” with original polity2 scores greater than zero and “autocracies” with scores equal to or less 
than zero (see Persson and Tabellini 2006). Results indicate that democratic or authoritarian group mem-
bership does indeed influence the impact of IFI-PRS lending on democratic practices and rights in recipi-
ent countries since estimation coefficients are negative and significant in the autocratic group (regression 
2), but not in the democratic group (regression 3). The impact of other program types on citizen empow-
erment also seems to be sensitive to the type of recipient political regime. While IFI-SAP lending scores 
better in autocratic countries, traditional lending approaches show significant positive (IMF-STB) and 
negative effects (WB-INV) in more democratic countries.  
Taking into account that the estimation of separate models for each group can result in a loss of statistical 
power, in the remaining regressions I allow all coefficients to vary across all recipients, and test whether a 
country’s participation in different program affects its human rights record conditional on the starting lev-
el of human rights. Regression 4 shows the results for the IMF and the World Bank's traditional lending 
approaches. In line with most research on bilateral aid, I find a negative baseline effect of project-like 
interventions (WB-INV), which increases with the level of human rights in a country, but no effect of 
crisis-induced interventions (IMF-STB) or its interaction with the extent of government respect for human 
rights. Turning to my variables of interest, regression 5 shows the conditional impact of the newer types of 
financial support by the international financial institutions. The estimation coefficient for IFI-PRS lending 
turns positive and remains significant, while the coefficient for IFI-SAP lending loses its significance, but 
remains positive. Moreover, the negative interaction term between IFI-PRS lending and human rights is 
highly significant, suggesting that this type of rights-based development approach is more effective the 
lower the recipient regime’s human rights record is. Finally, in regression 6 I include the full set of finan-
cial instruments used by the IMF and World Bank since 1999. Results largely confirm individual effects. 
Here I recover the positive and significant effect of IFI-PRS as well as the negative and significant effect 
of WB-INV. While the beneficial effects of IFI-PRS are stronger in countries with low respect for human 
rights, the harmful effects of WB-INV become worse if government respect for human rights was high 
prior to the start of investment project lending. By contrast, the effects of financial stabilization and struc-
tural adjustment programs are not conditional on prior empowerment of citizens, suggesting that they 
come without any hidden democratic motives.  
Finally, I re-run the regressions in Table 5-6 but replace the CIRI human empowerment index with the 
polity2 regime index estimating the conditional impact on procedural democracy (see Annex 5-5, Table 
A5-3). In line with my theoretical expectations, I find that the impact of PRS lending on democratization 
is not conditional on the type of recipient regime. Neither a sample split nor the use of an interaction term 
yields significant results. However, what I do find is a negative and significant effect of financial stabiliza-
tion programs (IMF-STB) on procedural democracy conditional on recipient regime type. This effect is 
277 
highly significant and seems to become worse the higher the level of procedural democracy is, consistent 
with my theoretical prediction.  
 
5.7.5. Impact of program lending conditional on donor coordination 
Having looked at the dependent variable and its interaction with the lagged program type variables, I will 
now disaggregate the explanatory variables among donors and look at their individual and joint impact on 
democratization. Table 5-7 presents the disaggregate results for IMF and World Bank lending when their 
financial instruments subsumed under the same program type are kept separate.  
Since collaboration between the IMF and World Bank already started under structural adjustment pro-
grams in the 1980s, estimation results are based on the baseline specification with two-way fixed effects 
for the full time period (1980-2011). My focus thereby lies on the newer lending types (IFI-SAP and IFI-
PRS) that brought more overlap and institutionalized collaboration between the two sister organizations. I 
start with the first regression of Table 5-5 estimating the general impact of different types of IFI lending 
on a country’s quality of political governance in the full sample (regression 1). When I keep Bank and 
Fund lending apart, results indicate that lending from both institutions has a positive effect on procedural 
democracy, though this effect is weaker for the Bank (regression 2) than the Fund (regression 3). While 
the coefficients for PRS-based lending are positive and significant for both institutions (WB-PRS and 
IMF-PRS), the coefficient for WB-SAP is slightly below conventional significance levels (p-value=0.12).  
Given that donor coordination is key to program-based aid modalities in support of country-owned devel-
opment strategies, one might expect the effect of aid modalities that respect democratic accountability 
mechanisms to be much stronger if donors coordinate their assistance. Following this logic, I add an inter-
action term for the same type of lending by the IMF and World Bank within an individual country. Look-
ing first at program-based aid framed as structural adjustment lending, the interaction term that measures 
the composite outcome of a country's participation in structural adjustment programs from both institu-
tions is insignificant, while all coefficients of the individual lending programs drop further and only the 
Fund’s PRS-based lending remains significant (regression 4).  
  
278 
Table 5-7: Effects on procedural democracy conditional on donor coordination 
Variables Baseline 
Only WB 
programs 
Only IMF 
programs 
WB x IMF 
interaction 
SAP 
WB x IMF 
interaction  
PRS 
WB x IMF 
interaction 
SAP & PRS 
WB-INV (t-5) -0.13 -0.16  -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
 
(0.47) (0.38)  (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) 
IMF-STB (t-5) -0.46  -0.26 -0.33 -0.35 -0.32 
(0.29)  (0.54) (0.47) (0.42) (0.48) 
IFI-SAP (t-5) 0.58      
(0.12)      
IFI-PRS (t-5) 0.99**      
(0.04)      
WB-SAP (t-5)  0.54  0.37 0.45 0.36 
 (0.12)  (0.34) (0.20) (0.35) 
WB-PRS (t-5)  1.13*  0.88 2.04*** 2.17*** 
 
 (0.06)  (0.17) (0.01) (0.00) 
IMF-SAP (t-5)   0.96* 0.36 0.85 0.33 
  (0.07) (0.67) (0.11) (0.70) 
IMF-PRS (t-5)   1.33** 1.11* 1.19* 1.24* 
  (0.03) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) 
WB-SAP x     0.63  0.68 
IMF-SAP (t-5)    (0.45)  (0.41) 
WB-PRS x      -1.51* -1.63* 
IMF-PRS (t-5)     (0.09) (0.06) 
Polity (t-5) 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP per capita,  -1.19** -1.40** -1.18* -1.20** -1.16* -1.20** 
log (t-5) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
GDP per capita  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
change (t-5) (0.35) (0.47) (0.35) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) 
Urbanization  -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
rate (t-5) (0.71) (0.59) (0.72) (0.73) (0.74) (0.74) 
Price level,  -1.04** -1.07** -0.99** -0.97* -0.94* -0.96* 
log (t-5) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Trade openness,  0.11 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.13 
log (t-5) (0.88) (0.88) (0.92) (0.87) (0.85) (0.86) 
Conflict  -0.33 -0.33 -0.25 -0.31 -0.31 -0.30 
intensity (t-5) (0.25) (0.24) (0.37) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
Regional  -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
diffusion (t-5) (0.83) (0.89) (0.93) (0.85) (0.85) (0.84) 
Countries 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Observations 2374 2374 2374 2374 2374 2374 
R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Note: robust p-values (based on standard errors clustered at country level) in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. Estimates based on Table 5-3, regression 3 (i.e., two-way fixed effects, and sample covering the full period). 
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Considering that collaboration between the IMF and World Bank was only institutionalized under the PRS 
approach, I compare these results with those I receive when I add an interaction term for joint PRS-based 
lending (reflecting simultaneous participation of a country in poverty reduction programs by the IMF and 
World Bank) in regression 5. Here I recover the positive and significant effect of both WB-PRS and IMF-
PRS. Especially the increase in the coefficient of the Bank’s poverty reduction programs is remarkable as 
it almost doubles in size and becomes highly significant (p=0.001). PRS-based lending by the Bank thus 
seems highly sensitive to aid-giving by the Fund. By contrast, the coefficient of the Fund’s poverty reduc-
tion and growth facility remains remarkably stable across all regressions in the table, suggesting that its 
impact on the quality of a political regime is not conditional on the Fund’s collaboration with the Bank. 
Last but not least, I observe a negative and significant impact of Bank-Fund interaction under the PRS 
approach, suggesting that a lack of cooperation leads to adverse democratic outcomes. These results are 
still significant, and remain so when I examine individual and joint effects of all newer lending types to-
gether (regression 6). While the simultaneous presence of the IMF and World Bank within an individual 
country under the Washington Consensus does not affect governance quality in this country, overlap and 
interaction under the PRS approach appear to have a negative impact on procedural democracy (notwith-
standing their individual programs’ beneficial democratic outcomes).  
By contrast, I find no significant results for Bank-Fund interaction when I replace the polity2 regime indi-
cator with the CIRI human empowerment index estimating the conditional impact of development aid on 
substantive democracy (see Annex 5-5, Table A5-4). Bank-Fund interaction does not influence the link 
between programmatic lending and substantive democracy. Except for the positive and significant effect 
of the Fund’s structural adjustment programs (probably caused by their gate-keeping role for aid-giving by 
other donors), newer program types by the IMF and Fund do not have any individual positive effects. 
These results are consistent with the IFIs’ apolitical mandate and expected theoretical relationships.  
 
5.8. Comparison with insights from expert interviews and online survey 
The first part of the econometric analysis has focused on different types of IMF and World Bank lending 
and has shown that their impact on democratization varies depending on the type of financial assistance. 
In the second part, the analysis has concentrated on poverty reduction strategy-based lending and exam-
ined the conditions under which this aid type contributes to democratization in recipient countries. As part 
of an iterative research process, I will now re-examine the findings of the qualitative analysis in light of 
the statistical results in order to deepen my understanding of how aid impacts on democratization in recip-
ient countries.   
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5.8.1. Democratic intervention strategies and time horizon 
Results of the statistical analysis indicate that the impact of IFI-PRS lending differs in terms of the democ-
racy concept and the time period under consideration. The qualitative analysis helps to explain these con-
trary tendencies of poverty reduction programs. In particular, it has identified two fields of surrogate ac-
countability that are subsumed under the PRS approach and through which donors potentially influence 
democratization in recipient countries.  
In the PRS field, the World Bank follows a strategy of empowering citizens in recipient countries, which 
is seen as instrumental for reducing poverty and deepening democracy. As a surrogate of weak citizens, 
the World Bank holds corporate government actors accountable in the PRS fields for their formulation of 
national reform agenda and their consultation of domestic stakeholders. As a result, it is hoped that the 
government agenda also reflects what the society at large wants.  
In the GBS field, the strategy of the World Bank aims at improving governance quality in recipient coun-
tries, which is seen as beneficial both from a development and democratic perspective. As a surrogate of 
weak governance institutions, the World Bank holds collaborative government actors accountable in the 
GBS fields for their implementation of the national reform agenda via the use of general budget support 
and their coordination of external partners. As a result, it is hoped that the government budget is submitted 
to public scrutiny.  
These two fields of surrogate accountability interact with the broader field of democratic accountability in 
recipient countries. In the DEM field, representative government actors are held accountable by electoral 
and political accountability forums at the recipient country level. While the World Bank does not directly 
intervene in the DEM field, it does hold representative government actors accountable for the outcomes of 
the surrogate accountability process, thereby influencing the democratic process. More specifically, the 
Bank holds representative government actors responsible for their political ownership of the national re-
form agenda and their financial performance in the use of public resources.  
Regarding these two outcomes, the quantitative analysis finds empirical evidence for an IFI strategy aimed 
at improving governance quality, but could not detect any impact (or even finds a counterproductive ef-
fect) of IFI efforts aimed at empowering citizens in recipient countries. Results indicate that poverty re-
duction lending simultaneously had a strong and positive impact on procedural democracy in the full time 
period (1980-2011), but a negative impact on substantive democracy when the sample was restricted to 
the post-1999 period. These results suggest that two broad strategies guide PRS-based lending and its 
democratic targets, since its impact significantly differs between the indices for procedural democracy and 
substantive democracy, but not between the composite variables of these indices themselves. All concept 
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variables have the same direction, even though they are not significant all the time. What matters more in 
terms of strategy, seems to be time horizon allowed for targeted aid to become effective. Aid that is tar-
geted at governance reforms, such as external audit of the general budget, becomes effective only in the 
medium to long term, while aid that is targeted at civil society support, such as participatory priority-
setting in national development strategies, has an effect (or none at all) only in the short term.  
 
5.8.2. Democratic targets and recipient regime 
Moreover, the qualitative analysis examined the initial conditions in recipient countries under which these 
two intervention strategies could realize their democratic potential.  
In line with its primary goal of reducing poverty worldwide, most respondents thought that – from an ef-
fectiveness perspective – the elaboration of a national poverty reduction strategy is not dependent on the 
type of political regime, but rather depends on government commitment and the technical capacities avail-
able in a country. While poverty reduction strategies build on and strengthen democratic accountability 
institutions and procedures, they can at least help to build a national consensus around one single docu-
ment framing donor intervention and external capacity building efforts in countries with weak democratic 
accountability. According to these respondents, poverty reduction strategies can thus play a useful role in 
both political contexts.  
A second group of respondents argued that – from an empowerment perspective – the donor requirement 
to solicit inputs from civil society in elaborating this strategy brings little added value because donors are 
driving the process. While there could be a demonstration effect in less democratic countries, if the partic-
ipatory process is done well and genuinely, an entirely donor-driven participatory process could also have 
a counterproductive effect, if it comes against the will of the incumbent regime. The type of political re-
gime thus matters, but the direction of impact remains unclear.  
A third argument finally was that – from a governance perspective – the impact of PRS-based lending is 
not dependent on the starting level of democracy and good governance in a country, because, as one inter-
viewee puts it, “wherever you are, it takes you to a better place on accountability”. Program-based aid in 
support of the general budget is seen as a great way to introduce or improve accountability between state 
agencies and to build the basic level of capacity that civil service needs to function. While general budget 
support surely is more effective in achieving economic goals in democratic settings, the political impact of 
delivering aid through national budgets probably is much higher in recipient countries with less matured 
institutions and lower levels of democracy.  
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If I compare these insights of World Bank experts with the results of the statistical analysis, I find empiri-
cal support for democratic targets of PRS-based lending as expressed in the governance and empowerment 
perspectives, while leaving the empirical test of economic motives as shown by the effectiveness perspec-
tive to further research. First, regression results confirm that if we look at the prior level of human rights 
and civic empowerment in a country (substantive democracy), then the impact of donor strategies aimed at 
involving civil society in political decision-making is conditional on the type of political regime. While a 
simple sample split indicates that PRS-based lending may have a negative impact in more autocratic re-
gimes (i.e., a counterproductive effect), the use of an interaction term overrules this finding by suggesting 
that it rather has a positive impact that becomes stronger the more autocratic a regime is (i.e., demonstra-
tion effect). Second, regression results also confirm that if we look at the starting level of democratic insti-
tutions and procedures in a country (procedural democracy), then the impact of donor strategies aimed at 
opening the budget process to formal review and public control is not conditional on the type of political 
regime. Neither a sample split nor the use of an interaction term yields significant results.  
These results thus support the broad consensus among World Bank staff that PRS-based lending may be 
more useful in countries with dysfunctional institutions and low quality of the political regime, as it comes 
with many efforts to improve the system.  
 
5.8.3. Aid modalities and donor coordination 
Finally, the qualitative analysis demonstrated that the aid modalities through which donors hold domestic 
power wielders accountable involved an increasingly larger number of participants. This shift towards 
participatory accountability mechanisms was judged as positive in the PRS field, where the involvement 
of new domestic stakeholders, and in particular civil society, is associated with more country ownership of 
national development strategies. In this regard, it is seen as crucial that national development strategies 
and visions emerge from domestic struggles and are not imposed by foreign actors. However, perceptions 
differ with regard to the increase in numbers of external development partners in the GBS field.  
According to the advocates of general budget support, the important innovation (or “true revolution”) of 
PRS-based lending has been that everyone is getting involved. The original value of the PRS approach is 
seen in that the donor community told the government to get all sectors together, to formulate a national 
development strategy, to link this strategy with the general budget, and that then donors would directly 
support and monitor budget execution. Opening the national budget process to outsiders, as one respond-
ent puts it, is by far the most important initiative for these countries, because governments have complete 
ownership over their budgets, for better or worse.  
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By contrast, critics of general budget support propose that particularly in countries with large donor com-
munities, these new participatory aid modalities came along with more bureaucracy and inconsistency 
among external partners. For example, respondents report that the processes of donor harmonization and 
alignment are difficult to combine with budget preparation as in the books. Although the provision of mul-
ti-donor budget support has become one of the hallmarks of the PRS approach, there is a tendency for 
participation from the early stages of writing the action matrix for budget support. This “participation bu-
reaucracy” hampers the predictability of aid and the execution of the general budget. What is more, the 
simultaneous presence of donors in the same country does not mean that they cooperate. In particular, the 
ownership principle creates inconsistencies in message-making between the international financial institu-
tions.  
The disaggregate – and partly ambiguous – results support both advocates and critics of general budget 
support. On the one hand, individual outcomes of Bank and Fund lending indicate that sectoral alignment 
to the national poverty reduction and donor coordination around general budget support increased the im-
pact of World Bank lending, but did not affect outcomes of IMF lending. This may be explained by their 
individual specialization. While the Fund’s primarily focuses on the macroeconomic framework, the 
Bank’s activities cover a broader spectrum of policies ranging from social measures to institutional re-
forms. Since these sectoral policies need approval by the government and all other donors at the negotia-
tion table, donor alignment and harmonization is thus much more fundamental for the World Bank than 
for the IMF, who depends less on other donors for its overall balance of payment support. Unlike the IMF, 
the World Bank achieves more weight in its area of specialization when the Bank is joined by as many 
development partners as possible – including the IMF whose approval of the macroeconomic framework 
is often a necessary condition for other donors to join multi-donor budget support operations. The stronger 
individual effect of World Bank lending when a country simultaneously participates in IMF lending shows 
precisely this effect.  
On the other hand, statistical results cannot support the argument that donor harmonization and alignment 
has led to more local demand for good governance and broader country ownership of strategies, because 
Bank-Fund interaction does not have any significant effect on substantive democracy. Rather, empirical 
findings lend support to the arguments of more bureaucracy and inconsistency between donors. Although 
the Bank and Fund individually have a positive impact on the quality of governance in recipient countries, 
results show that their joint impact on procedural democracy is negative and significant. This result indi-
cates that increased overlap of aid is not equivalent to increased cooperation among donors. Instead, quali-
tative evidence from the interviews and the survey suggests that the bureaucracy involved in coordinating 
aid among multiple budget-providing donors have caused the IMF and World Bank to focus on their own 
areas of specialization and, as a result, inconsistencies in message-making between the two sister organi-
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zations have increased under the current aid architecture. To increase consistency between their develop-
ment efforts, Bank staff thus recommended that IMF staff should insist more that budgets are executed the 
way they are written and should not allow governments to override their deficits. To have more leverage, 
it would be useful to have the two organizations give the same message in the sense that both organiza-
tions should write this message in their staff reports and then send it to their respective Boards. Thus, 
while a clear specialization and division of labor may theoretically lead to synergies among donors in-
volved in poverty reduction lending, both the qualitative and quantitative analyses show that the interac-
tion between the World Bank and the IMF in practice rather leads to conflicts regarding their common 
stance vis-à-vis recipient governments and may even have a negative effect on the quality of political re-
gimes in recipient countries.  
 
5.8.4. Summarizing the empirical evidence 
The main results are the following:  
First, the qualitative analysis identified two surrogate accountability forums where domestic stakeholders 
and external development partners interact, that is, the PRS and GBS fields, whose intervention logic was 
said to differ in terms of their democratic targets. While World Bank staff associated the PRS field more 
closely with the direct promotion of citizen empowerment and human rights in recipient countries, they 
saw the Bank’s intervention in the GBS field as consisting of many small steps towards the strengthening 
of democratic governance in recipient countries. Confirming the existence of two parallel, but distinct 
intervention strategies, the quantitative analysis showed that poverty reduction lending simultaneously had 
a strong and positive impact on procedural democracy in the 1980-2011 period, but a negative impact on 
substantive democracy when the sample was restricted to the post-1999 period. Participatory priority-
setting in PRS processes thus seems to be associated with a worsening of substantive democracy in the 
short term, while programmatic lending in support of national or sector budgets (starting with structural 
adjustment lending) seems to improve procedural democracy over the long run.  
Second, many respondents in the qualitative analysis thought that the success of the Bank’s strategy for 
broadening political ownership beyond the government in the PRS field depends ultimately on recipients’ 
prior level of democracy and good governance because ownership means that the government leads the 
process. By contrast, they considered the Bank’s strategy for improving financial performance in the GBS 
field to be independent of the previous level of democracy and good governance in a country because, in 
their view, general budget support comes with many efforts to improve the system. The quantitative anal-
ysis partly confirmed that if we look at substantive dimensions of democracy, then the impact of donor 
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strategies aimed at involving civil society in political decision-making is conditional on the recipients’ 
initial level of government respect for human rights and may turn positive in less democratic regimes (as 
opposed to its negative impact if the interaction with recipient regime is not taken into account.). Howev-
er, if we look at procedural democracy dimensions, then the impact of donor strategies aimed at opening 
the budget process to formal review and public control is independent of recipients’ quality of democratic 
institutions and procedures at the start of the process.  
Third, the qualitative analysis showed that there has been a shift from delegation to participatory mecha-
nisms in both surrogate accountability forums, marked by an increase in the number of participants. This 
increase in participation was judged positively in the PRS field, where the involvement of new domestic 
stakeholders is associated with more country-owned development strategies. However, particularly in 
countries with large donor communities, respondents felt that in the GBS field participatory development 
mechanisms also come with more bureaucracy and inconsistency in message-making among external 
partners. The quantitative analysis lends support for the argument of a participation bureaucracy at the 
donor side by showing that the interaction between the IMF and World Bank in individual countries is 
negatively associated with procedural democracy, consistent with the qualitative evidence from the inter-
views and the survey. However, the quantitative evidence cannot support the argument of broader country 
ownership of strategies at the recipient side, as Bank-Fund interaction does not have any significant effect 
on substantive democracy.  
 
 
5.9. Discussion: democracy strengthened through the PRS approach? 
The question this chapter wanted to answer was whether and under which conditions the new type of PRS-
based lending, as opposed to other types of IMF and World Bank support, has made any meaningful dif-
ference in terms of strengthening democracy in recipient countries.  
Previous research generally distinguished between two types of aid: development aid (or economic aid) 
and democracy aid (or political aid). While IFI lending traditionally is perceived to belong to the category 
of development aid, this chapter argued that newer types of lending programs additionally display certain 
characteristics of democracy aid, as they come with many efforts to improve national governance systems.  
The theoretical framework proposed to analyze the issues by looking both at the underlying democratic 
targets and the way in which development aid interacts with democratic accountability in recipient coun-
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tries. By using the concept of surrogate accountability as an analytical lens for categorizing different aid 
modalities in terms of their interaction with democratic accountability, the argument was made that not 
only the strategic targets that define external intervention strategies but also the modalities of aid delivery 
matter. Taking these differences in strategic targets and aid delivery into account allows us to reconcile 
seemingly contradictory results of the handful of studies on the democratic outcomes of multilateral aid 
(see Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Barro and Lee 2005; Nelson and Wallace 2005).  
Using panel data for a sample of 100 developing countries over a period of 30 years, and controlling for a 
number of alternative explanations, the statistical analysis showed that the new type of PRS-based lending 
has indeed made a meaningful difference in terms of strengthening democratization in recipient countries. 
However, the empirical evidence also indicates that the democratic outcomes of IFI lending depend on the 
specific aid type as well as the political context on both sides of the multilateral aid relationship, which 
must be taken into account. Accordingly, this research situates itself firmly within the conditional strand 
of the literature, which it supports and extends in several respects.  
 
5.9.1. Impact varies with aid type 
The empirical findings support the view that the impact of development aid on democratization varies 
according to the purpose of aid and the particular channel through which aid is delivered. My findings 
must be seen within a recent trend in the aid and democratization literature to disaggregate explanatory aid 
variables and democratic outcome variables (Bermeo 2011; Carnegie and Marinov 2017; Dietrich and 
Wright 2015). These scholars were able to show that different channels of aid delivery differ in their im-
pact on democratization in recipient countries depending on donor motives for providing targeted democ-
racy assistance.  
Statistical results for IFI lending show that development aid by the IMF and World Bank also comes via 
different channels, which in the case of poverty reduction lending seem to exert a positive impact on pro-
cedural democracy, but a negative impact on substantive democracy, thereby confirming earlier research 
on structural adjustment lending with similar contradictory propensities (see Abouharb and Cingranelli 
2007).  
My results also underpin the insignificant or even negative effects from sub-programs of U.S. democracy 
assistance specifically targeted at improving the human rights situation in recipient countries. These re-
sults essentially contradict the overall positive effect of targeted democracy assistance as found by the 
same authors (see Scott and Steele 2005, 2011; Finkel et al. 2007, 2008).  
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My theoretical framework solves this apparent contradiction by interpreting the negative effects on human 
rights as a result of donors’ paternalistic promotion of citizens’ preferences. Surrogate accountability ar-
rangement around aid bear the greatest potential when they strengthen procedural norms and rule-
following of recipient governments (as with general budget support operations), but they seem less suited 
to advance policy preferences of citizens vis-à-vis their own governments (as with broad-based consulta-
tion processes on poverty reduction strategies).  
Radical critics of the PRS approach provide similar support to this line of reasoning by showing – from a 
developmental perspective – that neither governments nor donors or civil society actors have become 
more responsive to citizens’ preferences through participatory priority-setting, but rather pursue their own 
material, ideological or organizational interests (see Hickey and Mohan 2008; Komives 2011; Winters 
2010).  
 
5.9.2. Impact depends on recipient and donor characteristics 
Findings from the statistical analysis emphasize the need to analyze the effects of development aid on 
democratization conditional on donor and recipient characteristics. According to the conditional strand of 
the literature, the type of political regime affects the relationship between aid and democratization but 
must be analyzed separately for general development assistance and targeted democracy assistance. Find-
ings from this literature show that general development assistance stabilizes or even amplifies the existing 
political regime but cannot make autocratic regimes more democratic. By contrast, the effects of democra-
cy aid vary across recipient regimes, but selection effects may play a larger role making it difficult to draw 
general conclusions.  
My results respond to those studies that found a stabilizing effect of development aid on recipients’ politi-
cal regime (Dutta et al. 2013; Morrison 2007, 2009; Wright 2009), as they show that the type of political 
regime also affects the impact of traditional lending approaches (IMF-STB and WB-INV) that come clos-
est to bilateral forms of development aid. While these traditional lending types did not show any signifi-
cant impact in the baseline models estimating their general impact on democratization, their negative ef-
fects became visible when I took their interaction with the political regime into account. Accordingly, 
WB-INV lending worsens democratic rights and practices in democratic regimes, whereas IMF-STB by-
passes democratic institutions and procedures in autocratic regimes, consistent with their different inter-
vention strategies.  
My results also respond to previous studies that found selection effects at play in the allocation of targeted 
democracy and governance assistance (see Bermeo 2011; Dietrich and Wright 2015; Nielsen and Nielson 
288 
2010). However, the results of these studies differ highly across estimation methods and democratic out-
comes, which makes their common interpretation difficult and the theoretical argument especially im-
portant (Nielsen and Nielson 2010: 7).  
According to my theoretical framework, democracy aid comes with different democratic targets. Donors 
may either target governance or empowerment standards of democratic accountability and, corresponding-
ly deliver aid either via the recipient government channels or circumvent these governments by channeling 
their assistance directly to organized civil society. Given that the former type usually comes with the con-
sent of incumbent regimes, only the latter type that comes against the will of incumbent regimes is ex-
pected to be dependent on the type of regime. Statistical results for IFI-PRS lending that approximates 
bilateral democracy aid in many respects confirm that we need to differ between conflictual and consensu-
al strategies.  
In particular, the inclusion of an interaction term between aid and procedural democracy does not signifi-
cantly change the results, suggesting that the more consensual strategy of democracy aid – governance 
assistance – does not depend on the type of political regime. By contrast, when I include an interaction 
term between aid and substantive democracy, results differ significantly. While estimation coefficients for 
IFI-PRS lending were negative and significant in the baseline specifications, they show a significantly 
positive impact on human rights and civil liberties, indicating that a conflictual intervention strategy aimed 
at “leveling the playing field between incumbent governments and opposition groups and allows for bot-
tom-up pressure to occur” (Dietrich 2013: 708) depends on a recipient regime’s human rights record. Giv-
en the big differences in impact, once I take initial political conditions into account, this finding under-
scores the need to disaggregate the dependent variable, in line with much of the literature.  
As regards donor characteristics, my results are related to previous research on the link between donor 
coordination (or the lack of it) and development outcomes. Following the pioneering work by Marchesi 
and Sirtori (2011), I approximate Bank-Fund interaction with their simultaneous presence in the same 
country but distinguish according to program types. My results show that the interaction between these 
two sister organizations has no effect for IFI-SAP lending, but that IFI-PRS lending has a significant nega-
tive effect on procedural democracy. This result suggests that simultaneous presence within a single coun-
try does not lead to more beneficial democratic outcomes. I thereby contradict Marchesi and Sirtori (2011) 
who found a positive effect of Bank-Fund interaction on economic growth that increases with their degree 
of information-sharing, their specialized knowledge, and their scope of conditionality (Marchesi and 
Sabani 2014).  
My results must be seen as more in line with the rather pessimistic conclusions of the general literature on 
donor coordination and specialization. The limited evidence available suggests that changes in the global 
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aid regime have not led to greater cooperation among major bilateral and multilateral donors (Aldasoro et 
al. 2010: 935; Nunnenkamp et al. 2013: 557). However, I do find indication for greater specialization, as 
shown by the strong significant positive effects of World Bank lending as compared to IMF lending once 
Bank-Fund interaction is taken into account, suggesting that increased overlap of areas has led to more 
specialization (as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for greater cooperation).  
In sum, empirical findings from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis support the idea that the 
intervention logic of program-based aid bears great potential for promoting procedural democracy, but 
only when donors overcome their collective action problems in practice (e.g., Collier 2006; Emmanuel 
2010). In this context, political conditionality attached to multi-donor general budget support operations 
arises as a promising area of future research (for an outline of this research agenda, see Molenaers et al. 
2015).  
 
5.9.3. Impact measured by a conservative research strategy 
Empirical research designs on aid and its impact on democratization are highly sensitive to their handling 
of endogeneity issues, measurement choices and estimation strategies, of which this analysis makes no 
exception. To account for the problem of endogenous aid-giving, some of the most exciting studies ex-
ploring the causal mechanisms underlying the aid-democracy nexus find that their results strongly differ 
(and even change prefix), when they use an instrumental variables approach (e.g., Carnegie and Marinov 
2017; Dietrich and Wright 2015; Marchesi and Sirtori 2011). However, the aid and democratization litera-
ture has been largely unable to find appropriate instruments for democracy aid (and to a lesser extent, eco-
nomic aid) that do not violate the exclusion restriction. Even more, it has been argued that if the role of aid 
is to provide an economic incentive to recipient governments for initiating democratic reforms, this neces-
sarily implies that aid follows reform. The use of an instrumental variables approach is considered to elim-
inate precisely this kind of endogeneity and thus the entire incentive effect (Kersting and Kilby 2014: 
135). To stay on the safe side, this research thus applied a conservative estimation strategy in line with the 
latest trends within the relevant literature (see Clemens et al. 2012).  
In addition to choosing a cautionary statistical approach, this analysis also goes beyond most of the previ-
ous research (for a notable exception, see Harrigan et al. 2006) in that the quantitative results were addi-
tionally cross-checked with insights from the qualitative analysis. Combining the quantitative results with 
the qualitative evidence of the previous chapter provides a more robust and generalizable picture of the 
PRS approach than is found in the literature so far. Still, despite the exhaustive robustness checks in the 
first part and the cross-checking with expert interviews in the second part, I cannot fully preclude the pos-
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sibility that the results of the quantitative analysis are driven by omitted variable bias, which urges me to 
interpret these results with caution. The consideration of additional factors that may be closely related to 
separate IMF and World Bank program types in general and to their joint lending, in particular, remains a 
challenge for future research on the new global partnership for effective and sustainable development co-
operation.  
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6. Conclusions 
6.1. Results 
6.1.1. Core statement and contributions to the academic debate 
Over the last two decades, there have been far-reaching changes in the strategic targets of foreign aid and 
the modalities how donors deliver aid to recipient countries. Introduced in 1999, the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS) approach by the IMF and the World Bank has represented the centerpiece of this new aid 
agenda towards which the international community has turned of late. Signaling a clean break with the 
technocratic decision-making model that characterized earlier development efforts, the PRS approach 
became the main instrument for access to debt relief and for financial assistance from both institutions.  
This study argues that the promotion of mutual accountability between donors and recipients of aid, which 
lies at the heart of the international aid effectiveness agenda, has added an inherently political logic to the 
IFIs’ predominantly economic reform agenda. Moreover, this study argues that this new political logic 
also affects democratic institutions and procedures in aid-receiving countries. Thus, despite the PRS ap-
proach’s frame of largely apolitical terms (which is not surprising considering the economic mandates of 
the IMF and World Bank), some of the changes involved in the new aid agenda, as argued here, have 
turned out to be strongly political and have even influenced democratic change at the recipient country 
level.  
Previous research on the PRS approach remained surprisingly silent as to the political, let alone the demo-
cratic dimensions of the international aid effectiveness agenda. Primarily informed through case studies on 
the nature of participation within the new governance of aid, the academic debate has been organized 
around the two principles of local ownership and global partnership as the central axes of dispute. In line 
with the two “promises” made by the architects of the new development approach, Chapter 1 divided the 
existing PRS literature into a governance and a participation strand. The governance strand focuses on the 
development potential of the PRS approach and asks whether it has transformed aid relationships at the 
donor-recipient level (for summaries of the debate within the governance strand, see Driscoll and Evans 
2005 as well as Whitfield and Fraser 2009). The participation strand investigates whether the democratic 
potential inherent to the PRS approach has mitigated the democratic deficits at the state-society level in 
aid-receiving (Lazarus 2008 and Siebold 2005 provide reviews of the debate within the participation 
strand). However, very few attempts have been made to examine the development and democracy per-
spective within one common analytical framework.  
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The present study used the concept of accountability as an analytical lens to bridge this gap in the PRS 
literature. In particular, it shed light on the different intervention strategies, accountability mechanisms 
and underlying goals according to which donors are holding recipients accountable and their interaction 
with democratic accountability in recipient countries. On a more general level, this study contributes to the 
academic debate on the aid-democracy nexus in the following way.  
First, this research provides a more comprehensive and democratic conceptual framework taken from 
democratic theory than the one previously sketched in the global aid architecture, where the principle of 
mutual accountability has been reduced to joint monitoring by donors and recipients of mutual progress in 
implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness. By contrast, this research proposes to analyze aid 
modalities as institutionalized accountability forums or spaces of actual confrontation between the new aid 
partners, including organized civil society, which makes it possible to explore how mutual accountability 
relations at the donor-recipient level interact with domestic accountability relations at the state-society 
level in aid-receiving countries. Furthermore, the theoretical framework proposed here recognizes the 
primacy of democratic accountability holders by defining donors as surrogates of citizens when they hold 
recipient governments accountable for their development performance, and thus sees civil society partici-
pation in the new governance of aid from a more democratic perspective.  
Second, this research describes an empirical trend towards more political and rights-based aid policies in 
the domestic and mutual accountability domains. In particular, chapter 3 highlights how the institutiona-
lized accountability relationships at the state-society level, where development actors submit to public 
scrutinity (‘oversight triangle’), and the normative accountability standards at the donor-recipient level to 
which development actors voluntarily agree (‘shared agendas’) have both increasingly been linked to an 
international framework of human rights, democracy and good governance. A desk review of relevant 
policy documents by bilateral and multilateral donors alike finds substantive evidence for the hypothesis 
that over the past two decades a more “political spirit” has been introduced into the global aid architecture.  
Last, this research contributes to the empirical literature on aid and democratization by demonstrating that 
not only the democratic targets of aid matter, but that also the modalities of development aid have a signif-
icant impact on democratization in recipient countries. While chapter 4 traces the shift in aid relations 
between donors and recipients of foreign aid under the PRS approach as perceived by World Bank staff 
which has been engaged in these new aid modalities, chapter 5 statistically assesses the democratic impact 
of PRS-based lending by the IMF and World Bank and compares it to more established types of IFI lend-
ing. Together, the qualitative and quantitative analyses performed by this research contribute to a more 
robust and general picture of the PRS approach than is found in the literature so far.   
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6.1.2. Main findings for each chapter 
In the following, I will first review the main findings for each chapter before I give a conclusive answer to 
the two questions that guided this thesis.  
The literature review in chapter 1 showed that previous research on the PRS approach has been divided 
between two streams of scholarship that focused either on the developmental or democratic potential of 
the new approach, but which generally did not take the empirical findings of the other strand into account. 
Accordingly, the objective of Chapter 2 was to bring these different strands of literature into a dialogue 
with each other. The central question that guided this theoretical exchange of ideas was how democratic 
theory helps us to understand the new development approach.  
A first way in which democratic theory can help is by pointing at two different conceptions of accounta-
bility that have been used in parallel. The literature review showed that accountability in the development 
literature was generally understood as an normative concept to evaluate the performance of an actor 
against a certain set of standards, while democracy scholars usually referred to accountability as a social 
concept to describe the feature of institutional structures, more precisely, the interaction between different 
actors within institutionalized accountability arrangements. The conceptual framework of this research 
draws on both strands as it describes the interaction of development actors within institutionalized ac-
countability forums and then evaluates the impact of these surrogate accountability forums according to 
democratic accountability standards.  
A second way how democratic theory is helpful is by uncovering the theoretical roots of today’s frame of 
accountability used in the governance of aid. More specifically, the theoretical chapter showed that aid has 
traditionally been framed along the lines of a principal-agent model (‘aid as contract’), whereas newer aid 
frames, which are related to reforming accountability mechanisms along the aid chain, refer to models of 
stakeholder democracy (‘aid as entitlement’) or to a pluralist-institutionalist model of global accountabil-
ity (‘aid as partnership’). Over time, as the combined review of the democracy and development literature 
reveals, there has been a shift in accountability mechanisms from a traditional model based on delegation 
towards increasingly participatory accountability mechanisms used in development cooperation today. As 
a result, new “domestic stakeholders” at the recipient country level, respectively “external partners” at the 
global level have been added to the basic aid frame in the mainstream development discourse.  
Finally, the theoretical chapter also showed that democratic theory can help to classify foreign transparen-
cy and accountability initiatives in terms of their strategic targets and aid modalities. By examining typol-
ogies of public accountability in the democracy and development literature, this chapter proposed to de-
scribe the different intervention strategies for promoting domestic accountability according to the type of 
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domestic accountability forum they support. In turn, the examination of aid modalities suggests that do-
nors either directly support these domestic accountability forums or indirectly support them by acting as 
surrogates of weak citizens in surrogate accountability forums whose interventions must be evaluated 
according to the normative accountability standards – democratic or otherwise – that have been set.  
In sum, by comparing the concepts, the theories, and the typologies of accountability across the democra-
cy and development literature, chapter 2 provided a more comprehensive understanding of accountability 
than the one that has shaped the current aid architecture. The concept of surrogate accountability thereby 
served as a means to make the democratic dimension of the new aid agenda explicit.  
Chapter 3 presented policy-based evidence that the promotion of mutual accountability in the international 
aid architecture has added an inherent political logic to the IFIs predominantly economic reform agenda. 
The objective of this chapter was to describe the historical and political context of the PRS approach. The 
central question that guided this context analysis was whether development policies have become more 
political over the last two decades. In line with the conceptual framework introduced in chapter 2, aid 
policies were analyzed with regard to accountability relationships at the state-society and donor-recipient 
level.  
First, an analysis of the way how the World Bank monitored and supported “national governance systems” 
under the PRS approach showed that the Bank’s direct intervention strategy for enhancing domestic ac-
countability at the state-society level has become increasingly more “political” over the last two decades. 
The political character manifests itself in the strategic focus of World Bank policies, which moved from 
empowering individual “domestic stakeholders” to a system-wide approach for enhancing domestic ac-
countability. In particular, evidence from the World Bank’s (2006) Global Monitoring Report indicates 
that the Bank’s effort for enhancing domestic accountability between recipient state and organized society 
has gone through three generations targeting three different types of institutionalized accountability rela-
tionships within the domestic arena, namely oversight and auditing institutions (administrative accounta-
bility), civil society organizations (social accountability), and national parliaments (political accountabil-
ity). By tracing the strategic focus of World Bank policies over time, the chapter demonstrated that these 
three types of public accountability jointly and progressively contributed to deepen the extent to which 
democratic constituencies can hold their governments accountable.  
Second, an analysis of the international agreements and global initiatives that built the aid architecture in 
its current form found that donors’ indirect strategy for promoting domestic accountability via the norma-
tive standards to which they hold recipient governments accountable at the donor-recipient level have also 
become more “political”. By comparing the World Bank’s (1999) Comprehensive Development Frame-
work with subsequent landmark agreements by the United Nations and the Organization of Economic Co-
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operation and Development, this analysis brought the mutual accountability standards, as embodied in 
shared agendas and reciprocal commitments voluntarily agreed by donors and recipients, to the front. In 
general, the policy analysis showed that recipient governments of development aid must account for three 
things within the global aid architecture: good policies, good finances, and good processes. As the adjec-
tive “good” signals, the conduct expected from “development partners” is measured against certain inter-
nationally agreed rights and norms. While early agreements established aid effectiveness as a norm, evi-
dence from more recent ones rather points to more “political” norms guiding foreign aid delivery. In par-
ticular, aid policies with regard to “good processes” increasingly referred to democratic standards firmly 
embedded within an international human rights-based development approach. The findings of this policy 
desk review thus suggest that not only compared to their own previous lending approach, but also in con-
cert with other donors the IMF and World Bank have increasingly relied on democratic standards and 
types of public accountability in recipient countries.  
In sum, through tracing the shift in policies in the in the national and global governance of aid, evidence 
from these two analyses shows that the PRS approach does indeed differ from earlier development efforts 
in terms of enhancing the scope for domestic accountability. However, since these changes captured here 
relate to aid policies enacted by the heads and high representatives of global aid agencies, the next chapter 
addressed the open question how far aid relationships have actually changed in the daily practice of these 
agencies.  
To answer this question, chapter 4 compared the different experiences and perceptions of World Bank 
staff – assuming that they should know, since they implement these policies – about the extent of change 
brought by the PRS approach. The objective of this chapter was to explore the interplay of surrogate and 
democratic accountability under the PRS approach and to find out whether the World Bank’s intervention 
strategy, accountability mechanisms, and underlying goals have actually changed over time.  
To get to grips with the highly technocratic language used by World Bank experts, chapter 4 applied the 
conceptual framework outlined in chapter 2 to analyze the strategic domains (i.e., accountability fields) 
the specific mechanisms (i.e., accountability models) and the normative goals (i.e.,accountability stand-
ards) of the aid modalities promoted under the PRS approach.  
First, the analysis challenges the long-standing notion that IMF and World Bank strategic intervention is 
predominantly technocratic and apolitical in character. Evidence from a mapping exercise of the account-
ability fields surrounding the PRS approach demonstrates that the World Bank’s strategy for promoting 
domestic accountability has changed over time. The analysis found a slow, but steady shift both in terms 
of targets and instruments of the World Bank’s direct intervention strategy. In particular, the type of ac-
countability forum targeted in aid-receiving countries signals a marked departure from earlier technocratic 
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decision-making. The two main channels for promoting domestic accountability under the PRS approach, 
that is, the PRS process and the GBS operations originally served to incorporate social and administrative 
accountability holders in the governance of aid. Today, however, they serve as public forums for donors to 
start a dialogue with recipient governments on national governance systems. The focus of this dialogue 
thereby lies on making recipient governments accountable to electoral and political accountability holders. 
Moreover, the strategic use of political dialogue as an instrument that respects the domestic process has 
become more important in comparison with other donor instruments that bypass domestic accountability 
institutions and procedures. While hard measures, such as positive and negative conditionalities have de-
creased over time, softer and less visible tools and methodologies, such as political dialogue and technical 
support have been increasingly used.  
Second, the analysis of the development discourse around the new ownership philosophy unveils the theo-
retical roots of the IMF and World Bank’s new mechanisms for holding borrowing governments account-
able. Evidence from personal interviews and an online survey points to the relevance of two accountability 
models (i.e., delegation and participation model) that frame not only the World Bank’s strategic discourse, 
but also influence the World Bank’s operational practice. A closer analysis of the two main channels for 
promoting domestic accountability under the PRS approach (i.e., the PRS process and GBS operations) 
showed that there has been a shift in the way the World Bank holds recipient governments accountable. 
When the PRS approach was introduced, World Bank interventions were still regulated by a delegation 
model of public accountability, which proved to be instrumental for recipient governments (who were able 
to reduce external influence on domestic policies), while it granted legitimacy to donors (who allowed 
recipient governments to define their own development priorities). However, with the second iteration of 
the PRS approach, the World Bank shifted to a participation model of public accountability and the legi-
timacy function changed. Since then, the mechanisms by which development actors held each other ac-
countable lend legitimacy to recipient governments (who derive reputational benefits from a technocratic 
form of citizen participation that does not allow for real popular control) and appear to be instrumental for 
donors (who can effectively insert themselves into policy-making at the recipient country level).  
The final part of the analysis focused on the political goal dimension of the World Bank’s new develop-
ment approach that may be hide behind the new rhetoric of aid. An assessment of the perceived effects of 
the new aid modalities under the PRS approach identified three normative perspectives underlying the 
World Bank’s PRS approach. The majority of World Bank staff sees the original (and present) value of 
the PRS approach in that it makes aid delivery more effective by shaping government policies around one 
specific document that also serves as framework for donors to address the challenges of underdevelop-
ment. Independent of donor and recipient characteristics, a single document to forge development partner-
ships is seen as valuable as it strengthens common efforts toward reducing poverty. Over time, however, 
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as argued by a smaller part of staff members, these government-driven documents have lost much of their 
original value and joint donor efforts aimed at improving the quality of national governance in recipient 
countries have, in relation, become more important. Depending on the degree of Bank-Fund coordination, 
GBS operations are perceived to be valuable as they strengthen democratic institutions and processes in 
recipient countries through forcing the government to align all sectors to its national development plan, to 
link it then with the government budget, and finally to monitor and evaluate its implementation. Finally, 
the smallest number of World Bank staff argued that the PRS approach has lost so much value because the 
type of civil society consultation done routinely today does not empower citizens vis-à-vis their govern-
ments in recipient countries. Depending on the nature of the recipient regime, the PRS process may have 
value if it can serve as a catalyst for introducing democratic practices and rights that were not available 
before.  
In sum, through a democratic theory-guided exploration of the fields, the models, and the standards of 
surrogate accountability arrangements under the PRS approach, the analysis was able to show that the 
PRS approach has changed strategic discourse and operational practice at the World Bank. Moreover, 
empirical findings from interviews and an online survey further showed that both the operational tension 
and the strategic potential of the PRS approach lie at the interfaces of democratic and surrogate accounta-
bility fields.  
To evaluate the democracy-enhancing potential of these interfaces under the PRS approach, chapter 5 
compared PRS-based lending with other types of IFIs’ financial support. In doing so, this chapter both 
differs from, but also builds on the extensive literature on aid and democratization.  
Theoretically, it differs from the existing literature through its use of a triadic concept of surrogate ac-
countability that matches the interplay of the triangular forces who are involved in multilateral develop-
ment aid – IFIs, recipient governments, and organized civil society – more closely than the simple but 
widespread notion of aid as a bilateral contract between donors and recipients of foreign aid. While pre-
vious research has tended to focus on foreign aid as a source of unaccountable revenue that can be appro-
priated by incumbent governments for their own survival, the concept of surrogate accountability empha-
sizes both the role of citizens (as democratic constituencies) and donors (as their surrogates) for holding 
recipient governments accountable under the new program-based aid modalities that are at the center of 
the contemporary aid architecture.  
Empirically, this chapter builds on the existing literature by distinguishing between different aid types and 
different conditions under which these types can have an impact on democratization in recipient countries. 
With regard to IFI lending, this chapter identified four general types of development aid. Depending on 
their strategic focus and modalities, it has been argued that traditional lending types in the form of IMF 
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stabilization programs and World Bank investment projects should have a negative effect on democratiza-
tion, as surrogate accountability arrangements of crisis-induced, respectively, project-like forms of inter-
ventions neither strategically target nor do their modalities respect democratic accountability. By con-
strast, poverty reduction strategy programs are expected to have a positive effect on democratization, as 
general budget support directly targets and simultaneously respects democratic accountability. The effect 
of structural adjustment programs on democratization is expected to be positive for procedural democracy, 
but negative for substantive democracy, as sector-wide financial support does respect but does not target 
democratic accountability.  
The aggregate results confirm the positive relationship between poverty reduction strategy programs and 
changes in procedural democracy. They equally confirm the less-clear, but nonetheless positive role of 
structural adjustment in improving procedural democracy. And they generally reproduce the negative, but 
insignificant, assumptions for IMF stabilization and World Bank project lending in terms of procedural 
democracy. Except for the findings of insignificance of traditional types of multilateral aid, these results 
are in line with hypotheses about the general effect of different types of IMF and World Bank lending on 
democratization.  
The disaggregate results could explain some of these insignificant effects and they made some additional 
qualifications.  
First, they showed that the impact of IFI lending differs depending on democratic target, respectively ac-
countability standard – improving governance or empowering citizens – that guides development efforts. 
Results for substantive democracy indicate that those aid types that do not directly target the authority of 
democratic accountability holders do not impact on the level of human rights and citizen empowerment in 
recipient countries. By contrast, those aid types that actively undermine or directly promote the involve-
ment of citizens in the definition of development priorities have a significant impact on human rights and 
civic empowerment – once the original level of substantive democracy is taken into account.  
Second, results showed that the impact of IFI lending on substantive democracy – capturing external ef-
forts in terms of citizen empowerment – vary with the type of recipient regime. Empirical findings show 
that PRS-based lending that is conditioned on civic participation in the definition of national development 
strategies cannot be judged independently from the overall legitimacy of the political regime. While its 
general impact on government’s respect for human rights is negative, the impact of poverty reduction 
strategy-based lending turns positive and seems to perform better in more autocratic countries, when the 
initial human rights record in recipient countries is taken into account. By contrast, the impact of PRS-
based lending on procedural democracy – capturing donors’ effort in terms of improving governance qua-
lity – does not seem to depend on the type of recipient regime. While not being significant in the baseline 
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specifications, disaggregate results found a negative impact both for World Bank investment lending on 
substantive democracy and for IMF stabilization program on procedural democracy, if the prior level of 
democracy is taken into account.  
Third, disaggregate results for similar IMF and World Bank programs showed that individual and joint 
impact on procedural democracy differ. In line with the aggregate results, empirical findings for the IMF 
and World Bank confirm the positive relationship between individual poverty reduction strategy programs 
and procedural democracy, and they equally confirm the somewhat smaller, but nonetheless positive, role 
of individual structural adjustment programs. However, if a country participates simultaneously in a PRS-
based IMF and World Bank lending program, results show that Bank-Fund interaction has a negative and 
significant effect on procedural democracy in recipient countries as opposed to their individually positive 
effects. These contradictory results suggest that the simultaneous presence of comparable poverty reduc-
tion programs does not imply that the IMF and World Bank collaborate, but may be understood as a re-
treat to their own spheres of influence aiming probably at increasing their returns on investment. From a 
recipient’s point of view, the negative impact of joint Bank-Fund participation in the national budget pro-
cess can thus be interpreted as the political cost of external coordination failure.  
In sum, by assessing the general impact of PRS-based lending on democratization as compared to other 
types of IFI financial support, empirical findings showed that the PRS approach has been more than just 
“nice words”. Moreover, by disaggregating data not only by type, but also by purpose, recipient and do-
nor, the statistical analysis was able to pinpoint the conditions under which this new type of development 
aid made any meaningful difference in terms of strengthening procedural and/or substantive democracy.  
 
6.1.3. Answering the two principal questions 
In terms of the two questions that guided my research, I may summarize the above discussion as follows:  
First, this research asked if and how the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach has changed the relations 
between donors and recipients of foreign aid as compared to earlier development efforts. Aid relation-
ships were found to have changed under the PRS approach inasmuch as they have increased the scope for 
domestic accountability as compared to past aid practices. By employing an analytical framework based 
on the concept of surrogate accountability, the qualitative analysis in chapter 4 was able to capture differ-
ent political aspects as well as important dynamics over time of this shift in aid relationships. In particular, 
changes in multilateral aid were found to be three-fold:  
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First, when the PRS approach was introduced, the World Bank followed a direct strategy based on the use 
of positive and negative incentives for building the capacities of social and administrative accountability 
forums at the recipient country level. However, as a way of reducing the tension between democratic and 
surrogate accountability demands, the Bank increasingly applied a more indirect strategy based on a mix 
of technical assistance and political dialogue aimed at strengthening the answerability of recipient go-
vernments within the domestic electoral and political arena.  
Second, this change in strategy occurred simultaneously with a change in mechanisms for holding aid 
recipients accountable. With the second generation of poverty reduction strategies, the World Bank’s ope-
rational practice moved from a delegation logic of “aid as contract” to a participation logic framing World 
Bank intervention in staff’s strategic discourse in terms of “aid as entitlement” and “aid as partnership”, 
which called for broad-based participation of both domestic stakeholders and external partners in the go-
vernance of aid.  
Third, the goals to be achieved by the World Bank’s new development approach have also changed. Cur-
rently, development aid by the World Bank is primarily evaluated on the basis of its contribution to redu-
cing poverty in developing country. By analyzing, the distinct functions ascribed to particular phases of 
the surrogate accountability process, the more the hidden democratic dimension of the international aid 
effectiveness agenda comes to the fore. Beyond reducing poverty, empirical evidence from interviews and 
the survey showed that the new aid practices also serve to strengthen democratic institutions and practices 
in developing countries through improving the quality of governance and empowering citizens in recipient 
countries.  
In sum, the changes in strategy, mechanisms, and goals of development aid as provided by the World 
Bank under the PRS approach point to a shift in surrogate accountability arrangements that has increased 
the scope for domestic and in particular, democratic accountability as compared to earlier development 
efforts.  
Second, this research asked whether and under which conditions this new type of aid, as opposed to other 
types of IMF and World Bank support, has made any meaningful difference in terms of strengthening de-
mocracy in recipient countries. Statistical results showed that among all types of IMF and World Bank 
support, general budget support under the PRS approach has indeed has the strongest impact on democra-
tization in recipient countries. However, policies advocating this type of aid should consider the condi-
tions under which general budget support is thought to be most effective. Complementing the conditional 
strand of the aid and democratization literature, three conditions were found to be of central importance:  
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First, democratic targets matter. Research on foreign aid generally distinguishes between development aid 
(donor-to-government) given as an incentive for governance reform, and democracy aid (donor-to-civil 
society) given for civil society targets. The PRS approach is ambiguous as it combines two democratic 
targets under one conceptual roof. To differ between these two democratic targets of development aid, the 
impact of poverty reduction strategy-based programs has been measured with respect to different dimen-
sions of democracy. Results show positive effects if these programs are evaluated against their success in 
promoting democratic institutions and procedures, but negative effects if these programs are evaluated in 
terms of their contribution to fostering government’s respect for human rights and empowering civil socie-
ty.  
Second, there is abundant research that points to the relevance of recipient regimes on bilateral aid given 
for democratic puposes. To take the initial conditions in recipient countries into account, an interaction 
term between aid type and recipient regime has been included in additional regressions. The statistical 
results provided support for the relevance of initial level of human rights in recipient countries, if aid is 
given for civil society building purposes, i.e., deepening substantive democracy. Conversely, results do 
not show any significant effect through the prior level of democracy in recipient countries, if aid is given 
for domestic governance reform, i.e., strengthening procedural democracy. In particular, results showed 
that when recipient’s initial human rights record is taken into account, the poverty reduction strategy-
based lending positively influences human empowerment, but only in countries with previously low hu-
man rights.  
Third, some research does exist that suggests that donor coordination around multi-donor budget support 
matters for the outcome of multilateral aid given for development purposes. To assess the relevance of the 
participatory logic for external development partners, an interaction term between similar forms of multi-
lateral aid has been included in the final regressions. Empirical evidence points to a strong impact of 
Bank-Fund interaction, i.e., joint participation in general budget support operations, on procedural democ-
racy, whereas no impact on substantive democracy was found, this is in accordance with the IMF’s ab-
sence from broad-based civil society consultations. While individual poverty reduction strategy-based 
programs show positive effects, results also showed that joint participation in general budget support 
negatively impacts on recipient’s democratic institutions and procedure suggesting political costs for re-
cipient countries due to the international financial institutions’ failure to coordinate. In sum, the statisticial 
analysis provided suggestive, but robust evidence that beyond the new rhetoric of aid, the PRS approach 
indeed has strengthened democracy in practice. While evidence from disaggregated data supports this 
general conclusion, it also shows that the impact of the PRS approach may differ according to the demo-
cratic targets, the nature of the recipient regime, and the extent of donor coordination.   
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6.2. Policy implications 
6.2.1. Encouragement through empirical results 
These results have important implications for policymakers who are interested in the promotion of democ-
racy and good governance across the developing world and for program managers at the international 
financial institutions and beyond who are working on transparency and accountability initiatives. By 
shedding light on the central accountability forums under the PRS approach this study shows both the 
different strategies whereby foreign actors can promote domestic accountability at the recipient country 
level and the different conditions under which such strategies successfully strengthen democracy in prac-
tice. It finds that an indirect strategy of fostering democratic accountability through using aid modalities 
that respect and build upon domestic accountability systems can have a substantial impact on procedural 
democracy, conditional on donor coordination. By contrast, donors’ direct efforts for promoting democrat-
ic accountability do more harm than good to substantive democracy in countries that already have a social 
infrastructure capable of holding power wielders accountable. These processes may have a small but ro-
bustly positive impact in countries where government respect for human rights is low. Since the impact of 
the PRS process seems to have worsened the situation for civil society in some countries but not in others, 
a first general implication of this research is to separate GBS operations from the PRS process in its pre-
sent form and to focus on GBS operations instead, which have remained largely in the shadow of the for-
mer aid modality so far. Due to the participatory logic inherent to multi-donor GBS, a second general im-
plication for the IMF and World Bank is that they need to improve their collaboration.  
 
6.2.2. Implications for donors in general budget support 
Empirical results have shown that the impact of general budget support on procedural democracy is condi-
tional on donors’ own behavior. This raises some interesting questions about organizational behavior. In 
particular, we may ask in which ways the IMF and World Bank can support the domestic budget process 
in recipient countries in order to enhance democratic accountability and in which ways can they adjust 
their own lending operations in order to reduce accountability demands from foreign actors. The proposed 
theoretical framework suggests looking at these questions through the lens of a triadic concept of account-
ability. Accordingly, donors act as surrogates of citizens in surrogate accountability fields where borrow-
ing governments are held accountable for their management of public revenues. Consequently, policy 
implications for aid agencies can be drawn based on the evaluation of how close they come to what demo-
cratic accountability holders would have done in each phase of the process.  
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Regarding the information phase, there is a widespread perception among citizens that broad-based con-
sultations in PRS forums are only public “theaters”, while the “real deal” regarding donors’ support of the 
government budget are made in secrecy without any participation of the general public (CIDSE-Caritas 
2004). To shift the answerability of the government from donors towards citizens, a first policy implica-
tion for donors providing direct budgetary support thus is that donors should actively support transparency 
and openness in recipient countries and disclose all information on their budget-supporting operations to 
democratic constituencies at the donor and recipient country level. There is widespread agreement among 
the international development community that transparent practices form the basis for enhanced accounta-
bility, as shown by donors’ reiterated commitment to provide more accurate, timely and comprehensive 
information on aid flows such as to enable recipient governments to present comprehensive budget reports 
to their legislatures and citizens (OECD 2005a, 2008b, 2011a). The International Aid Transparency Initia-
tive launched at Accra 2008 provides a hopeful example in this regard. However, more steps are needed to 
ensure that this information reaches the general public on both sides. On their part, donors could also 
strengthen their efforts to ensure that their financial assistance (and corresponding reporting cycle) is fully 
aligned to the domestic budget cycle and that their operational practices are specificied in legal rules that 
are publicly available (and easy to find for those interested).  
With regard to the debate phase, one of the main insights from research on traditional forms of ex-ante 
conditionality has been that donors can never replace citizens’ own assessment of their needs. However, 
donors may be better than citizens in assessing compliance of government behavior with human rights and 
other internationally recognized norms, such as gender equality or corruption control. To strengthen the 
focus on rule-following and conformity of government behavior with valuable substantive and procedural 
norms, a second policy implication of this study is that donors should intensify the dialogue with recipient 
governments on the rules and norms of good governance and encourage broad-based dialogue with citi-
zens. For example, donors could insist through political dialogue with the government that the parliament 
(or a similar political assembly fulfilling a balance function within the recipient state) approves and moni-
tors the government budget (including donor operations) as a way to create more transparency and ac-
countability around foreign revenues of the state. Furthermore, the government is accountable to both 
citizens and donors (as their surrogates) for “delivering” on GBS. Thus, donors could exploit synergies 
between themselves and original accountability holders through involving representatives of organized 
society in joint donor-citizen forums for improving the political dialogue on GBS operations.  
Finally, during the last phase of the accountability process, donors substitute for citizens in their capacity 
to sanction recipient governments through attaching conditions to money flows, but this should not mean 
that they also replace them in their authority for defining public policies. According to the international 
aid effectiveness agenda, citizens and recipient governments have the right to define their own policy pri-
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orities. Conversely, third parties, such as foreign aid agencies have to respect the political process in reci-
pient countries which may change with every new government coming to power. To avoid donors enga-
ging in unwarranted paternalism by sanctioning (or rewarding) governmental policies that are not owned 
by the citizens of recipient countries, a third implication of this study is that donors should only enforce 
accountability standards related to rule-following (fiscal accountability) and compliance with procedural 
norms (process accountability), but restrain from defining public policies (program accountability) via 
GBS operations. This means that donors should not use policy conditionality based on PRS blueprints that 
have sidelined the democratic chain of delegation, but instead let nationals define their own development 
priorities by their own approach. For example, donors could take the government agenda, the program of 
the ruling party program, the country’s long-term vision, or similar country-owned document, and then 
strive to align their financial support to whatever policy agenda there is. While accepting the right of na-
tionals to draw their own, politically informed conclusions, donors should condition their GBS operations 
on the domestic process. This implies that they work with a flexible approach to permanent adaption to the 
political realities in recipient countries (what to a certain degree, they already have done), for example, by 
rewarding good financial practice and an open, democratically owned process, while waiting as long as 
necessary, if financial and procedural standards of accountability have not yet been met.  
Above all, the key to a renewed aid relationship aimed at strengthening public accountability is that do-
nors take their political role as surrogates for democratic accountability holders more seriously and that 
they strengthen their interaction with citizens in aid-receiving countries within and beyond the national 
budget process. As shown above, many entry points do exist along the phases of a typical surrogate ac-
countability process for strengthening donors’ interaction with citizens around GBS operations that can 
work as incentives for recipient governments to induce democratic change. Most importantly, however, 
this study suggests that the necessary changes in procedural democracy will come about only if donors can 
improve their coordination and harmonization in setting democratic accountability standards that can 
guide their behavior vis-à-vis recipient governments and citizens in institutionalized surrogate accounta-
bility forums. Empirical findings from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis support the idea that 
the intervention logic of general budget support bears great potential, but only when donors can agree on 
shared targets in terms of procedural democracy related to the rule of law and valuable procedural norms 
in recipient countries. In this context, political conditionality arises as a promising area of future research 
(for an outline of this agenda, see Molenaers et al. 2015).   
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6.2.3. Role of citizens in multi-donor budget support 
Advocating donor interventions in surrogate accountability forums does not mean that donors should not 
directly target democratic standards of citizen empowerment anymore. On the contrary – it has been one 
of the most important lessons from the third wave of democratization that a strong civil society plays a 
pivotal role in fostering democratization (Diamond 1999; Young 2000). However, the depoliticized man-
ner in which civil society has participated in the PRS process has often bypassed the formal political pro-
cess and the representative bodies of broader societal concerns. What is needed are better donor-society 
linkages that open the budget process to the general public and embed GBS operations in a democratic 
environment. Still, the danger is real that the international financial institutions – in line with their eco-
nomic mandate – fear the interaction with more political sections of organized society and therefore 
choose to retreat into their own professional spheres of interests based on close working relations with 
sympathetic insiders of the recipient state administration. To avoid the risk that civil society participation 
merely serves as (local) validation exercise of predetermined policy agendas, more knowledge is needed 
on how to adapt the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda (i.e., respecting country ownership, recog-
nizing inclusive partnerships, focusing on results and enhancing mutual accountability) to targeted sub-
stantive democracy assistance.  
 
 
6.3. Future research 
The present study has demonstrated that aid relations between donors and recipients of foreign aid have 
changed with the introduction of the PRS approach whose aid modalities have significantly increased the 
scope for democratic accountability. This requires an expansion of the current research agenda. Previous 
research focused on questions of aid effectiveness and development outcomes. However, there is also a 
need to shed more light on accountability dynamics and democratic oucomes of the global aid regime, 
because surrogate accountability arrangements may both hamper or faciliate democratic accountability in 
aid-receiving countries. The analysis of the aid-democracy nexus presented here could be continued in 
several different directions.  
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6.3.1. Empirical level: economic-political divide 
The empirical analysis could be continued to research the interaction of different types of aid and their 
joint impact on different dimensions of democracy. This study has shown the value of differentiating aid 
modalities and precisely measuring democracy in a way that most closely matches the democratic targets 
of the intervention strategy. In particular, it demonstrated that the impact of PRS-based lending signifi-
cantly differs from other program types of the IMF and World Bank, since these programs intend to em-
power citizens in aid-receiving countries directly. While this research has assessed the impact of four dif-
ferent types of IMF and World Bank programs on democratization, the effects of their interaction among 
each other and with other categories of foreign aid are still unexplored. More precisely, development aid 
and democracy aid apply different standards of public accountability; yet, they are linked inextricably as 
democratic expectations are often rooted in demands for better living conditions (Przeworski et al. 2000). 
However, since the indirect effect of development aid on democratization is said only to become effective 
over the long run, a longer time period might thus be required to assess these combined effects of different 
aid types. Furthermore, novel datasets for sophisticated quantitative analysis have recently become availa-
ble, which enable finer disaggregation of aid by different strategic rationales and distinct modalities of aid 
delivery (e.g., the AidData research lab and website). Future research will benefit from examining new 
datasets with increasingly fine-grained data and the longer time periods available in order to explain how 
different aid categories affect one another and interact to impact on different concepts and dimensions of 
democracy (for recent approaches in this direction, see Gibson et al. 2014; Jones and Tarp 2016).  
In addition, research needs to address the interplay of the IMF and World Bank with other donors, who 
may pursue competing foreign policy goals that prevent them from making a more positive contribution. 
The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation launched at Busan 2011 has seen the 
emergence of a broad coalition of development partners ranging from governments over international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations to the private sector in donor and recipient countries. 
The principles who were agreed on by more than 160 countries and 50 organizations are said to guide 
actions of all these partners towards deepening, extending and operationalizing “the democratic ownership 
of development policies and processes” (OECD 2011a, para. 12). However, as this study has shown, even 
for two donors who are most similar in kind (‘sister institutions’), aid fragmentation and coordination 
failure around general budget support operations have major implications for the democratic process in 
recipient countries. To be effective, conditions attached to multi-donor budget support need to be based on 
some degree of unity among donors. If governments have access to financial support from other foreign 
actors, the international financial institutions’ leverage is reduced (for a recent examination of the credible 
commitment hypothesis, see Li 2017). By including other donors in their analyses, future research on the 
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influence of these new and diverse foreign actors will become challenging given the new development 
partners’ rather contradictory reputation in terms of their (dis-)regard for human rights and democracy.  
Complementary to the inclusion of other donors in future analyses, the influence of other recipient charac-
teristics on the relevance of aid for different aspects of democratization should be further explored. There 
is now a substantial literature on the impact of different sources of state revenue, including foreign aid, on 
processes of state formation, regime stability, and the quality of governance in developing countries 
(Moore 2004; Morrison 2009). According to this literature, countries with alternative sources of income, 
particularly from oil and other natural resources are less likely to be influenced by conditions attached to 
aid flows. If some degree of aid dependence is taken as a prerequisite for effective conditionality, then, the 
availability of other revenues without any strings attached and their interaction with foreign aid seems 
particularly relevant to explore in the case of political conditionality around multi-donor budget support. 
The DAC guidelines on accountability and democratic governance suggest that there is a general interest 
in more detailed information on how external budget support can be tailored to specific country contexts 
in order to “to move beyond narrow revenue collection targets to include other governance and social ob-
jectives” (OECD 2014: 127). Future research could make an important contribution by taking other recipi-
ent characteristics into account, foremost the interaction of general budget support with domestic taxation 
along with the capacity of the recipient government in managing the domestic budget process (for recent 
contributions to the debate, see Eubank 2012 and Asongu 2015).  
 
6.3.2. Theoretical level: global-local divide 
Future research could also extend the theoretical framework used here by analyzing what standard ac-
countability holders can do when surrogates do not act in their interest. In particular, future research could 
focus on the basic problem of any accountability relationship, namely the challenge of second-order ac-
countability or – in other words – the long-standing dilemma how those who hold others accountable can 
be held accountable themselves. Applied to the international development context, the question arises who 
is entitled to hold aid agencies (i.e., surrogate accountability holders) accountable when they do not act in 
citizens’ (i.e., original accountability holders) interest (for recent research on second-order surrogate ac-
countability in the humanitarian aid and peacekeeping sector, see Chynowth, Zwi and Whelan 2018; 
Hirschmann 2019). This problem seems particularly pressing with the kind of political role fulfilled by 
donors in the domestic budget process. Previously, donors remained in the dark as they saw themselves 
fulfilling only a supervisory role with regard to recipients’ implementation of individually agreed aid pro-
jects. By contrast, as financier of national budgets, they fulfill an accountability function for which they 
must open themselves to the general public they jointly substitute in the process. Like other activities in-
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volving the crossing of national borders, aid operations in support of national budgets involve two publics, 
namely citizens who donate aid and citizens who receive aid. Accordingly, two pathways for future re-
search on accountability relations surrounding general budget support may be sketched out, which may be 
called “second-order” since sanctioning of donors (i.e., the surrogates of democratic accountability hold-
ers) and not of the recipient state (i.e., the power wielder) stands at the center (as discussed by Rubenstein 
2007).  
The first of these would address accountability mechanisms at the global level that citizens in aid-
receiving countries can use to sanction donors for their performance as surrogate, i.e., for sanctioning re-
cipient governments on their behalf (second-order standard accountability). For example, although dis-
empowered citizens cannot sanction their political oppressors at the recipient country level, they might 
possibly sanction their financiers at the global level by publicly denunciating them for supporting an ille-
gitime political regime. Since donors establish legitimacy for general budget support through claiming that 
they are acting in the interests of whole populations, sanctioning efforts by exactly these beneficiaries (and 
their stakeholders in transnational civil society) are particularly successful if they can show that budget-
supporting donors are not acting in their interests. While the IMF and World Bank are particularly vulner-
able to charges that they are undemocratic and unaccountable to the world’s poor given their mission and 
membership base (Woods and Narlikar 2001), a strategy of “naming and shaming” should generally work 
for all aid agencies and interventions that derive their legitimacy from claiming to support democratically 
owned development results (OECD 2011a, para. 12).  
Second, future research could shed more light on domestic accountability mechanisms that citizens in aid-
donating countries can use to sanction donors for their performance as surrogate, i.e., for sanctioning go-
vernments on behalf of citizens in aid-receiving countries (second-order surrogate accountability). As 
argued by global governance scholars, the international financial organizations may be held accountable 
either by the financially strong and powerful states who entrusted them with powers – whether they are 
democratic or not (see Grant and Keohane 2005) or by the most poor and vulnerable people around the 
world – whether they are represented through governments or not (see Scholte 2005). Theoretically, these 
two fields of public accountability can be imaged to interact. If the international financial institutions fail 
to meet their obligations to poor people being affected by their policies, rich people in donor countries 
might act as second-order surrogates for their counterparts in aid-receiving countries. For example, they 
could sanction the international financial institutions by a reduction of their government’s contribution to 
their budget. However, because of the physical distance, the taxpayers in donor countries often do not 
know if their money is well spent by the international financial institutions and aid-receiving governments, 
whereas the poor beneficiaries who know about the performance of these two aid intermediaries often 
have only limited mechanisms for sanctioning either or both of them.  
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To bring perspectives of poor and rich publics on aid together, more theory-guided and field-proven re-
search is needed to understand how different fields of accountability interact at the recipient country, at 
the donor country, or at the global level. Along these lines, recent research has shown that efforts by states 
and non-state actors to hold surrogate accountability holders accountable are more successful, if they 
combine their abilities in sanctioning and monitoring (Buntaine 2015). Yet, the problem with surrogate 
accountability holders in international development aid is not their lack of accountability, but the fact that 
ordinary citizens at both ends of the aid chain are not heavily involved in these processes. Besides analy-
zing how different fields of accountability interact, more research is further needed to find out how to 
make surrogate accountability arrangements more democratic. Both of these questions remain to be more 
closely investigated in the future.  
 
6.3.3. Methodological level: insider-outsider divide 
There is a third path for future research that is focused on methodological issues and possible ways to 
address the gap between academic debate and policy domain that has for a long time characterized the 
study of foreign aid. As highlighted by Green and Kohl (2007), any attempt to evaluate the impact of for-
eign aid faces considerable methodological challenges, such as the difficulty of demonstrating causality, 
the paucity of operational indicators, the possibility of time and period effects among others. While these 
issues are common to the evaluation of general development assistance, they are particularly daunting in 
evaluating targeted democracy and governance assistance due to “the more qualitative nature of the de-
pendent variable” (Green and Kohl 2007: 163). This study has demonstrated the usefulness of combining 
different methods to address some (but not all) of these problems. More specficially, it has followed a 
research strategy of combining micro-level knowledge embodied in field personnel with traditional mac-
ro-oriented analysis based on aggregate measures and statistical methods to evaluate the impact of the 
PRS approach. However, mixing methods is not enough. More country-specific knowledge is needed for 
understanding the mechanisms through which aid impacts political systems, including the evaluation of 
transparency and accountability initiatives and their impact on democratization in aid-receiving countries. 
To this end, more work needs to be done on both sides of the insider-outsider divide.  
More scientific and applied research is needed by development and democracy scholars alike that can 
document influence of accountability support by foreign actors on democratic decision-making. For ex-
ample, scholars could focus on research questions with practical relevance, such as determining criteria 
and benchmarks to measure impact of transparency and accountability initiatives in practice. Moreover, 
they could use qualitative research methods, including participant observation, ethnographic techniqes and 
interviews to accumulate in-depth knowledge of cases. Lastly, future research might rely on a more recent 
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trend towards large-scale field experiments to shed more light on the causal mechanisms between foreign 
aid and political accountability (see, e.g., de la Cuesta 2017; Guiteras and Mobarak 2015). The emergence 
of accountability as a means for maximizing the impact of aid, stimulated by the OECD’s series of high-
level fora on aid effectivenesss since 2002 has matured into a goal in its own right for many bilateral and 
multilateral donors all over the world. Since the promotion of accountability became so central to the poli-
cy domain, it is all the more important to evaluate the impact of this type of foreign aid. Given the United 
Nations’ recent commitment to develop effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels over 
the next 15 years, as agreed upon within the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, additional re-
search and academic thinking in this area would be particularly timely.  
More work needs to be done by aid practitioners to link scholarly findings on the external promotion of 
democratic accountability to their operational practice. For example, we may expect the self-ascribed 
“knowledge Bank” (and its sister institution) to take new scholarly insights into account when changing 
development strategies and activities. Particular attention should be paid to the tension and potential that 
might arise from simultaneously using different goals, mechanisms and strategies for promoting domestic 
accountability, which cannot simply be explained by the principal-agent model that has been dominant in 
development circles (see, e.g., World Bank and GTZ 2007). At the same time, practitioners could also 
invest resources and time in experimenting with these different concepts, models and typologies of public 
accountability (along the lines suggested, for example, by Behn 2001). By definition, these “experiments” 
in public accountability must involve citizens. After all, the rationale for involving citizens in the govern-
ance of aid is to achieve better results from a welfare and democracy perspective. These “experiments” 
should be conducted with a view to understanding how to mitigate the democratic deficits both at the do-
nor-recipient level and at the state-society level in aid-receiving countries, through identifying practical 
and feasible steps towards enhancing democratic accountability along the aid chain.  
Gaining more detailed information on transparency and accountability initiatives is relevant for the inter-
national financial institutions and other aid intermediaries who are constantly in need of feedback on the 
effectiveness and impact of their aid programs for a variety of internal purposes. However, the relevance 
is also high for citizens around the world who increasingly require that aid agencies along the aid chain 
have to render an account themselves, thereby demonstrating receptiveness to citizens’ interests that 
would grant some democratic legitimacy to their past and future interventions abroad. To improve human 
welfare and empowerment, a better understanding of the models and types of accountability by scholars, 
but also a higher commitment by practitioners to their own accountability standards in terms of creating 
and sustaining an effective, transparent and inclusive governance of aid are required.   
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Annex 
Annex 4-1: List of World Bank experts included in the sample 
Respondents (in alphabetical order) 
Addison, Douglas Kwawukume, Smile 
Alfandari, Gilles MacWilliam, Cal 
Bado, Celestin Bepio Mbowe, Appolenia 
Bakayoko, Siaka Mossi, Dante 
Benito-Spinetto, Maria Murphy, Daniel 
Benjamin, McDonald Ndione, Mamadou 
Benjamin, Nancy Nucifero, Antonio 
Bidani, Benu Nthara, Mwima 
Binkert, Gregor Nelsson, Adam 
Cavalcanti, Carlos Omer, Jemal M. 
Dalsten, Kasper Oppong, Felix 
Dessus, Sébastien Ould Cheikhna, SidʼAhmed 
Diawara, Alassane Owens, Janet 
Douglas, Addison Revilla, Julio 
Engelke, Wilfried Richaud, Christine 
Fengler, Wolfgang Sackey, James 
Funk, Kathryn Saponara, Miguel J. 
Grieve, Bronwyn Sebudde, Rachel 
Harasty, Claire Seck, Abdoulaye 
Ibrahim, Amadou Sousa, Clara de 
Kapoor, Kaqpil Utz, Robert 
Konate, Abdoulaye Walliser, Jan 
Koulibaly, Mamady Zacchia, Paolo 
Koyasse, Faustin-Ange N.N. 
Kwalingana, Samson N.N. 
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Annex 4-2: Questionnaire used in expert interviews and online survey 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Country 
 
What is the country you were involved in the PRS process? 
 
1.2. Expertise 
 
Please indicate the stages of the PRS process you are familiar with in your country: 
□ PRS I (first generation): formulation of the national development strategy 
□ PRS I (first generation): implementation of the national development strategy 
□ PRS II (second generation): formulation of the national development strategy 
□ PRS II (second generation): implementation of the national development strategy 
□ PRS III (third generation): formulation of the national development strategy 
 
 
FIRST PART: PRS FORMULATION PROCESS 
 
2. PRS Formulation Process at the Country Level 
 
2.1. Principle of Ownership 
 
Ownership of the national development strategy is one of the key principles of the World Bank’s Compre-
hensive Development Framework (CDF), which was introduced in 1999 and later on operationalized 
through the PRS approach. In this context, what does ownership mean to you personally?  
 
Could you please define it or give an example: 
 
2.2. Owners of the PRS Process 
 
In principle, which stakeholders should have first priority, second, third, and so forth in having ownership 
over the PRS process? 
□ The general public: particularly the poor and vulnerable groups, such as youth, women’s groups, 
disabled 
□ The government: civil servants and elected representatives in central ministries, line ministries, local 
government bodies, parliament, cabinet, and general assemblies 
□ Civil society organizations: networks, NGOs, community-based organizations, trade unions and 
guilds, academic institutions, and research groups 
□ Private sector: umbrella groups representing groups within the private sector, professional associa-
tions 
□ Donors: multilateral and bilateral 
 
2.3. Expression of Political Will by Top Leadership 
 
In practice, how strong has the degree of commitment to and support of the PRS process by the top politi-
cal level been in your country? 
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Degree of commitment: PRS I  
(first generation) 
PRS II  
(second generation) 
PRS III  
(third generation) 
very high □ □ □ 
high □ □ □ 
rather high □ □ □ 
rather low □ □ □ 
low □ □ □ 
no □ □ □ 
don’t know □ □ □ 
 
Please specify your rating.  
Why has there been high / low degree of government commitment (in relation to PRS I and/or PRS II)? 
 
2.4. Pre-existing National Development Plans 
 
Has there been a pre-existing (i.e., before the PRS) national development plan in Your Country? 
□ Yes, namely:  
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
 
2.5. Development Over Time 
 
If yes: 
Which of the following situations apply? 
□ The national development plan evolved into the PRS over time. 
□ The PRS replaced the national development plan over time. 
□ The pre-existing national development plan and the PRS ran in parallel over time. 
□ Other:  
 
If no: 
Has the PRS evolved into the country’s truly owned national development plan over time? 
□ Yes 
□ No, why not?  
 
2.6. Other Government Initiatives 
 
Have there been any other specific and dramatic up-front actions initiated by the government in Your 
Country either before or at the inception of the PRS process providing evidence-based signals about its 
future commitment to a national PRS? 
 
For example: 
□ Pro-poor program initiated by government 
□ Significant increase in the share of pro-poor expenditures over total expenditures 
□ Sharp reduction in the share of military expenditures over total expenditures 
□ Anti-corruption campaigns 
□ Specific macro-economic / trade policies 
□ Decentralization reform 
□ Other:  
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2.7. PRS and Electoral Cycles 
 
Did the timing of elections play a role for the formulation of the PRS in Your Country (e.g., was the PRS 
intentionally developed by the government before or after the national elections)? 
 
 PRS I (first generation) PRS II (second generation) 
Yes □ □ 
No □ □ 
Don’t know □ □ 
 
2.8. Timing of Elections 
 
If no: 
Why was the PRS process not aligned to the national electoral cycle? 
If yes: 
In which manner did the timing of elections play a role (e.g., was it intentionally developed before or after 
the parliamentarian / presidential election)? 
 
2.9. PRS Coordination 
 
On a technical level, which has been the main government unit to coordinate and prepare your country’s 
national PRS document(s)? 
 
2.10. Creation of New PRS Coordination Unit 
 
Has this PRS coordination unit set up outside of traditional government structures in your country? 
 
 PRS I (first generation) PRS II (second generation) 
Yes □ □ 
No □ □ 
Don’t know □ □ 
 
2.11. Institutionalization of PRS Coordination Unit 
 
If yes: 
Have these PRS units been disbanded after PRS formulation or do they still exist? 
 
 PRS I (first generation) PRS II (second generation) 
Yes □ □ 
No □ □ 
Don’t know □ □ 
 
2.12. Hiring of External Consultants 
 
Have (domestic and/or international) consultants been hired by the government in your country to formu-
late a coherent national PRS? 
 
 PRS I (first generation) PRS II (second generation) 
Yes □ □ 
No □ □ 
Don’t know □ □ 
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2.13. Stakeholder Participation in PRS Formulation 
 
Please indicate how much the following stakeholders participated in the PRS formulation process: 
 
Reference (below): □ PRS I (first generation) □ PRS II (second generation) 
 
Degree of participation very high high low very low don’t know 
The Cabinet (the Council of Ministers) □ □ □ □ □ 
The Core Ministries (Finance, Planning) □ □ □ □ □ 
The Line Ministries in priority sectors □ □ □ □ □ 
Local Governments (sub-national level) □ □ □ □ □ 
Parliament □ □ □ □ □ 
Civil society (NGOs, CBOs, think-tanks) □ □ □ □ □ 
Private sector (professional associations) □ □ □ □ □ 
 
2.14. Exclusion of Stakeholders 
 
According to your opinion, were there any relevant stakeholders excluded from participation in the PRS 
formulation process in Your Country? Multiple answers are possible. 
 
Reference (below): □ PRS I (first generation) □ PRS II (second generation) □ Don’t know 
 
For example: 
□ Political parties (in general) 
□ Political opposition 
□ Religious organizations 
□ Ethnic groups 
□ Representatives from different regions of the country 
□ Traditional institutions / leaders 
□ The “real” poor 
□ Other:  
 
2.15. Non-governmental Stakeholder Consultation Process 
 
Could you please describe in what manner civil society and private sector actors participated in the PRS 
formulation process (e.g., was it more a direct / indirect process, organized on a geographical / functional 
basis, mainly government-led with / without alternative consultations)? 
 
2.16. Approval of PRSP document by Parliament 
 
Was there a formal vote of approval in parliament on the PRS document (i.e., PRSP), consistent with its 
constitutional or traditional mandate? 
 
 PRS I (first generation) PRS II (second generation) 
Yes □ □ 
No □ □ 
Don’t know □ □ 
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2.17. Language of PRSP document 
 
Reference (below): □ PRS I (first generation) □ PRS II (second generation) □ Don’t know 
 
In which language has the original PRS document (i.e., PRSP) in your country been written? 
 
2.18. Translation of PRSP document 
 
Has the PRS document or a simplified version of it been translated into local languages? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
 
 
3. Role of World Bank in PRS Formulation Process 
 
3.1. Level of Bank Engagement in PRS Formulation 
 
In your country, did the World Bank take more of a passive, hands-off approach (i.e., an observer’s role) 
or did it actively participate in and support the formulation of the national PRS? 
 
 PRS I (first generation) PRS II (second generation) 
Passive approach □ □ 
Active approach □ □ 
 
3.2. Reasons for Hands-off Approach 
 
If passive approach: Why? 
 
3.3. Type of World Bank Support in PRS Formulation 
 
If active approach: What type of support did the World Bank provide in Your Country? Multiple answers 
are possible. 
 
Reference (below): □ PRS I (first generation) □ PRS II (second generation) 
 
For example: 
□ Policy dialogue before and during the PRS formulation process 
□ Assistance in drafting the PRS document (e.g., selection and monitoring of indicators) 
□ Analytical work (e.g., involvement in poverty analyses) 
□ Technical assistance (e.g., facilitation of workshops, training of staff) 
□ Finance (e.g., funding for various activities within the PRS formulation process) 
□ Other:  
 
3.4. Bank Assessment of Participatory Processes 
 
How does the World Bank keep track of the degree of participation in Your Country’s PRS process? 
□ Through the country’s PRS documents (i.e., PRSPs) / Annual Progress Reports (APRs) 
□ Through own Joint Staff Advisory Notes (JSANs) / Joint Staff Assessments (JSAs) 
□ The World Bank does not track the degree of participation in the PRS process 
□ Other:  
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SECOND PART: PRS IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
 
4. PRS Implementation Process at the Country Level 
 
4.1. PRS Implementation 
 
Based on previous experiences, several good practices in implementing the national PRS have been 
brought forward. How much would you agree that the following have been realized in your country? 
 
Reference (below): □ PRS I (first generation) □ PRS II (second generation) 
 
Implementing good practices: strongly 
agree 
agree rather 
agree 
rather 
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
don’t 
know 
(a) There is a strong mechanism 
for inter-ministerial coordination at 
the policy level. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
(b) Line ministries systematically 
align sector action plans with PRS 
priorities. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
(c) Local development plans are 
compatible with PRS priorities. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
(d) PRS implementation is linked 
to the national budget process. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
(e) PRS monitoring system is inte-
grated into existing domestic sys-
tems of oversight and control. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
4.2. Institutionalized Stakeholder Participation 
 
In your country, how much would you agree that the government is involving stakeholders in systematic 
dialogue on PRS implementation, through permanent institutions (e.g., standing committees), with mutu-
ally agreed objectives and timetables? 
 
Reference (below): □ PRS I (first generation) □ PRS II (second generation) □ Don’t know 
 
With regard to... strongly 
agree 
agree rather 
agree 
rather  
disagree 
disagree strongly 
disagree 
(a) …parliament □ □ □ □ □ □ 
(b) …civil society □ □ □ □ □ □ 
(c) …private sector □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
4.3. Media Coverage 
 
In your country, have the national media regularly and widely monitored the PRS process?  
 
Reference (below): □ PRS I (first generation) □ PRS II (second generation) □ Don’t know 
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Please assess the extent of media coverage: 
□ very high 
□ High 
□ Low 
□ No 
 
4.4.  Alignment with Existing Systems 
 
In general, how much would you agree that the monitoring system of the PRS process is integrated into 
existing domestic systems of oversight and control in Your Country? 
 
Reference (below): □ PRS I (first generation) □ PRS II (second generation) □ Don’t know 
 
□ strongly agree 
□ Agree 
□ rather agree 
□ rather disagree 
□ Disagree 
□ strongly disagree 
 
4.5.  PRS Monitoring 
 
Which domestic stakeholders have been involved in the monitoring of the PRS process? 
□ Parliament 
□ Civil society 
□ Private sector 
□ National audit office 
□ Other:  
 
 
5. Role of World Bank in PRS Implementation Process 
 
 
Reference (below): □ PRS I (first generation) □ PRS II (second generation) 
 
5.1. Type of Lending Instrument Used 
 
Why did the World Bank decide to support your country’s national PRS with a PRSC series? 
 
5.2. Alignment of PRSCs with national PRS in terms of content 
 
In your country, please indicate to what extent the PRSC series has been aligned with the PRS or its na-
tional equivalent in terms of content? 
 
□ Full alignment 
□ The majority of policy measures aligned 
□ Aligned in terms of objective and overall direction 
□ Somewhat aligned 
□ Not aligned 
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5.3. Alignment of PRSCs with national PRS in terms of process 
 
In your country, is the PRSC series aligned to the government’s budget cycle?  
□ Yes, since (year):  
□ No 
 
5.4. PRSCs Flexibility and Country Program Implementation 
 
PRSC series in support of your country’s PRS are expected to provide regular and predictable funding to 
the recipient government. 
 
To what extent has the need to ensure predictable financing resulted in pressures to move ahead with the 
PRSC series even when there was limited program progress? 
□ Was never an issue 
□ No pressure to move ahead just to ensure regularity of financing 
□ Some pressure 
□ Substantial pressure 
 
5.5. PRSCs and Program Changes  
 
Could you please answer the following questions regarding financial changes made to the World Bank’s 
development policy lending in Your Country?  
 
 Yes No 
(a) Has the PRSC series ever been discontinued early? □ □ 
(b) Has the PRSC loan amount ever been adjusted downward compared to initial notional 
allocations? 
□ □ 
(c) Has the PRSC loan amount ever been adjusted upward compared to initial notional  
allocations? 
□ □ 
(d) Has the disbursement of PRSC loan amounts ever been delayed compared to initial  
schedule? 
□ □ 
 
 
THIRD PART: OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS 
 
6. General Questions related to the PRS Approach 
 
6.1. Country Ownership and Bank Intervention 
 
Previous research often speaks of a general dilemma regarding the PRS approach, namely that there is an 
inherent tension between the World Bank’s requirement of a PRS for concessional lending and – at the 
same time – requiring country ownership of the PRS. Based upon your work experience, did you personal-
ly feel this tension between country ownership and Bank intervention?  
If yes, how did you handle it? 
 
6.2. Initial Conditions and Good Governance 
 
In general, would you say that the PRS approach is more successful in achieving good governance in 
countries with a higher level of democracy / sophistication of institutions at the start of the PRS process; 
or would you say that it has the biggest potential in countries with a lower starting level of democracy / 
sophistication of institutions (i.e., more nascent political institutions)? 
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6.3. PRS and Good Governance 
 
Do you think that the PRS process has had a direct impact on good governance / democratization in Your 
Country during the last decade; or would you say that good governance / democratization cannot be im-
posed externally and has solely been determined by the domestic context? 
 
 
6.4. Prospects of the PRS Approach 
 
After ten years of implementing the PRS approach, do you think the PRS approach still holds value for the 
IMF and World Bank or does it need to be changed? 
 
 
6.5. Recommendations for Bank Assistance 
 
Based on your experience, what recommendations in terms of increasing country ownership of the nation-
al development strategy can be drawn for the World Bank and the IMF?  
 
 
7. Respondent’s Information 
 
What is your name? 
How many years have you been working for the World Bank? 
What years have you worked in / on your country? From (year) to (year) 
What is/was your formal position within the country team unit at that time? 
 
On which PRSC(s) have you been working in Your Country? 
□ PRSC (1) □ PRSC (6) 
□ PRSC (2) □ PRSC (7) 
□ PRSC (3) □ PRSC (8) 
□ PRSC (4) □ PRSC (9) 
□ PRSC (5) □ PRSC (10) 
 
Have you worked on other Policy-Based Lending before?  
□ PRSCs in country:  
□ SACs in country:  
□ HIPC in country:  
□ Other DPL in country:  
□ None   
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Would you like to add something? 
Who else would you recommend me to consult on the PRS approach in your country (name, email)? 
 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
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Annex 5-1: List of countries included in the sample 
The sample includes all countries with the exception of traditional OECD members and all countries who 
did not gain independence before 1990. Therefore, all countries in Europe and Central Asia, North Ameri-
ca, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as a handful of countries in Africa and Asia, are excluded. 
Countries (in alphabetical order) 
Afghanistan Gambia, The Nicaragua 
Algeria Ghana Niger 
Angola Guatemala Nigeria 
Argentina Guinea Oman 
Bahrain Guinea-Bissau Pakistan 
Bangladesh Guyana Panama 
Benin Haiti Papua New Guinea 
Bhutan Honduras Paraguay 
Bolivia India Peru 
Botswana Indonesia Philippines 
Brazil Iran, Islamic Rep. Qatar 
Burkina Faso Iraq Rwanda 
Burundi Israel Saudi Arabia 
Cambodia Jamaica Senegal 
Cameroon Jordan Sierra Leone 
Cape Verde Kenya Singapore 
Central African Republic Korea, Dem. Rep. (North) Solomon Islands 
Chad Korea, Rep. (South) Somalia 
Chile Kuwait South Africa 
China Lao PDR Sri Lanka 
Colombia Lebanon Sudan 
Comoros Lesotho Swaziland 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Liberia Syrian Arab Republic 
Congo, Rep. Libya Taiwan 
Costa Rica Madagascar Tanzania 
Cote d'Ivoire Malawi Thailand 
Cuba Malaysia Togo 
Djibouti Mali Trinidad and Tobago 
Dominican Republic Mauritania Tunisia 
Ecuador Mauritius Uganda 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Mexiko United Arab Emirates 
El Salvador Mongolia Uruguay 
Equatorial Guinea Morocco Vanuatu 
Ethiopia Mozambique Venezuela, RB 
Fiji Myanmar (Burma) Zambia 
Gabon Nepal Zimbabwe 
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Annex 5-2: List of variables, indicators, and sources 
Variable Indicator Source 
Polity Polity2 is the revised and transformed combined regime indi-
cator of the Polity IV data series ranging from -10 (strongly 
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). According to the 
Polity IV manual, the unified polity scale was revised by ap-
plying a simple treatment to the following standardized au-
thority scores of the original polity variable in order to facili-
tate its use in time-series analyses: Cases of “foreign interrup-
tion” (-66) are treated as “system missing”, cases of “interreg-
num” (-77) or anarchy are converted to 0, and cases of “re-
gime transition” (-88) are prorated across the time span of the 
transition 
Marshall, Monty; 
Keith Jaggers; and Ted 
Gurr (2011) 
Executive  
recruitment 
Executive recruitment is the revised concept variable 
“EXREC” of the Polity IV data series ranging from 1 (ascrip-
tion) to 8 (competitive election). Revision followed the same 
procedure as with the Polity2 regime indicator 
Marshall et al. (2011) 
Executive  
constraints 
Executive constraints is the revised concept variable  
“EXCONST” of the Polity IV data series ranging from 1 (un-
limited authority) to 7 (executive parity or subordination). 
Revision followed the same procedure as with the Polity2 
regime indicator 
Marshall et al. (2011) 
Political  
competition 
Political competition is the revised concept variable  
“POLCOMP” of the Polity IV data series ranging from 1 
(suppressed) to 10 (institutionalized electoral). Revision fol-
lowed the same procedure as with the Polity2 regime indicator 
Marshall et al. (2011) 
Empowerment Empowerment rights index is the additive index of the 
Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights dataset that 
measures government human rights practices. It is constructed 
from the foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly & association, workers’ rights, 
electoral self-determination, and freedom of religion indica-
tors. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these seven 
rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights) 
Cingranelli, David; 
David Richards; and 
Chad Clay (2014) 
Freedom of  
speech 
This variable indicates the extent to which freedoms of speech 
and press are affected by government censorship. Values are 0 
(complete censorship), 1 (some censorship), and 2 (no censor-
ship) 
Cingranelli et al. 
(2014) 
Freedom of  
assembly &  
association 
This variable indicates the extent to which the freedoms of 
assembly and association are subject to actual governmental 
limitations or restrictions (as opposed to strictly legal protec-
tions). Values are 0 (severely restricted), 1 (limited for all or 
severely restricted for select groups), 2 (freely enjoyed) 
Cingranelli et al. 
(2014) 
Workers’  
rights 
This variable indicates the extent to which workers enjoy in-
ternationally recognized rights at work. Values are 0 (severely 
restricted), 1 (somewhat restricted), and 2 (fully protected) 
Cingranelli et al. 
(2014) 
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Investment  
project  
(WB-INV) 
For any specific year investment lending by the World Bank is 
captured by a categorical variable that counts the number of 
lending categories within the four financial instruments cov-
ered by the Bank’s Operational Policy BP 10.00: Specific 
Investment Loan (SIL), Sector Investment and Maintenance 
Loan (SIM), Financial Intermediary Loan (FIL), and Technical 
Assistance Loan (TAL)  
World Bank (2013a) 
Stabilization  
program  
(IMF-STB) 
Stabilization lending by the IMF is captured by a dummy vari-
able that is coded 1 for the country-years when there was an 
IMF stabilization program in force, 0 otherwise; the financial 
instruments included in this program variable are the IMF’s 
Stand-by Arrangement (SBA), the Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF), and since 2009, the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) 
Vreeland, James. 
(2003)  
IMF (various years) 
IMF (2013) 
Structural  
adjustment  
program  
(IFI-SAP) 
Structural adjustment lending is measured by a dummy varia-
ble coded 1 for the country-years when there was either an 
IMF or a World Bank structural adjustment program in force, 
0 otherwise; this program variable includes four financial in-
struments by the World Bank (Sector Adjustment Loan 
(SAD), Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL), Programmatic 
Structural Adjustment Loan (PSAL), Special Structural Ad-
justment Loan (SSAL)) and two financial instruments by the 
IMF (Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)) 
Vreeland (2003);  
IMF (various years);  
IMF (2013);  
World Bank (2013a) 
Poverty  
reduction  
program  
(IFI-PRS) 
Poverty reduction lending is measured by a dummy variable 
coded 1 for the country-years when there was either a World 
Bank or an IMF poverty reduction program in force, 0 other-
wise; the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Support Credit 
(PRSC) and the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF), which was succeeded by the Extended Credit Facility 
(ECF) in 2010, are included 
Vreeland (2003);  
IMF (various years);  
IMF (2013);  
World Bank (2013a) 
Bank structural  
adjustment  
program  
(WB-SAP) 
Structural adjustment lending is measured by a dummy varia-
ble coded 1 for the country-years when there was a World 
Bank structural adjustment program in force, 0 otherwise.  
World Bank (2013a) 
Fund structural  
adjustment  
program  
(IMF-SAP) 
Structural adjustment lending is measured by a dummy varia-
ble coded 1 for the country-years when there was an IMF 
structural adjustment program in force, 0 otherwise 
Vreeland (2003);  
IMF (various years);  
IMF (2013); 
Bank poverty  
reduction  
program  
(WB-PRS) 
Poverty reduction lending is measured by a dummy variable 
coded 1 for the country-years when there was a World Bank 
poverty reduction program in force, 0 otherwise 
World Bank (2013a) 
Fund poverty  
reduction  
program  
(IMF-PRS) 
Poverty reduction lending is measured by a dummy variable 
coded 1 for the country-years when there was an IMF poverty 
reduction program in force, 0 otherwise 
Vreeland (2003);  
IMF (various years);  
IMF (2013); 
GDP per  
capita 
GDP per capita measured in PPP and constant 2005 US dol-
lars, log 
World Bank. (2013b) 
GDP per  
capita change  
Growth rate of real GDP per capita (constant prices: chain 
series) 
Heston, Alan; Robert 
Summers; and Bettina 
Aten. (2011) 
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Urbanization  
rate  
Urban population as a percentage of the total population World Bank (2013b) 
Price level PPP over consumption/exchange rate, log Heston et al. (2011) 
Trade  
openness 
(Imports+exports)/GDP, log Heston et al. (2011) 
Conflict  
intensity 
Combined index of the maximum level of conflict intensity 
across the following four types: extrasystemic, interstate, in-
ternal and internationalized armed conflict; 3-point ordinal 
scale with the categories “no conflict” (0), “minor conflict: 
between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year” (1), 
and “war: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year” 
(2) 
Gleditsch, Nils; Peter 
Wallensteen; Mikael 
Eriksson; Margareta 
Sollenberg; and 
Håvard Strand. (2002) 
Regional  
diffusion 
Regional democracy diffusion is captured by an index that 
measures the average regional value of the polity2 regime 
indicator in the following five regions: East Asia and Pacific, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Af-
rica, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa; note that the coun-
try the observation itself refers to is excluded in order to avoid 
endogeneity issues.  
Marshall et al. (2011) 
Population Total population (in thousand), log Heston et al. (2011) 
Lending  
volume 
This variable reflects the volume that provides the best ap-
proximation of financial flows related to the different aid vari-
ables indicated in Table 1: (1) WB-INV: net financial flows by 
IBRD + IDA; (2) IMF-STB: IMF non-concessional; (3) IFI-
SAP: IDA + IMF concessional; (4) PRS: IDA + IMF conces-
sional. 
World Bank. (2013) 
Bilateral aid Bilateral aid as a share of recipient GDP World Bank. (2013) 
US military 
aid 
US Military Aid, obligations, in constant 2005 US dollar mil-
lions 
USAID (2015) 
UNGA voting  
with US 
Alignment with the United States on votes in the UN General 
Assembly 
Strezhnev and Voeten 
(2012);  
U.S. State Department 
(1984-2012); cleaned 
version as used by 
Kilby (2011) 
UNSC rotating  
member 
UN Security Council non-permanent member (dummy varia-
ble coded 1 for years of temporary membership) 
UN (2014) 
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Annex 5-3: Construction of the IMF and World Bank variables 
Data on the different financial instruments of the World Bank comes from the World Bank’s (2013a) Pro-
ject Database providing information on all Bank operations from 1947 to the present. Regarding the vari-
ous financial instruments of the IMF, I use Vreeland’s (2003) data on IMF lending activities from 1974 to 
2000. I updated his data up to 2011 by consulting the IMF Annual Reports.75 This information was cross-
checked with the data in the IMF’s (2013) MONA database starting in 2001.  
As of June 2013, the World Bank’s Project Database lists 10 lending instruments, while the IMF’s Moni-
toring of Fund Arrangement database counts 11 regular financial arrangement types currently in use. 
When previous financial instruments, specific combinations of financial instruments as well as non-
financial and non-regular instruments are included, the total number rises to (at least) 17 lending instru-
ments for the World Bank and 18 for the IMF. As far as any information is available on these instruments, 
I consider them for inclusion into my classification system. More details on which financial instruments 
were included, respectively excluded, from my program types variables are given below.  
(1) WB-INV: In the World Bank’s Project Database, there is a broad range of financial instruments coded 
as “investment project financing”, but not all of them are included in my program variable of investment 
lending. I exclude all lending operations with a grant element (predominately environmental projects, 
recipient executed actions, guarantees, debt reduction facilities, and other special financings) and only 
keep regular lending operations in my dataset. Of these, I consider only Bank operations falling under the 
four financial instruments, to which the World Bank’s Operational Policy on investment lending applies, 
namely Specific Investment Loan (SIL), Sector Investment and Maintenance Loan (SIM), Financial In-
termediary Loan (FIL), and Technical Assistance Loan (TAL). By contrast, Adaptable Program Loan 
(APL), Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL), and Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL), all of which have 
also been coded as investment-type lending in the Project Database, are not included in my measure of 
World Bank investment projects.76  
(2) IMF-STB: My variable on IMF stabilization programs (IMF-STB) includes the traditional lending 
instrument of Stand-by Arrangements (SBA) starting in 1952 and the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), which 
                                                     
75 Various years, online since 1996. 
76 The World Bank’s Operational Policy 10.00 („Investment Lending: Identification to Board Presentation”) was 
replaced with a new Operational Policy 10.00 (“Investment Project Financing”) in April 2013. As a result, the 
Bank’s financial instruments were clarified and consolidated. Basically, this reform brought two important changes, 
which resemble the way the WB-INV program variable was operationalized: first, only a single investment lending 
instrument was kept, because the additional submenu of investment lending did not bring about any additional value 
in practice; second, exceptional provisions in response to financial crises and natural disasters as well as support in 
high-risk contexts was phased out and not included in this new, single investment lending instrument. The existing 
financial instruments were streamlined, i.e., SIL, SIM, FIL, TAL, and APL were all brought under the single umbrel-
la of investment project financing, LIL and ERL were eliminated (for more details, see World Bank. (2012, 10-12). 
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has been introduced in 2009 and comes at the same financing terms as SBAs. Although the Extended 
Fund Facility (EFF) addresses a protracted balance of payment problems over a 3-4 year period, it is also 
included in my measure of IMF stabilization programs, because it belongs to the Fund’s main business 
operations since 1974. By contrast, among the more recent IMF lending instruments, those providing rapid 
financial assistance with limited conditionality to members dealing with urgent balance of payment needs 
were not included. This concerns the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) available for all member coun-
tries, and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) available only for low-income countries. The Stand-by Credit 
Facility (SCF), and its predecessor, the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF), were not included in my IMF-
STB program variable, either, because their financing terms are very different from those of SBAs and 
they are available only to low-income countries. SCF certainly provides more flexibility in the Fund’s 
lending practice, but it falls in-between my four “theoretical” program types and is thus not considered in 
my explanatory variables. Finally, the IMF’s Policy Support Instrument (PSI) effective since 2005 is ex-
cluded from my analysis due to its non-financial character.  
(3) IFI-SAP: Both IFIs have various adjustment lending instruments in their portfolio. Therefore, my 
structural adjustment program variable (IFI-SAP) is coded in a way that unites four financial instruments 
by the World Bank, i.e., Sector Adjustment Loan (SAD), Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL), Program-
matic Structural Adjustment Loans (PSAL) and Special Structural Adjustment Loan (SSAL), with two 
financial instruments by the IMF, i.e., the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the succeeding En-
hanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), under one roof. All of these financial instruments provide 
budget support to low-income countries with heightened risks of debt distress. Funds are disbursed upon a 
satisfactory assessment of performance in implementing policy and institutional reforms.  
(4) IFI-PRS: Structural adjustment and poverty reduction lending instruments are grouped together in the 
same lending category, which is “development policy lending” by the World Bank and the concessional 
lending facilities to low-income countries by the IMF. Unlike structural adjustment programs, however, 
poverty reduction programs are conditioned not only on the implementation of specific reforms but also 
on the inclusion of civil society, in particular, the poor, in the formulation of the national policy frame-
works (also called Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers or PRSPs). My variable on poverty reduction pro-
gram type (IFI-PRS) thus includes only the following financial instruments based on this particular type of 
“democracy aid”: the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) and the IMF’s Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which was succeeded by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) in 
2010. It must be noted that other financial instruments, which have also been coded as “development poli-
cy lending” in the World Bank’s Project Database are not included in my variable, namely Debt and Debt 
Reduction Loan (DRL), Rehabilitation Loan (REL), and Development Policy Lending (DPLI), i.e., the 
359 
financial instrument, not the lending type, because these are typically stand-alone operations that do not 
share the inherent democratizing logic of the previously mentioned instruments.  
 
 
Annex 5-4: Selection of the control variables 
A first explanation originating in modernization theory focuses on different levels of domestic socio-
economic development and their impact on democracy. Countries with higher levels of wealth, industriali-
zation, urbanization, and education are expected to be more prone to democratization (Lipset 1959). The 
strong correlation between economic development and political democracy is one of the most robust em-
pirical findings of the democratization literature (for a good overview, see Doorenspleet 2004, and for a 
recent application, see Epstein et al. 2006). To take the level of socio-economic development into account, 
I include a country’s real GDP per capita and the corresponding growth rate into my empirical analysis. 
Both measures are taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT) 7.0 dataset, as described by Heston et al. 
(2011), while the data on my third modernization proxy, the percentage of the total population who lives 
in cities, is taken from the World Bank’s (2013b) World Development Indicators (WDI) database.  
A second explanation relates to diffusion processes at the global and regional level. According to the 
democratic diffusion literature, integration into the global economy promotes the dissemination of demo-
cratic ideals and values (Starr 1991; Rudra 2005; Brinks and Coppedge 2006). Among the causal mecha-
nisms that have been proposed are bilateral trade, media exposure through different communication chan-
nels, and membership in international networks. Among these, I focus on a country's trade openness by 
measuring it with the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. Trade data is readily available 
in the PWT 7.0 dataset. Other studies have found that diffusion of democratic ideals and values is more a 
regional than a global phenomenon (Starr and Lindborg 2003; Doorenspleet 2004; Wejnert 2005) and 
should thus be operationalized with an indicator of democratic change in neighboring countries rather than 
with the level of a country’s world market integration (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Houle et al. 2009). To 
control for this alternative aspect of diffusion, I construct an index of regional democratic diffusion by 
calculating the average value of the polity2 regime indicator in each of the following four regions: Sub-
Saharan Africa, North Africa, and the Middle East, South Asia, as well as East Asia and Pacific. I then 
compute the change of these regional averages over time.  
A third explanation for democratization (or the lack of it) relates to unstable conditions in the developing 
world. Diffusion processes may also have a negative connotation. Cross-border and regional diffusion 
occurs as the “disease” of violent conflict is spread through contagious contact (Starr 1991). Since inde-
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pendence, many developing countries have experienced political instability and war, including civil war 
and internal strife (Bräutigam and Knack 2004). In particular, semi-democratic regimes seem to be more 
prone to political conflict (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Epstein et al. 2006). Similarly, many scholars 
argue that economic downturn involving slow or negative growth or high inflation may be most threaten-
ing to countries in the “dangerous middle stages” of development, where commitment to democracy is 
weak (Chirot 1977; Gasiorowski 1995; Gasiorowski and Power 1998). Following these arguments, I con-
trol for both economic and political instability. Failing to control for these instabilities could produce a 
spurious correlation between a country’s participation in various types of IMF and World Bank programs 
and a decline in either procedural or substantive democracy (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Pevehouse 
2002; Bräutigam and Knack 2004). I operationalize political conflict with an index measuring a change in 
the level of conflict intensity over a given period of years, including both domestic and foreign conflicts. 
Conflict data is provided by Gleditsch et al. (2002). Additionally, considering its large impact on the poor-
est sections of the population, I include the consumer price index taken from PWT 7.0 dataset as an indi-
cator for economic downturn in my set of controls.  
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Annex 5-5: Additional econometric results 
Table A5-1: The general impact with different lags 
(t-1) (t-2) (t-3) (t-4) (t-5) 
Variables Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE Two-way FE 
WB-INV 0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.06 -0.13 
(0.25) (0.55) (0.95) (0.69) (0.47) 
IMF-STB -0.03 -0.18 -0.34 -0.50 -0.46 
(0.81) (0.45) (0.30) (0.21) (0.29) 
IFI-SAP 0.03 0.13 0.26 0.55 0.58 
 
(0.84) (0.61) (0.41) (0.12) (0.12) 
IFI-PRS 0.12 0.33 0.60 0.87* 0.99** 
(0.40) (0.21) (0.11) (0.08) (0.04) 
Polity (lag) 0.83*** 0.66*** 0.50*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP per capita, log -0.42*** -0.67** -0.82** -0.98* -1.19** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
GDP per capita change -0.00 -0.02** -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
(0.84) (0.04) (0.07) (0.11) (0.35) 
Urbanization rate -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
(0.97) (0.88) (0.84) (0.79) (0.71) 
Price level, log -0.34* -0.55* -0.70 -0.92* -1.04** 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) 
Trade openness, log 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.11 
(0.65) (0.83) (1.00) (0.93) (0.88) 
Conflict intensity -0.05 -0.14 -0.20 -0.29 -0.33 
 
(0.65) (0.34) (0.31) (0.23) (0.25) 
Regional diffusion 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.03 
(0.25) (0.45) (0.63) (0.87) (0.83) 
Countries 100 100 100 100 100 
Observations 2771 2672 2573 2474 2374 
R-squared 0.81 0.65 0.52 0.43 0.36 
Note: robust p-values (based on standard errors clustered at country level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Computations based on Table 5-3, regression 3, which is reported again for comparison in the last column of 
this table. Regressions 1-4 consider the explanatory variables and controls in years closer to the measurement of the 
dependent variable (t-1 to t-4). 
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Table A5-2: The specific impact with period dummies and two-way FE for 1999-2011 period 
Variables WB-INV IMF-STB IFI-SAP IFI-PRS R2 Countries Observations 
Procedural democracy        
Period dummies        
Polity -0.13 -0.59 0.73* 0.97** 0.35 100 2374 
(0.47) (0.17) (0.05) (0.02) 
Executive 0.01 -0.18 0.18 0.41** 0.22 100 2204 
recruitment (0.85) (0.19) (0.15) (0.03) 
   Executive -0.07 -0.11 0.16 0.26 0.25 100 2204 
constraints (0.27) (0.46) (0.27) (0.11) 
   Political competition -0.05 -0.25 0.47*** 0.41* 0.43 100 2204 
(0.59) (0.27) (0.00) (0.05) 
Two-way FE ≥ 1999     
Polity -0.17 -0.30 0.22 0.59 0.05 98 1140 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.16) 
Executive -0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.24 0.04 97 1060 
recruitment (0.81) (0.81) (0.54) (0.15) 
   Executive -0.02 -0.14 0.01 0.22 0.05 97 1060 
constraints (0.79) (0.37) (0.90) (0.16) 
Political competition 0.01 -0.12 0.22** 0.29 0.06 97 1060 
 (0.93) (0.60) (0.04) (0.15)    
Substantive democracy         
Period dummies        
Empowerment -0.02 0.04 0.33* -0.53** 0.13 102 2157 
 (0.82) (0.85) (0.07) (0.05) 
   Freedom of 0.02 0.03 0.09** -0.22*** 0.05 102 2175 
speech (0.36) (0.49) (0.02) (0.00) 
Freedom of assembly -0.00 -0.03 0.07* -0.11 0.10 102 2167 
& association (0.95) (0.54) (0.10) (0.11) 
Workers’ rights 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.15** 0.08 102 2172 
 
(0.51) (0.69) (0.40) (0.03) 
   Two-way FE ≥ 1999     
Empowerment -0.13 0.19 0.35** -0.05 0.21 100 1092 
 (0.20) (0.37) (0.04) (0.86)    
Freedom of 0.00 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.17 100 1095 
speech (0.91) (0.17) (0.81) (0.57)    
Freedom of assembly -0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.11 0.11 100 1095 
& association (0.24) (0.60) (0.12) (0.17) 
Workers’ rights 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.23 100 1094 
(0.76) (0.58) (0.66) (0.92) 
Note: robust p-values (based on standard errors clustered at country level) in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. Estimates based on Table 5-3, regression 5 and regression 6. 
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Table A5-3: Effects on procedural democracy conditional on recipient regime 
Variables Baseline 
Only  
autocracies 
Only  
democracies 
Traditional  
x Polity 
Newer  
x Polity All x Polity 
WB-INV (t-5) -0.21 -0.30 0.01 -0.50 -0.49 
(0.38) (0.33) (0.98) (0.26) (0.24) 
IMF-STB (t-5) -0.31 -2.04** 0.20 -2.12** 
 
-1.95* 
 
(0.44) (0.03) (0.52) (0.04) 
 
(0.05) 
IFI-SAP (t-5) 0.21 -0.03 0.21 -1.02 -0.71 
(0.48) (0.95) (0.53) (0.15) (0.26) 
IFI-PRS (t-5) 0.68* 0.54 0.06 1.85* 1.82* 
(0.10) (0.39) (0.85) (0.08) (0.08) 
WB-INV x  0.02 0.02 
Polity (t-5) (0.37) (0.35) 
IMF-STB x  0.13** 0.11* 
Polity (t-5) (0.04) (0.07) 
IFI-SAP x  
    
0.09* 0.07 
Polity (t-5) (0.08) (0.13) 
IFI-PRS x  -0.10 -0.09 
Polity (t-5) (0.14) (0.16) 
Polity (t-5) -0.03 0.31 0.12 -0.11 -0.06 -0.13 
 (0.65) (0.10) (0.19) (0.13) (0.37) (0.11) 
GDP per capita,  -0.10 0.53 0.33 -0.11 -0.08 -0.14 
log (t-5) (0.90) (0.55) (0.82) (0.90) (0.91) (0.88) 
GDP per capita  -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
change (t-5) (0.61) (0.96) (0.84) (0.69) (0.59) (0.57) 
Urbanization  0.09 0.20 -0.11 0.11 0.11 0.08 
rate (t-5) (0.38) (0.27) (0.25) (0.30) (0.28) (0.46) 
Price level,  -0.15 -0.07 -0.70 -0.22 -0.03 0.01 
log (t-5) (0.76) (0.92) (0.29) (0.63) (0.95) (0.98) 
Trade openness,  -0.71 -0.47 -2.00** -0.67 -0.68 -0.63 
log (t-5) (0.34) (0.64) (0.03) (0.37) (0.37) (0.39) 
Conflict  -0.22 -0.04 -0.74** -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 
intensity (t-5) (0.35) (0.91) (0.04) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36) 
Regional  0.14 -0.50 0.53* 0.19 0.14 0.10 
diffusion (t-5) (0.66) (0.25) (0.06) (0.53) (0.63) (0.75) 
Countries 98 56 66 98 98 98 
Observations 1140 492 648 1140 1140 1140 
R-squared 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Note: robust p-values (based on standard errors clustered at country level) in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. Estimates based on Table 5-3, regression 4 (i.e., country fixed effects, and sample covering the period with 
IFI-PRS fully established as a new lending instrument (1999–2011).  
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Table A5-4: Effects on substantive democracy conditional on donor coordination 
Variables Baseline 
Only WB 
programs 
Only IMF 
programs 
WB x IMF 
interaction 
SAP 
WB x IMF 
interaction 
PRS 
WB x IMF 
interaction 
SAP & PRS 
WB-INV (t-5) 0.02 0.03 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.87) (0.80) 
 
(0.96) (0.95) (0.95) 
IMF-STB (t-5) 0.11 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.26 
(0.63) (0.19) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) 
IFI-SAP (t-5) 0.28 
(0.19) 
IFI-PRS (t-5) -0.12 
(0.69) 
WB-SAP (t-5) 0.26 0.03 0.06 0.03 
(0.18) (0.88) (0.79) (0.90) 
WB-PRS (t-5) 
 
-0.67 
 
-0.64 -0.29 -0.25 
  
(0.14) 
 
(0.16) (0.40) (0.49) 
IMF-SAP (t-5) 0.85*** 0.64* 0.81*** 0.63* 
(0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.09) 
IMF-PRS (t-5) 0.30 0.42 0.44 0.46 
(0.41) (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) 
WB-SAP x  0.21 0.22 
IMF-SAP (t-5) (0.60) (0.58) 
WB-PRS x  -0.45 -0.49 
IMF-PRS (t-5) (0.48) (0.44) 
Empowerment  0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
(t-5) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP per capita,  -0.52 -0.48 -0.47 -0.44 -0.43 -0.44 
log (t-5) (0.31) (0.35) (0.33) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
GDP per capita  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
change (t-5) (0.68) (0.63) (0.68) (0.65) (0.63) (0.64) 
Urbanization  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
rate (t-5) (0.87) (0.87) (0.81) (0.81) (0.80) (0.80) 
Price level,  -0.44 -0.47* -0.37 -0.38 -0.37 -0.38 
log (t-5) (0.12) (0.10) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Trade openness,  -0.35 -0.34 -0.33 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 
log (t-5) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) 
Conflict  -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
intensity (t-5) (0.43) (0.42) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) 
Regional  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
diffusion (t-5) (0.73) (0.69) (0.71) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67) 
Countries 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Observations 2284 2284 2284 2284 2284 2284 
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Note: robust p-values (based on standard errors clustered at country level) in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. Estimates based on Table 5-3, regression 3 (i.e., two-way fixed effects, and sample covering the full period).  
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